J. D. & A. B. SPRECKLES CO. v. COMMISSIONER

41 B.T.A. 370, 1940 BTA LEXIS 1197
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedFebruary 14, 1940
DocketDocket No. 90390.
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 41 B.T.A. 370 (J. D. & A. B. SPRECKLES CO. v. COMMISSIONER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J. D. & A. B. SPRECKLES CO. v. COMMISSIONER, 41 B.T.A. 370, 1940 BTA LEXIS 1197 (bta 1940).

Opinion

[373]*373OPINION.

HaeRon:

The principal issue for determination is whether or not the Tire Co. was a member of the affiliated group of corporations of which petitioner was the parent, within the intent of section 141 of the Revenue Act of 1932, during the last 10 months of 1933. In the consolidated return filed by petitioner and its affiliated corporations for the calendar year 1933, a deduction was taken for a net loss of $191,268.52, claimed to have been sustained by the Tire Co. during the period in question. The respondent disallowed the deduction on the ground that the Tire Co. was not a member of the affiliated group, within the intent of the statute, during the period in question.

The provisions of section 141 of the Revenue Act of 1932, in so far as they are pertinent to the question here presented, are as follows:

(a) Privilege to File Consolidated Betukns, — An affiliated group of corporations shall, subject to the provisions of this section, have the privilege of making a consolidated return for the taxable year in lieu of separate returns. * * *
*******
(d) Definition or “Affiliated Group”. — As used in this section an “affiliated group” means one or more chains of corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent corporation if—
(1) At least 95 per centum of the stock of each of the corporations (except the common parent corporation) is owned directly by one or more of the other corporations; and
(2) The common parent corporation owns directly at least 95 per centum of the stock of at least one of the other corporations.

Petitioner contends that it was the owner of all of the capital stock of the Tire Co. during the period from February 20 to [374]*374December 31, 1933, and that, therefore, the sole test of affiliation provided by the statute was satisfied. The parties litigant have stipulated that on February 20, 1933, petitioner acquired all of the capital stock of the Tire Co. from the Securities Co. for $1, and that petitioner “remained the owner” of the stock until the Tire Co. was dissolved on December 23,1935. For the purpose of this proceeding, it is assumed that petitioner was the owner, both in fact and in law, of all of the capital stock of the Tire Co. during the period in question.

Respondent asserts that the Tire Co. was not a member of the affiliated group within the intent of the statute, because of the fact that petitioner’s ownership of the stock of the Tire Co. did not serve a business purpose, as distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose.

The first question raised by respondent’s contention is one of statutory construction as to whether or not the framers of the statute intended that the privilege of making consolidated returns may be enjoyed in cases where the affiliation does not serve a business purpose, as distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose. If it should be decided that the framers of the statute intended that the privilege may be enjoyed in such cases, it will not be necessary to pass upon the remaining question of fact as to whether or not the affiliation which is involved here served a business purpose, as distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose.

The privilege to make a consolidated return, granted to an affiliated group of corporations, is “akin” to an exemption. Commissioner v. Manus Muller & Co., Inc., 79 Fed. (2d) 19, 20. The purpose for the granting of the privilege is stated in the Report of the Senate Finance Committee on the Revenue Bill of 1928, 70th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 960, p. 14, as follows:1

The permission to file consolidated returns by affiliated corporations merely recognizes the business entity as distinguished from the legal corporate entity of the business enterprise. Unless the affiliated group as a whole in the conduct of its business enterprise shows net profits, the individuals conducting the business have realized no gain. The failure to recognize the entire business enterprise means drawing technical legal distinctions, as contrasted with the recognition of actual facts. The mere fact that by legal fiction several corporations owned by the same stockholders are separate entities should not obscure the fact that they are in reality one and the same business owned by the same individuals and operated as a unit. To refuse to recognize this situation and to require for tax purposes the breaking up of a single business into its constituent parts is just as unreasonable as to require a single corporation to report [375]*375separately for tax purposes the gains, from its sales department, from its manufacturing activities, from its investments, and from each and every one of its agencies. It would be just as unreasonable to demand that an individual engaged in two or more businesses treat each business separately for tax purposes.
Much, of the misapprehension about consolidated returns will be removed when it is realized that it is only when the corporations are really but one corporation that the permission to file consolidated returns is given, amd that no ultimate advantage under the taso laws really results. * * * [Italics supplied.]

The purpose for the granting of the privilege is restated succinctly in the Report of the Senate Finance Committee on the Revenue Bill of 1932,72d Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 665, p. 9, as follows:

The provisions for consolidated returns under the present law and regulations recognize sound accounting practices and require tax liabilities to be determined on the basis of the total net income of the enterprise as a whole. No improper benefits a/re obtained from the privilege. [Italics supplied.]

The intent which underlies the granting of the privilege finds some expression in the provisions of subdivision (b) of section 141 of the Eevenue Act of 1932, which provides as follows:

(b) Regulations. — The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in order that the tax liability of an affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the group, both during and after the period of affiliation, may be determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted in such manner as clearly to reflect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax liability.

It is apparent that the privilege was granted in order that the tax liability of a group of corporations which were combined for business purposes into one business unit might be based upon the true net income of the business unit. The framers of the statute evidently believed and intended “that no ultimate advantage under the tax laws really results” from the granting of the privilege to make consolidated returns and that “No improper benefits are obtained from the privilege.” It is believed that they did not intend that the privilege be enjoyed in cases where the affiliation relied upon as the basis for the privilege to make a consolidated return is without a business purpose.

The next question raised by respondent’s contention is a question of fact as to whether or not the affiliation which is relied upon here served a business purpose, as distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose.

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J. D. & A. B. SPRECKLES CO. v. COMMISSIONER
41 B.T.A. 370 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1940)

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Bluebook (online)
41 B.T.A. 370, 1940 BTA LEXIS 1197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-d-a-b-spreckles-co-v-commissioner-bta-1940.