Jacobs v. Colorado Department of Revenue Taxation Division
This text of Jacobs v. Colorado Department of Revenue Taxation Division (Jacobs v. Colorado Department of Revenue Taxation Division) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellate Case: 24-1421 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 12, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ERIKA JACOBS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-1421 (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00143-LTB-RTG) COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF (D. Colo.) REVENUE TAXATION DIVISION,
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Erika Jacobs sued the Colorado Department of Revenue (CDR), seeking a tax
refund and punitive damages. The district court dismissed the action as barred by the Tax
Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Liberally construing Ms. Jacobs’s pro se
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1421 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2025 Page: 2
filings, see United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009), and exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Jacobs’s second amended complaint alleged the CDR mailed a tax refund
check for $1,150 to her old address, the post office returned it, and then CDR recalculated
her taxes. Instead of reissuing her a refund, it determined she owed about $300.
Ms. Jacobs disagreed, so she sought an order directing the CDR to reissue her refund and
imposing punitive damages.
A magistrate judge concluded that the TIA barred Ms. Jacobs’s action, divesting
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. He further determined that Ms. Jacobs
had an adequate state-law remedy to challenge her tax liability, and that the statutes she
relied upon, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206 & 7422, were inapposite. Over Ms. Jacobs’s objections,
the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal. See Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of
Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999).
The TIA states that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. “The Tax
Injunction Act imposes a broad limitation on federal court interference with state
collection of taxes and is not limited to injunctive relief. The Tax Injunction Act bars
2 Appellate Case: 24-1421 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2025 Page: 3
declaratory relief, and suits for damages as well.” Marcus, 170 F.3d at 1309 (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In her second amended complaint, Ms. Jacobs challenged the CDR’s
determination that she is no longer entitled to her $1,150 tax refund and instead owes
about $300 in taxes, but the TIA plainly bars her action. See Brooks v. Nance, 801 F.2d
1237, 1239 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding TIA barred civil rights action challenging state
officials’ seizure of untaxed cigarettes). She failed to allege the lack of an adequate state-
law remedy to challenge the CDR’s tax assessment. The magistrate judge correctly
explained that Colorado law offers numerous administrative and judicial means to
challenge state tax assessments. See Liebhardt v. Dep’t of Revenue, 229 P.2d 655, 657
(Colo. 1951) (recognizing Colorado law “affords the taxpayer a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy and full opportunity to be heard as to the quantum of the tax and the
alleged irregularities leading up to the fixation of tax liability”).
As in district court, Ms. Jacobs cites 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206 and 7422 to invoke the
district court’s jurisdiction. But these statutes are inapposite. Section 7206, a criminal
statute, makes it unlawful to file a false or fraudulent tax return. See, e.g., United States
v. Geddes, 71 F.4th 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2023). Section 7422 authorizes civil actions
for a tax refund against the federal government, not state governments. See id.
§ 7422(f)(1) (“A suit or proceeding . . . may be maintained only against the United States
. . . .”). Ms. Jacobs suggests otherwise, citing two out-of-circuit cases, Mondshein v.
United States, 338 F. Supp 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and Radio Shack Corp. v. United States,
105 Fed. Cl. 617 (2012). But both involved actions against the federal government for
3 Appellate Case: 24-1421 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2025 Page: 4
refunds of federal taxes, not against state governments for refunds of state taxes.
See Mondshein, 338 F. Supp. at 787 (describing plaintiff’s dispute with the Internal
Revenue Service); Radio Shack, 105 Fed. Cl. at 621-22 (explaining the Court of Federal
Claims’ jurisdiction to consider tax refund suits against the federal government to the
extent it waived sovereign immunity under § 7422).
Finally, Ms. Jacobs suggests the magistrate and district court judges retaliated
against her for filing a previous action. She provides few details, and her reliance on
adverse rulings provides no basis to infer disqualifying bias or prejudice. See Green v.
Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that adverse rulings provide
no basis for judicial disqualification).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Ms. Jacobs’s motion to proceed
without prepayment of costs and fees.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Jacobs v. Colorado Department of Revenue Taxation Division, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacobs-v-colorado-department-of-revenue-taxation-division-ca10-2025.