FAY, Circuit Judge:
James Messer, Jr. was convicted of murder and kidnapping with bodily injury in the Superior Court of Polk County, Georgia on February 8, 1980, and was sentenced to death on both charges. On November 23, 1982, after exhausting his state remedies,1 Messer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The district court denied the petition and Messer appeals. On appeal, petitioner claims that (1) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after an outburst by the victim’s father in the presence of the jury, (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the trial judge erred in not defining “bodily injury” in the jury charge as it pertains to the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. FACTS
On February 14, 1979, the half-nude, blood-spattered body of eight-year old Rhonda Tanner was found lying in the woods outside rural Cedartown, Georgia. There were six stab wounds to the body and five knife slashes traversing the victim’s abdomen. The little girl’s face, neck and upper chest were covered with numerous lacerations and abrasions. Massive bruises and swelling indicated that the little girl’s head had been kicked and stomped. Swabs taken from the child’s abdomen and vaginal area indicated the presence of sperm.
The following day, local police, along with state and federal agents, arrested the victim’s uncle, James Messer, and charged him with the crime. Messer was subsequently indicted by the grand jury of Polk [1083]*1083County during the November term of 1979, for kidnapping with bodily injury and for the murder of Rhonda Tanner. A jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict against Messer on both charges. Messer was given the death penalty on both the murder and the kidnapping with bodily injury charge.
The facts adduced at trial paint a vivid picture of the events which transpired on that fateful day. Rhonda Tanner left her parents’ home early on the morning of February 13, 1979, and boarded the bus which took her to College Street Elementary School in Cedartown. At approximately 2:30 p.m. that afternoon, Messer arrived at the grade school and told the principal, Sam Brabson, that Rhonda’s father had been injured in an accident at work and that he was there to pick Rhonda up. Brabson summoned Rhonda from her classroom. When the little girl arrived at the principal’s office, she quickly ran to her uncle’s side and caressed his hand. Brabson, having no reason to suspect that anything was awry, allowed the child to leave with Messer.
When Rhonda did not get off the bus that afternoon, her mother became worried and drove to the elementary school to look for her. Mr. Brabson told Mrs. Tanner what had transpired earlier and described the individual who picked Rhonda up. Mrs. Tanner immediately contacted her mother-in-law who in turn notified the police and then called Messer’s wife. Messer’s wife stated that she knew of no reason why her husband would take Rhonda from school.
When Messer arrived home that evening, his wife and his sister-in-law, Pamela Dunn, were waiting for him. Ms. Dunn testified that Messer came in the door cursing and complaining about having spent the entire day at the doctor’s office. He then went straight to the bathroom where he immediately changed clothes. In reference to Rhonda’s disappearance, Ms. Dunn asked Messer what could be wrong with Rhonda, to which he replied, “I don’t know and I don’t give a damn.” (T. at 243).
The following day, Ms. Dunn was driving down Old Mill Road when she spotted Rhonda’s coat lying in some bushes near the railroad tracks. She notified the police and a search of the area was immediately undertaken. By this time, agents of the FBI and the GBI had joined in the investigation of Rhonda’s disappearance. Later that afternoon, Rhonda’s body was found in a secluded wooded area near the railroad tracks. Her books, pants, and panties were discovered nearby.
Throughout the day, law enforcement officials had been conducting interviews with various witnesses. Retha Wood, an employee at Barber’s Service Company, told police that on the morning of Rhonda’s disappearance, a man came into the store and inquired about light fixtures and supplies. Mrs. Wood, who was working alone at the store, told police that the man acted rather strangely and kept insisting that she go back to the storeroom to get the supplies he needed. She refused and then called her husband to come to the store. The man immediately left the store but returned later thinking that Mrs. Wood was alone. When Mr. Wood appeared from the back of the store, the stranger again left the premises. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Mrs. Wood saw this same individual drive by the store and look in the window. According to Mrs. Wood, he was heading in the direction of College Street Elementary School.
