1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jason C Redditt, No. CV-25-00030-TUC-AMM (BGM)
10 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
11 v.
12 M. Gutierrez,
13 Respondent. 14 15 On January 21, 2025, Petitioner Jason C. Redditt, who is currently incarcerated with 16 the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and housed at the United States Penitentiary in 17 Tucson, Arizona (USP-Tucson), filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 18 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Redditt raises multiple grounds for relief in his petition, 19 alleging that Bureau officials acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner to deprive him of 20 his good conduct time. (Id. at 6.) Redditt requests that the Court excuse him from the 21 PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, find that Bureau officials acted in an arbitrary and 22 capricious manner to impermissibly find him guilty of a jailhouse violation, and order the 23 Bureau to restore 41 days of lost good conduct time. (Id. at 7.) 24 Under LRCiv 72.1 and 72.2, Redditt’s petition was referred to Magistrate Judge 25 Bruce G. Macdonald for a report and recommendation. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Upon review of 26 the parties’ briefs and relevant documentary evidence, the Magistrate Judge recommends 27 that the District Judge, after her independent review, deny Redditt’s petition and dismiss 28 with prejudice this case. 1 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 2 Jason Redditt is currently serving an aggregate 845-month term of imprisonment 3 for various federal crimes, including carjacking and firearm offenses. (Doc. 16-1 at 11- 4 12.) Redditt has been housed at USP-Tucson since December 22, 2020, (id. at 17), and is 5 projected to be released from Bureau custody on September 20, 2060, (id. at 10). 6 On February 16, 2024, Bureau Special Investigative Services (SIS) technician 7 Baeza intercepted an incoming certified mail package addressed to inmate Redditt. (Id. at 8 27, 30.) The technician then performed a NIK2 test on a sheet of paper from the package, 9 which tested positive for morphine. (Id. at 30-31.) Based on the positive NIK test results, 10 another SIS technician, technician Islas, initiated an investigation. (Id. at 27.) 11 The investigation revealed that Redditt was in contact with a former Bureau inmate 12 via email and telephone. (Id.) On February 6, 2024, Redditt had emailed the former inmate 13 and mentioned he was waiting on a motion from the former inmate for a sentence reduction. 14 (Doc. 16-4 at 5.) Two days later, the former inmate confirmed that he sent the motion and 15 exhibits via certified mail to the institution the previous night. (Id.) SIS corroborated that 16 the package was sent via certified mail on February 7, 2024, the same day the former inmate 17 claimed. (Doc. 16-1 at 24.) The return address on the package listed the former inmate’s 18 full name and former federal inmate registration number. (Id.) On February 28, 2024, 19 Redditt phoned the former inmate to inform him that he was placed in the Special Housing 20 Unit (SHU) because of the package he received from the former inmate. (Id.) 21 On April 2, 2024, technician Islas authored Incident Report No. 3917560. (Doc. 22 16-1 at 27.) Redditt received a copy of the report the following day. (Id.) Lieutenant 23 Karlan, the investigating officer, advised Redditt of his rights concerning the disciplinary 24 25 1 The information in the background section is given in the light most favorable to Redditt. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2010) (reciting facts in light favorable 26 to petitioner). 2 Narcotics Identification Kit. See Torres v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:19-CV-2015 27 DB P, 2020 WL 469347, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020) (“[P]laintiff was charged with 28 possession of narcotics after a NIK (Narcotics Identification Kit) tested positive on pieces of cardstock found in plaintiff’s property.”). 1 process and Redditt was given an opportunity to make a statement. (Id. at 29.) Redditt 2 declined to make a statement or present evidence at that time. (Id.) Following the 3 investigation, the Bureau charged Redditt with attempted introduction of drugs/alcohol, 4 criminal mail abuse, and criminal phone abuse. (Id. at 27.) Lieutenant Karlan then referred 5 the matter to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) for further processing. (Id. at 29.) 6 On April 5, 2024, the UDC conducted a hearing of the incident in question. (Id. at 7 28.) During the hearing, Redditt requested that his phone calls starting back from 8 December be reviewed again and asserted the calls were based on his sentence reduction 9 and that there was no talk or code about the introduction of drugs. (Id.) Based on the 10 evidence, the UDC referred the incident to the DHO for further consideration. (Id.) The 11 same day, Redditt signed copies of a Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the DHO and 12 Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing forms. (Id. at 40-41, 44.) 13 On June 6, 2024, DHO Padgett conducted a discipline hearing. (Id. at 22-26.) 14 Redditt was present at the hearing along with his designated staff representative Unit 15 Manager Stangl. (Id. at 22.) After being advised of the charges against him and his due 16 process rights, Redditt denied the charges and provided a written statement. (Id. at 23, 33- 17 34.) In the statement, Redditt asserted that he had been working with a former Bureau 18 inmate since December 2023, preparing a motion for compassionate release. (Id. at 33.) 19 Redditt stated he instructed the former inmate to send the motion via certified mail because 20 “games are played with the regular mail.” (Id.) Redditt admitted he vented his frustrations 21 to the former inmate on the phone because he was accused of something he would never 22 do. (Id. at 34.) Redditt also claimed that the phone calls and emails used in the incident 23 report were made to look like he was attempting to introduce drugs, while the calls, if 24 listened to in their entirety, would not reflect that he engaged in criminal activity. (Id.) 25 At the hearing, Redditt also submitted a written inmate-witness statement. (Id. at 26 23, 39.) The inmate asserted that he was present on March 7, 2024, when Reddit also 27 received legal mail. (Id. at 39.) The witness testified that, on that date, Redditt repeatedly 28 told staff they could keep the original document if they made a copy for him. (Id.) 1 Unit Manager Stangl, Redditt’s designated staff representative, also provided a 2 statement at the discipline hearing. (Id. at 22.) Stangl stated that she listened to phone 3 calls pertaining to the investigation at Redditt’s request. (Id.) She confirmed that Redditt 4 had been receiving calls since December 2023, concerning his legal paperwork. (Id.) 5 Stangl also provided a separate statement to the DHO in which she asserted she had listened 6 to the phone calls outlined in the incident report and that they were consistent with section 7 11 of the report. (Id.) Section 11 of the incident report states, in pertinent part: 8 On February 28, 2024, Reddit completed a phone call to [redacted] phone 9 number [redacted]. During the phone call, Redditt told [redacted] that he is 10 housed in the Special Housing Unit due to the article of mail he received from [redacted]. He further advised [redacted] that the article of mail had 11 [redacted] full name and his BOP registration number, in which gave SIS 12 staff all the information needed to correlate it with the outside caller sending the drugs. Redditt further stated, I would have never tried getting drugs under 13 my name. 14 15 (Doc. 16-1 at 27.) 16 After consideration and a thorough review of the evidence, DHO Padgett found that 17 Redditt committed the prohibited act of attempted introduction of drugs. (Id. at 24-25.) 18 DHO Padgett also found that Redditt did not commit the other charged prohibited acts of 19 criminal mail abuse and criminal phone abuse because the charges were largely duplicative 20 of the attempted introduction charge. (Id. at 25.) In reaching his findings, the DHO relied 21 on the information in the incident report, the NIK test, a staff memorandum, the SIS 22 investigation, the inmate-witness statement, Redditt’s witness statement, the staff 23 representative statement, and photo evidence forms. (Id. at 24.) As a result of the culpable 24 finding associated with the drug violation, DHO Padgett imposed the following sanctions 25 against Redditt: (a) 41 days loss of good conduct time; (b) 180 days loss of personal 26 telephone privileges; and (c) 180 days loss of personal email privileges. (Id. at 25.) 27 The day after the hearing, Redditt received a copy of the DHO’s report, which 28 included his written findings and conclusions. (Id. at 26.) The report also detailed the 1 reasons for the sanctions against Redditt. (Id. at 25-26.) Redditt was advised of his right 2 to appeal the DHO’s findings and conclusions within twenty (20) calendar days through 3 the administrative remedy procedure. (Id. at 26.) 4 On January 21, 2025, Redditt filed the petition at hand. (Doc. 1.) On August 20, 5 2025, the Bureau filed its return and answer. (Doc. 16.) On October 9, 2025, Redditt filed 6 his reply. (Doc. 20.) While Redditt’s petition was pending, he also filed a motion for leave 7 to file declaration, a proposed declaration, a second motion for temporary restraining order, 8 a motion for entry of default, and a motion to expand the record. (Docs. 21, 22, 25, 26, 9 28.3) This Report and Recommendation follows. 10 LEGAL STANDARD 11 A district court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner is in custody in “violation 12 of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 13 Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence are filed under § 2255 in the 14 sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a 15 sentence’s execution are brought under § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v. 16 Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). An inmate may obtain relief under § 2241 17 for the loss of good time credits if the prison disciplinary proceeding did not comply with 18 due process of law. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on 19 other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). This is 20 because the loss of good time credits may affect the duration of the inmate’s confinement. 21 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (ruling that inmates’ suit seeking 22 restoration of good time credits was “within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very 23 duration of their physical confinement”). A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he 24 is being held contrary to constitutional mandates by a preponderance of the evidence. 25 Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 26 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 28 3 The Court addresses these motions at the end of its analysis. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Redditt brings his § 2241 petition raising three grounds for habeas relief. (Doc. 1 3 at 6.) He contends that: (i) DHO Padgett’s finding was not supported by adequate evidence; 4 (ii) Bureau officials made the inmate grievance procedure unavailable to him; and (iii) Unit 5 Manager Stangl, and all others associated with the investigation and discipline hearing of 6 his incident report, used a capricious discipline proceeding to deprive him of good conduct 7 time. (Id.) Redditt requests that the Court “excuse him from the PLRA,” find that Bureau 8 officials engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct during his appeal, find that technician 9 Islas filed a misleading report, and order the Bureau to restore his good conduct time. (Id. 10 at 7.) While the Court finds that the Bureau fails to demonstrate available administrative 11 remedies and waives the prudential exhaustion requirement, it concludes that the DHO’s 12 finding was supported by sufficient evidence, an unavailable grievance procedure fails to 13 constitute a due process violation, it lacks the authority to evaluate the credibility of 14 disciplinary witnesses, and Redditt was provided with an impartial DHO. The Court also 15 finds that none of Redditt’s post-petition motions entitle him to injunctive or habeas relief. 16 Redditt’s petition should therefore be denied and this case dismissed. 17 I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 18 “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 19 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 20 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). If a petitioner fails to exhaust 21 prudentially required administrative remedies, courts are instructed to either dismiss the 22 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner exhausts his remedies. 23 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). 24 However, an inmate is “required to exhaust only available remedies,” Albino v. 25 Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated in part on other grounds by Perttu 26 v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 475 (2025), and administrative remedies may be functionally 27 unavailable where: (i) the administrative procedure operates as a dead end—with officers 28 unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates; (ii) an administrative scheme is so 1 opaque that it becomes incapable of use; or (iii) prison administrators thwart inmates from 2 taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 3 intimidation, Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016). This list is non-exhaustive and 4 there are other limited circumstances that render administrative remedies unavailable, 5 including the failure of prison officials to properly process a prisoner’s timely filed 6 grievance. Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2017). Because failure 7 to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, it is the defendant’s burden 8 to prove that there was an available administrative remedy that the prisoner did not exhaust. 9 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Once the defendant has carried that burden, the burden shifts to 10 the prisoner to come forward with evidence “showing that there is something in his 11 particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 12 effectively unavailable to him.” Id. 13 A. Prudential Exhaustion Requirement Waived 14 The Court interprets Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief both as an assertion 15 that administrative remedies were unavailable to him in the administrative exhaustion 16 context and as a separate substantive ground for habeas relief. (See Doc. 1 at 6.) 17 In ground two of the petition, Redditt asserts that his due process rights were 18 violated during his appeal of the DHO’s decision because the Bureau’s Regional and 19 Central Offices allegedly engaged in conduct that made the inmate grievance procedure 20 unavailable. (Id.) Redditt supports the assertion with reference to section 12 of Bureau 21 Program Statement 1330.18 and 28 C.F.R. § 542.18, (id.), which provide guidance on 22 Bureau response time to inmate grievance requests and appeals, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.18; 23 Bureau Program Statement 1330.18.4 Redditt states that he accepted the “Regional 24 Office’s non-response in the time allotted (30 days) as a denial” and filed his BP-11 to the 25 Central Office. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Redditt then asserts that the Central Office rejected his BP- 26 11 “to try to cure the Regional Office’s default/due process violation and [backdated] their 27
28 4 United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Remedy Program (2014), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1330_018.pdf. 1 response.” (Id.) 2 The Bureau, on the other hand, limits its response to Redditt’s second ground for 3 habeas relief to asserting that the claim is inactionable. (See Doc. 16 at 13.) As it concerns 4 Redditt’s contention that administrative remedies were unavailable to him in the exhaustion 5 context, the Bureau responds by dropping a footnote denying the allegation and asserting 6 that the “record shows that [it] afforded [Redditt] extended deadlines as well as remarks on 7 how to submit a proper appeal.” (Id. at n.2.) By interpreting Redditt’s petition too 8 narrowly, however, the Bureau abandons its burden of demonstrating there was an 9 available administrative remedy that Redditt failed to exhaust. (See id.) 10 While the Bureau includes a summary of Redditt’s grievance history as it concerns 11 his habeas claims, (see Doc. 16 at 6-8), it fails to link the summary to any cogent argument 12 that Redditt failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, (see id.). It is not 13 the Court’s responsibility to sift through the Bureau’s brief and exhibits and construct a 14 failure to exhaust argument, see Indep. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 15 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (reiterating that the court cannot manufacture a party’s arguments 16 and that a “bare assertion of an issue does not preserve a claim”), and the Bureau’s footnote 17 is insufficient to meet its burden to demonstrate there was an available administrative 18 remedy that Redditt failed to exhaust, see Albino, 747 F.3d at 1176 (concluding that 19 defendants failed to carry their initial burden of proving their affirmative exhaustion 20 defense). The Court therefore waives the prudential exhaustion requirement and proceeds 21 to the merits of Redditt’s petition. 22 II. Due Process Requirements In Disciplinary Hearings 23 Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner is entitled to 24 certain due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation. Wolff v. 25 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974). “Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is 26 satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence 27 relied on by the prison officials and the reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. 28 Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The inmate also has a limited 1 right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence “when permitting him to do so 2 would not unduly threaten institutional safety and goals.” Id. Finally, “[f]indings that 3 result in the loss of liberty will satisfy due process if there is some evidence which supports 4 the decisions of the disciplinary board.” (Id.) 5 A. “Some Evidence” Standard 6 In Redditt’s first ground for habeas relief, he asserts that the DHO’s disciplinary 7 finding was “not supported by adequate evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Redditt adds that the 8 incident report was drafted in a misleading manner to give the appearance of misconduct. 9 (Id.) Redditt asks the Court to find that the incident report was created using exaggerations, 10 misstatements, and concealed material facts, and that the Court restore his good conduct 11 time. (Id. at 7.) The Court finds that the “some evidence” standard has been satisfied and 12 that Redditt’s first ground for habeas relief should be denied. 13 Ascertaining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied “does not require 14 examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or 15 weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence 16 in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Lane v. 17 Salazar, 911 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 18 455-56 (1985)). This standard is “minimally stringent,” and “evidence only must bear 19 some indicia of reliability to be considered some evidence.” Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 20 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence may also qualify as some evidence even “if it does 21 not logically preclude any conclusion but the one reached.” Id. A prison administrative 22 decision may be overturned only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have found the inmate 23 guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.” Diaz v. Gunther, No. CV 24- 24 03210, 2025 WL 4051894, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2025) (citing Henderson v. U.S. Parole 25 Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994)). 26 B. Some Evidence Supports Disciplinary Finding 27 Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the DHO’s finding that 28 Redditt attempted to introduce drugs into the institution. The record indicates that: (i) 1 Redditt initiated email contact with a former inmate asking the inmate to send him mail, 2 (Doc. 16-4 at 5); (ii) Redditt previously instructed the former inmate to only send him 3 certified mail, (Doc. 16-1 at 33); (iii) the former inmate indicated he would be sending the 4 mail certified, (Doc. 16-4 at 5); (iv) the former inmate confirmed he sent the information 5 via certified mail on February 7, 2024, (id.); (v) Bureau officials intercepted and tested the 6 mail for narcotics, (Doc. 16-1 at 30-32); (vi) paper in the mail tested positive for morphine, 7 (id. at 30); (vii) Redditt called and complained to the former inmate that he was sent to the 8 SHU for attempting to introduce drugs, (id. at 27); (viii) during the call, Redditt advised 9 the former inmate that the inmate included his full name and former registration number in 10 the return address, which gave SIS staff all the information needed to correlate it with the 11 outside caller sending drugs, (id.); and (ix) during the call, Redditt vented to the former 12 inmate that he would never have tried to obtain drugs using his own name, (id.). This 13 evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” standard, and Redditt’s first 14 ground for habeas relief should be denied. 15 III. No Due Process Violation For Unavailable Grievance Procedure 16 As previously mentioned, Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief is based on the 17 assertion that his due process rights were violated during the grievance appeal process by 18 Bureau officials who made the grievance procedure unavailable to him. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 19 Redditt asserts the officials violated their own program statement by rejecting his grievance 20 appeal in an attempt to cure their own procedural mistakes. (Id.) The Court finds that even 21 if Bureau officials violated their own program statement by failing to respond to Redditt’s 22 grievance appeals in a timely manner, such violations fail to constitute valid grounds upon 23 which a § 2241 habeas petition may be granted,5 and Redditt’s second ground for habeas 24 relief should be denied.
