SIMONETT, Justice.
An employee who was bumped from his job by reason of the seniority provision in his collective bargaining agreement seeks review of a denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Finding that the legislature has chosen not to discard the “constructive voluntary quit” rule, we affirm.
Relator John R. Jansen, a member of the Electrical Workers Union Local 110, was employed for about a year by respondent Peoples Electric Company, Inc. Under the union contract, Jansen was a probationary, nonseniority employee, since he had not yet worked the 1,800 hours nor passed the examination required for seniority. On January 28,1981, Jansen was “bumped” from his job and replaced by another union electrician, a man with seniority who had lost his job with another electrical contractor covered by the same collective bargaining agreement. Both parties agree that this replacement was required by the union agreement.
Jansen was willing and able to continue to work at the time of his termination, and there was no reduction in the number of electricians at Peoples Electric as a result of Jansen’s being terminated. The seniority provision of his union’s contract was the sole cause of Jansen’s termination. Benefits were awarded by the claims deputy; the award was reversed by the Appeal Tribunal, and this denial of benefits was affirmed by the commissioner's representative. Jansen now seeks review here.
Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(1) (1980), disqualifies an employee from benefits when “[t]he individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer” discontinues his or her employment. In [880]*880other words, when a termination is voluntary, benefits are awarded only when the employee had “good cause” to resign due to some conduct on the part of the employer. This is in keeping with a basic purpose of the statute to deny benefits to anyone whose termination was volitional and not a result of circumstances beyond his control. Christensen v. Fiberite Corp., 269 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.1978).
In Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 254 Minn. 93, 93 N.W.2d 815 (1958), a movie projectionist who was a member of a nonlocal union lost his job to a member of the local union with seniority status. On these facts, nearly identical to those on this appeal, we denied benefits, holding that since the union was in effect the agent of the employee the employee’s termination would be construed as voluntary. We explained:
Whether the separation from the employment is the voluntary or involuntary act of the employee is determined not by the immediate cause or motive for the act but by whether the employee directly or indirectly exercised a free-will choice and control as to the performance or nonperformance of the act. If the act of employment separation was performed by him directly of his own free will, or indirectly by his act of vesting in another discretionary authority to act in his behalf, the ultimate resulting act is a voluntary one which disqualifies him for compensation. This is likewise true when an employee acts directly in obedience to a representative control which, by his own choice, he has vested in another as his agent.
254 Minn, at 98, 93 N.W.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
The doctrine of “constructive voluntary quit,” first enunciated by the court in An-son, has had a complex history since then, both in terms of the decisions of this court and the legislature’s reaction.
In two earlier Minnesota cases, for example, benefits were denied employees who were put out of work by a vacation shutdown approved or required by their union. Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951); Johnson v. LaGrange Shoe Corp., 244 Minn. 354, 70 N.W.2d 335 (1955). In response to this judicial limitation of benefits, however, the legislature passed a statutory amendment providing that “any individual unemployed as a result of a uniform vacation shutdown shall not be deemed to be voluntarily unemployed.” Minn.Stat. § 268.04, subd. 23 (1980).
Later, we held that termination of an employee due to a collectively bargained mandatory retirement plan should be considered a voluntary termination. Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958). Nearly 20 years later, this decision was legislatively overruled by an amendment to section 268.09, subd. l(2)(d), stating that disqualification from benefits should not result from forced retirement.
In 1979, in Stawikowski v. Collins Electric Construction Co., 289 N.W.2d 390 (Minn.1979), the employee lost his job as an electrician because of the seniority provisions of his union contract. This court followed An-son and denied benefits. The employee was working as an apprentice at the time, and the legislature responded to this conflict by leaving the broad constructive voluntary quit rule untouched but added an amendment on March 24, 1979, allowing benefits in those narrow instances where the employee “is separated from employment due to the completion of an apprenticeship program, or segment thereof * * Minn. Stat. § 268.09, subd. l(2)(f) (1980).
In 1980, the interaction between this court’s decisions and legislative amendments became more complicated. Two cases arose which challenged the constructive voluntary quit rule. In Loftis v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 237 (Minn.1980), the employee had been hired for a temporary position only, for 11 weeks. In Commissioner of the Department of Economic Security v. City of Duluth, 297 N.W.2d 239 (Minn.1980), the employees were terminated because they failed to pass civil service examinations required for their continued em[881]*881ployment. In both eases we held, on rehearing, that the terminations were not voluntary and thus we awarded benefits. Between the time our original opinions were filed and new opinions were issued on rehearing, the legislature again amended the statute, but again did so on a piecemeal, narrow basis. The 1980 amendments simply provided that “a separation from employment by reason of its temporary nature or for inability to pass a test or for inability to meet performance standards” would not be deemed a voluntary quit. Section 268.-09, subd. 1(1). But, as before, the broader constructive voluntary quit rule of Anson was left intact.1
The Anson rule has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953); Warner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 396 Pa.
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SIMONETT, Justice.
An employee who was bumped from his job by reason of the seniority provision in his collective bargaining agreement seeks review of a denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Finding that the legislature has chosen not to discard the “constructive voluntary quit” rule, we affirm.
Relator John R. Jansen, a member of the Electrical Workers Union Local 110, was employed for about a year by respondent Peoples Electric Company, Inc. Under the union contract, Jansen was a probationary, nonseniority employee, since he had not yet worked the 1,800 hours nor passed the examination required for seniority. On January 28,1981, Jansen was “bumped” from his job and replaced by another union electrician, a man with seniority who had lost his job with another electrical contractor covered by the same collective bargaining agreement. Both parties agree that this replacement was required by the union agreement.
