Jackson v. Beacon City School District

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 14, 2019·No. 7:19-cv-08164-PMH·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WALTER L. JACKSON, Plaintiff, 19-CV-8164 (NSR) -against- ORDER TO AMEND BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, alleging that his employer discriminated against him based on his race. By order dated November 12, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v, Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

CALLY Boe

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits — to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “Tt|hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U:S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible — not merely possible — that the pleader is entitled to relief. Jd. BACKGROUND Using the Court’s form complaint for employment discrimination, Plaintiff Walter L. Jackson brings this complaint against the Beacon City School District, alleging that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race. Plaintiff, who identifies himself as African- American, checks the box indicating that he is alleging discrimination under Title VU, although he does not indicate his race in that section of the complaint. Plaintiff does not check the box indicating that he is asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but he does indicate his race in that section of the complaint. Similarly, although Plaintiff does not check the box indicating that he is asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 — 634, he does indicate that he was born in 1978.

Plaintiff alleges the following: Friday, September 14, 2017, I went to Beacon City school district to pick up my check. When I spoke to the dispatcher (Ann), she informed me that I didn’t have a check because I didn’t fill out a time card. It should be noted I did have a conversation with “Ann” on Tuesday, September 11, 2017[,] [i]n regards to filling out a time card in which she told me “it was too early.” Later I found out that I was the only Black [illegible] that wasn’t paid. (ECF No. 2 at 5.)! Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and that he received the August 1, 2019 notice of right to sue on August 4, 2019.” He seeks unspecified monetary damages. DISCUSSION A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Section 1981 “protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States’ to ‘make and enforce contracts’ without respect to race.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). To state a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendants intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerns one of the statute’s enumerated activities. /d. at 476 (holding that a plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 1981 “when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship.”). Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination do not suffice to state a claim under § 1981. The alleged facts do not suggest that Defendant’s conduct was motivated by race-based animus.

' Page numbers refer to those generated by the Court’s electronic filing system. Plaintiff does not attach a copy of the notice to his complaint.

B. Title VII and ADEA Claims Title VI provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jackson v. Beacon City School District, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Jackson v. Beacon City School District (Jackson v. Beacon City School District) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Kinneary v. City of New York
601 F.3d 151 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald
546 U.S. 470 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)