PER CURIAM:
Javier Portillo (“Portillo”) sued his former employers for unpaid overtime wages in a collective action suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). When Defendants responded that they had no record of his employment, Portillo revealed that he had applied for employment using a fake name and social security number. Defendants then filed a reply asserting summary judgment was appropriate on equitable grounds. Portillo moved to have the class certified with himself as the class representative. The district granted summary judgment, explaining that Portillo was unfit to represent the proposed collective action. Because dismissal of Portillo’s individual claim was not the appropriate remedy for a rejection of his sought-for [278]*278representative role in this collective action, we VACATE and REMAND,
I.
Portillo worked from approximately November 2011 to December 2012 as a general laborer for Defendant Permanent Workers, LLC (“Permanent Workers”), which is owned by Defendant Danny Cepero (“Cepero”). Permanent Workers provided staff for three shipbuilding facilities managed by Defendant Conrad Industries, Inc. (“Conrad”).
Portillo applied for employment under the assumed alias “Felix Serrano," using a fake social security card and state-issued identification.1 While employed by Permanent Workers, he worked at all three shipyards managed by Conrad and allegedly worked 50-hour weeks on a frequent basis. Alongside a number of other similarly situated workers, Portillo alleges that he was never paid overtime of “time-and-half' for his services beyond the 40-hour week. In his sworn declaration, Portillo stated
I was paid $18.00 per hour. For every hour that I worked in excess of forty in any particular work week, I was paid $18.00. On average, I worked approximately fifty hours per week .,,. I know from my conversations with my co-workers that they received approximately $18,00 per hour .... I know for a fact that many of these workers did not receive full overtime compensation.
Following a Department of Labor investigation, Permanent Workers voluntarily sent notice letters to workers it had underpaid, offering the back wages it owed. Por-tillo received a letter, but it was addressed to “Felix Serrano,” and Portillo never responded to it.
Instead, Portillo filed a “Collective Action Complaint” against Defendants, claiming a violation of the FLSA on behalf of himself and others similarly situated.2 He sought unpaid wages, interest, liquidated damages, and attorney fees. Cepero and Permanent Workers responded, arguing inter alia that they had no record of ever having employed-anyone under the name of “Javier Portillo.”3 They argued that Portillo failed to establish the requisite “employment relationship” necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the FLSA, and moved for summary judgment. In response, Portillo admitted for the first time that he had been employed under the identity “Felix Serrano.”4 Defendants responded that Portillo’s admission further supported summary judgment on equitable grounds.5
[279]*279Portillo then filed a motion for conditional certification of the collective action. In support of his motion, Portillo described two of his former Permanent Workers colleagues, Pedro Cruz and Julio Virgen, as prospective collective action members. Portillo argued that Cruz and Virgen were “similarly situated,” justifying conditional certification of the collective action.6 He also asked the district court to authorize notice to other potential plaintiffs who might “opt-in” to the collective action as authorized under the FLSA.7
The district court scheduled a hearing to address Portillo’s motion for conditional certification of the collective action. The scheduled hearing never took place, because the court granted “summary judgment” before the date of the certification hearing. As we read the transcript of the summary judgment hearing, the district court’s decision to dismiss Portillo’s claims rested on its disapproval of the collective action component of his complaint. Specifically, the court observed that Portillo lacked credibility, and that his legal status and identity were unverified,8 The court concluded that it “c[ould] not allow someone who has broken federal law to be the number one person in a class action,” and granted summary judgment. Although the court “dismissed [the case] in its entirety without prejudice,” it indicated that a future suit with a different lead plaintiff— and Portillo as a member of the collective action—-was permissible, Portillo timely appealed.
Because the court’s grant of summary judgment rested on its conclusion that Portillo was unfit to be the lead plaintiff in a collective action,9 we construe the district court’s grant of summary judgment as an implicit denial of conditional certification of Portillo’s proposed collective action.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.10 Under this standard, this Court evaluates whether the party seeking summary judgment has demonstrated that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”11
III.