25 5 This is not to say that an obfuscated administrative grievance procedure will preclude a 26 prisoner from bringing a § 2241 habeas petition. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (cleaned up) (“When rules are so confusing that no reasonable prisoner can use 27 them, then they're no longer available.”). Rather, an unavailable prison grievance 28 procedure, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground for § 2241 habeas relief. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly concluded that a failure by the Bureau to follow 2 its own program statements is not a cognizable ground for § 2241 habeas relief. See, e.g., 3 Martin v. United States, No. 23-4037, 2025 WL 1662682, at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2025) 4 (citing Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“[A]ny claim that the 5 B[ureau] violated its own program statements is not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas 6 petition.”). It has also instructed that a prisoner’s claim that Bureau officials “added 7 things” to an appeal to “mask [its] procedural errors” fails to establish the deprivation of a 8 liberty interest because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific 9 prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief should therefore be denied. 11 IV. Redditt Provided With Unbiased Decisionmaker 12 Redditt’s third ground for habeas relief is based on the assertion that Bureau staff 13 associated with the investigation of the incident report and discipline hearing used a 14 capricious disciplinary proceeding to deprive him of his good time credits. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 15 Redditt adds that Unit Manager Stangl, who was supposed to help him obtain and present 16 evidence before and during the disciplinary hearing, actually helped technician Islas and 17 the DHO find him guilty based on inadequate facts. (Id.) Redditt contends that Stangl also 18 failed to report employee conduct violations by all officers involved. (Id.) 19 The Court finds that to the extent Redditt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 20 upon which he was found to be culpable, it has already concluded that the DHO’s finding 21 was based on sufficient evidence. The Court also finds that to the extent Redditt alleges 22 Bureau personnel, separate from the DHO, were biased in their participation of the 23 disciplinary process, the Court is not required to independently assess the credibility of 24 witnesses to ensure the proceeding comported with due process requirements. See Lane, 25 911 F.3d at 951 (ruling that the “some evidence” standard does not require “independent 26 assessment of the credibility of witnesses”). Finally, the Court concludes that Redditt fails 27 to demonstrate that the DHO was a victim, witness, investigator, or otherwise significantly 28 involved in the incident; that the DHO relied on knowledge outside the prison disciplinary 1 proceedings to make his findings; or that the DHO displayed deep-seated and unequivocal 2 antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b) (“The 3 DHO will be an impartial decision maker who was not a victim, witness, investigator, or 4 otherwise significantly involved in the incident.”); Burgess v. Rios, No. 1:12-CV-00544, 5 2015 WL 3402933, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2015) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 6 46-47 (1975)) (“There is a presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of decision 7 makers which may be overcome by evidence of a risk of actual bias or prejudgment based 8 on special facts and circumstances.”); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) 9 (instructing that bias is shown only when a decisionmaker “relies upon knowledge outside 10 the prison disciplinary proceedings” or displays “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism 11 that would render fair judgment impossible”). Redditt’s third ground for habeas relief 12 should therefore be denied and the petition dismissed in its entirety. 13 V. Miscellaneous Motions 14 Redditt filed a number of motions after his petition was fully briefed and pending 15 resolution. (See Docs. 21, 25, 26, 28.) The Court addresses these motions in turn. 16 A. Motion to Add Declaration 17 On October 24, 2025, nine months after Redditt filed his petition and fifteen days 18 after he filed his reply, Redditt filed a Motion to Add Petitioner’s Declaration and a 19 proposed lodged Declaration. (Docs. 21, 22.) In the motion, Redditt requests that the Court 20 allow the declaration to be added to his petition “along with exhibit (F) of memorandum 21 of law.” (Doc. 21 at 1.) Notably, the motion fails to include an Exhibit F or a memorandum 22 of law. (See generally id.) Moreover, Redditt’s declaration proclaims his innocence and 23 reiterates the arguments made in his petition. (See Doc. 22.) 24 “The abuse of the writ doctrine forbids the reconsideration of claims that were or 25 could have been raised in a prior habeas petition.” Eldridge v. Howard, 70 F.4th 543, 551 26 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the doctrine, “a 27 successive petition that raises identical grounds for relief as a prior petition must be 28 dismissed unless the petitioner can show (1) cause for bringing a successive petition and 1 that prejudice would result or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result 2 from failure to entertain the claim.