Hunter, J.
This matter comes before us on the petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. She seeks an order providing for a waiver of filing fees and cost bond,'and a free transcript and statement of facts.
This action was commenced as a wrongful eviction action in which judgment was entered for the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff), Lil Iverson, in the amount of $1,000. Thereafter, the plaintiff attempted to appeal from what she alleges is an inadequate award of damages. Being without funds to perfect her appeal, she made application to the court for several orders which,-in effect, would have allowed her to proceed on appeal without cost to her. These motions were denied, apparently on jurisdictional grounds. The denial of the plaintiff’s motions effectively prevented her from proceeding with her appeal.
After the denial of her motions by the trial court, the plaintiff renewed her pro se motions in this court. The matter was heard in April of 1972. At that time the record did not reflect with any-degree of certainty whether the plaintiff was in fact an indigent and it lacked sufficient information as to whether or not the appeal was in good faith and lacked frivolity. We declined to rule on the plaintiff’s motions against such an indefinite background and [165]*165referred the case to the superior court for further determinations consistent with our opinion in O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969). To aid the trial court in its determinations and clarify the requirements for motions of this nature, we set forth the following guidelines concerning the plaintiff’s motions.
1. Petitioner’s motion and affidavit shall set forth the claim of indigence and supporting facts, and also aver that the appeal is in good faith and not frivolous. Petitioner may amend her motion and affidavits to comply.
2. Petitioner shall file a concise statement of the points on which she intends to rely on appeal, and if it is claimed that the evidence is insufficient to justify the judgment, she shall specify with particularity in what respect she believes the evidence is lacking. (The allegations of error need not be expressed in any technical form, but must clearly indicate what is intended.)
3. The trial court, guided by our opinion in O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra, shall determine:
a. petitioner’s indigence or lack of indigence, and the factual basis for the determination;
b. whether any allegations of error are frivolous and, if so, the reasons;
c. whether the appeal is sought in good faith and, if not, the reasons for such determination.
4. If the trial court determines that petitioner is indigent and her appeal is in good faith and not frivolous, the court shall also determine whether the claimed errors and points relied upon
a. are of such nature that they may be adequately presented and determined without necessity of a statement of facts by reference to the transcript; or
b. may be adequately presented and determined by means of an agreed statement of facts (ROA 1-34(5)) and, if so, whether such will be available to petitioner; or
c. may be so presented and determined by means of a short record (ROA 1-34 (4)) and, if so, wnat portion of the stenographic transcript will be necessary to properly conduct the petitioner’s appeal; or
d. will require, for adequate presentation and determination, a full statement of facts.
Prior to making its determinations, the trial judge re[166]*166quested that counsel assist the plaintiff in presenting what had previously been her pro se motions. With the aid of counsel, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s assets were insufficient to permit her to pay the costs of pursuing her appeal without deprivation of her basic living expense. This conclusion was based on the court’s finding that: (1) the plaintiff’s total monthly income including foodstamps is $181; (2) she does not own any property of value that could be liquidated or pledged as security for the purposes of obtaining finances sufficient to pursue her appeal; (3) she presently maintains a judgment in her favor against the defendant, Marine Bancorporation, in the sum of $1,000, but that amount is unavailable to her for use in pursuing her appeal due to the existence of an attorney’s lien on said judgment in the amount of $1,050.
The court also concluded: (1) that the plaintiff’s allegations of error in her appeal are not frivolous and her appeal is sought in good faith; (2) that the plaintiff’s claimed errors and points relied upon are not of such a nature that they may be adequately presented and determined without the necessity of a statement of facts, or by means of an agreed statement of facts, or by means of a short record; (3) that the plaintiff’s claimed errors and points relied upon in pursuing her appeal will require a complete transcript, including exhibits and a full statement of facts, except that counsel’s opening statements and closing arguments are not necessary for review.
With this background as a reference we turn to the issues presented. Amicus curiae contends that this court has both a right and a duty stemming from the Constitution of the State of Washington to provide the plaintiff with the relief she requests. They argue that the state constitution sets up both the Court of Appeals and this court to handle a particular mission. That mission, they argue, is for the courts to hear and decide all cases regardless of whether the parties are rich or poor; that they be accessible to all citizens; and that they resolve individual and social con[167]*167flicts regardless of whether the parties are rich or poor. We agree.