That night, Mrs. Wood called the police and reported what had happened. Subsequently, both Mr. and Mrs. Wood identified a photograph of Messer as the same man who had been in the store on the day Rhonda disappeared. Even more importantly, the principal and two other witnesses from Rhonda’s school had also selected Messer’s photograph as being the man whom they saw pick Rhonda up. These witnesses further stated that on the day in question, Messer was wearing a red cap, blue jeans and a tan jacket.
On the evening of February 14, 1979, the day after Rhonda’s disappearance, investigators went to a residence to question Messer. He agreed to accompany them to the Cedartown Police Station where he volun[1084]*1084tarily gave a statement and signed a waiver permitting a search of his house. Messer was not under arrest at this time.
Initially Messer denied killing Rhonda, but when confronted with the fact that witnesses had identified him, he broke down crying and confessed to the murder. Messer stated that on February 13, 1979, he tried to pick up a female employee at Barber’s Service Company. That attempt having failed, he drove to College Street Elementary School to get Rhonda. Messer claimed that when he picked Rhonda up at school, he planned to molest her, but not to kill her. He also confessed to telling the school’s principal that Rhonda’s father had been injured on the job in order to secure Rhonda’s release.
Messer then left with Rhonda and drove down Old Mill Road to a secluded area near the railroad tracks. Messer stopped the car and the two of them walked into the woods together. Messer then began to molest Rhonda. When she resisted, Messer told investigators that he beat and stomped her head with his fists and shoes. Messer further stated that he stabbed Rhonda repeatedly and slashed her stomach. Although he denies having raped his victim, Messer did inform investigators that he masturbated at the scene. Messer concluded that he spent approximately thirty minutes in the woods before leaving. Following this confession, Messer was informed by the investigators that he was under arrest.
II. THE TRIAL
Following Messer’s indictment, Attorney John Sawhill was appointed as counsel for the accused. Sawhill was the third attorney appointed by the court. The first two attorneys asked to be relieved and cited community pressure as the reason. On November 9, 1979, Messer entered his plea of not guilty.2
The evidence presented against Messer at trial was overwhelming. Mr. and Mrs. Wood had both picked Messer’s picture out of a photo lineup as being the man loitering around Barber’s Service Company on the day Rhonda disappeared. Mrs. Wood again identified Messer in court and related seeing the defendant driving in the direction of College Street Elementary School just minutes before Rhonda was picked up. In addition, the car which Mrs. Wood described and the license tag number which she wrote down were unquestionably that of the defendant.
Messer’s photo was also selected from a lineup by Mr. Brabson, the school’s principal, and by his secretary, Jane Hackney. Priscilla Lay, the mother of one of Rhonda’s classmates, also was present when the defendant picked Rhonda up and likewise selected Messer’s picture out of a photo lineup. At trial, Brabson, Hackney and Lay all pointed to Messer and identified him as being the individual whom they saw take Rhonda Tanner from the College Street Elementary School on February 13, 1979. According to these witnesses, Rhonda took the defendant’s hand, stroked it, and pranced about gleefully while she explained that she would not have to take the bus that day because her uncle was there to take her home;
The evidence revealed that Messer was spotted again approximately one hour later as he emerged alone from the woods near Old Mill Road. Robin Sides, a resident of nearby Rockmart, Georgia, was driving in her pickup truck down Old Mill Road at approximately 3:35 p.m. on February 13, 1979. She was on the way to pick up a friend. As she neared the railroad tracks, she noticed a car parked about 50 yards from the side of the road. Sides testified that she did not see anyone inside or near the car but that this did not strike her as being too unusual.
[1085]*1085After picking up her friend, Sides turned her truck around and again proceeded down Old Mill Road. As the two girls approached the parked car, they noticed a man emerging from the woods near the railroad tracks. Sides stopped at the tracks to make sure that a train was not coming. Sides testified: “[H]e scared us both. I don’t know ... the way he looked, and ... Lisa said ‘you’d better leave,’ and I told her ... ‘see what kind of car it is and get the tag number.' ” (T. at 232-233). The two girls were unable to get the exact number, but they did notice that it was a Polk County plate. When the girls later learned that a murder victim had been found in that vicinity, they immediately related their experience to the police, who by now had begun to suspect Messer. The police drove the girls by Messer’s parked automobile and they positively identified it as the one they had seen earlier on Old Mill Road. Moreover, the girls’ description of the man whom they saw emerging from the woods was consistent with the descriptions provided by the other witnesses.
