Jade Waichulaitis, et al. v. Michael Sloat, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00900
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Jade Waichulaitis, et al., No. CV-25-00900-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Michael Sloat, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants City of Chandler (the “City”), Lydia Ravelo, 16 Matthew Loper, Matthew Figley, Hiago Pereira, and Ryan Stover’s (collectively, the “City 17 Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 29). 18 The Motion has been fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part 19 Defendants’ Motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This case stems from Plaintiff Jade Waichulaitis’ (“Jade”) allegation that he was 22 falsely arrested and charged with aggravated assault. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 11.) The FAC alleges 23 the following. On April 17, 2024, Jade observed Defendant Michael Sloat (“Sloat”) 24 stealing a gas can from his driveway. (Id. at 5–6 ¶ 30.) Jade did not know Sloat at that 25 time. (Id. at 6 ¶ 30.) Jade confronted Sloat, who subsequently recorded Jade with his 26 phone. (Id.) Jade attempted to grab the phone. (Id. ¶ 31.) Sloat then attacked Jade while 27 holding the gas can. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) During the altercation, Jade tried to retrieve the gas 28 can from Sloat, but the cap came lose spilling gas on Jade and Sloat. (Id. ¶ 32.) 1 As Jade backed towards his front door, Sloat followed him. (Id. ¶ 33.) Jade then 2 “acted in self-defense against [Sloat] to protect his house.” (Id.) Sloat and Jade disagreed 3 as to whether Jade used a rock in self-defense or produced a lighter during the altercation. 4 (Id. ¶ 34.) Jade incurred multiple bruises and a cut on his forehead. (Id. ¶ 36.) 5 Jade told his mother, Sharon Waichulaitis (“Sharon”) to call the police because he 6 had been punched by Sloat. (Id. at 4 ¶ 19.) Jade was not present when Officers Ravelo, 7 Loper, and Figley of the Chandler Arizona Police Department arrived at the house. (Id. 8 at 4 ¶¶ 17, 19, 5 ¶ 28.) Sloat told the police that Jade had attacked him. (Id. at 3 ¶ 13.) 9 Sloat said he went onto Jade’s property to get his phone but tackled Jade after Jade called 10 Sloat “a name” and doused him with gasoline. (Id. at 3 ¶ 16, 5 ¶ 29.) 11 Officer Figley gave Sharon a report number and instructed her to have Jade contact 12 police “in order to get his side of the story.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 21.) However, Officer Ravelo 13 immediately put out an “attempt to locate” for Jade “to arrest him for probable cause for 14 aggravated assault.” (Id. ¶ 18.) 15 Later that night, an “Immediate Action Team” (“IAT”)1 “was formed in front of 16 Waichulaitis’ residence and another IAT was formed in the backyard of the rear of the 17 neighbor’s home in an attempt to arrest Jade.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 24.) Jade was arrested after he 18 “briefly ran from police.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Officer Stover “used his rifle to arrest Jade” and other 19 officers pointed guns at him with “night scopes/lights.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 26, 10 ¶ 51.) 20 Jade was charged with aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal damage. 21 (Id. at 3¶ 11; 7 ¶ 38.) After the arrest, Officer Ravelo submitted a “false or misleading 22 Form IV/release questionnaire” that did not include Jade’s version of events.2 (Id. at 3 23 ¶ 13, 5 ¶ 10.) Additionally, it is alleged that Officer Pereira falsified his police report by 24 providing that Jade caused “substantial damage to the right rear patrol vehicle’s door” by 25 1 The FAC also alleges that a “SWAT team” was used to arrest Jade. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 11.) 26 It is unclear what the distinction—or relationship—is between the IAT and the SWAT team. 27 2 A Form IV outlines details of an arrest, including “facts which establish probable cause for the crime(s) for which the defendant is booked or is charged.” See Ariz. R. Crim P. 28 Form 4(a). A “Form IV” is a form completed by police and used by Arizona courts See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 41 1 kicking it despite there being “no significant damage to the police vehicle.” (Id. at 7 2 ¶¶ 37–38.) Jade spent ten days in jail before the charges were dismissed. (Id. at 8 ¶ 42.) 3 Jade, Sharon, and Jade’s father, Bruce Waichulaitis (“Bruce”) (collectively, 4 “Plaintiffs”) now bring a panoply of state and federal claims against Sloat, the City, and 5 Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, Pereira, and Stover. The present Motion only seeks 6 dismissal of the claims brought against the City and Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, 7 Pereira, and Stover (collectively, the “City Defendants”). This Order collectively refers to 8 Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, Pereira, and Stover as the “Officer Defendants.” 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure 11 to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) 12 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 13 relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 14 which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) 15 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets 16 forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 17 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 18 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 20 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 21 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 22 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 23 cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 24 matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 26 “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 27 unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 28 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’” 1 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 2 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations 3 are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 4 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 5 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 6 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 7 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence 8 outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States 9 v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider 10 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 11 the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into 12 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908. 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 At the outset, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ repeated insistence that dismissal is 15 inappropriate because discovery is necessary to substantiate their claims. (Doc. 34 at 1, 2, 16 8–9, 16–17.) Of course, the nature of some claims makes it difficult to provide sufficient 17 details at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126 18 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that it is often impossible to provide details of a conspiracy claim 19 at the pleading stage, thus necessitating discovery). All the available evidence is not 20 always available at the pleading stage—that is the purpose of discovery. See Keith H. v. 21 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 655 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Generally, the 22 purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain 23 evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.”). However, this understanding 24 is baked into the pleading standard; claimants must only include enough factual detail to 25 make their claim plausible—not certain. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the nature of the 26 underlying claim might affect what constitutes sufficient factual detail, “[t]hreadbare 27 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are 28 never sufficient. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not exempted from Rule 8’s requirements 1 merely because they want discovery. 