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th 3 Cir. 2011). Redditt’s declaration raises identical grounds for relief as his initial petition 4 and Redditt fails to demonstrate cause for bringing the successive motion and that prejudice 5 or a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failing to entertain his claims. 6 (See Docs. 21, 22.) Even if the Court were to consider the claims in Redditt’s declaration, 7 nothing in the declaration alters the Court’s findings and recommendations concerning his 8 petition. Redditt’s motion to add declaration should therefore be denied. 9 B. Second Motion For Temporary Restraining Order 10 On December 9, 2025, shortly after District Judge Martinez denied his first motion 11 for temporary restraining order, (see Doc. 24), Redditt filed a letter with the Court, which 12 the Court interprets as a second motion for temporary restraining order, (see Doc. 25). In 13 his motion, Redditt requests that the Court order the Bureau to deliver to him family 14 pictures and religious books that were sent to the institution, a declaration allegedly sent 15 by the former Bureau inmate who mailed Redditt the illegal narcotics for which he was 16 disciplined, to resend a motion for compassionate release that allegedly never made it to 17 the intended recipient, to unblock certain family members from contacting him, and to 18 comply with other requests for injunctive relief. (See Doc. 25.) The Court finds that 19 Redditt requests relief that is not of the same character as the relief that may be granted 20 finally and recommends that his second motion for temporary restraining order be denied. 21 A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) must satisfy the same legal 22 standard governing preliminary injunctions, including establishing each of the following 23 elements: (i) a likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) a likelihood of irreparable injury if 24 injunctive relief is not granted, (iii) a balance of hardships favoring the moving party, and 25 (iv) an advancement of the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 26 7, 20 (2008). For a prisoner to be entitled to a TRO or a preliminary injunction, “there 27 must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and 28 the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. 1 Queens Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). This relationship is established 2 where the TRO would grant “relief of the same character as that which may be granted 3 finally.” Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). 4 Absent such a relationship or nexus, district courts lack authority to grant emergency 5 injunctive relief. Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636; see also LA All. for Hum. Rts. 6 v. Cnty. of L.A., 14 F.4th 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted) (explaining that a district court may grant injunctive relief only on “the merits of 8 the case or controversy before it, and does not have the authority to issue an injunction 9 based on claims not pled in the complaint”). 10 Here, Redditt’s second motion for temporary restraining order is unrelated to the 11 factual allegations and legal claims outlined in his § 2241 habeas petition. (Compare Doc. 12 1 at 6-7 with Doc. 25 at 1-4.) Moreover, the relief that Redditt seeks in his second TRO is 13 not of the same character that which may be granted finally, which is the restoration of his 14 good conduct time. (See Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent Redditt seeks injunctive relief to 15 receive a declaration from the former inmate who sent him illegal drugs, he fails to argue, 16 much less demonstrate, that he satisfies any of the requisite Winter factors. (See Doc. 25.) 17 Redditt also fails to support his allegations with an affidavit as required by Federal Rule of 18 Civil Procedure 65(b)(1). As such, the Court lacks the authority to grant Redditt’s second 19 motion for injunctive relief and his request should be denied. 20 C. Declaration for Entry of Default 21 On December 9, 2025, the same day he filed his second TRO motion, Redditt filed 22 a Declaration for Entry of Default. (Doc. 26.) In the declaration, Redditt asserts that “more 23 than 20 days” have passed since the Bureau was served with a copy of his reply and it has 24 failed to “answer or otherwise defend as [to his] response.” (Id. at 1.) Redditt adds that 25 the Bureau is not “in the military service” and is not an “infant[ ] or incompetent[ ].” (Id. 26 at 2.) The Bureau responded six days later, informing Redditt that it was neither authorized 27 nor required to file a sur-reply to his reply and requesting that his motion for entry of default 28 1 be denied. (Doc. 27.) The Court agrees with the Bureau and recommends that Redditt’s 2 declaration for entry of default be denied. 