The physical and scientific evidence presented at trial was equally overwhelming. Messer knowingly and voluntarily consented to a search of his home. The investigators seized several articles of clothing which matched the descriptions given by witnesses. A footprint found at the scene of the murder was matched to a pair of bloodstained shoes found in Messer’s home. Bloodstains found on a pair of Messer’s jeans were typed and found to be type 0, the same as the victim, Rhonda Tanner. Messer has type B blood. The bloodstains found on Messer’s shoes were also analyzed but the quantity was insufficient for typing.
Experts also testified that hairs found on Messer’s jeans were characteristically similar to samples removed from the victim’s head. Similarly, hairs found at the murder scene were consistent with hairs taken from the defendant’s head.
Of course the most incriminating piece of evidence in the state’s arsenal is the confession itself. When confronted with the fact that several witnesses had selected his picture out of a photo lineup, Messer fell out of his chair crying and agreed to tell the investigators everything.
At trial, FBI Agent Robert Leary related for the jury Messer’s own first-hand account of the murder. According to Leary, Messer admitted trying to pick up a female employee at Barber’s Supply Company. He likewise confessed to taking Rhonda from the school under the pretense that her father had been injured. Messer then told Leary that he drove to Old Mill Road, stopped his car, and told Rhonda that they had to go into the woods and find a rock to fix the car’s battery. According to Leary, Messer then explained how he began to fondle Rhonda and remove her clothes. When Rhonda started crying, Messer hit her in the face with his fists, knocking her to the ground, and then he stomped and kicked her head. Messer told Leary that Rhonda kept crying, so he stabbed her repeatedly and then slashed her abdomen with his pocket knife. Finally, Messer told the agent that he removed his pants and masturbated over the child’s lifeless body.
Agent Leary told the jury that he asked Messer whether he had raped his niece and that Messer responded that he didn’t because he didn’t want to hurt her. (T. at 371). Leary also explained to the jury that he had asked Messer several questions aimed at testing his story. These questions involved critical details which only the murderer would know, and according to Leary, Messer answered every question correctly.
In the course of this confession, Messer produced the pocket knife with which he murdered Rhonda Tanner. Expert testimony elicited at trial revealed that the victim’s stab wounds were consistent with Messer’s knife. In addition, blood stains were found on the knife, but the quantity detected was too small to be typed.
Messer also showed the investigators a bruise on his foot which he said he sustained while kicking Rhonda in the head. A photograph of the bruise was admitted at trial.
[1086]*1086According to Agent Leary, Messer also drew a detailed map of the crime scene and then used it to outline his every move. This map accurately depicted the area where Rhonda’s body was found and, according to Leary, his explanations were consistent with the evidence already compiled.
Finally, it was revealed at trial that Messer had also told the investigators of a pond where he had washed the blood from his knife and discarded his hat. Officers went to the pond and retrieved the hat described by Messer and the witnesses who saw him on the day in question. Expert testimony revealed that hairs found on the cap were characteristically similar to Messer’s.
Simply put, if ever there was an open and shut case, this is it. Eyewitness testimony outlined Messer’s every move. The physical evidence is uncontroverted and overwhelming. As far as the state is concerned, Messer’s confession was simply icing on the cake.
III. REFUSAL TO DECLARE MISTRIAL
During the trial, FBI Agent Leary related for the jury Messer’s own first-hand account of the gruesome murder. At one point, the agent’s testimony was interrupted when Wayne Tanner, the father of the victim, lunged toward the defendant screaming and shouting. Messer’s first argument is that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial as a result of this incident. We disagree.
