NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0062n.06
Case No. 25-1346
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jan 29, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk JACQUELINE MEADOWS, ) Plaintiff - Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC., CHRISTIAN ) MICHIGAN GUNN, PETER SABALLA-DAVIS, ) Defendants - Appellees. ) OPINION )
Before: GIBBONS, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Jacqueline Meadows
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Delta Air Lines,
Christian Gunn, and Peter Saballa-Davis. Meadows sued the defendants under both federal and
state law, alleging that they engaged in race discrimination in violation of Title VII and the
Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act through the discipline she received following a
workplace incident with another Delta flight attendant. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm
the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Meadows’s claims.
I.
Jacqueline Meadows began a full-time position with Northwest Airlines in 1989 before
later becoming a Delta employee when the two airlines merged in 2008. At the time of the
discipline giving rise to Meadows’s lawsuit, she was a “purser-qualified” flight attendant, meaning
she was the “on-board leader[]” in charge of the cabin on flights that she worked. DE 25-2, No. 25-1346, Meadows v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.
Meadows Dep., Page ID 198; DE 25-3, Purser Policy, Page ID 266. During the same time period,
Meadows also served as a reserve officer for the Detroit Police, a position she began in July 2017.
As a reserve officer, Meadows’s duties included providing support to the sworn officers and
conducting patrols. Meadows made her employment as a reserve officer known to her colleagues
at Delta.
A. October 7, 2019 Incident
On October 7, 2019, Meadows was working as the flight leader on Delta Flight 2880, a
round-trip flight from Detroit to Orlando. Other than Meadows, the crew for that flight consisted
of flight attendants Lynette Marshall, Taylor Ramone, Kristin Moore, and a fourth, unidentified
attendant. No issues arose on the first leg of the trip from Detroit to Orlando. Upon the flight’s
arrival in Orlando, Delta policy required that a minimum crew of flight attendants stay onboard
the aircraft until all passengers deplaned; in this case, this meant all five flight attendants needed
to remain on the aircraft. However, Meadows exited the aircraft prior to all passengers deplaning
to assist a passenger with a wheelchair.1 After assisting the passenger exit the plane, Meadows
briefly spoke on the phone with her father to discuss her mother, who at that time was in the
hospital, while she was still on the jetway and before she reentered the aircraft. Because Meadows
apparently did not remain on the aircraft until all passengers deplaned, she was not present when
flight attendant Marshall went to the front of the plane to let her know that the safety check had
been completed.
As Meadows re-boarded the aircraft, Marshall, who was sitting in an exit row near the
aircraft door, told Meadows that she should not have deplaned while passengers were still onboard.
1 Meadows maintains that she did not commit a minimum crew violation in this case because Delta policy states that all flight attendants must remain on board until all passengers deplane unless they are performing certain tasks, including “checking on [the] status of [a] wheelchair, or other special assistance [at the] passenger’s request.” DE 25- 2, Meadows Dep., Page ID 208.
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Meadows informed Marshall that she had been assisting a passenger with a wheelchair and was
also retrieving paperwork needed for their return flight. At some point during this exchange,
Marshall stood up from the exit row where she was seated, allegedly prompting Meadows to tell
Marshall that if she “took another step, she would take [Marshall] down.” DE 25-6, Marshall
Dep., Page ID 306; DE 25-7, Marshall SRS Report, Page ID 317; DE 25-8, Mohammed Decl.,
Page ID 320. Marshall stated that she interpreted this comment to be a threat because she was
aware that Meadows also worked as a reserve officer for the Detroit Police. Meadows concedes
that she told Marshall to “back away,” but denies telling Marshall that she would “take [her] down”
and maintains that when Marshall came towards her, she walked away. DE 25-2, Meadows Dep.,
Page ID 210. Captain Patrick B. Cooney, who served as the captain of Flight 2880 and witnessed
part of the interaction between Meadows and Marshall, later stated that Marshall “proceeded to
yell at [Meadows] in a totally unprofessional manner” and was “relentless in verbally attacking
[Meadows] and creating a scene.” DE 32-1, Cooney Statement, Page ID 794. Captain Cooney
acknowledged that he did not know the circumstances that led to the interaction between Meadows
and Marshall but maintained that Meadows “responded to this event in a completely professional
manner.” Id.
