8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 JAGROOP SINGH, Case No. 1:26-cv-00028-JLT-EPG-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS, DENY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS MOOT, 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS 15 Respondents. TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PETITIONER 16 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 10) 17 18 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 19 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 20 undersigned recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus on Count Two, denying 21 Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner was born in India and entered the United States on July 1, 2024 without 25 inspection and was briefly detained by Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) based on a 26 Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-3 at 3.) On July 1, 2024, 27 Petitioner was released by DHS on an Order of Release on Recognizance. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-3 at 2, 4.) The conditions of release required Petitioner to be placed on Alternative to 1 Detention (“ATD”) monitoring and mandated that Petitioner check in with Immigration and 2 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (ECF No. 1 at 4–5.) On the same date, DHS served Petitioner 3 with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), which designated him as “an alien present in the United States 4 who has not been admitted or paroled” and charged him with removability pursuant to section 5 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-2 6 at 2.) 7 Following his release from detention, Petitioner timely filed a Form I-589, Application 8 for Asylum, with the immigration court. Petitioner also obtained gainful employment and 9 complied with all the conditions of his order of release. Petitioner has no criminal history. On 10 October 24, 2025, Petitioner was detained during a routine ICE check-in appointment, without 11 prior notice and despite the absence of any alleged violation of release conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 12 5.) 13 On January 5, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for 14 temporary restraining order (“TRO”), challenging his detention on substantive and procedural 15 due process grounds and as violative of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF Nos. 16 1, 2.) On January 6, 2025, the Court denied the motion for TRO as untimely but converted it to a 17 motion for preliminary injunction and referred the matter to the undersigned. (ECF No. 6.) On 18 January 21, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 10.) That same day, 19 Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 11.) 20 II. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. Consolidation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction with the Merits 23 In the order setting the briefing schedule, the undersigned indicated that “[g]iven that the 24 petition and the motion for preliminary injunction raise the same claims and seek identical relief, 25 and for purposes of judicial efficiency, it appears to the Court that issuing findings and 26 recommendations on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), which provides that ‘the court may 27 advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing’ on a motion for preliminary 1 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents “respectfully suggest that if the Court is inclined to 2 grant a preliminary injunction and deny the motion to dismiss the habeas petition, judicial 3 economy counsels that the Court should go further and enter a final judgment granting the 4 petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Respondents do not seek a hearing.” (ECF No. 5 10 at 2.) In the reply, Petitioner requests the Court “[e]nter final judgment consistent with Rule 6 65(a)(2) and Respondents’ own request for judicial economy.” (ECF No. 11 at 7.) 7 Given that the petition and the motion for preliminary injunction raise the same claims 8 and seek identical relief, and for purposes of judicial efficiency, the undersigned recommends 9 “advanc[ing] the trial on the merits and consolidat[ing] it with” the motion for preliminary 10 injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). See Dzhabrailov v. Decker, No. 20-CV-3118 (PMH), 2020 11 WL 2731966, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (considering preliminary injunction and merits of 12 habeas petition simultaneously). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The court shall summarily hear and 13 determine the facts, and dispose of [a petitioner’s habeas petition] as law and justice require.”). 14 A. Procedural Due Process 15 In Count Two, Petitioner asserts a violation of his procedural due process rights. (ECF 16 No. 1 at 9–10.) “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks 17 whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the 18 second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 19 sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations 20 omitted). 21 1. Liberty Interest 22 Respondents argue that “Petitioner is a citizen and national of India who entered the 23 United States illegally. He is then an ‘applicant for admission’ who is subject to mandatory 24 detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) 25 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 26 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 27 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 1 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court 2 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior 3 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 4 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 5 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 6 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and 7 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 8 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 9 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The 10 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 11 12 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although 13 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 14 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 15 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 JAGROOP SINGH, Case No. 1:26-cv-00028-JLT-EPG-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS, DENY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS MOOT, 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS 15 Respondents. TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PETITIONER 16 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 10) 17 18 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 19 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 20 undersigned recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus on Count Two, denying 21 Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner was born in India and entered the United States on July 1, 2024 without 25 inspection and was briefly detained by Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) based on a 26 Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-3 at 3.) On July 1, 2024, 27 Petitioner was released by DHS on an Order of Release on Recognizance. (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-3 at 2, 4.) The conditions of release required Petitioner to be placed on Alternative to 1 Detention (“ATD”) monitoring and mandated that Petitioner check in with Immigration and 2 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (ECF No. 1 at 4–5.) On the same date, DHS served Petitioner 3 with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), which designated him as “an alien present in the United States 4 who has not been admitted or paroled” and charged him with removability pursuant to section 5 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-2 6 at 2.) 