The following excerpt from the trial transcript depicts the outburst:
AGENT LEARY: He said while they were walking down the railroad embankment Rhonda willingly accompanied him thinking that he was just looking for a rock. After he left the railroad track he went down into the woods a short distance and when he got to the point in the woods he told Rhonda that he wanted to play a game with her, he said at that point he started touching her, he said “down there in between her legs” and thereafter____ now, during this time I’m interviewing him he was crying and had his head in this [sic] hands and some of the statement was just disjointed, the next thing he talked about was that she was laying on the ground and crying. He said to stop her from crying he stabbed her in the chest several times with his knife. He said he couldn’t remember the exact number of times he had stabbed her. I asked him did he cut her anywhere other than on the chest and he said he remembered slashing her abdomen with his knife. I asked him if he had or attempted to have sexual intercourse with her and he said no that he hadn’t and he said that he didn’t try to have intercourse with her because he didn’t want to hurt her. I asked him if he took off his clothes ... (At this point and time the Court was disrupted by someone in the audience which was later identified as Mr. Tanner, the father of Rhonda Tanner, which was raging and lunging forward towards the Defendant, and at this time a State Trooper along with other officers seized Mr. Tanner). MR. TANNER: "... He ... He’ll pay! You’re liable! ... you’ll pay. You’ll pay. You’re liable. Oh! What you think ... oh you ... you’re going to get it ... you____ THE COURT: Let the jury go out to the jury room.
(T. at 371-72).3
After the jury was removed, Sawhill immediately moved for a mistrial. The mo[1087]*1087tion was denied and after curative instructions were given, the trial resumed. Saw-hill renewed his motion several times throughout the course of the trial but each time it was again denied.
Because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of a spectator’s outburst, the decision on whether to grant a mistrial lies within his sound discretion. See e.g., United States v. Brooks, 670 F.2d 148, 152 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 2943, 73 L.Ed.2d 1339 (1982). Absent an abuse of that discretion, this court will not intervene. Id. In the instant case, we find no such abuse.
Our review of the record indicates that the trial court twice instructed the jury to disregard the outburst; once immediately after the outburst, and then again during the sentencing phase.4 Both times the court inquired as to whether the outburst would in any way affect the jurors judgment, and both times the jury gave no indication that it would. (T. at 379 and 500). After the trial, during a hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, each individual juror was called as a witness and each testified that the outburst in no way affected their judgment. (R. Vol. 3 at 49-157). The majority of the jurors also stated that they did not recall any of the other jurors even mentioning the outburst during deliberations or at any other time. Id.
[1088]*1088Appellant argues that the question of whether the jurors were influenced by the outburst is irrelevant. Messer cites Collier v. State, 115 Ga. 803, 42 S.E. 226 (1905), and Glenn v. State, 205 Ga. 32, 52 S.E.2d 319 (1949), for the proposition that the test is whether the outburst was calculated to influence the jury in their deliberations. While we agree with appellant that this is the applicable test under Georgia law, we simply do not believe that Wayne Tanner’s actions were in any way motivated by a desire to influence the jury. Clearly this outburst, unfortunate as it was, resulted merely from a bereaved father being unable to contain his emotions during a particularly lurid segment of the testimony.
We agree with the trial judge, that the outburst was not calculated to influence the jury and that the curative instructions given by the court were sufficient to counter any prejudice which might arguably have ensued. As the jurors themselves repeatedly indicated, they were in no way influenced by the incident. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in not granting defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
(1) Argument
Messer’s position is that his attorney, John Sawhill, was ineffective throughout the trial and that he conceded guilt and separated himself from his client during the closing arguments. In addition, Messer claims that Sawhill failed to “humanize” him during the closing arguments of the sentencing phase and that he failed to present all available mitigating evidence. This performance, argues Messer, deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel.
(2) Applicable Test
In Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. In applying that test, this court has noted:
The Washington Court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. First, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient by identifying specific acts and omissions. Counsel’s conduct, viewed as of the time of the actions taken, must have fallen outside of a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. In assessing a right to counsel’s claim, an attorney’s actions are strongly presumed to have fallen within that range, and a court must examine counsel’s conduct without the use of judicial hindsight.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance was prejudicial. The Washington Court followed a standard that requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (citation omitted)____ A defendant’s failure to establish either the performance or the prejudice component results in denial of his Sixth Amendment claim.
King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1463 (11th Cir.1984).
Sawhill has stated that his strategy was to utilize a low-key approach, maintain his credibility with the jury, and then to attempt to humanize Messer during the sentencing phase in hopes that the jury would spare his life. In Washington, the Supreme court noted that there are countless ways to defend an individual accused of a crime and that “[ejven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Washington, — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Under the standard set forth in Washington, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome a strong presumption that his attorney’s actions might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at---, 104 S.Ct. [1089]*1089at 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95. The Court has further cautioned that in reviewing the performance of a criminal defense attorney, every effort must be made to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. “[I]t is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id.5
(3) Innocence/Guilt Phase
As support for his argument that trial counsel was ineffective throughout the trial, Messer sets forth a number of statistical observations. First, he notes that of the state’s twenty-three witnesses, only nine were cross-examined. Messer further complains that Sawhill failed to object to even one of the state’s fifty-three items of physical evidence. Petitioner implies that these statistics, in and of themselves, are sufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Messer asserts Saw-hill’s decision not to make an opening argument or present a case-in-chief as further proof of counsel’s overall ineffectiveness.
We believe the statistics quoted by Messer do not paint a fair or accurate picture of the representation which he received. True, Sawhill did not object to any of the state’s fifty-three items of physical evidence. This crude statistic, however, in no way reflects the numerous occasions on which Sawhill examined witnesses on voir dire in an attempt to find some weakness or legal imperfection on which to base just such an objection. Finding none, Sawhill thereafter allowed the evidence to come in before the jury without challenge. Compare Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 402 (11th Cir.1984) (failure to object to evidence already ruled admissible does not render counsel ineffective). We do not find, and the petitioner has not directed us to, a single specific instance where Sawhill’s failure to object to physical evidence in some way significantly prejudiced defendant’s case. A general observation that trial counsel failed to object to physical evidence does not in itself prove that counsel was ineffective. The second prong of the [1090]*1090Washington test requires some showing of prejudice as a result of counsel’s omission. Washington, — U.S. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. In regard to Sawhill’s failure to object, Messer has made no such showing.
Much the same can be said for Messer’s complaint that Sawhill only cross-examined nine of the prosecution’s twenty-three witnesses. Clearly this decision was a tactical one well within the discretion of a defense attorney. When cross-examination was warranted, Sawhill undertook it zealously and competently. Where the testimony appeared to be unrefuted and less critical, Sawhill apparently elected to fore-go cross-examination. It should also be noted that several witnesses were cross-examined out of the presence of the jury in hopes that something usable would be found. As previously stated, an attorney’s actions are strongly presumed to have fallen within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, id. at---, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95; King, 748 F.2d at 1463, and Messer’s general allegations in this respect are simply insufficient to overcome that presumption. Moreover, petitioner has not directed us to a single specific instance where cross-examination arguably could have affected the outcome of either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial. Absent such a showing of prejudice, the second prong of the Washington test remains unsatisfied.
In regards to these statistical observations, we question whether they are even specific enough to satisfy the first prong of the Washington test. Assuming for the moment that the allegations do raise some question as to counsel’s performance, it nonetheless is clear that petitioner has failed to direct us to any segment of the trial where a reasonable probability exists that, but for Sawhill’s failure to object or cross-examine, the results of the trial would have been different. Consequently, petitioner’s arguments fail to satisfy the second component of Washington.