Const. art. 4, § 1 and § 30, vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and superior courts of this state. Upon creation, these courts assumed certain powers and duties. See O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra, and In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918). These duties include, among others, the fair and impartial administration of justice and the duty to see that justice is done in the cases that come before the court. The administration of justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be open to the indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs of pursuing judicial relief. O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra.
In the O’Connor case we stated on page 605:
Were this court to hold that the Supreme Court has the power to waive prepayment of costs and that the superior court has a like power, but that no such power exists in justice courts, an anachronism would result. This would be tantamount to a holding that, if a poor person has a large claim, the courts will open their doors to him; but if his claim is small, those doors must be closed, simply because there were no justice courts at common law. . . .
The proper and impartial administration of justice requires that these doors be kept open to the poor as well as to those who can afford to pay the statutory fees.
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Hunter, J.
This matter comes before us on the petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. She seeks an order providing for a waiver of filing fees and cost bond,'and a free transcript and statement of facts.
This action was commenced as a wrongful eviction action in which judgment was entered for the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff), Lil Iverson, in the amount of $1,000. Thereafter, the plaintiff attempted to appeal from what she alleges is an inadequate award of damages. Being without funds to perfect her appeal, she made application to the court for several orders which,-in effect, would have allowed her to proceed on appeal without cost to her. These motions were denied, apparently on jurisdictional grounds. The denial of the plaintiff’s motions effectively prevented her from proceeding with her appeal.
After the denial of her motions by the trial court, the plaintiff renewed her pro se motions in this court. The matter was heard in April of 1972. At that time the record did not reflect with any-degree of certainty whether the plaintiff was in fact an indigent and it lacked sufficient information as to whether or not the appeal was in good faith and lacked frivolity. We declined to rule on the plaintiff’s motions against such an indefinite background and [165]*165referred the case to the superior court for further determinations consistent with our opinion in O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969). To aid the trial court in its determinations and clarify the requirements for motions of this nature, we set forth the following guidelines concerning the plaintiff’s motions.
1. Petitioner’s motion and affidavit shall set forth the claim of indigence and supporting facts, and also aver that the appeal is in good faith and not frivolous. Petitioner may amend her motion and affidavits to comply.
2. Petitioner shall file a concise statement of the points on which she intends to rely on appeal, and if it is claimed that the evidence is insufficient to justify the judgment, she shall specify with particularity in what respect she believes the evidence is lacking. (The allegations of error need not be expressed in any technical form, but must clearly indicate what is intended.)
3. The trial court, guided by our opinion in O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra, shall determine:
a. petitioner’s indigence or lack of indigence, and the factual basis for the determination;
b. whether any allegations of error are frivolous and, if so, the reasons;
c. whether the appeal is sought in good faith and, if not, the reasons for such determination.
4. If the trial court determines that petitioner is indigent and her appeal is in good faith and not frivolous, the court shall also determine whether the claimed errors and points relied upon
a. are of such nature that they may be adequately presented and determined without necessity of a statement of facts by reference to the transcript; or
b. may be adequately presented and determined by means of an agreed statement of facts (ROA 1-34(5)) and, if so, whether such will be available to petitioner; or
c. may be so presented and determined by means of a short record (ROA 1-34 (4)) and, if so, wnat portion of the stenographic transcript will be necessary to properly conduct the petitioner’s appeal; or
d. will require, for adequate presentation and determination, a full statement of facts.
Prior to making its determinations, the trial judge re[166]*166quested that counsel assist the plaintiff in presenting what had previously been her pro se motions. With the aid of counsel, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s assets were insufficient to permit her to pay the costs of pursuing her appeal without deprivation of her basic living expense. This conclusion was based on the court’s finding that: (1) the plaintiff’s total monthly income including foodstamps is $181; (2) she does not own any property of value that could be liquidated or pledged as security for the purposes of obtaining finances sufficient to pursue her appeal; (3) she presently maintains a judgment in her favor against the defendant, Marine Bancorporation, in the sum of $1,000, but that amount is unavailable to her for use in pursuing her appeal due to the existence of an attorney’s lien on said judgment in the amount of $1,050.
The court also concluded: (1) that the plaintiff’s allegations of error in her appeal are not frivolous and her appeal is sought in good faith; (2) that the plaintiff’s claimed errors and points relied upon are not of such a nature that they may be adequately presented and determined without the necessity of a statement of facts, or by means of an agreed statement of facts, or by means of a short record; (3) that the plaintiff’s claimed errors and points relied upon in pursuing her appeal will require a complete transcript, including exhibits and a full statement of facts, except that counsel’s opening statements and closing arguments are not necessary for review.
