Jatinder Singh v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JATINDER SINGH, Case No. 1:25-cv-02006-JLT-EPG-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, 14 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., DENY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS MOOT, AND DIRECT 15 Respondents. RESPONDENTS TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PETITIONER 16 (ECF Nos. 13, 14, 15) 17 18 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 19 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 20 undersigned recommends granting the first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on Count 21 II, denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. 22 I. 24 Petitioner, a citizen of India, last entered the United States on or about December 18, 25 2021. After entry, Petitioner was encountered by U.S. Border Patrol. The petition alleges that 26 after being processed, Petitioner was placed in immigration proceedings under section 240 of the 27 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and was released under an order of release on recognizance by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) for the purpose of continuing 1 his removal proceedings. Since his release, the Petitioner fulfilled the conditions of his release, 2 filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal and protection under the Convention 3 Against Torture before the immigration court. (ECF No. 14 at 4.) 4 Despite Petitioner’s compliance while released, including attending his court hearings in 5 his removal proceedings, Petitioner was re-detained on or around August 27, 2025 at his U.S. 6 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in at their office in Fresno. Prior to re- 7 detaining the Petitioner, Respondents did not provide any written notice and did not assess 8 whether the Petitioner presented a flight risk or danger to the community. Respondents did not 9 provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Petitioner is currently detained at the 10 California City Corrections Center. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) 11 On December 26, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion 12 for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On December 29, 2025, the Court 13 denied the motion for TRO as untimely. (ECF No. 8.) On January 20, 2026, Respondents filed a 14 motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 13.) That same day, Petitioner filed a first amended 15 petition (“FAP”) and motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) On February 12, 16 2026, Respondents filed a response to the FAP and opposition to injunctive relief “for the 17 reasons previously argued in its return and motion to dismiss filed on January 20, 2026.” (ECF 18 No. 19.) On February 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 20.) 19 II. 21 A. Consolidation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction with the Merits 22 In the order setting the briefing schedule, the undersigned indicated that “[f]or purposes 23 of judicial efficiency, it appears to the Court that issuing findings and recommendations on the 24 merits on the FAP pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), which provides that ‘the court may advance the 25 trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing’ on a motion for preliminary injunction, is 26 appropriate.” (ECF No. 18 at 2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2)).) In the motion to dismiss, 27 Respondents “respectfully suggest that should the Court ultimately agree with Petitioner’s 1 a final judgment granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits.” (ECF No. 13 at 2 2.) 3 For purposes of judicial efficiency, the undersigned recommends “advanc[ing] the trial 4 on the merits and consolidat[ing] it with” the motion for preliminary injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 65(a)(2). See Dzhabrailov v. Decker, No. 20-CV-3118 (PMH), 2020 WL 2731966, at *4 6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (considering preliminary injunction and merits of habeas petition 7 simultaneously). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The court shall summarily hear and determine the 8 facts, and dispose of [a petitioner’s habeas petition] as law and justice require.”). 9 B. Procedural Due Process 10 In Count II of the FAP, Petitioner asserts a violation of his procedural due process rights. 11 (ECF No. 14 at 13–15.) “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first 12 asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the 13 State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were 14 constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) 15 (internal citations omitted). 16 1. Liberty Interest 17 Respondents argue that “noncitizens who are not admitted into the United States have 18 ‘only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute,’ and ‘the Due 19 Process Clause provides nothing more.’” (ECF No. 13 at 7 (quoting DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 20 U.S. 103, 140 (2020)).) The Court finds such an argument unpersuasive. Thuraissigiam 21 challenged “restrictions on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain review under the federal 22 habeas statute” that prevented him from “obtain[ing] additional administrative review of his 23 asylum claim and ultimately . . . obtain[ing] authorization to stay in this country.” 591 U.S. at 24 106. Thuraissigiam did not concern a due process challenge to immigration detention. 25 Respondents “ask the Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a broad rule that any inadmissible 26 noncitizen possesses only those due process rights afforded to them by statute, regardless of the 27 nature of their status or the relief they seek. But such a conclusion is untethered to the claim in 1 necessarily constrained to challenges to admissibility to the United States.” Padilla v. U.S. 2 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023), appeal filed, No. 24- 3 2801 (9th Cir. argued May 21, 2025). See Castillo v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01586-JLT-HBK, 4 2025 WL 3466064, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (finding Thuraissigiam “inapposite and 5 reject[ing] Respondents’ argument that ‘entry fiction’ cases guide the analysis for cases not 6 involving an expedited removal process”); J.E.H.G. v. Chesnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 7 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 n.10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (rejecting similar government 8 argument); Carmen G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at 9 *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) (rejecting similar government argument). 10 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 11 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 12 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 13 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 14 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court 15 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior 16 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 17 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 18 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 19 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and 20 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 21 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 22 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The 23 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 24 25 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although 26 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 27 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 1 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who 2 have been released from immigration custody pending civil removal proceedings have a 3 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 4 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK 5 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 6 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran, 7 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez 8 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 9 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8 10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376, 11 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025). 12 “Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 13 authority for all ‘applicants for admission,’ Respondents fail to contend with the liberty interest 14 created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance[.]” Garcia v. 15 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). 16 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest 17 in remaining out of immigration custody. 18 2. Mathews Test 19 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 20 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 21 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 22 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 23 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 24 requirements would entail. 