2 The Court also cautions Plaintiffs against “shotgun pleading.” Shumlich v. U.S. 3 Bank, N.A., No. 2:24-CV-01681-MJP, 2025 WL 19871, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2025) 4 (“Pleadings that seek to overwhelm defendants with an unclear mass of allegations and 5 make it difficult to impossible for the defendants to make informed responses to the 6 plaintiff’s allegations are considered shotgun pleadings.” (citation modified)). Complaints 7 may be considered impermissible shotgun pleadings if they merely set forth “everyone did 8 everything” allegations or “simply incorporat[e] every antecedent allegation by reference.” 9 Id. (citation modified); see Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). Shotgun 10 pleadings risk dismissal under Rule 8(a)(2). See A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc, 11 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 943 (D. Or. 2020). Here, Plaintiffs assert blanket claims against 12 groups of defendants, rarely attributing particular actions to particular Defendants. This 13 pleading “strategy” makes it difficult for the Court to properly assess the adequacy of 14 Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court now turns to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ eleven causes 15 of action. 16 A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution 17 The FAC includes a claim for false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Jade 18 against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 17.) The FAC also includes state law claims 19 for false imprisonment and malicious prosecutions by Jade against the City Defendants. 20 (Id. at 14–15.) The Court analyzes these claims together because there was probable cause 21 to arrest and prosecute Jade—a complete defense to these claims.3 22 1. False Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 23 The Court begins by analyzing Jade’s § 1983 false arrest claim. Section 1983 24 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 25 custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

26 3 Plaintiffs insist that “probable cause is a factual issue” which requires discovery. (Doc. 34 at 7.) They are mistaken. “[T]he question of whether a reasonable officer could have 27 believed probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) existed to justify an arrest is an essentially legal question that should be determined by the district court at the earliest 28 possible point in the litigation.” Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation modified). 1 United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 2 Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” “The ultimate 3 issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question 4 posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of 5 federal rights fairly attributable to the government?” Pasadena Republican Club v. W. 6 Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). To state a § 1983 claim, 7 “a plaintiff must ‘plead that (1) the defendants acted under color of state law and 8 (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.’” WMX 9 Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Gibson v. 10 United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)). It is undisputed that the Officer 11 Defendants were acting under the color of state law. 12 “A claim for [false] arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 13 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” 14 Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, 15 Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that Jade was arrested without probable cause. See 16 Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs fail to 17 do so. 18 “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably 19 trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an 20 offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. 21 Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). Importantly, “[w]hether probable cause exists 22 depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting 23 officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (emphasis 24 added). Additionally, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the 25 criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Id. at 153. The 26 FAC establishes that there was probable cause to arrest Jade for any number of crimes. 27 Prior to the arrest, Sloat informed police that Jade attacked him with a rock and 28 doused him with gasoline. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 13, 4 ¶ 16, 5 ¶ 27.) By the time police became 1 involved, Sloat was visibly injured and Jade was not present. (Id. at 4 ¶ 17, 5 ¶ 28, 7 ¶ 40.) 2 Furthermore, Jade ran from police when they attempted to arrest him. (Id. at 5 ¶ 26.) These 3 facts are sufficient to establish that there was probable cause to arrest Jade. 4 Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. At bottom, Plaintiffs contend 5 that further investigation disproved many of the facts that gave rise to probable cause. 6 (Doc. 34 at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Jade was arrested for assault with a deadly 7 weapon “yet further investigation revealed that no rocks were found.” (Id.) Additionally, 8 Plaintiffs argue that the Form IV and police report “show numerous inconsistencies and 9 blatantly false claims.” (Id.) These arguments errantly rely on information made available 10 after the arrest, not “at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. 11 Disproving facts used to form probable cause after an arrest does not make the 12 probable cause determination unreasonable in the first instance. See District of Columbia 13 v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018) (“To determine whether an officer had probable cause 14 for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these 15 historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 16 amount to probable cause.” (emphasis added) (citation modified)). This conclusion is in 17 harmony with the understanding that probable cause demands objective reasonableness, 18 not perfection. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (noting that the 19 “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness” and that “[t]o be reasonable is 20 not to be perfect” (citation modified)). As the Supreme Court noted, “probable cause does 21 not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” 22 Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61. Much less are officers required to do so when a suspect’s first 23 encounter with the police is evading arrest. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 24 (2000) (noting that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . is a pertinent factor in 25 determining reasonable suspicion”). The Wesby Court went on to note that “innocent 26 explanations—even uncontradicted ones—do not have any automatic, 27 probable-cause-vitiating effect.” 583 U.S. at 68. This accords with the understanding that 28 probable cause is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 1 factual contexts.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. 2 Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). 3 Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s § 1983 false arrest claim 4 against the Officer Defendants. 5 2. False Imprisonment 6 The foregoing analysis also demands dismissal of Jade’s false imprisonment claim 7 under state law. To establish false imprisonment under Arizona law, a plaintiff must show 8 that they were unlawfully detained “without his consent and without lawful authority.” 9 Cullison v. City of Peoria, 584 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Ariz. 1978). However, “a detention which 10 occurs pursuant to legal authority . . . is not an unlawful detention.” Id. Accordingly, 11 “[p]robable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest or false imprisonment.” 12 Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2009); see Hansen v. Garcia, 713 13 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that a summary judgment should be granted 14 on false imprisonment claims where an arrest was legal and made with probable cause). 15 Plaintiffs argue that Jade was falsely imprisoned because “police did not conduct an 16 investigation and instead of waiting for Jade to contact them, they initiated a nighttime 17 arrest with rifles, flashlights and frightening police action.” (Doc. 17 at 14 ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs 18 further contend that “Jade was not only arrested but he was kept in jail for a week.” (Id.) 19 These arguments fail to establish that police did not have probable cause “at the time 20 of the arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. Plaintiffs do not point to any authority that 21 required police to “wait[] for Jade to contact them.” Indeed, there are no facts indicating 22 that it was unreasonable for police to accept Sloat’s version of events at the time of the 23 arrest. Again, “probable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent 24 explanation for suspicious facts.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61; Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 25 P.2d 550, 553 (Ariz. 1975) (“Police depend upon the information furnished by citizens, 26 and, unless the contrary appears, they should be able to depend upon the presumption that 27 men speak the truth.”). Broadly, Plaintiffs fail to allege that police lacked lawful authority 28 to arrest Jade. 1 Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s false imprisonment claim 2 against the City Defendants. 3 3. Malicious Prosecution 4 Finally, the Court turns to Jade’s state law claim of malicious prosecution. “[T]he 5 essential elements of an action for malicious prosecution are 1) a criminal prosecution, 6 2) that terminates in favor of plaintiff, 3) with defendants as prosecutors, 4) actuated by 7 malice, 5) without probable cause and 6) causing damages.” Cullison, 584 P.2d at 1160. 8 “The key element of malicious prosecution is malice, which can be inferred from a lack of 9 probable cause.” Id. Thus, “the existence of probable cause to institute an action is a 10 complete defense to malicious prosecution.” Id. 11 “In the context of malicious prosecution, probable cause is defined as a reasonable 12 ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent 13 man in believing the accused is guilty of the offense.” Gonzales v. City of Phoenix, 52 14 P.3d 184, 187 (Ariz. 2002) (citation modified). “The test generally applied is: upon the 15 appearances presented to the defendant, would a reasonably prudent man have instituted 16 or continued the proceeding?” Id. (quoting McClinton v. Rice, 265 P.2d 425, 431 (Ariz. 17 1953)). Here, Jade was charged with aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal 18 damage. (Doc. 17 at 3¶ 11, 7 ¶ 38.) The FAC and incorporated documents establish that 19 there was probable cause to prosecute Jade for each crime.4 20 a. Aggravated Assault 21 There was probable cause to prosecute Jade for aggravated assault. Under Arizona 22 law, a person commits criminal assault by: (1) “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly 23 causing any physical injury to another person”; (2) “[i]ntentionally placing another person 24 in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury”; or (3) “[k]nowingly touching 25 another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 26 4 As noted, “[a] court may, however, consider materials—documents attached to the 27 complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 28 Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. The FAC relies heavily on the Form IV, Officer Pereira’s police report, and other documents relating to Jade’s prosecution. 1 § 13-1203(A)(1)–(3). Criminal assault becomes aggravated assault “[i]f the person uses a 2 deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(2). Jade was 3 charged with using a rock as a deadly weapon.5 (Doc. 29-5 at 3.) 4 The Court already relayed those facts in the FAC which supported the existence of 5 probable cause to arrest Jade. Based on these facts, a reasonable person would institute an 6 aggravated assault proceeding against Jade. Again, Sloat, who was visibly injured, 7 informed police that Jade attacked him with a rock, doused him with gasoline, and 8 attempted to evade arrest. (Doc. 17 at 3 ¶ 13, 4 ¶ 16, 5 ¶¶ 26–27, 7 ¶ 40.) This information 9 was also relayed by Officer Ravelo in the Form IV, which states Sloat had “injuries from 10 the gasoline on skin.”. (Doc. 29-2 at 2–3.) The Form IV was completed after the arrest. 11 (Doc. 29-2 at 2.) 12 Plaintiffs argue that the Form IV cannot establish probable cause to prosecute Jade 13 for aggravated assault because it contains false information. (Doc. 34 at 7.) Plaintiffs 14 primarily contend that Officer Ravelo was aware of Jade’s version of events when she filed 15 out the Form IV but failed to include those details. (Doc. 17 at 5.) However, Plaintiffs do 16 not cite any authority suggesting that a suspect having a different version of events is 17 sufficient to eliminate a finding of probable cause. Of course, such a rule would be utterly 18 impracticable. Nor do Plaintiffs point to any facts suggesting that it was patently 19 unreasonable for police to rely on Sloat’s version of events. 20 Of course, “an officer may not ignore exculpatory evidence that would negate a 21 finding of probable cause.” Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 22 2015) (citation modified). However, Jade’s protestations do not negate a finding of 23 probable cause because “[t]he mere existence of some evidence that could suggest 24 self-defense does not negate probable cause.” Id. Ultimately, Plaintiffs fail to plead any 25 facts that demonstrate that the officers’ first-hand observations and Sloat’s recapitulation 26 of events was objectively unreasonable. And while the Form IV might not contain Jade’s 27 version of events, the police report does include Jade’s version of events. (Doc. 29-2 at 6.)

28 5 Arizona courts have recognized that rocks can be dangerous instruments. See, e.g., In re A.E., No. 2 CA-JV 2023-0117, 2024 WL 471654, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024). 1 Although Plaintiffs repeatedly bemoan the Form IV for being “false,” they seem to 2 exclusively focus on the Form IV “[s]tating there was a deadly weapon or dangerous 3 instrument,” which, in Plaintiff’s view, “is directly contradicted by the police report.” 4 (Doc. 34 at 8.) Plaintiffs state that “further investigation revealed that no rocks were 5 found.” (Doc. 17 at 7 ¶ 40.) 6 The Form IV provides that at approximately 1 PM Jade twice “threw a rock at 7 [Sloat’s] face.” (Doc. 29-2 at 2.) The police report provides that “further investigation 8 revealed that no rocks were found” but that a “single rock was found” on a nearby house. 9 (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) However, this is not the inconsistency Plaintiffs make it out to be. The 10 Form IV pertains to the 1 PM altercation between Jade and Sloat. (Doc. 29-2 at 1.) 11 However, the police report pertains to an 11 PM “Disorderly Conduct call” placed 12 regarding a “suspect . . . throwing rocks at a neighbor’s house.” (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) It is 13 unclear that the Form IV is “blatantly false” based on police not finding a rock on the 14 ground more than 10 hours after the alleged altercation. 15 b. Disorderly Conduct 16 There was probable cause to prosecute Jade for disorderly conduct. Under Arizona 17 law, “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of 18 a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such 19 person . . . [e]ngages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20 § 13-2904(A)(1). The above facts and analysis are sufficient to establish probable cause 21 to prosecute Jade for disorderly conduct. 22 c. Criminal Damage 23 Finally, there was probable cause to prosecute Jade for criminal damage. “A person 24 commits criminal damage by . . . [r]ecklessly defacing or damaging property of another 25 person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1602(A)(1). Jade was charged with “causing damage in an 26 amount of $250 or less” under § 13-1602(B)(6). (Doc. 29-5 at 3.) In the police report, 27 Officer Pereira wrote: During the process of placing [Jade] in the rear cab of the patrol vehicle[,] 28 [Jade]was uncooperative and refused to enter the patrol vehicle, placing his 1 right foot at the patrol vehicle’s door. After brief resistance, [Jade] was placed in the rear cab of the patrol vehicle. While inside the patrol vehicle, 2 [Jade] became aggressive and began kicking the patrol vehicle from inside, 3 causing substantial damage to the right rear patrol vehicle’s door. I secured [Jade’s] legs with a strap using restraint technique to prevent kicking, in an 4 attempt to prevent more damage to the patrol vehicle and to prevent [Jade] 5 from injuring himself. 6 (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) Plaintiffs contend that the criminal damage prosecution was malicious 7 because it was “dismissed after prosecutors found out the claims were false and misleading 8 about . . . the damage to the vehicle.” (Doc. 17 at 15 ¶ 80.) Plaintiffs allege that the 9 prosecutor stated: “The State has been notified by the Police Department there was no 10 significant damage to the police vehicle as a result of this incident and therefore no 11 restitution sought.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 38.) Accepting as true that there was no “significant 12 damage” to the police vehicle, there still was probable cause to prosecute Jade for criminal 13 damage. 14 In Arizona, criminal damage does not require “significant damage.” Instead, 15 § 13-1602(A)(1) only requires reckless damage of another’s property. For purposes of 16 § 13-1602(A)(1), “damage” is defined broadly as it “means any physical or visual 17 impairment of any surface.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1701(1) (emphasis added); see Ariz. 18 Rev. Stat. § 13-1601(1) (adopting § 13-1701’s definition of “damage” to § 13-1602). 19 Accordingly, the amount of damage caused does not influence whether someone 20 commits criminal damage in the first instance. Instead, the amount of damage affects the 21 punishment for criminal damage. See § 13-1601(B). Although the alleged damage Jade 22 caused might have been dubbed “substantial” and “significant” by police officers and 23 prosecutors, Jade was ultimately charged with causing less than $250 worth of 24 damage—the lowest form of criminal damage. See § 13-1602(B)(6). 25 Taking as true Plaintiffs’ allegations that Jade did not cause “substantial damage,” 26 the police report would still establish probable cause. Jade kicking the inside of the police 27 car to a point necessitating restraint would be “sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent 28 man in believing the accused is guilty of” causing criminal damage. Gonzales, 52 P.3d 1 at 187 (citation modified). Again, criminal damage only requires “any physical or visual 2 impairment of any surface.” § 13-1701(1) (emphasis added). 3 Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Jade’s malicious prosecution claim 4 against the City Defendants. 5 B. Assault and Battery 6 The FAC includes state law claims for assault and battery against the City 7 Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 9). Under Arizona law, “[a]n actor is subject to liability to another 8 for battery if the actor intentionally engages in an act that results in harmful or offensive 9 contact with the person of another.” Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 10 435, 438 (Ariz. 2003). “Similarly, to succeed on an assault claim a plaintiff must prove 11 that the defendant acted with intent to cause another harmful or offensive contact or 12 apprehension thereof, and the other person apprehended imminent contact.” Lewis v. Dirt 13 Sports LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1044 (D. Ariz. 2017) (citation modified). “The two 14 claims are the same except that assault does not require the offensive touching or contact.” 15 Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 809 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)). 16 Plaintiffs allege that the Officer Defendants “intentionally attacked . . . and harmed” 17 Jade. (Doc. 17 at 9 ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs go on to allege that “[t]hese actions included the 18 offensive contact having countless officers enter the neighbor’s home, pointing guns with 19 night scopes/lights at Jade at night at his own house, and the use of a rifle to arrest Jade 20 despite there being no indication weapons were needed to be drawn.” (Id. at 9–10 ¶ 51). 21 The assault and battery claims are easily dismissed as to Officers Ravelo, Loper, 22 Figley, and Pereira. The FAC fails to allege that that these officers participated in the 23 above conduct or were even present at Jade’s arrest.6 The only named defendant alleged 24 to participate in the foregoing conduct is Officer Stover. The FAC provides that Officer 25 Stover “used his rifle to arrest Jade despite there being no indication weapons were needed 26 to be drawn.” (Doc. 17 at 5 ¶ 25.) This is insufficient to give rise to a battery claim because

27 6 Based on the police report, it appears that Officer Pereira was present at Jade’s arrest. But it is unclear what role Officer Pereira played in Jade’s arrest beyond strapping Jade’s 28 legs to keep him from kicking the inside of the police vehicle. (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) The FAC does not cite this incident as giving rise to an assault or battery claim. 1 Plaintiffs fail to allege that Officer Stover touched or contacted Jade. 2 This leaves the assault claim against Officer Stover. The Court finds that Plaintiffs 3 have plausibly pleaded that Officer Stover caused Jade to apprehend imminent harm or 4 offensive contact by pointing a rifle at him. 5 The City Defendants correctly point out that, under Arizona law, police are 6 “justified in threatening or using physical force against another if in making or assisting in 7 making an arrest.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-409; see Oakry v. City of Tempe, 629 F. Supp. 3d 8 974, 987 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“Arizona law provides that a person cannot be civilly liable for 9 justified conduct . . . .”). However, an officer is only justified in using physical force under 10 § 13-409 if: (1) “[a] reasonable person would believe that such force is immediately 11 necessary to effect the arrest or detention or prevent the escape; (2) “[s]uch person makes 12 known the purpose of the arrest . . . or believes that it is otherwise known or cannot 13 reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested or detained; (3) “[a] reasonable 14 person would believe the arrest or detention to be lawful.” § 13-409(1)–(3). While these 15 factors might be met in this case, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the assault claim 16 against Officer Stover at this juncture. Ultimately, the City Defendants bear “the burden 17 of proving a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil case.” Ryan 18 v. Napier, 425 P.3d 230, 241 (Ariz. 2018). 19 Accordingly, apart from the assault claim against Officer Stover, the Court 20 dismisses without prejudice Jade’s assault and battery claims against the City Defendants. 21 C. Gross Negligence 22 The FAC includes a gross negligence claim by Jade against the City Defendants. 23 (Doc. 17 at 11). Under Arizona law, gross negligence “involves the creation of an 24 unreasonable risk of bodily harm to another (simple negligence) together with a high 25 degree of probability that substantial harm will result (wantonness).” Roebuck v. Mayo 26 Clinic, 575 P.3d 375, 383 (Ariz. 2025) (citation modified). Thus, gross negligence requires 27 negligence paired with a “choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious 28 danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger 1 to any reasonable man.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Wise, 476 P.2d 145, 151 (Ariz. 1970)); 2 see Noriega v. Town of Miami, 407 P.3d 92, 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). Plaintiffs fail to 3 plead a gross negligence claim. 