We next consider Messer’s allegations that Sawhill’s performance in regard to opening and closing arguments denied him effective assistance of counsel. Saw-hill has stated that his strategy was to use a low-key approach, maintain credibility with the jury, and then to present the human side of his client during the sentencing phase in hopes that the jury would spare Messer’s life. In light of Messer’s confession and the overwhelming amount of evidence against him, we are not prepared to say that Sawhill’s trial strategy was unwise. Sawhill’s decision not to make an opening statement is understandable in light of the fact that he accomplished during voir dire what most attorneys set out to do in their opening remarks. Furthermore, his decision not to present a case in chief is in keeping with his stated strategy, and Messer directs us to no evidence which Sawhill arguably could have presented to further his defense.
In regard to closing arguments, Messer claims Sawhill conceded his guilt and separated himself from the accused. We have carefully reviewed Sawhill’s closing argument and find no express concession of guilt, and nothing to support Messer’s contention that he was abandoned by his counsel.6 If guilt were to some degree implied in what Sawhill said, it was a weak implication at best, and arguably unavoidable in light of the overwhelming evidence and stated trial strategy. This situation differs markedly from the cases cited in appellant’s brief where defense attorneys expressly conceded or strongly implied the guilt of their clients. See Francis v. [1091]*1091Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1193 n. 7 (11th Cir.1983) (counsel stated during closing: “I think he went in the house and I think he committed the crime of murder probably____”);7 Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 797 n. 10 (11th Cir.1982) (counsel stated: “Under the evidence of this case, I only ask you for life.”). In light of the totality of the evidence before the jury, we are simply unable to believe that the decision reached by the jury “would reasonably likely have been different absent the [alleged] errors” in Sawhill’s closing argument. Washington, — U.S. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.
(4) Sentencing Phase
Messer’s next argument regarding ineffective assistance relates to the sentencing phase of the trial. Messer claims Sawhill failed to present all available mitigating evidence and that the only witness which he did present, Messer’s mother, was unprepared. Specifically, Messer contends that this lack of preparation resulted in his mother making a damning statement to the effect that Messer anticipated a death sentence. According to Messer, this overall failure by Sawhill to “humanize” him deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. Wé disagree.
The standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel is the same for both the guilt and sentencing phase of a trial. Id. — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693; King, 748 F.2d at 1463. Accordingly, “[a] defendant challenging a death sentence must show that without the error there is a reasonable probability that ‘the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington, — U.S. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698).
Petitioner argues that there were several witnesses available who could have presented mitigating evidence had they been called to the stand. We note, however, that an attorney’s actions, including his decision to put a particular character witness on the stand, is given great deference by this court. King, 748 F.2d at 1463; Solomon, 735 F.2d at 404. We have reviewed Sawhill’s testimony from the state habeas proceeding. He thoroughly investigated Messer’s background and was familiar with the mitigating evidence which was available. He was very much aware of the possible character witnesses and had spoken to most of them. Sawhill further indicated that he had every intention of calling some of these witnesses, but that for the most part, they appeared reluctant to testify on Messer’s behalf. Faced with such a dilemma, we are not prepared to say that Sawhill’s decision not to put these witnesses on the stand was unwarranted. See id. Even more importantly, we have reviewed the mitigating factors which were to have been introduced by these witnesses, and we find that they do not even begin to tip the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in favor of Messer.
[1092]*1092We further find no merit to the allegation that Sawhill failed to prepare Messer’s mother to testify. To the contrary, Sawhill stated that he discussed her testimony with her on several occasions, and that he decided that the best approach would be to allow her to testify in a narrative fashion. Sawhill further stated that he specifically instructed her not to mention that her son was anticipating the death sentence. We refuse to fault an attorney for the spontaneous exclamation of an emotional witness where the attorney has specifically instructed the witness to avoid that topic.
In applying the Washington standard to the sentencing phase, we find that Messer has asserted two specific acts or omissions aimed at proving Sawhill ineffective. As for the argument that there was additional mitigating evidence, we believe that Saw-hill was justified in not presenting questionable character witnesses. The evidence indicates that these witnesses were somewhat reluctant to testify on Messer’s behalf and it is doubtful whether their testimony would have in any way aided Messer. We further refuse to fault Sawhill for the unanticipated statement by Messer’s mother regarding his anticipation of the death sentence. This clearly was not the result of Messer’s mother being unprepared to testify. In our opinion, petitioner has failed to show that Sawhill’s performance during the sentencing phase was deficient to the extent that this court cannot rely on the result as being just. See Washington, — U.S. at---, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93.
