Jaggard v. Abbott Cardiovascular Systems Inc

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *

4 RICHARD JAGGARD, et. al., Case No. 3:21-CV-00360-RCJ-CLB

5 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF 6 v. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

7 ABBOTT CARDIOVASCULAR [ECF No. 23] SYSTEMS, INC., 8 Defendant. 9 10 This lawsuit is the second case filed by Plaintiffs Richard and Judy Jaggard 11 (“Plaintiffs”) arising from a cardiac catheterization procedure that Richard Jaggard 12 underwent in March 2017. In the first case, Plaintiffs sued various medical providers, 13 including the lead surgeon who performed the procedure, in Nevada state court. 14 Ultimately, Plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with the named defendants. In this 15 case, Plaintiffs sue Defendant Abbott Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (“Abbott”), who was 16 not sued in the Nevada state court action, for defects in the medical device involved in 17 the procedure. 18 During discovery, Abbott made explicit discovery requests seeking copies of the 19 settlement agreements between Plaintiffs and the defendants in the Nevada state court 20 action. Plaintiffs refused to provide copies of the agreements asserting that the 21 agreements are confidential. Abbott now moves the Court for an order compelling 22 Plaintiffs to provide them copies of all settlement agreements reached between Plaintiffs 23 and the defendants in the underlying state court action. (ECF No. 23.) Abbott argues that 24 these settlement agreements are discoverable and relevant to this lawsuit. Specifically, 25 Abbott asserts that the underlying settlement agreements are relevant to their defenses 26 and to determine what, if any, setoff would be due for any damages in this case. 27 In response, Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that these settlement agreements are 1 assert that the settlement agreements are confidential and that the motion should be 2 denied because Abbott has not “satisfied the standards in this district for overcoming 3 confidentiality.” (Id. at 2.) 4 Abbott replied arguing that it had met the standards necessary for disclosure of the 5 underlying settlement agreements. (ECF No. 28) The Court agrees with Abbott. 6 Therefore, for the reasons stated below, the motion to compel (ECF No. 23) is granted. 7 I. LEGAL STANDARD 8 “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett 9 v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). The “scope of discovery” encompasses 10 “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional 11 to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is to be construed broadly 12 to include “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that 13 could bear on” any party's claim or defense. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 14 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted). Moreover, information “need not be admissible in 15 evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 16 When a party fails to provide discovery and the parties' attempts to resolve the 17 dispute without Court intervention are unsuccessful, the opposing party may seek an 18 order compelling that discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). However, the party moving for an 19 order to compel discovery bears the initial burden of informing the Court: (1) which 20 discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel; (2) which of the responses 21 are disputed; (3) why he believes the response is deficient; (4) why defendants’ objections 22 are not justified; and (5) why the information he seeks through discovery is relevant to the 23 prosecution of this action. Harris v. Kernan, No. 2:17-cv-0680-TLN-KJN-P, 2019 WL 24 4274010, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019); see also Ellis v. Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-05646- 25 AWI-SMS-PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff must inform the court 26 which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for each disputed 27 response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why defendant's 1 Thereafter, the party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing why 2 that discovery should not be permitted. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 3 (9th Cir. 1975). The party resisting discovery “‘must specifically detail the reasons why 4 each request is irrelevant’ [or otherwise objectionable,] and may not rely on boilerplate, 5 generalized, conclusory, or speculative arguments.” F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 6 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev. 2013) (quoting Painters Joint Comm. v. Emp. Painters Trust 7 Health & Welfare Fund, No. 2:10-cv-1385 JCM (PAL), 2011 WL 4573349, at *5 (D. Nev. 8 2011). Arguments against discovery must be supported by specific examples and 9 articulated reasoning. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 10 2006). 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 In this instance, Abbott has met its initial burden related to the motion to compel. 13 Specifically, Abbott has identified the discovery requests that are in dispute and the 14 responses, has explained why the responses are deficient, and has explained why the 15 discovery requested is relevant. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show why the 16 discovery should not be permitted. However, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. 17 Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the settlement agreements are discoverable, 18 nor do they claim that at least some of the information contained in the documents, 19 namely the settlement amounts, are relevant. Rather, Plaintiffs simply claim that the 20 settlement agreements are “confidential,” and Abbott has not overcome the standards for 21 maintaining this confidentiality as set forth in a prior decision from another magistrate 22 judge in this district. (ECF No. 24.) The Court disagrees. 23 As a starting point, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the settlement agreements should not 24 be disclosed because they are “confidential” is unpersuasive. There is not a federal 25 privilege preventing the discovery of settlement agreements in litigation. Bd. Of Trs. Of 26 Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco, Int’l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 521, 523 (C.D. Cal. 2008.) 27 Moreover, a protective order can be imposed to ensure the confidentiality of the 1| settlement agreements in the underlying litigation, including the amounts of the settlements, are relevant to this case in several ways, including, but not limited, to the issues of offsets, the question of any release of liability, and other matters related to this 4) litigation. Plaintiffs have failed provide any valid basis or rationale to prevent the 5 | disclosure of the underlying settlement agreements and thus, Abbott’s motion to compel 6 | should be granted. 7| Ill «CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Abbott’s motion to compel, (ECF No. 23), is GRANTED in its entirety. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have fourteen (14) days from the 11 date of this order to provide Abbott with any and all settlement agreements they reached 12 with any and all defendants in the underlying Nevada state court action without redaction. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that these documents shall be marked 14| “CONFIDENTIAL” and that Abbott is precluded from disseminating these documents t the public or to any third parties, and are to be kept confidential, except as is □□□□□□□□□□ for Abbott to defend its interests in the present action. 17| DATED: October 5, 2022 | .

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28