4 Plaintiffs allege that the City Defendants acted outrageously by “respon[ding] to 5 this matter at 11:00 at night and going to neighbors and presenting Jade as a dangerous 6 criminal.” (Doc. 17 at 11 ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs further allege that the false statements in the 7 Form IV and police report “can support a claim of gross negligence.” (Id. ¶ 60.) These 8 conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the City Defendants were 9 grossly negligent. At bottom, Plaintiffs do not specifically identify any particular action 10 by any particular defendant that rises to the level of gross negligence. 11 First, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts demonstrating that the City Defendants had 12 reason to know “facts that would lead a reasonable person to recognize their conduct 13 created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and involved a high probability of substantial 14 harm.” Garibay v. Johnson, 565 P.3d 236, 246 (Ariz. 2025). Plaintiffs essentially allege 15 that police conducted a late-night arrest that became known to Jade’s neighbors. It is 16 unclear what risk of substantial harm Jade was exposed to. This hardly rises to the level 17 of gross negligence.7 18 Second, Plaintiffs allege—without any supporting authority—that the City 19 Defendants were grossly negligent because they knowingly gave false testimony. (Doc. 20 17 at 11 ¶ 60.) It is unclear how giving false testimony, by itself, can support a claim of 21 7 Plaintiffs do not specifically state that Officer Stover was grossly negligent in pointing a 22 rifle at Jade. However, it is unclear whether Officer Stover’s act of pointing a rife at Jade could plausibly support both an assault claim and a gross negligence claim. See, e.g., 23 Hernandez v. County of Santa Cruz, No. CV-24-00353-TUC-SHR, 2025 WL 2495065, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2025) (dismissing a gross negligence claim where the underlying 24 conduct was an intentional use of force). In Ryan, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that negligence and intentional torts are “mutually exclusive grounds for liability.” 425 25 P.3d at 236. While claimants can assert both claims as alternate theories of liability, claimants must demonstrate that a set of facts plausibly gives rise to both a negligence 26 claim and an intentional tort claim. See id. at 238. However, an intentional use of force cannot support a gross negligence claim. See id. A negligence claim can only tenably 27 accompany an intentional use of force claim where: (1) the negligence claim is based on “conduct that is independent of the intentional use of force”; or (2) an action can reasonably 28 be construed as either intentional or negligent. See id. For example, in Ryan, an officer’s intentional release of a K-9 did not support a negligence claim. Id. 1 gross negligence. Plaintiffs fail to link the alleged false testimony to an unreasonable risk 2 of bodily harm. As other courts in the District have noted, “[while] a plaintiff need not 3 show that actual bodily harm occurred, it is not true that this ‘risk of bodily harm’ 4 requirement is dispensable when making a claim for gross negligence.” Daurio v. Arizona, 5 No. CV-25-00001-PHX-SPL, 2025 WL 1745106, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2025)I. While 6 false testimony could hypothetically expose someone to bodily harm, that is not this case. 7 As noted, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate any patent falsehood in either the Form IV or the 8 police report. However, even if Plaintiffs did so, these documents were completed after 9 Jade was arrested. Plaintiffs do not identify what risk of bodily harm Jade faced after the 10 Form IV and police report were completed or how that risk was at all related to the Form 11 IV or the police report. 12 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s gross negligence claim 13 against the City Defendants. 14 D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 15 The FAC claims intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) by each Plaintiff 16 against the City Defendants.8 (Doc. 17 at 12.) Under Arizona law, “one who by extreme 17 and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 18 another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 19 results from it, for such bodily harm.” Godbehere v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 20 785 (Ariz. 1989) (citation modified). IIED has three elements: (1) “the conduct by the 21 defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’”; (2) “the defendant must either intend to 22 cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will 23 result from his conduct”; and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result 24 of defendant’s conduct.” Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005) 25 (quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)). 26 Plaintiffs allege that Jade, Bruce, and Sharon each suffered from emotional distress 27 due to “Jade’s wrongful arrest, court proceedings and incarceration.” (Doc. 17 at 14 ¶ 73.)

28 8 Count Four also includes an IIED claim by Jade against Sloat. (Doc. 17 at 12). The Court does not address this claim. 1 Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fail because they fail to allege that the City Defendants’ conduct 2 was extreme or outrageous. Plaintiffs also make blanket assertions that apparently apply 3 to each of the City Defendants without attributing specific conduct to specific defendants. 4 IIED claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim where the claim is predicated 5 on a lawful arrest. See Malnes v. City of Flagstaff, 710 F. App’x 764, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) 6 (citing Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 909 P.2d 7 486, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)). Lawful arrests cannot “constitute the ‘extreme or 8 outrageous’ behavior required to establish [IIED].” Id. (citing Wallace, 909 P.2d at 496). 9 As discussed, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Jade’s arrest or prosecution was unlawful. 10 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fails because those claims are predicated on a lawful 11 arrest and prosecution. 12 Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff’s IIED claim against the 13 City Defendants. 14 E. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 15 The FAC includes claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) by 16 Bruce and Sharon against the City Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 16.) Under Arizona law, “the 17 tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires” that the plaintiff: (1) “witnessed 18 an injury to a closely related person”; (2) “suffered mental anguish manifested as physical 19 injury”; and (3) “was within the zone of danger so as to be subjected to an unreasonable 20 risk of bodily harm created by the defendant.” Doe I ex rel. Fleming & Curti PLC v. Warr, 21 566 P.3d 342, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) (citation modified). 22 Plaintiffs allege that Bruce and Share “were in the zone of danger” “by seeing their 23 son taken into custody” (Doc. 17 at 16–17 ¶¶ 87, 90.) As a result, Plaintiffs allege that 24 Bruce and Sharon experienced “emotional distress that resulted in physical harm including 25 loss of sleep, headaches, stomach aches and loss of appetite.” (Doc. 17 at 16 ¶ 87.) 26 Plaintiffs’ claim fails for a myriad of reasons. 27 It is unclear what injury Bruce and Sharon witnessed as Plaintiffs never specify what 28 harm befell Jade. Plaintiffs allege that Bruce and Sharon saw “their son harmed” and “were 1 damaged by seeing their son taken into custody by this conduct.” (Id. at 16–17 ¶¶ 87, 89.) 2 Plaintiffs also repeatedly allege that Jade incurred physical injuries. (Id. at 10 ¶ 52.) 3 However, Plaintiffs never specify what those injuries are or how they were incurred. 4 Instead, Plaintiffs lodge cursory allegations such as “Defendants intentionally attacked 5 [Jade] and harmed him.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 51.) While it is unclear what “attack” and “harm” 6 means in this context, it appears that Plaintiffs are labeling Jade’s arrest as the attack. 