Both Meadows and Marshall agreed that they could work together on the return flight from
Orlando to Detroit. Before the plane departed, however, Marshall contacted Delta’s Operations
and Customer Center (“OCC”), reported the incident, and requested that a manager come meet the
crew in Orlando. Also during this time, Meadows texted her managers Renee Mullen and Steven
Jones to inform them that she had been “verbally assaulted” by Marshall. DE 25-2, Meadows
Dep., Page ID 214. In response to Marshall’s OCC report, Field Service Manager (“FSM”) Neil
Mohammed met the aircraft while it was in Orlando. FSM Mohammed stated that Meadows
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acknowledged during his interview with her that she indeed told Marshall that she would “take her
down.” DE 25-8, Mohammed Decl., Page ID 320. FSM Mohammed prepared a summary of his
conversations with Meadows, Marshall, and Captain Cooney, and sent that summary to each flight
attendants’ FSM in Detroit.
B. Delta’s Investigation & Determination Regarding the October 7 Incident
Upon their return to Detroit, FSMs Austin Lynch and John Arila met the aircraft and
interviewed the flight crew regarding the incident in Orlando. FSM Lynch and FSM Arila prepared
a short, combined incident report and did not participate further in the investigation.
Within twenty-four hours of the incident, Marshall disclosed her interaction with Meadows
to Delta through an “SRS report,” a safety reporting system that Delta utilized for reporting
incidents involving safety or security. DE 25-6, Marshall Dep., Page ID 305; DE 25-7, Marshall
SRS Report, Page ID 315–17. The day after the incident occurred, Meadows discussed the events
with her manager FSM Renee Mullen, who instructed Meadows to submit a statement. Meadows
e-mailed a statement that same day to Courtney Ebert, the Human Resources manager for Delta’s
Detroit base. Shortly thereafter, Meadows also submitted a request to appellee Peter Saballa-Davis
that she be assigned an FSM other than FSM Mullen, as she felt FSM Mullen was being insensitive
regarding the incident. Saballa-Davis complied and assigned appellee Christian Gunn to be
Meadows’s new FSM. Because Meadows was transferred to FSM Gunn’s team, he took over the
investigation into the October 7 incident from FSM Mullen. After reviewing all of the documents
collected in the investigation, including witness statement affidavits, FSM Gunn recommended
that both Meadows and Marshall receive formal verbal coaching.
Delta’s Workplace Violence Policy (“WPV Policy”) prohibits employees from making
threats of violence towards one another, which includes the actual physical contact or its threat.
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FSM Gunn’s recommendation stated that he did not believe that Meadows violated Delta’s WPV
Policy because he construed her “I will take you down” comment as a defensive stance in response
to Marshall’s instigation of the conflict. However, the Workplace Violence Committee (“WPV
Committee”) maintained final authority to determine whether a violation of the Delta WPV Policy
occurred. On January 13, 2020, the WPV Committee reviewed the October 7 incident, as
presented by Detroit Base Manager Kara Vanneman and FSM Gunn, and supported by HR
Manager Ebert. After reviewing all of the evidence, the Committee determined that Meadows’s
“I will take you down” statement constituted a verbal threat and therefore violated the WPV Policy.
The WPV Committee further concluded that Meadows failed to de-escalate the situation as part of
her duties as flight leader.
Because of its findings, The WPV Committee recommended that Meadows receive a Final
Corrective Action Notice (“FCAN”). An FCAN may be issued to an employee who “commits an
infraction Delta considers serious enough to warrant a higher level of discipline,” and it remains
in the employee’s file for “36 months or until the most recent written Performance Development
expires.” DE 25-20, IFS Performance Development Policy, Page ID 390. Neither Meadows’s nor
Marshall’s race was disclosed during the WPV Committee meeting discussing the incident. As
for Marshall, the WPV Committee did not find that her conduct violated the WPV Policy but did
determine that it was inappropriate and violated the standards set forth in Delta’s Rules of the Road
and the Way We Fly. As a result, Delta issued a Written Coaching to Marshall.
On February 27, 2020, the WPV Committee conducted a follow-up meeting at the request
of Corporate Director Claudine Rydstrand, who was not present at the original WPV Committee
meeting finding Meadows had violated the WPV Policy. Director Rydstrand wanted to ensure
that the WPV Committee had considered that Meadows was under stress at the time of the October
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7 incident because her mother was ill, and that Meadows had since denied making the “I will take
you down” statement. At the follow-up meeting, the WPV Committee also received and
considered for the first time Captain Cooney’s statement regarding the incident, which maintained
that Marshall instigated the conflict, and that Meadows responded professionally. The WPV
Committee ultimately adhered to its original determination and recommendation that Meadows
receive an FCAN, finding that Cooney’s statement did not change its decision because he was not
present when Meadows allegedly made the infringing comment. Delta leadership in Detroit
ultimately adopted the WPV Committee’s determination and accepted its recommendation.