25 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 26 Respondents contend that the “Supreme Court has never used this balancing test to divine 27 the due-process requirements for immigration detention,” citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 1 However, in Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional because under the Due Process 3 Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond hearing at which the government 4 bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,” the panel majority “assume[d] 5 without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the Ninth Circuit has “regularly 6 applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding “Mathews 7 remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the 8 immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent 9 “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 10 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there was a due process 11 violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See Rocha Chavarria v. 12 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 13 (“Many district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that non-citizens paroled into the United 14 States pursuant to § 1182(d)(5) have a liberty interest in their continued release, entitling them to 15 certain due process protections, the extent of which are determined by applying the test provided 16 in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).”); J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108, at *10–11 17 (finding “liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on 18 recognizance” and “[t]hus, the Court must evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. 19 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) 20 that have been applied to Petitioner are sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue”). Based 21 on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Mathews test is appropriate in this instance. 22 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue is 23 fundamental. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it “is beyond dispute” an immigration 24 detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the 25 ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 26 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 27 With respect to the second factor, “‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is 1 hearing.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, 2 No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025)). “Civil 3 immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a 4 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25- 5 cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (alteration in 6 original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner’s release on recognizance necessarily 7 required a determination that he posed neither a flight risk nor a danger. Rocha Chavarria, 2025 8 WL 3533606, at *4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 9 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025)); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 10 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The federal government sometimes releases noncitizens on bond or 11 parole while their removal proceedings are pending. Release reflects a determination by the 12 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”), aff’d sub 13 nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). Respondents do not argue that 14 Petitioner is now a flight risk or a danger to the community. “[A]s there have been no procedural 15 safeguards to determine if petitioner’s re-detention is justified, ‘the probable value of additional 16 procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.’” Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427- 17 KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3167826, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting A.E., 2025 WL 18 1424382, at *5). 19 With respect to the third and final factor, “although the government has a strong interest 20 in enforcing the immigration laws, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a 21 hearing is ‘low.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 22 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094). See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22- 23 cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government 24 has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued 25 removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 26 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). Courts generally have found that the cost of 27 providing a custody hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this 1 administratively burdensome. See J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (“In immigration court, 2 custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” (citing Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 3 1094)). 4 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond 5 hearing and “[t]hat hearing should have occurred before petitioner was re-detained.” Carmen 6 G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7 8, 2025). 8 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 9 deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. 10 Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that 11 the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty ....”). Courts typically require evidence 12 of urgent concerns or an especially strong government interest to justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 13 1983677, at *9; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to 14 the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental 15 interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations 16 omitted)). 17 Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7. 18 At such a pre-deprivation hearing, the government bears the burden of proving by clear 19 and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk such that re- 20 detention is warranted. See Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (“On balance, the Mathews 21 factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing where the government must prove that 22 she is a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence.”); J.E.H.G. v. 23 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 24 (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by the government that the 25 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government that 26 initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of 27 providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 1 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has demonstrated that he has a strong liberty interest in 2 remaining out of custody, that the risk of erroneous deprivation will be meaningfully reduced by 3 requiring notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and that the 4 governmental burden in providing such procedure is quite minimal. Accordingly, the 5 undersigned recommends granting the FAP on Count II.1 6 C. Appropriate Relief 7 Courts in this district have taken differing approaches to the relief granted to petitioners 8 who have been released, subsequently re-detained, and denied bond hearings in violation of due 9 process. In some cases, the immediate release of the petitioner has been ordered. See, e.g., 10 Yurani Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 11 2025) (ordering immediate release of petitioner who had been released from immigration 12 detention on parole, was arrested for theft but the case was resolved with community service and 13 did not result in a conviction, and was re-detained at a routine six-month check-in); Carmen 14 G.C., 2025 WL 3521304 (ordering immediate release of petitioner who allegedly violated 15 reporting requirements four times); Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606 (ordering immediate 16 release of petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not identified and 17 where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for petitioner’s re- 18 detention). 19 In other cases, bond hearings have been ordered rather than immediate release. See, e.g., 20 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 21 reporting requirements numerous times and was re-detained based on said violations); Paz 22 Aguilera v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01619 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3485016 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025) 23 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements one time and 24 was re-detained based on said violation); Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826 (ordering bond hearing 25 for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements eight times). 26 /// 27 1 In light of this conclusion, and given that Respondents have failed to respond to Petitioner’s other 1 Here, Respondents do not allege, and there is nothing in the record before this Court, that 2 Petitioner violated his conditions of release. Respondents do not contend that Petitioner is a 3 danger or flight risk. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s immediate release is the 4 appropriate remedy. 7 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 8 1. The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 14) be GRANTED on 9 Count II. 10 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) be DENIED. 11 3. Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 15) be DENIED as moot. 12 4. Respondents be directed to immediately release Petitioner from custody with the same 13 conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his re-detention on August 27, 2025. 14 5. Respondents be enjoined and restrained from re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance 15 with constitutional protections, which include at a minimum, predeprivation notice of at 16 least seven days before a predeprivation hearing at which the government will bear the 17 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to flee or pose 18 a danger to the community if not arrested. 19 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 20 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 21 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 22 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 23 written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 24 serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 25 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 26 within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 27 Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 1 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 Dated: _ February 17, 2026 [spe ey — 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28