Jaime Martinez-Martinez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-1464
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1464

JAIME MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: September 9, 2025 Decided: November 5, 2025

Before AGEE, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review granted; Board decision vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Heytens and Judge Berner joined.

ARGUED: Jeremy Layne McKinney, MCKINNEY IMMIGRATION LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Petitioner. Allison Frayer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Dara Arroyo-Longoria, MCKINNEY IMMIGRATION LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Petitioner. Yaakov Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer Levings, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1464 Doc: 51 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 2 of 10

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Jaime Martinez-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) denying his application for

cancellation of removal based on the false testimony bar. For the reasons that follow, this

Court grants his petition for review and remands for further proceedings.

I.

In 2014, Martinez-Martinez was charged with a misdemeanor offense and placed in

removal proceedings. He conceded the charge of removability and applied for cancellation

of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. On that application, Martinez-Martinez listed one

alias: Jaime Martinez Hernandez.

At the merits hearing on his cancellation of removal application, Martinez-Martinez

testified that the application was accurate but that “some details . . . are just not the way

they’re supposed to be.” J.A. 116. He then provided the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) with an

amended application, which Martinez-Martinez revised to include an entry into the United

States in April 2006. The IJ questioned him about the use of an alias, and Martinez-

Martinez testified that he used the alias “Jaime Martinez Hernandez” to acquire work

documentation. Toward the end of his direct examination, Martinez-Martinez testified that

he used an additional alias, “Vicente Martinez-Martinez,” when he crossed the border in

2006.

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On cross-examination, the Government asked Martinez-Martinez about another

alias, “Juan Sanchez Cabrera,” and it produced an I-213 form recording an encounter with

immigration officials. The form reflected that Martinez-Martinez provided that alias to

immigration officials during an attempted border crossing in 2006. He explained: “I know

I used a name but I don’t remember the name that I used.” J.A. 154. He further stated that

he didn’t recognize the alias referenced by the Government but was “sure that [he] gave a

different name” than his own to immigration officials in April 2006. J.A. 155. Throughout

cross-examination, Martinez-Martinez reiterated that he did not remember all of the aliases

he used during his residency in the United States.

In a written decision, the IJ denied Martinez-Martinez’s application for cancellation

of removal. Relevant here, the IJ concluded that Martinez-Martinez was statutorily barred

from a finding of good moral character under § 1101(f)(6) because he provided false

testimony. In so concluding, the IJ relied on Martinez-Martinez’s “failure to disclose his

entry into the United States on April 24, 2006, under the name ‘Juan

Sanchez-Cabrera’ . . . for the purpose of obtaining his sought-after relief of cancellation of

removal.” J.A. 56. The IJ noted that Martinez-Martinez failed to mention that alias on his

application and during his direct testimony.

Martinez-Martinez appealed to the Board, arguing that “he did not intend to deceive

the [IJ] by failing to provide the alias ‘Juan Sanchez-Cabrera’ because he explained that he

provided a false name to immigration officials but could not remember the name.” J.A. 4.

The Board rejected that argument, finding no “clear error” in the IJ’s finding that Martinez-

Martinez failed to explain the use of that alias in his cancellation of removal application

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and during his direct testimony. Id. The Board further “discern[ed] no clear error in the

[IJ’s] determination that [Martinez-Martinez] provided false testimony . . . because he had

a subjective intent to deceive in order to obtain immigration benefits as evidenced by his

failure to fully and voluntarily disclose his aliases until DHS confronted him with

evidence.” Id.

Martinez-Martinez timely petitioned this Court for review. Two months later, he

moved to reopen his case before the Board based on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Martinez-Martinez then filed a motion to hold this appeal in abeyance pending the

outcome of his ineffective assistance claim. We denied the abeyance motion and the motion

to reopen remains pending before the Board.

We have jurisdiction over questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact in

the immigration context under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.

209, 223 (2024).

II.

Before turning to the merits, a bit of procedural table-setting is appropriate. We must

decide: (1) whether we have jurisdiction over Martinez-Martinez’s arguments under

§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (2) the applicable standard of review, and (3) whether we may consider

the IJ’s decision in reviewing Martinez-Martinez’s petition. We address these issues in turn

below.