On April 29, 2020, Saballa-Davis informed Meadows of her FCAN during a telephone call.
As a result of her FCAN, Delta would remove Meadows from her purser position for 36 months.
Meadows proceeded to contact Director Rydstrand, seeking to overturn her discipline; she also
reached out to other Delta leaders during this time. Meadows submitted a statement to Director
Rydstrand which expressed her belief that she had “experienced racism, bullying and sexism on
the workplace” as a result of the October 7 incident and the way its investigation was handled by
Delta leaders. DE 33-4, Meadows Statement, Page ID 1191–92. On August 26, 2020, Director
Rydstrand and Senior HR Manager Terrence Jackson met with Meadows in person. At that
meeting, Meadows continued to deny making the “I will take you down” comment to Marshall
and disputed FSM Mohammed’s report that she confirmed making the comment to him. In
response, Director Rydstrand and HR Manager Jackson contacted FSM Mohammed, who
confirmed once again that Meadows admitted making the statement to him following the incident.
Following her conversation with FSM Mohammed, Director Rydstrand decided to uphold
the WPV Committee’s recommendation for an FCAN. Meadows remained in the purser program
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until November 2020 and was still employed as a flight attendant with Delta when she brought the
underlying lawsuit.
C. The Instant Suit
On June 8, 2022, Meadows sued Delta, Saballa-Davis, and Gunn, alleging intentional race
discrimination in violation of Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“Elliott-
Larsen Act”). She properly exhausted her claims first with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
The defendants filed a motion seeking summary judgment, requesting dismissal of
Meadows’s claims. The district court granted the defendants’ motion on March 17, 2025, finding
that Meadows failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the defendants’
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discipline.
Meadows timely appealed the district court’s order to our court on April 9, 2025.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Schleicher v. Preferred
Sols., Inc., 831 F.3d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate where the
“movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d
695, 700 (6th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, summary judgment is inappropriate when the
evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Clay, 501 F.3d at 700. “We draw all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party” when conducting our analysis. Rogers v. Henry Ford Health
Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2018). However, the nonmoving party must present “significant
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probative” evidence in support of its position to defeat summary judgment. Wright v. Murray
Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
III.
Meadows brings two claims of intentional race discrimination against Delta, Saballa-
Davis, and Gunn: one under Title VII and one under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act. We first
analyze her claims against the individual defendants before turning to the claims against Delta.
A. Individual Claims Against Saballa-Davis and Gunn
As a threshold matter, we must first address the fact that Meadows does not raise the issue
of her individual claims against Saballa-Davis and Gunn on appeal. We recognize that “‘[a]n
appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.’” Guilmette v.
Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 845–46 (6th Cir. 2006)). Meadows appears, at best, to merely reference
claims concerning Saballa-Davis and Gunn by consistently referring to the “Defendants”
altogether throughout her briefing. See CA6 R. 27, Appellant Br., at 30–47; CA6 R. 34, Reply
Br., at 4–11. However, Meadows may not refer to her claims involving Saballa-Davis and Gunn
“in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” Johnson,
440 F.3d at 846 (citation modified). Meadows therefore abandons her arguments against the
individual defendants on appeal.
We find further support that Meadows abandoned these claims in the fact that she also
failed to address the arguments set forth by the individual defendants regarding their individual
liability in her summary judgment briefing before the district court. And where a litigant fails to
address a claim in response to a motion for summary judgment, as well as in their briefing on
appeal, we deem that claim abandoned. See Nathan v. Great Lakes Water Auth., 992 F.3d 557,
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564 n.1 (6th Cir. 2021); Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023). We
therefore find that Meadows has discarded her claims against Saballa-Davis and Gunn twice over
and thus decline to reach the merits now.
B. Claims Against Delta
We evaluate claims of race discrimination brought under Title VII and the Elliott-Larsen
Act under the same standard. Rogers, 897 F.3d at 771; see also Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746
F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014); Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir.
2012).
Claims of intentional discrimination brought under Title VII can be proven through direct
or circumstantial evidence. Ondricko, 689 F.3d at 648–49. “Direct evidence, if believed, requires
the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s
actions.” Shazor v. Pro. Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grizzell
v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2006)). Where direct evidence is
present, the jury need not draw any inferences to conclude that prejudice against members of a
protected group motivated, at least in part, a challenged employment action. Id. Where there is
no direct evidence and instead only circumstantial, a plaintiff’s claim is analyzed under the burden-
shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the burden resides first with the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of race
discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff successfully proves their prima facie case, the burden then shifts
to the employer to provide a “legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its actions.” Id. If
the employer provides such explanation, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext;
meaning, that the employer’s explanation was merely fabricated to hide an illegal motive. Id.