7 Following his release from detention, Petitioner timely filed a Form I-589, Application 8 for Asylum, with the immigration court. Petitioner also obtained gainful employment and 9 complied with all the conditions of his order of release. Petitioner has no criminal history. On 10 October 24, 2025, Petitioner was detained during a routine ICE check-in appointment, without 11 prior notice and despite the absence of any alleged violation of release conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 12 5.) 13 On January 5, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for 14 temporary restraining order (“TRO”), challenging his detention on substantive and procedural 15 due process grounds and as violative of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF Nos. 16 1, 2.) On January 6, 2025, the Court denied the motion for TRO as untimely but converted it to a 17 motion for preliminary injunction and referred the matter to the undersigned. (ECF No. 6.) On 18 January 21, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 10.) That same day, 19 Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 11.) 20 II. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. Consolidation of Motion for Preliminary Injunction with the Merits 23 In the order setting the briefing schedule, the undersigned indicated that “[g]iven that the 24 petition and the motion for preliminary injunction raise the same claims and seek identical relief, 25 and for purposes of judicial efficiency, it appears to the Court that issuing findings and 26 recommendations on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), which provides that ‘the court may 27 advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing’ on a motion for preliminary 1 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents “respectfully suggest that if the Court is inclined to 2 grant a preliminary injunction and deny the motion to dismiss the habeas petition, judicial 3 economy counsels that the Court should go further and enter a final judgment granting the 4 petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Respondents do not seek a hearing.” (ECF No. 5 10 at 2.) In the reply, Petitioner requests the Court “[e]nter final judgment consistent with Rule 6 65(a)(2) and Respondents’ own request for judicial economy.” (ECF No. 11 at 7.) 7 Given that the petition and the motion for preliminary injunction raise the same claims 8 and seek identical relief, and for purposes of judicial efficiency, the undersigned recommends 9 “advanc[ing] the trial on the merits and consolidat[ing] it with” the motion for preliminary 10 injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). See Dzhabrailov v. Decker, No. 20-CV-3118 (PMH), 2020 11 WL 2731966, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (considering preliminary injunction and merits of 12 habeas petition simultaneously). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The court shall summarily hear and 13 determine the facts, and dispose of [a petitioner’s habeas petition] as law and justice require.”). 14 A. Procedural Due Process 15 In Count Two, Petitioner asserts a violation of his procedural due process rights. (ECF 16 No. 1 at 9–10.) “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks 17 whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the 18 second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 19 sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations 20 omitted). 21 1. Liberty Interest 22 Respondents argue that “Petitioner is a citizen and national of India who entered the 23 United States illegally. He is then an ‘applicant for admission’ who is subject to mandatory 24 detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) 25 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 26 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 27 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 1 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court 2 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior 3 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 4 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 5 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 6 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and 7 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 8 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 9 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The 10 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 11 12 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although 13 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 14 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 15 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 16 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who 17 have been released from immigration custody pending civil removal proceedings have a 18 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 19 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK 20 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 21 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran, 22 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez 23 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 24 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8 25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376, 26 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025). “Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the 27 applicable detention authority for all ‘applicants for admission,’ Respondents fail to contend with 1 recognizance[.]” Garcia v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *9 2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner has 3 a protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. 4 2. Mathews Test 5 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 6 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 7 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 8 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 9 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 10 requirements would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 12 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue is 13 fundamental. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it “is beyond dispute” an immigration 14 detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the 15 ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 16 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 17 With respect to the second factor, “‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is 18 high’ where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination 19 hearing.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, 20 No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025)). “Civil 21 immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a 22 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25- 23 cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (alteration in 24 original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner’s release on recognizance necessarily 25 required a determination that he posed neither a flight risk nor a danger. Rocha Chavarria v. 26 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 27 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at 1 (“The federal government sometimes releases noncitizens on bond or parole while their removal 2 proceedings are pending. Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen 3 is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 4 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is now a flight risk or a 5 danger to the community. “[A]s there have been no procedural safeguards to determine if 6 petitioner’s re-detention is justified, ‘the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., 7 a bond hearing, is high.’” Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 8 3167826, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5). 9 With respect to the third and final factor, “although the government has a strong interest 10 in enforcing the immigration laws, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a 11 hearing is ‘low.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 12 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094). See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22- 13 cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government 14 has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued 15 removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 16 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). Courts generally have found that the cost of 17 providing a custody hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this 18 Court demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a pre-deprivation hearing would be fiscally or 19 administratively burdensome. See J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (“In immigration court, 20 custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” (citing Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 21 1094)). 22 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond 23 hearing and “[t]hat hearing should have occurred before petitioner was re-detained.” Carmen 24 G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 25 8, 2025). 26 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 27 deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. 1 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State 2 deprives a person of liberty ....”). Courts typically require evidence of urgent concerns or an especially strong government interest to 3 justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677, at *9; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 4 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but 5 only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after 6 the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations omitted)). 7 8 Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7. 9 At such a pre-deprivation hearing, the government bears the burden of proving by clear 10 and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk such that re- 11 detention is warranted. See Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (“On balance, the Mathews 12 factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing where the government must prove that 13 she is a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence.”); J.E.H.G. v. 14 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 15 (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by the government that the 16 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government that 17 initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of 18 providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 19 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has demonstrated that he has a strong liberty interest in 20 remaining out of custody, that the risk of erroneous deprivation will be meaningfully reduced by 21 requiring notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and that the 22 governmental burden in providing such procedure is quite minimal. Accordingly, the 23 undersigned recommends granting the petition on Count Two.1 24 B. Appropriate Relief 25 Courts in this district have taken differing approaches to the relief granted to petitioners 26 who have been released, subsequently re-detained, and denied bond hearings in violation of due 27 1 In light of this conclusion, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s substantive due process and 1 process. In some cases, the immediate release of the petitioner has been ordered. See, e.g., 2 Yurani Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 3 2025) (ordering immediate release of petitioner who had been released from immigration 4 detention on parole, was arrested for theft but the case was resolved with community service and 5 did not result in a conviction, and was re-detained at a routine six-month check-in); Carmen 6 G.C., 2025 WL 3521304 (ordering immediate release of petitioner who allegedly violated 7 reporting requirements four times); Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606 (ordering immediate 8 release of petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not identified and 9 where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for petitioner’s re- 10 detention). 11 In other cases, bond hearings have been ordered rather than immediate release. See, e.g., 12 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 13 reporting requirements numerous times and was re-detained based on said violations); Paz 14 Aguilera v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01619 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3485016 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025) 15 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements one time and 16 was re-detained based on said violation); Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826 (ordering bond hearing 17 for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements eight times). 18 Here, Respondents do not allege, and there is nothing in the record before this Court, that 19 Petitioner violated his conditions of release. Respondents do not contend that Petitioner is a 20 danger or flight risk. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s immediate release is the 21 appropriate remedy. 22 C. Request for Abeyance Pending Ninth Circuit’s Rodriguez Vazquez Decision 23 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents raise an alternative argument with respect to “the 24 pending Ninth Circuit appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025), 25 Ninth Circuit docket no. 25-6842. Because the issues in Rodriguez are likely to be dispositive of 26 the issues in this case, Respondents ask that any further briefing deadlines be held abeyance until 27 the resolution of the Rodriguez case.” (ECF No. 10 at 3.) 1 Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025), 2 concerned a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection, lived in the country for 3 fifteen years, was apprehended by ICE, and raised a statutory claim that he is detained under 4 § 1226(a) and not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). The Court is doubtful that 5 the Ninth Circuit decision in Rodriguez Vazquez will have any bearing on the procedural due 6 process claim raised in the present case. In light of the recommendation that the petition be 7 granted on Count Two, the undersigned recommends denying Respondents’ request for abeyance 8 pending the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Rodriguez Vazquez. 9 III. 10 RECOMMENDATION 11 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 12 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on Count Two. 13 2. Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2) be DENIED as moot. 14 3. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be DENIED. 15 4. Respondents be directed to immediately release Petitioner from custody with the same 16 conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his re-detention on October 24, 2025. 17 5. Respondents be enjoined and restrained from re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance 18 with constitutional protections, which include at a minimum, predeprivation notice of at 19 least seven days before a predeprivation hearing at which the government will bear the 20 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to flee or pose 21 a danger to the community if not arrested. 22 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 23 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 24 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 25 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 26 written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 27 serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 1 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 2 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 3 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 4 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 5 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8| Dated: _ January 26, 2026 [Je heey —— 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28