Jean E. Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation and the State of Texas, Drott Manufacturing Company and J.I. Case Co.

739 F.2d 1034, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17150

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: October 31, 1984
• Docket: 83-2253
• Status: Published

Opinions

GEE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Jean Welch was injured in the course of her employment as a “seaman” (marine technician) while working on the ferry landing dock at Galveston, Texas. Ms. Welch sued her employer, the Texas Highway Department, and the State of Texas under the Jones Act and also sued the manufacturer of the mobile crane which she asserts contributed to her injury in a products liability suit. The district court, 533 F.Supp. 403, dismissed her Jones Act claim on the ground that the state defendants had not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity-either expressly, by virtue of the state Tort Claims Act, or impliedly, under the Parden doctrine.¹ Ms. Welch appeals the dismissal of her Jones Act claims² and we reverse.

The Eleventh Amendment immunizes an unconsenting state from federal court suits brought by citizens of the United States. A state can consent to suit, however, either expressly — by enacting a statute — or impliedly, by entering into a federally regulated sphere of activity where a private cause of action is provided for the violation of the applicable federal regulatory statute and Congress has expressly provided for that remedy to apply to the states. Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, State of Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, State of Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973). Since we conclude that there has been an express consent, we need not consider any question of an implied one.

The Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity to suit against the State for personal injuries proximately caused by the negligence of any officer or employee acting within the scope of employment if the injury arose from “the operation or use of a motor driven vehicle and motor driven equipment.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 3 (Vernon Supp.1980-81). Section 4 of the Torts Act specifically waives the State’s immunity from suit to the extent of the “liability created by Section 3” and grants permission to all claimants to sue the State of Texas for “all claims arising” under the Act. Section 19 of the Act, however, limits this waiver of immunity by •providing that a governmental unit carrying worker’s compensation is entitled to the privileges and immunities granted by the Workers’ Compensation Act.³ These include immunity from suits for damages under most circumstances. Section 19 reads:

Any governmental unit carrying Workmen’s Compensation Insurance or accepting the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Texas shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities granted by the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Texas to private persons and corporations. (emphasis added).

As of 1969, however, when this statute was enacted, it had long been clear that the state could confer no immunity from federal maritime remedies on “private persons and corporations.” E.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953). No private shipping company, after Pope & Talbot at the latest, could have rationally concluded that by taking out a state workers’ compensation policy on its seamen, it could deprive them of their Jones Act remedies on the ground that state law made the compensation remedy exclusive. That this was the'case was presumedly known, therefore, to the Texas Legislature when it enacted Section 19; for it is a maxim of general application, recognized by Texas courts, that:

“All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.” McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Sup.1942).

Since this is so, we must presume that in consenting to suit against state departments carrying workers’ compensation to the same extent as “private persons and corporations” carrying such coverage could be sued, the Legislature intended the departments to be subject to federal maritime remedies.⁴

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1 . Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964).

2 . The products liability part of the action has been concluded.

3 . The highway department carries workers' compensation insurance under a statute specifically providing for such. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6674s (Vernon 1977). Section 3 of this statute limits employees to this exclusive remedy for injuries sustained while working within the course of their employment.

4 . We recognize that our approach runs the risk of being criticized as overly technical and precious — as the dissent suggests. Despite these possible disadvantages, however, we remain convinced that the best way to ascertain a legislature’s intent is to look to what it has said —and to presume that its statements were made and enacted into law with full understanding of the implications of their language in light of then existing jurisprudence. Any other approach creates what we consider a greater danger than technicality — that of putting this federal court in the position of second-guessing the Texas legislature.

The dissent cites Lyons v. Texas A & M University, 545 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Civ.App.1976 — writ ref’d n.r.e.), as an authoritative state interpretation of the effect of section 19 and notes that Lyons was written by Judge Cire, the District Judge in this case, when he was on the state bench. Lyons does not address the specific construction argument on which we rely today and therefore cannot be read as a governing exposition of state law. More important, Lyons is bottomed on a fundamental misconception of the relative powers of the state and federal governments: it is not true that, as Lyons holds, "the State ... could provide any remedy it wished and limit seamen to that remedy exclusively.” 545 S.W.2d at 59. The proper statement would be that "the State may waive sovereign immunity or decline to do so to whatever extent it likes; but once it has waived immunity, it may not decree that the owners of maritime claims as to which it has done so are limited to the worker’s compensation remedy.” We note that the Texas Supreme Court, in refusing the writ n.r.e. declined to affirm the reasoning underlying the lower court’s opinion. And while we recognize the consistency of the district court’s views, we are not the more persuaded by them.