A.

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The Government contends that we lack jurisdiction to review Martinez-Martinez’s

arguments as they raise unreviewable questions of fact. We disagree.

It is axiomatic that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Royal Canin

U.S.A. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 28 (2025). This Court does not have jurisdiction to

review immigration judgments regarding certain grants of relief, including cancellation of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). However, that jurisdictional bar does not “preclud[e]

review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed

with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Notably, questions of fact fall outside this exception, and thus are not reviewable by a

federal court. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 333 (2022).

At first glance, this is a workaday dispute: the Government contends that Martinez-

Martinez raises factual issues, while he contends that his arguments present mixed

questions of fact and law. To be sure, the parties do make those arguments. But the

Government first takes a different tack, arguing that Supreme Court precedent is

irreconcilable with our decision in Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2006). There,

the Government contends that we permitted judicial review of factual questions underlying

a good moral character determination, which is a prerequisite to obtain cancellation of

removal. Because Patel and Wilkinson foreclosed such review, the Government’s argument

goes, Jean is no longer good law.

The Government misreads Jean and Supreme Court precedent. In Jean, this Court

expressly acknowledged that we “lack jurisdiction” “[t]o the extent that a petition asks us

to review a discretionary or factual determination[.]” Id. at 480. With that in mind, we held

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that the agency’s “decision that an [applicant] falls within one or more of the ineligible per

se categories is not a discretionary decision,” but rather a “legal determination involving

the application of law to factual findings,” over which we have jurisdiction. Id. at 482. In

other words, we held that the issue presented a “mixed question of law and fact,” which

exists when the Court reviews the “application of a statutory legal standard . . . to an

established set of facts.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212. Such questions are squarely within

our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2). Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized as much in

Patel and cited Jean as aligning with the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of

§ 1252(a)(2)—an interpretation it affirmed in that opinion. Patel, 596 U.S. at 336 n.1.

Further, in the wake of Patel and Wilkinson, we re-affirmed our support for the principle

articulated in Jean. See Ibarra v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 63, 67 n.3 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[M]ixed

questions of law and fact, like whether an [applicant] has good moral character under

§ 1229b, lie within [§ 1252(a)(2)(D)].”). Therefore, the Government’s challenge to Jean

fails.

That leaves us with this appeal’s core jurisdictional question: does Martinez-

Martinez raise factual questions or mixed questions of fact and law? We conclude that he

raises mixed questions of fact and law and thus we have jurisdiction.

Martinez-Martinez contends that the Board improperly applied § 1101(f)(6)’s false

testimony bar by conflating “false testimony” with “concealment,” contrary to Supreme

Court precedent. The Supreme Court “has frequently observed that the application of a

‘statutory standard’ presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 223.

In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court reiterated that principle and extended it to the application

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of § 1252(a)(2)(D). Id. at 222. Because Martinez-Martinez challenges the propriety of the

Board’s application of the false testimony bar—a statutory standard—to the facts of his

case, he presents a mixed question of fact and law over which we have jurisdiction.

That said, the Supreme Court stressed that its holding did not render

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) toothless, as “a court is still without jurisdiction to review a factual

question raised in an application for discretionary relief.” Id. In Kungys v. United States,

the Supreme Court explained that “testimony,” as used in § 1101(f)(6), “is limited to oral

statements made under oath,” but “does not include ‘other types of misrepresentations or

concealments, such as falsified documents or statements not made under oath.’” 485 U.S.

759, 780 (1988) (citation omitted). Kungys clarified that the question of “whether [a

petitioner’s] misrepresentations constitute[] ‘testimony’” is a question of law, while the

question of whether a petitioner “possesse[s] the subjective intent of [] obtaining

immigration or naturalization benefits” is a question of fact. Id. at 782. Thus, Wilkinson

forecloses jurisdiction over factual issues underlying the false testimony bar’s application,

such as Martinez-Martinez’s intent.