“[Tjhis court has never set a legal standard for collective-action certification,” but [280]*280we have affirmed at least two approaches.12 Although we do not reach here the application of either standard, the district court will.
The first approach tracks Rule 23, where district courts evaluate FLSA collective actions against the well-established requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.13 The second is the “Lusardi approach,” named for an opinion describing a two-stage certification process.14
During the first .stage of the Lusardi approach,
“[T]he plaintiff moves for conditional certification of his or her collective action. The district court then decides, usually based on the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, whether to provide notice to fellow employees who may be similarly, situated to the named plaintiff, thereby conditionally certifying a collective action,”15
Because plaintiffs seeking conditional certification need not identify other hypothetical collective action members, the stage one standard is considered to be “fairly lenient.”16 The decision whether to conditionally certify “lends itself to ad hoc analysis on a case-by-case basis,”17 but courts typically grant certification.18 Upon grant of conditional certification, “notice of the action should be given to potential class members,”19 allowing them the opportunity to “opt-in” to the collective action.20
In the second stage of the Lusardi approach, “once discovery is complete and [281]
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PER CURIAM:
Javier Portillo (“Portillo”) sued his former employers for unpaid overtime wages in a collective action suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). When Defendants responded that they had no record of his employment, Portillo revealed that he had applied for employment using a fake name and social security number. Defendants then filed a reply asserting summary judgment was appropriate on equitable grounds. Portillo moved to have the class certified with himself as the class representative. The district granted summary judgment, explaining that Portillo was unfit to represent the proposed collective action. Because dismissal of Portillo’s individual claim was not the appropriate remedy for a rejection of his sought-for [278]*278representative role in this collective action, we VACATE and REMAND,
I.
Portillo worked from approximately November 2011 to December 2012 as a general laborer for Defendant Permanent Workers, LLC (“Permanent Workers”), which is owned by Defendant Danny Cepero (“Cepero”). Permanent Workers provided staff for three shipbuilding facilities managed by Defendant Conrad Industries, Inc. (“Conrad”).
Portillo applied for employment under the assumed alias “Felix Serrano," using a fake social security card and state-issued identification.1 While employed by Permanent Workers, he worked at all three shipyards managed by Conrad and allegedly worked 50-hour weeks on a frequent basis. Alongside a number of other similarly situated workers, Portillo alleges that he was never paid overtime of “time-and-half' for his services beyond the 40-hour week. In his sworn declaration, Portillo stated
I was paid $18.00 per hour. For every hour that I worked in excess of forty in any particular work week, I was paid $18.00. On average, I worked approximately fifty hours per week .,,. I know from my conversations with my co-workers that they received approximately $18,00 per hour .... I know for a fact that many of these workers did not receive full overtime compensation.
Following a Department of Labor investigation, Permanent Workers voluntarily sent notice letters to workers it had underpaid, offering the back wages it owed. Por-tillo received a letter, but it was addressed to “Felix Serrano,” and Portillo never responded to it.
Instead, Portillo filed a “Collective Action Complaint” against Defendants, claiming a violation of the FLSA on behalf of himself and others similarly situated.2 He sought unpaid wages, interest, liquidated damages, and attorney fees. Cepero and Permanent Workers responded, arguing inter alia that they had no record of ever having employed-anyone under the name of “Javier Portillo.”3 They argued that Portillo failed to establish the requisite “employment relationship” necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the FLSA, and moved for summary judgment. In response, Portillo admitted for the first time that he had been employed under the identity “Felix Serrano.”4 Defendants responded that Portillo’s admission further supported summary judgment on equitable grounds.5
[279]*279Portillo then filed a motion for conditional certification of the collective action. In support of his motion, Portillo described two of his former Permanent Workers colleagues, Pedro Cruz and Julio Virgen, as prospective collective action members. Portillo argued that Cruz and Virgen were “similarly situated,” justifying conditional certification of the collective action.6 He also asked the district court to authorize notice to other potential plaintiffs who might “opt-in” to the collective action as authorized under the FLSA.7
The district court scheduled a hearing to address Portillo’s motion for conditional certification of the collective action. The scheduled hearing never took place, because the court granted “summary judgment” before the date of the certification hearing. As we read the transcript of the summary judgment hearing, the district court’s decision to dismiss Portillo’s claims rested on its disapproval of the collective action component of his complaint. Specifically, the court observed that Portillo lacked credibility, and that his legal status and identity were unverified,8 The court concluded that it “c[ould] not allow someone who has broken federal law to be the number one person in a class action,” and granted summary judgment. Although the court “dismissed [the case] in its entirety without prejudice,” it indicated that a future suit with a different lead plaintiff— and Portillo as a member of the collective action—-was permissible, Portillo timely appealed.