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Here, the parties dispute the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework: whether
Meadows met her burden of proving that Delta’s explanation for issuing her FCAN was merely
pretext.2 Meadows can create a triable issue of fact over whether her discipline was pretextual if
she establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, one of three things: “(1) that the proffered
reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate [her] discharge,
or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge.” Hedrick v. W. Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d
444, 460 (6th Cir. 2004). Meadows asserts that each of these showings for pretext are present in
her case. We disagree.
First, Meadows fails to show that Delta’s proffered reason for issuing her FCAN had no
basis in fact. The evidence demonstrates that Meadows received her FCAN due to the “I will take
you down” comment she made to Marshall, which the WPV Committee found to violate the WPV
Policy. Indeed, Delta leadership involved with the case understood that Meadows was disciplined
because she violated the WPV Policy. Marshall disclosed Meadows’s comment in the SRS report
she submitted within twenty-four hours of the incident, to FSM Mohammed when he met the flight
in Orlando following Marshall’s request to OCC, and to OCC when she made the initial report
requesting an FSM come speak to the flight crew. Shortly after the incident occurred, Meadows
herself confirmed to FSM Mohammed that she made the comment, FSM Mohammed reported the
comment, and he later confirmed to Delta leadership that Meadows made the comment after
2 Although Meadows also maintains that she properly established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the appellees do not fully dispute whether Meadows properly met her burden of establishing a prima facie case. As a result, we do not find that whether Meadows met her prima facie burden to be at issue in this appeal. See Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 675 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The first factor [of the pretext analysis] is not at issue because there is no dispute that [the plaintiff] set off firecrackers while working on March 22, 2006, and that this was the proffered reason for his discharge.”); Terre v. Hopson, 708 F. App’x 221, 228 (6th Cir. 2017) (discussing a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA). However, even if Meadows did properly establish a prima facie case, that conclusion would not be dispositive because (as we discuss in this opinion) she does not properly establish pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04; Chen, 580 F.3d at 400.
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Meadows subsequently denied doing so. Ultimately, even if a dispute of fact exists over whether
the statement happened, Delta leadership at least held an “honest belief” that Meadows made the
statement. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012). So, we certainly
cannot say that it was not the source of Meadows’s discipline. Accordingly, we find Delta’s reason
for issuing Meadows her FCAN had a basis in fact because it was grounded in Delta’s honest
belief.
Second, Meadows fails to show that Delta’s proffered reason did not actually motivate its
issuance of her FCAN. Delta leadership explicitly confirmed that Meadows’s FCAN was issued
because of her violation of the WPV Policy. There is no evidence that Meadows’s race was known
in any way by the WPV Committee, much less a factor in their decision regarding her discipline
following the October 7 incident. In fact, Delta leadership confirmed that it is standard practice to
ensure that the WPV Committee does not know the race of the employees involved in a potential
violation of the WPV Policy. Meadows does not present evidence that convinces us to conclude
the Committee impermissibly made an exception in her case.
Third, Meadows fails to show that Delta’s reason for her discipline was insufficient. Delta
maintains a zero-tolerance policy against violence in the workplace. That policy prohibits
employees from making threats of violence towards one another, including actual or threat of
physical contact. Here, Delta determined that Meadows’s “I will take you down” comment was a
violation of their WPV Policy and issued her discipline as a result. A showing that an employer’s
proffered reasoning was insufficient ordinarily involves evidence that other employees,
specifically those not in the protected class, were not punished even though they engaged in
essentially the same conduct that motivated punishment of the plaintiff. See Hedrick, 355 F.3d at
460. Meadows does not present such evidence here. There are no allegations that Delta also
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believed Marshall to have violated the WPV Policy but refrained from also issuing her an FCAN.
In fact, the evidence shows that Delta determined that Marshall did not violate the WPV Policy
and instead received appropriate discipline for the Delta policy violations that she did commit. We
therefore decline to find that Delta’s justification for Meadows’s FCAN was insufficient.
Meadows also asserts that she suffered disparate treatment based on her race as evidenced
by the appellees’ failure to investigate her complaint of discrimination. Specifically, she contends
that the failure to follow up on the statement she shared with Director Rydstrand, in which she
stated that she felt she had suffered discrimination due to her race, constituted disparate treatment.
However, the evidence before us does not support her argument. After receiving Meadows’s
statement, Director Rydstrand and Senior HR Manager Terrence Jackson met with Meadows in
person. Following that meeting, Director Rydstrand and HR Manager Jackson contacted FSM
Mohammed, who confirmed that Meadows admitted making the “I will take you down” statement
during his interview with her in Orlando. And it was after that conversation that Director
Rydstrand decided to uphold the WPV Committee’s recommendation. Thus, the record shows
that Delta did investigate Meadows’s complaint that she received unfair treatment. And even if
we found that Delta failed to investigate Meadows’s complaint, Meadows fails to present any
evidence that her race was the reason, or at least one of the reasons, for the alleged failure. See
Wright, 455 F.3d at 711 (confirming that disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII require
allegations that an employment decision was motivated, either in whole or in part, by an
illegitimate reason).
****
Finally, we address the arguments Meadows makes regarding the evidence submitted in
this case. Specifically, Meadows argues that the district court should have struck the appellees’
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references to the findings of the WPV Committee because the deposition of Christian Terry, who
testified as to the findings of the Committee, did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6). We interpret this argument as one essentially claiming that Meadows was not able to
conduct adequate discovery due to alleged deficiencies in Terry’s deposition, and therefore the
district court should not have granted summary judgment. In order to have properly preserved this
argument for our review, Meadows should have submitted an affidavit to the district court
specifying the reasons she could not present facts essential to justify her opposition to the
appellees’ motion for summary judgment because of the defects in Terry’s deposition. See Vance
ex rel. Hammons v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1148–49 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rohner,
634 F. App’x 495, 504 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). But she failed to do so and
instead raised the issue for the first time in her opposition to appellees’ motion for summary
judgment without any “specific objections or statements to the district court that additional
discovery was required.” Unan v. Lyon, 853 F.3d 279, 292 (6th Cir. 2017). Consequently, this
issue is inappropriate for our review. See Friendly Farms v. Reliance Ins. Co., 79 F.3d 541, 544
(6th Cir. 1996) (a party’s failure to raise the “discovery . . . issue in the district court precludes
[that] argument . . . on appeal”).
We find Meadows’s claim finding issue with the lack of a “documented finding” by the
WPV Committee in her personnel file similarly unavailing. CA6 R. 27, Appellant Br., at 31–32.
Delta produced the WPV Committee’s findings through its issuance of Meadows’s FCAN.
Several members of Delta leadership testified as to the issuance of the FCAN and the reasoning
behind it. The breadth of testimony taken and submitted by both parties in this case included
depositions and/or statements from those directly involved in the WPV Committee proceedings.
Thus, the thrust of Meadows’s argument for this claim, that the appellees are attempting to
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“backdoor evidence,” is without merit. Id. at 31. Indeed, Meadows had the FCAN herself from
the very beginning of this litigation, as she attached it to her Complaint.3
To discriminate under Title VII means, in the simplest terms, to treat similarly situated
individuals differently on the basis of a protected characteristic. Threat v. City of Cleveland, 6
F.4th 672, 677 (6th Cir. 2021). At bottom, Meadows fails to convince us that she received different
treatment than Marshall, or any other Delta flight attendants outside of her protected class, for the
same conduct because of her race. See Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 348 (6th
Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff] bears the burden of proving that white employees, similar in all of the
relevant aspects of employment, were not similarly disciplined.” (citation modified) (emphasis in
original)). And since we cannot say “yes” to “the ultimate question . . . [of] whether the plaintiff
was the victim of intentional discrimination,” we find that Meadows’s claims fail under Title VII
and the Elliott-Larsen Act. See Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, LLC, 595 F.3d 261,
264 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendants.
3 It is for these same reasons that we find Meadows’s argument concerning Michigan’s Bullard-Plawecki Act unpersuasive. Meadows argues that because no finding of the WPV Committee was put in her personnel file, the findings cannot be used against her in this litigation. Meadows does not provide the personnel record that apparently excluded any findings of the WPV Committee. Regardless, the Bullard-Plawecki Act does not preclude the use of personnel record information where that information was not intentionally excluded, and the employee has been given a reasonable time to review the information. M.C.L. § 423.502. Meadows does not attempt to argue that Delta purposely excluded any records of the WPV Committees’ findings, and her attachment of her FCAN to the Complaint clearly evinces that she has had access to a recorded finding of the Committee for her review for some time.
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