3 “Default may be entered when a party has failed to plead or otherwise defend an 4 action.” Cowen v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. CIV 10-452, 2010 WL 3342196, at *1 (D. Ariz. 5 Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). “However, default cannot be entered unless 6 documentation establishes that a defendant has been served with a summons and complaint 7 (or has agreed to waive service), the time allowed for responding has expired, and 8 defendant has failed to file a pleading or motion permitted by law.” Cowen, 2010 WL 9 3342196, at *1 (citation omitted). The term “otherwise defend” is understood to include 10 motions attacking service, motions to dismiss, motions for bills of particulars, or motions 11 for summary judgment. Id. 12 The Court’s June 24, 2025 Service Order instructs the Bureau to answer Redditt’s 13 petition “within 20 days of the date of service,” and allows Redditt an optional “30 days 14 from the date of service of the answer” to file a reply. (Doc. 10 at 3.) There is no provision 15 in the District of Arizona’s Local Rules or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permitting 16 a party opposing a § 2241 petition to file a sur-reply. See Burgess v. Shinn, No. CV-21- 17 01164, 2022 WL 2341218, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2022) (“[N]either the Federal Rules of 18 Civil Procedure nor the District’s Local Rules entitle a party to a sur-reply as a matter of 19 right.”) In fact, “sur-replies are highly disfavored and permitted only in extraordinary 20 circumstances.” Finley v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. CV-14-02609, 2016 WL 21 777700, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 29, 2016). Redditt’s declaration for entry of default should 22 therefore be denied. 23 D. Motion to Expand Record 24 On March 13, 2026, Redditt filed a Motion to Expand Record Pursuant to Rule 7 of 25 the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. (Doc. 28.) 26 In the motion, Redditt expands on the same grounds for relief offered in his initial petition 27 and raises new arguments in an attempt to demonstrate that the prison disciplinary 28 proceedings violated his due process rights. (See id. at 11-25.) Redditt also includes 1 exhibits that have already been considered or have been rejected by the Court. (See Doc. 2 28-1 at 1-16.) Redditt’s motion to expand the record should be denied. 3 “The Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings are applicable to petitions for writs 4 of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Muktar v. Gurule, No. CV-16-4028, 2017 WL 5 2414574, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2017) (citing Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 6 2254 Cases). Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides: 7 (a) In General. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the 8 parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the 9 petition. The judge may require that these materials be authenticated.
10 (b) Types of Materials. The materials that may be required include letters 11 predating the filing of the petition, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also 12 be submitted and considered as part of the record. 13 (c) Review by the Opposing Party. The judge must give the party against 14 whom the additional materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny 15 their correctness. 16 17 SECT 2254 Rule 7. “The purpose of Rule 7 is to enable the judge to dispose of some 18 habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for 19 an evidentiary hearing.” Williams v. Schriro, 423 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2006) 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 21 Here, there is no need to expand the record because the grounds for relief outlined 22 in Redditt’s petition are without merit and an evidentiary hearing is not necessary since the 23 existing record is sufficient to resolve Redditt’s claims. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 423 F. 24 Supp. 2d 994, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“[E]xpansion [of the record] is not warranted under 25 Rule 7 because the exhibits are not relevant.”); cf. Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580, 2007 26 WL 2808220, at *26 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007) (“Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the 27 AEDPA, limits a petitioner’s ability to present new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to 28 expand the record.”). The exhibits Redditt offers have already been considered by the 1 || Court in recommending the denial of his petition and the denial of his request to add a 2|| declaration. Redditt’s motion to expand record should therefore be denied. 3 RECOMMENDATION 4 For the aforementioned reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District || Judge, after her independent review, enter an order DENYING the Petition for a Writ of 6|| Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1); DENYING the Motion to Add || Petitioner’s Declaration (Doc. 21); DENYING the Declaration in Support of Temporary 8 || Restraining Order (Doc. 25); DENYING the Declaration for Entry of Default (Doc. 26); 9|| DENYING the Motion to Expand Record (Doc. 28); and DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil 11 || Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) || days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, and a party may 13 || respond to another party’s objections within (14) days after being served with a copy. No 14]| replies shall be filed unless leave is granted by the District Judge. If objections are filed, 15} the parties should use the following case number: CV-25-30-TUC-AMM. Failure to file timely objections to any of the Magistrate Judge’s factual or legal determinations may 17 || result in waiver of the right of de novo review. 18 19 Dated this 27th day of March, 2026. 20
22 Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 73 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28
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