Because the court’s grant of summary judgment rested on its conclusion that Portillo was unfit to be the lead plaintiff in a collective action,9 we construe the district court’s grant of summary judgment as an implicit denial of conditional certification of Portillo’s proposed collective action.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.10 Under this standard, this Court evaluates whether the party seeking summary judgment has demonstrated that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”11
III.
“[Tjhis court has never set a legal standard for collective-action certification,” but [280]*280we have affirmed at least two approaches.12 Although we do not reach here the application of either standard, the district court will.
The first approach tracks Rule 23, where district courts evaluate FLSA collective actions against the well-established requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.13 The second is the “Lusardi approach,” named for an opinion describing a two-stage certification process.14
During the first .stage of the Lusardi approach,
“[T]he plaintiff moves for conditional certification of his or her collective action. The district court then decides, usually based on the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, whether to provide notice to fellow employees who may be similarly, situated to the named plaintiff, thereby conditionally certifying a collective action,”15
Because plaintiffs seeking conditional certification need not identify other hypothetical collective action members, the stage one standard is considered to be “fairly lenient.”16 The decision whether to conditionally certify “lends itself to ad hoc analysis on a case-by-case basis,”17 but courts typically grant certification.18 Upon grant of conditional certification, “notice of the action should be given to potential class members,”19 allowing them the opportunity to “opt-in” to the collective action.20
In the second stage of the Lusardi approach, “once discovery is complete and [281]*281the employer moves to decertify the collective action, the court must make a factual determination as to whether there are similarly-situated employees who have opted in.”21 At this stage, courts are much less likely to allow the collective action to continue to trial.22 The court may consider: “(1) the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to [defendant] which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) fairness and procedural considerations.”23
Whichever standard a district court applies, this Court reviews its application of that standard for an abuse of discretion.24
IV.
This appeal does not require us to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in implicitly declining to certify Portillo’s proposed collective action. We express no opinion as to the merits of certification of the collective action here, nor do we endorse either standard for evaluating proposed collective actions in FLSA cases like this one.25 Rather, we are compelled to vacate the district court’s dismissal of Portillo’s individual claim for reasons unrelated to the viability of the proposed collective action.
This Court has explained that when a court declines to certify a proposed collective action, it “must dismiss the opt-in employees, leaving only the named plaintiffs original claims.”26 The original plaintiffs then “proceed to trial on their individual claims.”27 Our sister circuits have similarly explained that “[w]hen a collective action is decertified, it reverts to one or more individual actions on behalf of the named plaintiffs.”28
Here, the court could have explicitly ruled on Portillo’s motion for conditional certification of the collective action. If it denied certification, Portillo’s individual action should have proceeded. Alternatively, if the court chose to allow the collective action to proceed with a different lead plaintiff, it should not have dismissed but ought to have allowed counsel to offer another suitable plaintiff to lead the collective action.29 By dismissing Portillo’s indi[282]*282vidual claim without prejudice, it appears that the court intended to effect this result. However, the court erred as a matter of law by dismissing Portillo’s individual claim.
We VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4