With this in mind, our jurisdictional limitations are clear. The thrust of Martinez-

Martinez’s argument is that the agency erroneously applied the false testimony bar to

omissions or concealments. That is a mixed question of fact and law over which we have

jurisdiction. Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222. To the extent Martinez-Martinez invites us to

reconsider the Board’s finding that he acted with the requisite intent, Congress has stripped

us of jurisdiction over that inquiry. See id.; Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 325,

339 (2d Cir. 2025) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of intent under

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§ 1101(f)(6) because “[w]hether and why a petitioner testified falsely are questions of

fact”).

This Court therefore has jurisdiction over Martinez-Martinez’s arguments

concerning the Board’s application of the false testimony bar legal standard to his

testimony.

B.

Turning to the standard of review, we recently recognized that “Wilkinson requires

us to reconsider the standard of review we apply in cases that are reviewable pursuant to

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2024). Prior to

Wilkinson, this Court “appl[ied] de novo review to mixed questions of law and fact” under

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). Id. In Wilkinson, however, the Supreme Court explained that a mixed

question of fact and law, which “requires a court to immerse itself in facts[,] . . . suggests

a more deferential standard of review.” 601 U.S. at 222. “So, Wilkinson indicates that we

should consider the nature of the questions presented before determining how much

deference an opinion from the Board warrants.” Cortes, 105 F.4th at 133. In the wake of

Wilkinson, this Court and many of our sister circuits have yet to evaluate “whether a mixed

question is primarily factual or primarily legal and [] select a correspondingly deferential

standard of review.” Id.; see Samayoa v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 128, 136 n.4 (1st Cir. 2025)

(collecting cases). We find it unnecessary to do so in this appeal “because the results of our

analysis do not differ regardless of whether we apply de novo or abuse-of-discretion

review.” Cortes, 105 F.4th at 134.

C.

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Finally, we possess jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a). When the Board “adopts and affirm[ed] the IJ’s decision and supplements it

with its own opinion, we review both decisions.” Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615,

625 (4th Cir. 2021). In contrast, “[w]here, as here, the [Board] did not adopt the IJ’s opinion

but instead offered its own reasons for denying relief, we review the [Board’s] order rather

than the IJ’s decision.” Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2019).

III.

Turning to the merits, Martinez-Martinez argues that the Board: (1) improperly

reviewed the IJ’s legal determination that his omission of aliases constituted testimony

under § 1101(f)(6) for clear error, and (2) committed legal error by applying the false

testimony bar based on an omission, rather than an oral statement. We agree the Board

applied an incorrect standard of review and will therefore grant the petition for review and

remand to the Board to apply the correct standard. Consequently, we need not reach

Martinez-Martinez’s argument about the application of the false testimony bar.

The Board reviews factual findings for clear error, while it reviews questions of law,

discretion, and all other issues in appeals from IJ decisions de novo, “including, in cases

involving mixed questions of law and fact, the application of the governing legal standard

to the facts found by the immigration judge.” Duncan v. Barr, 919 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir.

2019) (citation omitted); see Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 908 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014); 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).

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Here, the Board “discern[ed] no clear error in the [IJ’s] determination that

[Martinez-Martinez] provided false testimony within the meaning of . . . § 1101(f)(6),

because he had a subjective intent to deceive in order to obtain immigration benefits as

evidenced by his failure to fully and voluntarily disclose his use of aliases until DHS

confronted him with evidence.” J.A. 4 (emphasis added). As discussed above, while intent

is a factual finding properly reviewed for clear error, the application of the false testimony

bar is a legal determination necessitating de novo review. Thus, the Board improperly

reviewed the legal question of whether Martinez-Martinez’s testimony as to aliases

constituted “testimony” under the false testimony bar for clear error. This error alone is

sufficient to grant the petition for review and remand to the Board for application of the

proper standard. See Funez-Ortiz v. McHenry, 127 F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he

BIA commits legal error if it uses the wrong standard in reviewing the IJ’s decision.”).

In sum, we grant the petition for review and remand to the Board for application of

the correct standard of review to the analysis of the § 1101(f)(6) false testimony bar.

IV.

For the reasons discussed, this Court grants Martinez-Martinez’s petition for review,

vacates the Board’s decision regarding the application of the false testimony bar, and

remands the matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED