Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11128 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00122-TCB
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
STEPHEN ROBERT SHEELY, in his individual capacity, CHUCK SMITH, in his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(September 3, 2019)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Jane Doe moved to proceed anonymously in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against Stephen Sheely and Chuck Smith. She alleges Sheely, an officer at the
Meriwether County Sheriff’s Office, sexually assaulted her on several occasions
while she was incarcerated in the Meriwether County Jail. She alleges Chuck
Smith, the Meriwether County Sheriff, adopted policies that allowed the assault to
happen. The district court denied Doe’s motion. This is Doe’s appeal of that
order. 1 After review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to proceed anonymously for abuse of
discretion. Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011). A district
court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on a legal error. Id. It also abuses its
discretion “if it fails to actually consider the circumstances of the case and to
weigh the relevant factors and instead follows a blanket rule in making its final
decision.” Id. But “the abuse of discretion standard allows a range of choice for
the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of
judgment.” Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation
marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires every complaint to name all
parties. “This rule serves more than administrative convenience. It protects the
1 We have jurisdiction over the district court’s order because an “order denying anonymity for a party is a final appealable order under the collateral order doctrine.” Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). 2 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 3 of 6
public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the
identities of the parties.” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). The rule “creates a strong presumption in favor of parties’ proceeding in
their own names.” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315. However, despite Rule 10(a)’s
“clear mandate,” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323, this Court has said “the rule is not
absolute,” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315. In “exceptional case[s] . . . a plaintiff may
proceed under a fictitious name.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323.
“The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is
whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary
and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). This Court has enumerated six factors to guide
district courts in this inquiry. “First, are the plaintiffs seeking anonymity
challenging government activity? Second, will they be required to disclose
information of the utmost intimacy? Third, will the plaintiffs be compelled to
admit their intention to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal
prosecution?” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316. We have also directed courts to consider
“factors such as whether the plaintiffs were minors, whether they were threatened
with violence or physical harm by proceeding in their own names, and whether
their anonymity posed a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.”
Id. (citations omitted). And even aside from these factors, we have made clear the
3 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 4 of 6
court “should carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and then
decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should
yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323. No single factor
should be considered dispositive. Id.
With these factors in mind, but cognizant of all the circumstances, we cannot
say the district court abused its discretion. Three of these factors are not present in
this case. Doe is not seeking to challenge government activity. She will not be
compelled to admit her intent to engage in illegal conduct. And she was not a
minor at the time of the alleged assaults, though she was barely past the age of
majority. Of course courts should be careful not to draw a bright line between a
plaintiff one day shy of her eighteenth birthday and a plaintiff one day past it. The
vulnerabilities faced by minor plaintiffs do not always fall away once they reach
the age of eighteen. The proper inquiry, as always, is the totality of the
circumstances. See Frank, 951 F.2d at 323. However, we are mindful Doe has not
presented any argument or evidence that her age raised special concerns in this
case. We therefore cannot say the district court abused its discretion in concluding
that Doe’s age weighed against anonymity.
As for the other factors, the district court found that the sexual assault
allegations in this case might result in personal embarrassment to the plaintiff.
This Court has said “personal embarrassment” alone is not enough for leave to
4 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 5 of 6
proceed anonymously. Frank, 951 F.2d at 324. The district court was entitled to
find that although disclosure of the sexual assault would result in personal
embarrassment, the disclosure did not involve information of the “utmost
intimacy” as this Court has defined it. Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316 (“[C]ourts have
often denied the protection of anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual
assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her to suffer some
personal embarrassment.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (collecting cases
where this Court has concluded the allegations involve matters of the utmost
intimacy).
Doe alleged she would face bodily harm if forced to proceed in her own
name, but the district court rejected the allegation because Doe presented no
evidence to support it. Doe did not identify anyone who might harm her. Nor did
she suggest that identifying someone who might harm her would, based on her
circumstances, reveal her identity and compromise her safety. Given this, it was
permissible for the district court to draw the conclusion it did. Cf. Doe v. Stegall,
653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“Evidence on the record indicates that
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Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11128 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00122-TCB
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
STEPHEN ROBERT SHEELY, in his individual capacity, CHUCK SMITH, in his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(September 3, 2019)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Jane Doe moved to proceed anonymously in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against Stephen Sheely and Chuck Smith. She alleges Sheely, an officer at the
Meriwether County Sheriff’s Office, sexually assaulted her on several occasions
while she was incarcerated in the Meriwether County Jail. She alleges Chuck
Smith, the Meriwether County Sheriff, adopted policies that allowed the assault to
happen. The district court denied Doe’s motion. This is Doe’s appeal of that
order. 1 After review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to proceed anonymously for abuse of
discretion. Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011). A district
court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on a legal error. Id. It also abuses its
discretion “if it fails to actually consider the circumstances of the case and to
weigh the relevant factors and instead follows a blanket rule in making its final
decision.” Id. But “the abuse of discretion standard allows a range of choice for
the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of
judgment.” Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation
marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires every complaint to name all
parties. “This rule serves more than administrative convenience. It protects the
1 We have jurisdiction over the district court’s order because an “order denying anonymity for a party is a final appealable order under the collateral order doctrine.” Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). 2 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 3 of 6
public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the
identities of the parties.” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). The rule “creates a strong presumption in favor of parties’ proceeding in
their own names.” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315. However, despite Rule 10(a)’s
“clear mandate,” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323, this Court has said “the rule is not
absolute,” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315. In “exceptional case[s] . . . a plaintiff may
proceed under a fictitious name.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323.
“The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is
whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary
and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). This Court has enumerated six factors to guide
district courts in this inquiry. “First, are the plaintiffs seeking anonymity
challenging government activity? Second, will they be required to disclose
information of the utmost intimacy? Third, will the plaintiffs be compelled to
admit their intention to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal
prosecution?” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316. We have also directed courts to consider
“factors such as whether the plaintiffs were minors, whether they were threatened
with violence or physical harm by proceeding in their own names, and whether
their anonymity posed a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.”
Id. (citations omitted). And even aside from these factors, we have made clear the
3 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 4 of 6
court “should carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and then
decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should
yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323. No single factor
should be considered dispositive. Id.
With these factors in mind, but cognizant of all the circumstances, we cannot
say the district court abused its discretion. Three of these factors are not present in
this case. Doe is not seeking to challenge government activity. She will not be
compelled to admit her intent to engage in illegal conduct. And she was not a
minor at the time of the alleged assaults, though she was barely past the age of
majority. Of course courts should be careful not to draw a bright line between a
plaintiff one day shy of her eighteenth birthday and a plaintiff one day past it. The
vulnerabilities faced by minor plaintiffs do not always fall away once they reach
the age of eighteen. The proper inquiry, as always, is the totality of the
circumstances. See Frank, 951 F.2d at 323. However, we are mindful Doe has not
presented any argument or evidence that her age raised special concerns in this
case. We therefore cannot say the district court abused its discretion in concluding
that Doe’s age weighed against anonymity.
As for the other factors, the district court found that the sexual assault
allegations in this case might result in personal embarrassment to the plaintiff.
This Court has said “personal embarrassment” alone is not enough for leave to
4 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 5 of 6
proceed anonymously. Frank, 951 F.2d at 324. The district court was entitled to
find that although disclosure of the sexual assault would result in personal
embarrassment, the disclosure did not involve information of the “utmost
intimacy” as this Court has defined it. Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316 (“[C]ourts have
often denied the protection of anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual
assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her to suffer some
personal embarrassment.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (collecting cases
where this Court has concluded the allegations involve matters of the utmost
intimacy).
Doe alleged she would face bodily harm if forced to proceed in her own
name, but the district court rejected the allegation because Doe presented no
evidence to support it. Doe did not identify anyone who might harm her. Nor did
she suggest that identifying someone who might harm her would, based on her
circumstances, reveal her identity and compromise her safety. Given this, it was
permissible for the district court to draw the conclusion it did. Cf. Doe v. Stegall,
653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“Evidence on the record indicates that
the Does may expect extensive harassment and perhaps even violent reprisals if
their identities are disclosed.”).2 On appeal, Doe says she may suffer
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before close of business on September 30, 1981. Id. at 1209. 5 Case: 19-11128 Date Filed: 09/03/2019 Page: 6 of 6
psychological harm. But she did not present that argument or any evidence
supporting it to the district court, and we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion for failing to consider an argument the plaintiff never made.
The district court did not decide the question of fundamental unfairness to
the defendant, nor was it required to. With no matters of “utmost intimacy” or risk
of “bodily harm” present in the case, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously.
All that said, we recognize that this case involves a sensitive subject. We do
not understand the district court’s order to have been a denial with prejudice. If the
plaintiff has evidence to show that proceeding in her own name will cause her
special harm, subject her to bodily injury, or implicate other factors that would
make hers an exceptional case deserving of anonymity, then she may file a more
fulsome second motion to proceed anonymously.
AFFIRMED.