UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JACQUELINE JACKSON,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-302 (EGS) v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) worked as an
educational aid/paraprofessional at Marie Reed Elementary School
(“Marie Reed), a District of Columbia Public School. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 20, 22. Ms. Jackson brings this suit against
the District of Columbia (“the District”), Katie Lundgren (“Ms.
Lungren”), the Principal of Marie Reed; and Doris Peña (“Ms.
Peña”), a colleague at Marie Reed (collectively, “Defendants”).
Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the
individual defendants in their official capacities, their
individual capacities, or both. See generally id. Ms. Jackson
brings the following Counts: (1) Sexual Harassment in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et seq.; (2) Disability Harassment in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et
seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (3) Reprisal Harassment
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
1 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et
seq.; (4) Racial Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a), et seq.; (5) Disability Discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C.
Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (6) Reprisal based on prior EEO
Activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-
507, et seq.; (7) Wrongful discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794,
et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (8) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (10) Negligence; and (11) Violation of Hate
Crime Statute, D.C. Code § 22-3704. Id. at 15-36.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. See Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“MPSJ”), ECF
No. 14. Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to Ms.
Jackson’s claims under District of Columbia Law; specifically
Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11 on the ground that they are barred by
Ms. Jackson’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set
forth in D.C. Code § 12-309. Defendants state that Section 12-
309 also bars these Counts as to Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña, to
the extent Ms. Jackson sues them in their official capacities.
Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Rather, in her Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
2 to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. Extension of Time”), she
states the following: “Plaintiff will not be offering any
opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Defendants for Claims 8-11.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff has a police report that she believes
would satisfy the notice provision of D.C. Code § 12-309.” Mot.
Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1 n.1.
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The
nonmoving party must utilize affirmative evidence and “come
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029,
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
Relevant to the claims in this case, D.C. Code § 12–309(a)
provides that:
an action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.
3 “Th[is] notice requirement is a prerequisite to a suit
against the District of Columbia ‘because it represents a waiver
of sovereign immunity.’” Blocker-Burnette v. District of
Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Faison
v. District of Columbia, 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, id.; and
“‘is to be strictly construed[.]’” Barnhardt v. District of
Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Gwinn
v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981)).
Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts accompanying
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment states as follows:
1.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JACQUELINE JACKSON,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-302 (EGS) v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) worked as an
educational aid/paraprofessional at Marie Reed Elementary School
(“Marie Reed), a District of Columbia Public School. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 20, 22. Ms. Jackson brings this suit against
the District of Columbia (“the District”), Katie Lundgren (“Ms.
Lungren”), the Principal of Marie Reed; and Doris Peña (“Ms.
Peña”), a colleague at Marie Reed (collectively, “Defendants”).
Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the
individual defendants in their official capacities, their
individual capacities, or both. See generally id. Ms. Jackson
brings the following Counts: (1) Sexual Harassment in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et seq.; (2) Disability Harassment in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et
seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (3) Reprisal Harassment
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
1 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et
seq.; (4) Racial Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a), et seq.; (5) Disability Discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C.
Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (6) Reprisal based on prior EEO
Activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-
507, et seq.; (7) Wrongful discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794,
et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (8) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (10) Negligence; and (11) Violation of Hate
Crime Statute, D.C. Code § 22-3704. Id. at 15-36.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. See Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“MPSJ”), ECF
No. 14. Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to Ms.
Jackson’s claims under District of Columbia Law; specifically
Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11 on the ground that they are barred by
Ms. Jackson’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set
forth in D.C. Code § 12-309. Defendants state that Section 12-
309 also bars these Counts as to Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña, to
the extent Ms. Jackson sues them in their official capacities.
Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Rather, in her Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
2 to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. Extension of Time”), she
states the following: “Plaintiff will not be offering any
opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Defendants for Claims 8-11.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff has a police report that she believes
would satisfy the notice provision of D.C. Code § 12-309.” Mot.
Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1 n.1.
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The
nonmoving party must utilize affirmative evidence and “come
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029,
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
Relevant to the claims in this case, D.C. Code § 12–309(a)
provides that:
an action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.
3 “Th[is] notice requirement is a prerequisite to a suit
against the District of Columbia ‘because it represents a waiver
of sovereign immunity.’” Blocker-Burnette v. District of
Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Faison
v. District of Columbia, 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, id.; and
“‘is to be strictly construed[.]’” Barnhardt v. District of
Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Gwinn
v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981)).
Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts accompanying
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment states as follows:
1. The District of Columbia Office of Risk Management (ORM) is responsible for receiving, processing, and maintaining records of claim notices served pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309. Declaration of Lana Craven ¶ 3, attached as Exhibit 1.
2. ORM receives written notices of claims from the Mayor’s Office or directly from claimants and records them in its claims management system. Id. ¶ 4.
3. ORM conducted a diligent search of its records for any written claim notices received from or on behalf of Plaintiff regarding any claims against the District. Id. ¶ 6.
4. This search did not reveal any letters or notices from or on behalf of Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7.
5. When ORM receives a claim notice, it issues an acknowledgment letter to the sender and
4 assigns a claim number for tracking and investigation. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
6. ORM’s search did not identify an acknowledgment letter, claim number, or any record of a notice from or on behalf of Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10-11.
7. ORM’s established practice is to store all claim notices in a searchable system. The absence of any record for Jacqueline Jackson confirms that she did not serve notice of her claims pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309.
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 14-1 at
1-2. Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts. See Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1
n.1; see generally Dkt. for Civil Action No. 25-302.
Accordingly, the Court considers the statement of facts
undisputed for the purpose of this motion. See FED. R. CIV. P.
65(e)(2).
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Jackson failed to
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309. Accordingly, Ms. Jackson’s claims in Counts 8, 9, 10, and
11 against the District are barred. See District of Columbia v.
Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1362 (D.C. 1995).
Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the individual
defendants in their official capacities, their individual
capacities, or both. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. To the
extent she sues them in their official capacities, her suit is
5 treated as a suit against the District and so her failure to
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309 also bars her claims against the individual defendants sued
in their official capacities. See Crockett v. District of
Columbia, Civil Action No. 16-1357, 2020 WL 1821121, at *7
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2020).
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge February 23, 2026