(5) Conclusion
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the second prong of the Washington test requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Id. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. As noted by the Supreme Court, however, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than a case of clear guilt supported by confessions and direct evidence. Id. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699; see also King, 748 F.2d at 1464. The instant case is clearly within the latter category, and consequently we recognize that petitioner must carry a substantial burden in trying to satisfy the second component of the Washington test. See Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.1984). Even if we accept that some of Sawhill’s specific actions fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, we nonetheless are convinced that, under the totality of the circumstances, they in no way affected the ultimate outcome of the guilt or sentencing phase of this trial. See United States v. Gibbs, 662 F.2d 728, 730 (11th Cir.1981). Accordingly, we hold that petitioner has failed to meet his “burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the [alleged] errors.” Washington, — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.
Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Petitioner’s final argument is that the trial judge failed to define bodily injury in his jury charge and that the jury, having never been instructed on this essential element, could therefore not return a verdict for kidnapping with bodily injury. Messer thus contends that he was convicted only of simple kidnapping. If in fact the jury did render its verdict without the benefit of such an instruction, then arguably our decision in Potts v. Zant, 734 F.2d 526 (11th Cir.1984), would support petitioner’s position. We have reviewed the instructions given, however, and conclude that the trial court did sufficiently charge the jury on the issue of bodily injury.
Petitioner’s argument is apparently premised on that portion of the jury charge where the trial judge read verbatim the Georgia Code section which defines simple kidnapping.8 Granted, if this was all that [1093]*1093the jury was given, then arguably the instructions would be insufficient. At the beginning of his charge to the jury, however, the trial judge, in discussing the indictment, instructed the jury as follows:
He is also charged in count two with the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury. That count alleges in substance that the accused did on February 13, 1979 in this county unlawfully forcibly maliciously and fraudulently lead, take, carry away, and entice away Rhonda Tanner a child under the age of sixteen years, the said accused being over the age of seventeen years, against the will of Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Tanner the child’s parents, and that the said accused did then and there inflict serious and grievous bodily injuries upon the said Rhonda Tanner, said injuries resulting in her death.
(T. at 485). (emphasis added). We are of the opinion that this portion of the jury instruction was sufficient to fulfill the trial court’s obligation to instruct the jury on this essential element of the crime charged. Clearly the term “bodily injury” is not a phrase which requires an elaborate explanation in order to be understood. We further note that this language serves to distinguish the instant case from Potts, where the trial judge never even mentioned the phrase “with bodily injury” in his instruction. See Potts, 734 F.2d at 530 n. 1.
Moreover, it is obvious that the jury was well aware that in regard to count two of the indictment, they were dealing with more than just simple kidnapping. The evidence clearly attests to that fact. In addition to being instructed on the nature of the kidnapping charge, it also appears that the jury had the indictment with them in the jury room during their deliberations. Count two of that indictment clearly states “KIDNAPPING WITH BODILY INJURY” and includes allegations “that the said accused did then and there inflict serious and grievous bodily injuries upon the said Rhonda Tanner, said injuries resulting in her death.” (R. Index at 3-4). The jury returned a verdict finding Messer guilty of count two. In this respect, the instant case is markedly different from Potts, where the defendant was indicted for kidnapping with bodily injury, but the jury’s verdict stated: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as to Count Three, kidnapping.” Potts, 734 F.2d at 530. (emphasis added). In the instant case, there is not the ambiguity and uncertainty alluded to by this court in Potts, see id., and therefore, we find that case distinguishable.
We therefore conclude that the jury was sufficiently instructed on all the essential elements of the crimes charged. Accordingly, petitioner was not denied due process in this respect.9
VI. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed petitioner’s allegations, we conclude that the district court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus should be, and is hereby,
AFFIRMED.