Jansen was willing and able to continue to work at the time of his termination, and there was no reduction in the number of electricians at Peoples Electric as a result of Jansen’s being terminated. The seniority provision of his union’s contract was the sole cause of Jansen’s termination. Benefits were awarded by the claims deputy; the award was reversed by the Appeal Tribunal, and this denial of benefits was affirmed by the commissioner's representative. Jansen now seeks review here.
Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(1) (1980), disqualifies an employee from benefits when “[t]he individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer” discontinues his or her employment. In [880]*880other words, when a termination is voluntary, benefits are awarded only when the employee had “good cause” to resign due to some conduct on the part of the employer. This is in keeping with a basic purpose of the statute to deny benefits to anyone whose termination was volitional and not a result of circumstances beyond his control. Christensen v. Fiberite Corp., 269 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.1978).
In Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 254 Minn. 93, 93 N.W.2d 815 (1958), a movie projectionist who was a member of a nonlocal union lost his job to a member of the local union with seniority status. On these facts, nearly identical to those on this appeal, we denied benefits, holding that since the union was in effect the agent of the employee the employee’s termination would be construed as voluntary. We explained:
Whether the separation from the employment is the voluntary or involuntary act of the employee is determined not by the immediate cause or motive for the act but by whether the employee directly or indirectly exercised a free-will choice and control as to the performance or nonperformance of the act. If the act of employment separation was performed by him directly of his own free will, or indirectly by his act of vesting in another discretionary authority to act in his behalf, the ultimate resulting act is a voluntary one which disqualifies him for compensation. This is likewise true when an employee acts directly in obedience to a representative control which, by his own choice, he has vested in another as his agent.
254 Minn, at 98, 93 N.W.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
The doctrine of “constructive voluntary quit,” first enunciated by the court in An-son, has had a complex history since then, both in terms of the decisions of this court and the legislature’s reaction.
In two earlier Minnesota cases, for example, benefits were denied employees who were put out of work by a vacation shutdown approved or required by their union. Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951); Johnson v. LaGrange Shoe Corp., 244 Minn. 354, 70 N.W.2d 335 (1955). In response to this judicial limitation of benefits, however, the legislature passed a statutory amendment providing that “any individual unemployed as a result of a uniform vacation shutdown shall not be deemed to be voluntarily unemployed.” Minn.Stat. § 268.04, subd. 23 (1980).
Later, we held that termination of an employee due to a collectively bargained mandatory retirement plan should be considered a voluntary termination. Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958). Nearly 20 years later, this decision was legislatively overruled by an amendment to section 268.09, subd. l(2)(d), stating that disqualification from benefits should not result from forced retirement.
In 1979, in Stawikowski v. Collins Electric Construction Co., 289 N.W.2d 390 (Minn.1979), the employee lost his job as an electrician because of the seniority provisions of his union contract. This court followed An-son and denied benefits. The employee was working as an apprentice at the time, and the legislature responded to this conflict by leaving the broad constructive voluntary quit rule untouched but added an amendment on March 24, 1979, allowing benefits in those narrow instances where the employee “is separated from employment due to the completion of an apprenticeship program, or segment thereof * * Minn. Stat. § 268.09, subd. l(2)(f) (1980).
In 1980, the interaction between this court’s decisions and legislative amendments became more complicated. Two cases arose which challenged the constructive voluntary quit rule. In Loftis v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 237 (Minn.1980), the employee had been hired for a temporary position only, for 11 weeks. In Commissioner of the Department of Economic Security v. City of Duluth, 297 N.W.2d 239 (Minn.1980), the employees were terminated because they failed to pass civil service examinations required for their continued em[881]*881ployment. In both eases we held, on rehearing, that the terminations were not voluntary and thus we awarded benefits. Between the time our original opinions were filed and new opinions were issued on rehearing, the legislature again amended the statute, but again did so on a piecemeal, narrow basis. The 1980 amendments simply provided that “a separation from employment by reason of its temporary nature or for inability to pass a test or for inability to meet performance standards” would not be deemed a voluntary quit. Section 268.-09, subd. 1(1). But, as before, the broader constructive voluntary quit rule of Anson was left intact.1
The Anson rule has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953); Warner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959); Annotation, Termination of Employment as a result of union action or pursuant to union contract as “voluntary” for purposes of unemployment compensation benefits, 90 A.L.R.2d 835, 843 (1963); Note, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 1243 (1980). We have noted these criticisms in our recent decisions. On the other hand, we have also noted our statute as construed by Anson has long been in force. “When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 4 (1980). Consequently, in Stawikowski we said:
When a longstanding judicial decision deeply rooted in social and economic considerations is not clearly wrong, we believe our proper role is to outline the problem, articulate the judicial view, and refer the matter to the legislature. We therefore exhort the legislature to consider statutory changes in the definition of voluntary discontinuance of employment and provisions governing employer contributions, confident that its resolution will serve the best interests of the public.
289 N.W.2d at 395.
In response to this request of the legislature to consider statutory changes, the legislature has chosen not to repeal the Anson rule; instead, the legislature has so far left that rule intact in its general application and has only modified its application in narrow, carefully specified situations. In this context, we do not think we should overrule a statutory interpretation that the legislature has chosen not to overrule.
The facts of this case cannot be distinguished from Anson itself. Thus we conclude we must affirm the decision of the commissioner’s representative.
Affirmed.