7 Regardless, even if the Court were to accept that Jade incurred the requisite injury, 8 Plaintiffs fail to establish that Bruce and Sharon were in the danger zone. “A person is not 9 within the zone of danger unless he witnesses the injury of a closely related person from a 10 position in which ‘the negligent defendant created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm’ to 11 him as well.” Marquez v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-08-1132-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 12 11338817, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2008) (quoting Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 670 13 (Ariz. 1979)). Plaintiffs fail to allege that Bruce and Sharon faced an unreasonable risk of 14 bodily harm. 15 Finally, Plaintiffs fail to plead that they “suffered mental anguish manifested as 16 physical injury.” Warr, 566 P.3d at 352. As noted, Plaintiffs complain they experienced 17 “emotional distress that resulted in physical harm including loss of sleep, headaches, 18 stomach aches and loss of appetite.” (Doc. 17 at 16 ¶ 87.) In Arizona, “physical injury, as 19 well as a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance, constitutes sufficient bodily 20 harm to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Monaco v. 21 HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 995 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). However, 22 “[t]ransitory physical phenomena, such as crying, nightmares, insomnia, and headaches, 23 that are themselves inconsequential and do not result in substantial bodily harm, cannot 24 support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Borunda v. Rico, No. 1 25 CA-CV 12-0859, 2013 WL 6327652, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013). Plaintiffs fail to 26 establish that their alleged injuries “result[ed] in substantial bodily harm” or otherwise 27 “persist[ed] so as to result in a long-term physical illness or mental disturbance.” Id. 28 (emphasis added). 1 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Bruce and Sharon’s NIED 2 claim against the City Defendants. 3 F. Defamation 4 The FAC includes claims of defamation by Plaintiffs against the City Defendants. 5 (Doc. 17 at 15.) “To prevail on a defamation claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must 6 show (1) the defendant published a false and defamatory statement, and (2) the defendant 7 either (a) knew the statement to be false and defamatory, (b) acted in reckless disregard to 8 these matters, or (c) acted negligently in failing to ascertain them.” Burton v. Ariz. Dep’t 9 of Pub. Safety, No. CV-20-00920-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 2806760, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 10 2025) (citing Peagler v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Ariz. 1977)). 11 Plaintiffs allege they were defamed because police “[p]resent[ed] Jade or his family 12 as criminals or harboring criminals by going into neighbors’ homes to obtain access to the 13 Waichulaitis home to arrest Jade.” (Id. at 16 ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs further allege that “body 14 cameras will show the published statements about the intended arrest.” (Id.) Plaintiff fails 15 to adequately plead a defamation claim. 16 At bottom, Plaintiffs do not identify a false or defamatory statement. Instead, 17 Plaintiffs appear to argue that Jade’s arrest was defamatory because it presented Jade and 18 his family as criminals. Courts have expressly rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., Pistor 19 v. Garcia, No. CV-12-0786-PHX-FJM, 2014 WL 116391, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2014) 20 (“Plaintiffs contend that their arrests in public communicated to those present that plaintiffs 21 were criminals. But the law of defamation in Arizona requires ‘a false and defamatory 22 statement concerning another.’” (quoting Fendler v. Phx. Newspapers Inc., 636 P.2d 1257, 23 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981))). The Court is unwilling to consider a lawful arrest a “false 24 statement.” 25 Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiffs’ defamation claims 26 against the City Defendants. 27 28 1 G. Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 2 The FAC includes claims of excessive force by Plaintiffs in violation of § 19839 3 against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 17.) As noted, a § 1983 claim is predicated on 4 a state actor depriving an individual of a constitutional right. See WMX Techs., 197 F.3d 5 at 372. “The use of excessive force by police officers in the course of an arrest can violate 6 the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Oakry, 629 7 F. Supp. 3d at 984. Whether a seizure is unreasonable is an objective inquiry; “the question 8 is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 9 circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 10 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). As the Supreme Court has noted: The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the 11 perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 12 vision of hindsight. . . . Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth 13 Amendment. 14 Id. at 396 (citation modified). “Whether a particular use of force was ‘objectively 15 reasonable’ depends on several factors, including the severity of the crime that prompted 16 the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and whether the 17 suspect was resisting arrest.” Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 18 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). 19 Plaintiffs allege that excessive force was used because a “SWAT team” was 20 employed to arrest Jade, which was “excessive in relation to the purpose for which it was 21 used.” (Doc. 17 at 20 ¶ 101.) Plaintiffs further allege that Jade’s arrest was “objectively 22 unreasonable given that Plaintiff was not a threat and there was no reason to bring an 23 extraordinary amount of officers with guns and night scopes at night and involve neighbors 24 to arrest him.” (Id. ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs also note that Jade was “forcibly arrested and 25 9 The FAC provides: “Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1982, excessive force and false arrest 26 occurred here.” (Doc. 17 at 17 ¶ 92.) The Court assumes the FAC mistakenly cites to these statutes because both pertain to racial discrimination, which is not implicated here. 27 The only other instance in which these statutes are cited is in Plaintiffs’ Response which provides: “Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1982, excessive force and false arrest occurred 28 here.” (Doc. 34 at 15.) The Court presumes that Plaintiffs reemployed this language by mistake. 1 detained.” (Id. at 19 ¶ 99.) 2 City Defendants do not seek dismissal of the excessive force claim against Officer 3 Stover. (Doc. 29 at 23.) This leaves Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, and Pereira. But as 4 noted, the FAC fails to allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, and Figley were even present at 5 the arrest. Neither does the FAC allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, and Figley employed 6 excessive force. While the police report establishes that Officer Pereira was present at 7 Jade’s arrest, it is unclear what role Officer Pereira played in Jade’s arrest beyond strapping 8 Jade’s legs to keep him from kicking the inside of the police vehicle. (Doc. 29-3 at 5.) The 9 FAC does not cite this incident as constituting excessive force. 10 Still, Plaintiffs contend that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, and Pereira “may be 11 held liable under the ‘integral participant’ standard.” (Doc. 17 at 8 ¶ 46.) “[A]n official 12 whose individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation 13 may be held liable under section 1983 only if the official is an integral participant in the 14 unlawful act.