With this background as a reference we turn to the issues presented. Amicus curiae contends that this court has both a right and a duty stemming from the Constitution of the State of Washington to provide the plaintiff with the relief she requests. They argue that the state constitution sets up both the Court of Appeals and this court to handle a particular mission. That mission, they argue, is for the courts to hear and decide all cases regardless of whether the parties are rich or poor; that they be accessible to all citizens; and that they resolve individual and social con[167]*167flicts regardless of whether the parties are rich or poor. We agree.
Const. art. 4, § 1 and § 30, vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and superior courts of this state. Upon creation, these courts assumed certain powers and duties. See O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra, and In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918). These duties include, among others, the fair and impartial administration of justice and the duty to see that justice is done in the cases that come before the court. The administration of justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be open to the indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs of pursuing judicial relief. O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra.
In the O’Connor case we stated on page 605:
Were this court to hold that the Supreme Court has the power to waive prepayment of costs and that the superior court has a like power, but that no such power exists in justice courts, an anachronism would result. This would be tantamount to a holding that, if a poor person has a large claim, the courts will open their doors to him; but if his claim is small, those doors must be closed, simply because there were no justice courts at common law. . . .
The proper and impartial administration of justice requires that these doors be kept open to the poor as well as to those who can afford to pay the statutory fees.
Inherent within this reasoning and logic is the conclusion that financial inability to pay the costs of pursuing a legal remedy will not operate to bar one from this state’s system of justice. An anachronism would also result were this court to hold that the doors of justice are to remain open to indigents at the trial level but closed at the appellate level. To hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief she requests would be to hold that indigents are entitled to pursue their remedies, but not to their logical conclusion. Consistent with our affirmative duty to keep the doors of justice open to all with what appears to be a meritorious [168]*168claim, for judicial relief, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested.
Having determined that this court has a duty to provide the plaintiff with the relief she requests, we hereby waive the requirements of a filing fee pursuant to ROA 1-10 (a) (1) (iii) (CAROA 10 (a) (1) (iii)). It is also ordered, via the authority vested in this court under RCW 2.28.150, that costs of the preparation of the transcript be waived and the plaintiff be furnished one at no expense.
ROA 1-22 (CAROA 22) requires that a bond for costs on appeal be filed with the clerk of the superior court when notice of appeal is given. This bond is designed to reimburse the respondent should he prevail. In O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969), we recognized that the power to make rules also contains the power to waive them. In pursuit of our duty to see that justice is done in all cases that come before us, we waive the requirement of a cost bond in order that the plaintiff may pursue her remedy. In doing this we recognize that there is no funding available to reimburse the defendant should he prevail. If, in fact, the defendant does prevail, he is authorized to file a claim with the legislature for the amount he is entitled to receive as costs, to the extent of the cost bond provided for in ROA 1-22 (CAROA 22). This is the procedure we adopted in Honore v. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wn.2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970), wherein no funds were available to reimburse attorneys who were representing indigent prisoners who are entitled to representation. In that case, as in the instant case, the fact that funds are not available cannot prevent this court from performing its duty of administering fair and impartial justice to all regardless of economic status.
We note also that there is no apparent funding available for the furnishing of a statement of facts which the trial court has determined is absolutely necessary to process the instant appeal. We therefore order that a statement of facts be furnished by the official reporter in this case, and the [169]*169reporter is authorized to file a claim with the legislature for reimbursement.
To clarify our position, costs may not be waived in every appeal; they may be waived only after a determination, as in the instant case, that the appeal is not frivolous and that the plaintiff is, in fact, an indigent. As our order indicates, any method which minimizes the costs involved without jeopardizing the plaintiff’s position must be utilized.
Consistent with fundamental fairness and in order not to overburden the public treasury, we hereby impose a lien upon all amounts over and above the original lien which the plaintiff may recover for the payment of cost incurred or for reimbursement to the state, as the case may be. If, in fact, the plaintiff does recover an increased amount, she will then be in a position to pay the cost incurred or to reimburse the state and should pay her share of the cost of her appeal.
We believe O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra, is dispositive of the remaining issues raised by the various parties and therefore need not comment upon them further.
It is so ordered.
Finley, Rosellini, Hamilton, Stafford, Wright, Utter, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur.