PER CURIAM:
James Volanty, an indigent, was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sen[244]*244tenced to twenty years in prison by a Texas state jury. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.1 Yolanty filed a petition for discretionary review and a state habeas corpus petition, both of which were denied.
Having exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, Yolanty brought the federal habeas petition before us now. Volanty alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel failed to timely move for appointment of a psychiatric expert, and he alleged that he was denied due process in that he was entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist. Volanty’s trial counsel did in fact file a timely motion for a court-appointed psychiatrist, which was denied on its merits by the state court. Vo-lanty’s motion urged that a psychiatrist was necessary because he had a severe heroin addiction at the time of the offense and was temporarily insane due to intoxication from drug usage. Under section 8.04 of the Texas Penal Code, a jury may consider evidence of temporary insanity due to voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor at the punishment phase.2
The Texas courts have, however, restrictively interpreted that statute, holding that “for a defendant to benefit from the provisions of § 8.04, he must do more than merely present evidence of intoxication or even gross intoxication.” Arnold v. State, 742 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Rather, he “must, as a result of intoxication (1) ‘not know his conduct was wrong,’ or (2) ‘was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he violated.’ ” Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (quoting Tex.Penal Code § 8.01).3
Thus, the Texas statute provides a means for a defendant to draw the connection between his intoxication and his sanity —but it provides no additional assistance. The defendant must put on evidence not simply that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense but that he was insane as a result of the intoxication in order to receive a jury instruction on the law of voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.
To analyze Volanty’s claim, we start with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the defendant’s bizarre behavior at his arraignment caused the trial court sua sponte to order a psychiatric examination. The psychiatrist found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and [245]*245Ake was committed. Six weeks later, Ake was found to be competent, and it was determined that as long as he continued to receive the antipsychotic drug he had been prescribed, his condition would remain stable. Id. at 71, 105 S.Ct. at 1090. At pretrial conference, Ake’s counsel informed the court that he would be raising an insanity defense and moved for the appointment of a psychiatrist. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 72, 105 S.Ct. at 1090. At trial, Ake’s only defense was insanity. Defense counsel called and questioned the psychiatrists who had examined Ake in the state hospital, but because none of them had examined Ake regarding his mental state at the time of the crime, none could testify on that point. Id. The jurors, following an instruction that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense unless he presented sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt to the contrary, found Ake guilty.
No new evidence was presented at the sentencing phase, and the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists regarding Ake’s future dangerousness. Ake had no expert witnesses to rebut this testimony. Id. at 73, 105 S.Ct. at 1091. The jury sentenced him to death.
The Oklahoma courts affirmed Ake’s conviction and sentence. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with Ake’s assertion that the state’s failure to appoint a psychiatrist had resulted in the denial of a fair trial and therefore constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court makes clear, however, that an indigent defendant is not entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist whenever he seeks one:
When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent. It is in such cases that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a reasonable chance of success. In such a circumstance, where the potential accuracy of the jury’s determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State’s interest in its fisc must yield.
Id. at 82-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1095-96 (footnote omitted). Thus, a defendant must make a sufficient showing of the fact that his sanity is truly at issue. However, because the facts in Ake make the issue of the defendant’s sanity so clear, it is difficult to distill from that case a bright line test for determining what constitutes a sufficient showing. We have previously noted that difficulty and have attempted to define more clearly the Ake threshold showing:
Ake requires that the defendant, at a minimum, make allegations supported by a factual showing that the defendant’s sanity is in fact at issue in the case.
Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir.1986). In Volson, the defendant’s attorney offered only conclusory allegations that the defendant had been unable to understand the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. This court found such a showing inadequate to invoke Ake.4
The Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion about what constitutes a showing sufficient to reach the Ake threshold. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc), affirmed — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (“In order for a defendant’s mental state to become a substantial threshold issue, the showing must be clear and genuine, one that consti[246]*246tutes a ‘close’ question which may well be decided one way or the other. Our interpretation ... is consistent with ... [that] set forth in Volson v. Blackburn....”); accord Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401 (10th Cir.1989).
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PER CURIAM:
James Volanty, an indigent, was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sen[244]*244tenced to twenty years in prison by a Texas state jury. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.1 Yolanty filed a petition for discretionary review and a state habeas corpus petition, both of which were denied.
Having exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, Yolanty brought the federal habeas petition before us now. Volanty alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel failed to timely move for appointment of a psychiatric expert, and he alleged that he was denied due process in that he was entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist. Volanty’s trial counsel did in fact file a timely motion for a court-appointed psychiatrist, which was denied on its merits by the state court. Vo-lanty’s motion urged that a psychiatrist was necessary because he had a severe heroin addiction at the time of the offense and was temporarily insane due to intoxication from drug usage. Under section 8.04 of the Texas Penal Code, a jury may consider evidence of temporary insanity due to voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor at the punishment phase.2
The Texas courts have, however, restrictively interpreted that statute, holding that “for a defendant to benefit from the provisions of § 8.04, he must do more than merely present evidence of intoxication or even gross intoxication.” Arnold v. State, 742 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Rather, he “must, as a result of intoxication (1) ‘not know his conduct was wrong,’ or (2) ‘was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he violated.’ ” Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (quoting Tex.Penal Code § 8.01).3
Thus, the Texas statute provides a means for a defendant to draw the connection between his intoxication and his sanity —but it provides no additional assistance. The defendant must put on evidence not simply that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense but that he was insane as a result of the intoxication in order to receive a jury instruction on the law of voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.
To analyze Volanty’s claim, we start with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the defendant’s bizarre behavior at his arraignment caused the trial court sua sponte to order a psychiatric examination. The psychiatrist found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and [245]*245Ake was committed. Six weeks later, Ake was found to be competent, and it was determined that as long as he continued to receive the antipsychotic drug he had been prescribed, his condition would remain stable. Id. at 71, 105 S.Ct. at 1090. At pretrial conference, Ake’s counsel informed the court that he would be raising an insanity defense and moved for the appointment of a psychiatrist. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 72, 105 S.Ct. at 1090. At trial, Ake’s only defense was insanity. Defense counsel called and questioned the psychiatrists who had examined Ake in the state hospital, but because none of them had examined Ake regarding his mental state at the time of the crime, none could testify on that point. Id. The jurors, following an instruction that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense unless he presented sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt to the contrary, found Ake guilty.
No new evidence was presented at the sentencing phase, and the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists regarding Ake’s future dangerousness. Ake had no expert witnesses to rebut this testimony. Id. at 73, 105 S.Ct. at 1091. The jury sentenced him to death.
The Oklahoma courts affirmed Ake’s conviction and sentence. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with Ake’s assertion that the state’s failure to appoint a psychiatrist had resulted in the denial of a fair trial and therefore constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court makes clear, however, that an indigent defendant is not entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist whenever he seeks one:
When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent. It is in such cases that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a reasonable chance of success. In such a circumstance, where the potential accuracy of the jury’s determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State’s interest in its fisc must yield.
Id. at 82-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1095-96 (footnote omitted). Thus, a defendant must make a sufficient showing of the fact that his sanity is truly at issue. However, because the facts in Ake make the issue of the defendant’s sanity so clear, it is difficult to distill from that case a bright line test for determining what constitutes a sufficient showing. We have previously noted that difficulty and have attempted to define more clearly the Ake threshold showing:
Ake requires that the defendant, at a minimum, make allegations supported by a factual showing that the defendant’s sanity is in fact at issue in the case.
Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir.1986). In Volson, the defendant’s attorney offered only conclusory allegations that the defendant had been unable to understand the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. This court found such a showing inadequate to invoke Ake.4
The Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion about what constitutes a showing sufficient to reach the Ake threshold. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir.1986), rev’d on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc), affirmed — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (“In order for a defendant’s mental state to become a substantial threshold issue, the showing must be clear and genuine, one that consti[246]*246tutes a ‘close’ question which may well be decided one way or the other. Our interpretation ... is consistent with ... [that] set forth in Volson v. Blackburn....”); accord Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401 (10th Cir.1989).
The substance of Volanty’s pretrial motion for appointment of a psychiatric expert at government expense was that “at the time of the alleged offense [he] was a severely addicted heroin addict with a $1,000 a day drug habit. As a result, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense [he] was temporarily insane due to intoxication from drug usage.” No supporting evidence was attached to Volanty’s motion, and none was presented at the pretrial hearing on the motion.5 The state, however, did not file any written response to the motion.6 The trial court denied Vo-lanty’s motion. The trial proceeded, and Volanty was found guilty.
At the punishment phase, Volanty presented three lay witnesses. First, Sergeant Johnny Oelschlegel of the Nueces County Sheriff’s Department made clear that Volanty had been wearing a particular shirt when he was brought to the county jail. This was significant since Jesse Mendoza, a counselor for the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation’s Substance Abuse division, next testified that during an interview with Volanty at the jail he observed “track marks” on Volanty’s arms which indicated intravenous heroin usage — as did the blood stains on the sleeves of the shirt Oelschlegel identified. Mendoza testified that, in his opinion, on the basis of those observations and the social history acquired from Volanty during the interview, Volanty was a heroin addict. On cross-examination, Mendoza testified that Volanty had told him that he was a heroin addict and that he used approximately $1,000 worth of heroin a day. Finally, Patrick Jennings, a registered nurse employed by the Nueces County Jail, testified that he had administered medi[247]*247cation to Volanty for discomforts of heroin withdrawal.
Apart from this testimony, Volanty introduced no evidence relevant to the question of his sanity. There is no evidence in the record of the pre-trial proceedings or of the trial itself that at the time of the commission of the crime, Volanty’s behavior was erratic or that his heroin habit rendered him unable to distinguish right from wrong or conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. The testimony of eyewitnesses to the crime revealed no hint that Volanty’s drug usage had rendered him temporarily insane. We acknowledge that the restrictive reading given by the Texas courts to section 8.04 of the Penal Code makes the testimony of a psychiatrist almost essential for a defendant to reap the benefit of that statute. We cannot conclude, however, that the failure of the trial court to provide Volanty with a psychiatrist on the bare assertion of his addiction resulted in the denial of a fair trial and a violation of his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, although Volanty amply demonstrated that he was an addict, at least by the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence at the sentencing phase,7 we hold that the fact of his addiction alone is not enough to make his sanity a “significant factor” at trial and thereby to satisfy the Ake threshold.
Because we find that Volanty failed to make the threshold showing required by Ake and its progeny to show that his sanity would be a “significant factor” at trial, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief.
AFFIRMED.