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). An 15 official may be considered an integral participant in two situations: (1) the defendant knows about and acquiesces in the constitutionally 16 defective conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct 17 constitutes the violation or (2) the defendant sets in motion a series of acts by others which the defendant knows or reasonably should know would 18 cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. 19 Id. (citation modified). Even if Jade was subject to excessive force, the FAC fails to allege 20 that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira were integral participants in applying said 21 force. 22 The FAC fails to implicate the first integral participant situation as it does not allege 23 that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira knew about or acquiesced to any behavior 24 that might be construed as constituting excessive force. This “category of liability is fairly 25 narrow.” Id. An officer knows about or acquiesces to unconstitutional behavior where he 26 participates in either the planning or execution of such behavior. See id. As noted, the 27 FAC does not establish that the foregoing officers participated in the execution of the arrest. 28 Neither does the FAC establish that the foregoing officers played any meaningful part in 1 planning Jade’s arrest—or at least those details of the arrest which could arguably give rise 2 to an excessive force claim. 3 Similarly, the FAC fails to implicate the second integral participant situation. The 4 FAC does not allege that Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira set in motion events 5 that were reasonably known to result in the use of excessive force. 6 At bottom, the FAC attempts to employ the integral participant doctrine as a catchall 7 to broadly impose liability on any officer that was remotely involved in Jade’s arrest. 8 However, integral participant “liability may not be imposed based on a ‘team effort’ theory 9 that would allow the jury to lump all the defendants together, rather than require it to base 10 each individual’s liability on his own conduct.” Id. at 890 (citation modified). 11 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s excessive force claim 12 under § 1983 against Officers Ravelo, Loper, Figley, or Pereira. 13 H. Conspiracy to Interfere With Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985) 14 The FAC includes a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in violation 15 of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 by Jade against the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 20.) The “first 16 clause” of § 1985(3)— commonly known as the “equal protection clause”—“prohibits two 17 or more persons from conspiring to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal 18 protection of the law.” 10 Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). 19 The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 20 indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, 21 or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance

22 10 The Court assumes Plaintiff does not bring a claim under either § 1985(1) or (2) because neither is remotely implicated. Section 1985(1) “extend[s] exclusively to the benefit of 23 federal officers.” Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1981). Section 1985(2) “proscribes conspiracies ‘to deter, by force, intimidation, or 24 threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such 25 party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified.’” Head v. Wilkie, 936 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting § 1985(2)). Additionally, 26 the Court assumes that Plaintiff does not bring a claim under the “second clause” of § 1985(3) which is known as the “support-or-advocacy clause.” See Gaetz v. City of 27 Riverside, 722 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2024). “A plaintiff asserting a claim under this subsection must . . . establish that the conspiracy’s purpose was to force, 28 intimidate, or threaten an individual legally entitled to vote who is engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.” Id. 1 of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in their person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 2 Gaetz, 722 F. Supp. 3d at 1068–69 (citing Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 3 (9th Cir. 1992)). 4 Plaintiff claims that “video evidence shows that two or more of the Defendants 5 conspired to ignore the typical procedure of obtaining and then resenting [sic] clearly 6 exculpatory evidence as to Jade’s rights to defend himself on his property.” (Doc. 17 at 21 7 ¶ 108.) Plaintiff further claims that the following facts “illustrates a conspiracy”: “arresting 8 Jade at night, involving the neighbors, falsifying the Form IV and related police reports, 9 setting forth false facts to try and justify a $250,000 bond . . . [,] not doing any investigation 10 despite setting in motion a business card to have Jade contact police,” and the “ police 11 report alleging substantial damage to a vehicle then the City’s own prosecution admitting 12 there was none.” (Id. ¶¶ 109–10.) These allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege 13 that any particular Officer Defendant conspired to injure Jade. 14 To meet the first element, “the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the 15 existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 16 1989). “[A] civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to 17 commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element 18 of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon 19 another, and an overt act that results in that damage.” Page v. Clark Cnty. Fire Dist. 6, 733 20 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (citation modified). Such an agreement “may 21 be inferred from conduct and need not be proved by evidence of an express agreement.” 22 Ward v. E.E.O.C., 719 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1983). Still, claimants must provide 23 “plausible allegations—with specific facts—that there was a ‘meeting of the minds’ or an 24 ‘agreement.’” Gaetz, 722 F. Supp. 3d at 1069. 25 Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the Officer Defendants expressly conspired 26 against Jade. Neither do Plaintiffs establish that any of the Officer Defendants tacitly 27 agreed to injure Jade. Plaintiffs merely allege that discrete events precipitated by discrete 28 1 individuals, in the aggregate, demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. “Although a 2 conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, to establish violation of 3 Section 1985(3), plaintiff will have to do more than show independent parallel behavior on 4 the part of the defendants.” Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 5 Plaintiffs only identify discrete events without plausibly alleging that these events were a 6 part of a coordinated effort to injure Jade. 7 Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to allege what role each Officer Defendant played in the 8 alleged conspiracy. Again, Plaintiffs assert that each Officer Defendant conspired against 9 Jade. However, Plaintiffs fail to allege, even generally, what role each Officer Defendant 10 had in the broader agreement to injure Jade. Plaintiffs’ generic allegation that each Officer 11 Defendant engaged in a conspiracy is “not enough to give fair notice and to enable the 12 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” I.H. ex rel. Hunter v. Oakland Sch. for Arts, 13 234 F. Supp. 3d 987, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citation modified). 14 Finally, claims under § 1985(3) require “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 15 invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. 16 Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); see also Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 17 227 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A cause of action under the first clause of § 1985(3) 18 cannot survive a motion to dismiss absent an allegation of class-based animus.”). Even if 19 the Officer Defendants conspired against Jade, Plaintiffs fail to allege that said conspiracy 20 was motivated by any discriminatory animus. Although courts are divided as to what 21 “categories” of animus are sufficient to give rise to a § 1985(3) claim, Plaintiffs fail to 22 claim that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by any commonly recognized animus such 23 as race, religion, or political affiliation. See Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 24 424 F. Supp. 3d 861, 878 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 985 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 25 cases). Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy, what role each 26 Officer Defendant played in the alleged conspiracy, or that the alleged conspiracy was 27 motivated by discriminatory animus. 28 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s § 1985(3) claim against 1 the Officer Defendants. 2 I. Monell Claim 3 Finally, the FAC includes the following Monell claims under § 1983 by Jade against 4 the City: unconstitutional policy and custom; failure to supervise and discipline; failure to 5 train; and negligent hiring. (Doc. 17 at 21.) As noted, § 1983 provides a cause of action 6 against state actors who deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. See WMX Techs., 7 197 F.3d at 372. A city can be a “state actor” amenable to suit under § 1983. Monell v. 8 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–94 (1978). However, § 1983 does not “impose 9 liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an 10 employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 11 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). “Instead, in Monell and 12 subsequent cases, [the Supreme Court] required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a 13 municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the 14 plaintiff’s injury.” Id. Such claims are commonly known as “Monell claim[s].” E.g., 15 Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2020). 16 To assert a Monell claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a 17 constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 18 (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; 19 and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau 20 v. Sch. Dist. No 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). Ultimately, 21 “there must be ‘a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged 22 constitutional deprivation.’” Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 23 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). 24 Plaintiffs allege that the City “either failed to properly hire, supervise, discipline, 25 monitor, terminate and/or train its employees and/or failed to establish policies and 26 procedures that would prevent individuals that were not fit for duty from being hired, 27 employed, employed without supervision and retained as detention or peace officers.” 28 (Doc. 17 at 22 ¶ 113.) Plaintiffs specifically point out that Officer Ravelo “instructed 1 Sharon to have Jade call the Police Department in order to get his side of the story” but that 2 the Officer Defendants “did not wait” and instead “set in motion the hunting down of Jade.” 3 (Id. ¶¶ 115–16.) Plaintiffs allege this resulted in “an outrageous nighttime SWAT assault” 4 and “Defendant Periera falsif[ying] his police report.” (Id ¶¶ 116–17.) It is unclear what 5 constitutional right Plaintiffs are attempting to vindicate through their Monell claim. 6 Nonetheless, the only remaining constitutional law claim is the alleged use of excessive 7 force by Officer Stover against Jade. Accepting the excessive force claim as true, Plaintiffs 8 fail to establish that the City was “the moving force behind” the alleged use of excessive 9 force. 10 Plaintiffs fail to point to a City “policy or custom” that bears a “direct causal link” 11 with the alleged use of excessive force. See Villegas, 541 F.3d at 957 (quoting City of 12 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Instead, Plaintiff recites that the City “either 13 failed to properly hire, supervise, discipline, monitor, terminate and/or train its employees 14 and/or failed to establish policies and procedures that would prevent individuals that were 15 not fit for duty from being hired.” (Doc. 17 at 22 ¶ 113.) However, these bare allegations 16 fail to identify a discrete City policy or action that was the “moving force behind the 17 constitutional violation.” Plumeau, 130 F.3d at 438 (quoting Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. 18 Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs’ allegation that the City 19 negligently hired certain employees fails for similar reasons. However, Plaintiffs fail to 20 provide any meaningful detail beyond blanket assertions that the City negligently hired 21 each employee that was involved in Jade’s arrest. 22 Additionally, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the City’s failure to train its 23 employees resulted in excessive force against Jade. Typically, “[a] pattern of similar 24 constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate 25 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 26 62 (2011) (citation modified). “Only when a city is on actual or constructive notice that a 27 particular omission in its training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ 28 constitutional rights can the city be deemed deliberately indifferent.” Hayes v. Riley, 525 1 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. 2 at 61). Plaintiffs only point to one instance in which excessive force might have been used. 3 This is insufficient to plausibly demonstrate the City failed to train its employees. As the 4 court in Hayes noted: To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim of deliberate indifference based on a 5 city’s failure to train requires more information about prior instances of 6 officer misconduct, what those incidents entailed, what the city knew (or should have known) about the incidents, and what training protocols could 7 have been implemented to prevent similar incidents from reoccurring. 8 525 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard. 9 Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the City failed to discipline its 10 employees. “[A]llegations that a city repeatedly refused, or failed to take appropriate 11 corrective action against one officer when that officer has numerous incidents of 12 misconduct may form the basis for liability against the city employing that officer.” Hayes, 13 525 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (citation modified). Even assuming Plaintiffs intended to allege 14 that the City failed to discipline any of the named officers, Plaintiffs fail to establish any 15 particular officer engaged in “numerous incidents of misconduct.” See id. Plaintiff’s bald 16 assertion that the City failed to discipline its officers is insufficient to plead a failure to 17 discipline claim. 18 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Jade’s Monell claim against the 19 City. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 Accordingly, 22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED dismissing the following counts with prejudice: 23 (1) Count Four: the IIED claims; (2) Count Five: the false imprisonment claims; (3) Count 24 Six: the malicious prosecution claims; (4) Count Seven: the defamation claims;; (5) Count 25 Nine: the false arrest claim under § 1983 (Doc. 17). 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the following counts without prejudice: 27 (1) Count One: the assault and battery claims except for the assault claim as to Officer 28 Stover; (2) Count Three: the gross negligence claims (3) Count Nine: the excessive force claims under § 1983; (4) Count Eight: the NEID claims; (5) Count Ten: the conspiracy claims under § 1985; and (6) Count Eleven: the Monell claims under § 1983 (Doc. 17). 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff leave to amend the claims 4|| dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiffs so choose, they must file a Second Amended 5 || Complaint no later than thirty (30) days after the date this Order is issued. 6 Dated this 18th day of November, 2025. 7 — . RP 9 Gated States District ludge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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