Israel Reyes v. Bulwark Construction, Inc. dba Residential Wall Systems; and Does 1 to 50, inclusive

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03638
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ISRAEL REYES, Case No.: 25cv03638 W (KSC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. REMAND [DOC. 3]; AND (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 14 BULWARK CONSTRUCTION, INC. MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. 4] dba RESIDENTIAL WALL SYSTEMS; 15 and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17

18 19 Two motions are pending before the Court. Plaintiff Israel Reyes (“Reyes”) moves 20 to remand this case to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. Defendant 21 Bulwark Construction, Inc. (“Bulwark”) opposes. Bulwark also moves to dismiss the 22 action with prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6). 23 The Court must first establish federal jurisdiction before making any ruling. 24 However, because both motions, and consequently also the jurisdictional inquiry, turn on 25 the resolution of the question of preemption, the Court treats both analyses 26 simultaneously. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral 27 argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Reyes’s 28 motion to remand and GRANTS Bulwark’s motion to dismiss. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This lawsuit arises out of an employment dispute between the parties. Reyes was 3 employed by Bulwark from October 2022 to March 2024 as a “plaster,” a role which 4 required performing plastering, wall preparation, and finishing work on construction 5 sites. (Compl. [Doc. 1] at ¶8.) Reyes was classified as a non-exempt, hourly employee 6 and was initially paid $25 per hour but received subsequent pay increases during his 7 employment. (Id. at ¶ 9.) He regularly worked 32–40 hours per week performing 8 physically demanding work at multiple construction sites in San Diego County. (Id. ¶ 9 10.) 10 While employed, Bulwark alleges Reyes was at times a member of the United 11 Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“Union”). (Ntc. of Removal [Doc. 1] 12 at ¶5.) Bulwark further alleges that both the Union and Bulwark were parties to a 13 Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the Pacific Rim Drywall Association 14 and the Western States Regional Council of Carpenters. (Remand Opp’n [Doc. 5] at 8.) 15 Reyes contends the CBA was never provided to him, never produced in pre-litigation 16 discussion, and never applied to him. (Mtn. to Remand [Doc. 3] at 4.) 17 On October 24, 2025, Reyes filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior 18 Court. (Compl. at 9–15.) The complaint alleges the following wage and hour claims 19 against Bulwark: (1) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512, 226.7); (2) 20 Failure to Provide Rest Periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (3) Failure to Pay Wages Due 21 (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); and (4) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Cal. 22 Lab. Code § 226). (Id. at ¶¶18–44.) Bulwark removed the action to this Court on or 23 around December 17, 2025. (See Ntc. of Removal.) Reyes filed a motion to remand on 24 December 24, 2025 (See Mtn. to Remand) and Bulwark opposed (See Remand Opp’n). 25 Bulwark also filed a motion to dismiss on December 24, 2025 (Mtn. to Dismiss [Doc. 4]), 26 to which Reyes opposed (Mtn. to Dismiss Opp’n [Doc. 7]). 27 On February 25, 2026, Reyes filed a notice of related cases (Ntc. of Related Cases 28 [Doc. 9]), and a notice of a pending motion to consolidate the related cases the next day. 1 (Mtn. to Consolidate [Doc. 10].) Bulwark objected to the notice of related cases on 2 March 4, 2026. (Objection to Related Cases [Doc. 11].) 3 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A. Motion to Remand 6 A federal court must order remand if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an 7 action. Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass’n v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 8 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, federal 9 jurisdiction is only proper when the plaintiff's complaint on its face shows that the cause 10 of action is based upon federal law. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). 11 Federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on “an actual or anticipated defense,” nor can it 12 rest upon “an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Id. 13 B. Motion to Dismiss 14 On the other hand, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the 15 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 16 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Where 17 a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court 18 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could 19 not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 20 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 21 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking 22 all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to 23 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 24 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 25 C. Preemption Under Section 301 of the LMRA 26 The “complete preemption” doctrine is an “independent corollary” to the well- 27 pleaded complaint rule and states that once an area of state law has been completely 28 1 and therefore arise under federal law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 2 (1987). The complete preemption corollary is applied primarily in cases raising claims 3 preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA.”) 4 Caterpillar Inc, 482 U.S. at 393. Section 301 states: 5 Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this 6 chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any 7 district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of 8 the parties. 9 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has held that the preemptive force of Section 10 301 is so powerful, it can entirely displace any state cause of action. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. 11 386 at 394. Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that 12 state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of Section 301. Id. (quoting 13 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)). The 14 Court further specified that an application of state law is preempted by Section 301 only 15 if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. Lingle 16 v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988). 17 To determine whether Section 301 preempts a given claim, and to ensure that it 18 “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role of labor arbitration in resolving 19 collective bargaining agreement disputes,” courts apply a two-part test. Curtis v. Irwin 20 Industries, Inc. 913 F.3d 1146, 1152. Under step one, courts ask whether the claim 21 involves a right existing “solely as a result” of a collective bargaining agreement, rather 22 than a right rising from state law. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 23 (9th Cir. 2007). If the asserted claim is brought “purely to vindicate a right or duty 24 created by the CBA itself,” the claim is preempted and the analysis ends there. Id. But if 25 not, courts proceed to the second step and ask, “whether a plaintiff’s state law right is 26 substantially dependent on the analysis of [the CBA],” which turns on whether the claim 27 cannot be resolved by simply “look[ing] to” versus “interpreting” the CBA. Id. at 1060. 28 1 At the second step of this analysis, claims are preempted only if there is an active dispute 2 over “the meaning of contract terms,” such that the terms need to be interpreted. Id. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Here, the parties dispute whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction over 5 Plaintiff’s California Labor Code claims and, therefore, whether remand or dismissal is 6 appropriate. The Court addresses the parties’ initial arguments around the validity and 7 effect of the CBA before analyzing the parties’ Section 301 preemption arguments. 8 A. The CBA’s Validity and Effect 9 Reyes argues that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction because Bulwark is 10 “invoking a collective bargaining agreement that was never provided to Plaintiff, never 11 served, never produced upon request, and never shown to govern Plaintiff’s employment 12 during the relevant period.” (Mtn. to Remand at 3.) These arguments are without merit. 13 Whether the CBA was provided, served, or produced in litigation has no bearing on its 14 binding effect. What matters is whether Reyes opted into the CBA as an employee. 15 As a threshold matter, the Court GRANTS Bulwark’s request for judicial notice 16 (“RJN”) of the CBA and the related documents discussed below1. (See Mtn. to Dismiss 17 RJN [Doc. 4-2].) Courts routinely take judicial notice of CBAs at the motion to dismiss 18 phase, especially when reference to the CBA is required to resolve issues of preemption. 19 See, e.g., Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 20 2015) (taking judicial notice of a CBA that formed the basis for defendant's argument 21 that certain claims were preempted by the LMRA). Furthermore, Reyes acknowledges 22 that the Court may take judicial notice of the existence of the submitted documents. (Mtn. 23 to Dismiss Opp’n at 5.) 24 25 26

27 1 Bulwark’s request for judicial notice also includes California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage 28 1 Reyes’s arguments about the validity of the CBA are unpersuasive. First, 2 Bulwark’s request for judicial notice includes Reyes’s completed application to join the 3 Union, agreement to pay dues, and executed authorization for “any and all” local unions 4 affiliated with the Western States Regional Council of Carpenters to represent him in 5 collective bargaining in “all matters pertaining to wages, hours and other terms and 6 conditions of employment.” (RJN Ex. 3 [Doc. 4-2] at 44–49.) Bulwark’s request also 7 contains the executed CBA between Pacific Rim Drywall Association and the Western 8 States Regional Council of Carpenters of the Union, the latter of which Reyes authorized 9 to represent him in collective bargaining negotiations. (RJN Ex. 1 [Doc. 4-2] at 5–32.) 10 Therefore, it is clear that Reyes opted into the CBA. 11 Reyes also argues that the Court cannot find federal question jurisdiction by way of 12 Bulwark invoking Section 301 preemption because it is a defense and therefore does not 13 appear in the complaint. (Mtn. to Remand at 5–6.) This argument misunderstands the law. 14 Section 301 was created with an “extraordinary pre-emptive power” that circumvents the 15 well-pleaded complaint rule. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65). 16 As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, “a civil complaint raising claims preempted by 17 Section 301 raises a federal question that can be removed to a federal court.” Id. Thus, 18 Reyes’s arguments that the Court may not look beyond the face of his complaint are 19 unfounded. 20 B. Preemption Under Section 301 of the LMRA 21 Reyes’s remaining two arguments broadly assert that his claims arise under state 22 law independent of any CBA and that any operative CBA provision does not require 23 interpretation. (Mtn. to Remand at 3–5.) In doing so, Reyes argues that his claims are not 24 preempted under steps one and two of the Section 301 preemption analysis. Curtis, 913 25 F.3d at 1152; Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. The Court analyzes each cause of action in 26 turn. 27 28 1 1. Failure to Provide Meal Periods 2 Reyes asserts that Bulwark was required to provide a timely, uninterrupted 30- 3 minute meal period for every work period exceeding five hours and it knowingly and 4 willfully failed to do so. (Compl. at ¶19–20). Bulwark argues the meal period claim is 5 exempted by California Labor Code section 512(e) and (f). The Court agrees. 6 California Labor Code section 512(a) provides that employers shall not employ an 7 employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the 8 employee with a meal period of no less than 30 minutes. Cal. Lab. Code §512(a). 9 However, section 512(e) provides an exception, stating section 512(a) does not apply if: 10 (1) the employee is covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement and (2) the valid collective bargaining agreement expressly provides for the 11 wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees, and expressly 12 provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium 13 wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly rate of pay of 14 not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate. 15 Cal. Lab. Code §512(e). Section 512(f)(1) states that section 512(e) applies to employees 16 employed in a construction occupation. Cal. Lab. Code §512(f)(1). 17 Here, at all relevant times, Reyes was employed in a construction occupation 18 within the meaning of section 512(f). (Compl. at ¶¶8,10.) In his complaint, he states that 19 he was employed as a “plaster” which involved working at multiple construction sites 20 during his employment. Id. Secondly, and as previously established, Reyes’s local union 21 executed a valid CBA on his behalf. A review of the CBA shows that it meets the 22 requirements of section 512(e) because it expressly provides for the conditions listed 23 above. Article XIII and Appendix A provide for wages, hours of work, working 24 conditions of employees, premium wages for overtime, and a regular hourly rate of pay 25 that is at least 30 percent more than the state minimum wage. (RJN Exhibit 1 (“CBA”) 26 [Doc 4-2] at 23–26, 28–30.) Article XIII also expressly provides for meal periods for 27 covered employees. (Id. at 23.) Article VII provides for final and binding arbitration of 28 disputes arising from the agreement, including the meal period provision. (Id. at 15–18.) 1 By its terms, Section 512(a) does not apply to Reyes, who is instead subject to the 2 specific, negotiated terms of his CBA. His meal period protections thus exist “solely as a 3 result of the CBA,” and is therefore preempted under step one of the Section 301 4 analysis. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1154. 5 2. Failure to Provide Rest Periods 6 Reyes also asserts that Bulwark was required to provide a paid 10-minute rest 7 period for every four hours worked or major fraction thereof and it knowingly and 8 willfully failed to do so. (Compl. at ¶26–27.) Bulwark argues the claim is covered by the 9 CBA and is preempted by the first prong of the Section 301 analysis. The Court agrees. 10 Reyes brings his rest period claim under Cal. Labor Code Section 226.7 (Compl. at 11 ¶26), which prohibits employers from requiring employees to work during mandated 12 meal, rest, or recovery periods. Cal. Labor Code Section 226.7(b). However, Industrial 13 Wage Order 16, which is incorporated in Reyes’s CBA, provides exemptions of rest and 14 meal period requirements for specified categories of employees, including construction 15 employees. It states: “[t]his order shall apply to all persons employed in the on-site 16 occupations of construction, including, but not limited to, work involving alteration, 17 demolition, building, excavating, renovation, remodeling, maintenance, improvement, 18 and repair work….” Cal. Code of Regs. 8 § 11160(1). Section 11 of the Wage Order then 19 addresses rest periods and expressly exempts any employees covered by a valid CBA if 20 the CBA provides equivalent protection. Cal. Code of Regs. 8 § 11160(11)(e). 21 Numerous cases in this circuit have held that if a CBA incorporates the terms of 22 Wage Order 16 and provides a grievance resolution mechanism, then the plaintiff’s rest 23 period claims are preempted. Zayerz v. Kiewit Infrastructure W., No. 16-CV-6405-PSG 24 (PJW), 2018 WL 582318, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018); Rodriguez v. S E Pipeline 25 Construction, 2023 WL 9319043, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2023); Rodriguez v. Gonsalves 26 & Santucci, Inc., No. 21-CV-07874-LB, 2022 WL 161892, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 27 2022). The CBA here provides identical protection to Wage Order 16: Article XIII 28 Section 2(e) incorporates Wage Order 16 in its entirety. (CBA at 24.) Furthermore, 1 Article VII of the CBA provides a grievance procedure, stating that “the decision of the 2 Arbitrator is final and binding upon the parties.” (Id. at 18.) Consequently, the CBA 3 provides equivalent protection and a final and binding grievance procedure. As a result, 4 Reyes’s rest period claim is preempted under step one of the Section 301 analysis. Curtis, 5 913 F.3d at 1154. 6 3. Failure to Pay Wages and Provide Accurate Wage Statements 7 Lastly, Reyes alleges that after his employment ended, Bulwark willfully failed to 8 pay him all wages earned and unpaid for the missed meal and rest periods. (Compl. at 9 ¶36.) He also alleges due to the failure to provide meal and rest periods, Bulwark failed to 10 provide accurate itemized wage statements. (Id. at ¶40.) Bulwark asserts that the claims 11 for failure to pay wages due and the failure to provide accurate wage statements are 12 preempted because they are derivative of claims that are preempted by the LMRA. 13 (Remand Opp’n at 14–15.) The Court agrees. 14 Due to the fact the meal and rest period claims are preempted, the derivative claims 15 of failure to pay timely after employment and to provide accurate wage statements are 16 also preempted to the extent they rely upon the prior claims. Estrada v. Kaiser Found. 17 Hosps., 678 Fed. App'x 494, 497 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that when a claim derives from 18 a preempted claim, the derivative claim also fails); Jimenez v. Young's Market Co., LLC, 19 No. 21-cv-02410-EMC, 2021 WL 5999082, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021) (“Because 20 overtime pay and meal periods claims are preempted, the derivative claims of failure to 21 pay final wages and provide accurate itemized wage statements are also preempted.”). 22 The complaint states the unpaid wages are for missed meal and rest periods and also 23 states that the itemized wage statements are inaccurate because they fail to reflect “all 24 hours worked, overtime wages, or premium wages owed for missed meal and rest 25 breaks.” (Compl. at ¶¶35, 40.) 26 As a result, the complaint establishes that the claims for failure to pay wages and 27 failure to provide wage statements are derivative of the meal and rest period claims and 28 are preempted for the same reasons illustrated above. Estrada v. Kaiser Foundation 1 Hospitals, 678 Fed.Appx. 494, 497 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that when a claim derives 2 from a preempted claim, the derivative claim also fails). 3 C. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 4 Bulwark has moved for the dismissal of all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 (See Mtn. to Dismiss at 2.) 7 Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have instructed courts to dismiss 8 claims found to be preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA if they are brought by an 9 employee who failed to exhaust the applicable CBA’s grievance and arbitration process. 10 DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983) (citing Republic Steel 11 Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)) (“[A]n employee is required to attempt to exhaust 12 any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement”); 13 see Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2016) 14 (failure to exhaust, or allege valid excuse for failure to exhaust, a claim preempted by 15 section 301 precludes pursuing that claim in court); Marquez v. Toll Global Forwarding 16 (USA) Inc., 2018 WL 3218102, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 679 (9th Cir. 17 2020) (“If a claim is preempted by the LMRA it can be dismissed if the claimant failed to 18 plead exhaustion of the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA.”). 19 Bulwark alleges that Reyes did not exhaust the CBA’s grievance and arbitration 20 process. (Mtn. to Dismiss at 17–18.) Reyes does not contest this fact but instead argues 21 that dismissing claims is an inappropriate remedy if he did not exhaust arbitration 22 procedures. (Mtn. to Dismiss Opp’n at 6). Instead, Reyes believes that if arbitration is 23 required then the proper procedural vehicle to consider the issue would be a motion to 24 compel arbitration and a stay of proceedings. (Id.) Reyes misunderstands the rules 25 governing Section 301 preemption. 26 As previously stated, courts are instructed to dismiss claims found to be preempted 27 by Section 301 of the LMRA if they are brought by an employee who failed to exhaust 28 the applicable CBA’s grievance and arbitration process. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163; see 1 Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1036–37. All four of Reyes’s claims are preempted, and because he 2 has not alleged exhaustion of the CBA’s grievance and arbitration provisions, the claims 3 are dismissed with prejudice. 4 Furthermore, Reyes argues that preemption is an affirmative defense and at the 5 motion to dismiss phase, cannot be relied upon to warrant dismissal. (Mtn. to Dismiss 6 Opp’n at 3). Generally, this is true. However, Section 301 of the LMRA is an exception 7 to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1151–52. Section 301 was 8 intended to “fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising 9 out of labor contracts” and “is an essential component of federal labor policy.” Burnside, 10 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007); Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. Accordingly, the Supreme 11 Court has held that “[a] state rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term 12 in a [labor] contract suit therefore is pre-empted by federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers 13 Corp. v Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). Section 301’s “extraordinary pre-emptive 14 power” “converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal 15 claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (quoting 16 Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). “In other words, a civil complaint 17 raising claims preempted by Section 301 raises a federal question that can be removed to 18 a federal court.” Id. 19 Reyes also alleges that due to improper removal, he should be awarded attorney’s 20 fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion. (Mtn. to Remand at 6.) Attorney fees, 21 however, are only appropriate under Section 1447(c) when the removing party had an 22 objectively unreasonable basis for removal. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 23 132, 141 (2005). The removal by Bulwark was not objectively unreasonable for the 24 reasons discussed above. Therefore, fees and costs are not warranted. 25 26 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 27 The doctrine of complete preemption renders the claims federal from their 28 inception, and the Court consequently has jurisdiction over them. Because all claims are 1 ||completely preempted, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Israel Reyes’s motion to remand. 2 ||(Mtn. to Remand [Doc. 3].) Furthermore, preempted LMRA claims should be dismissed 3 || with prejudice if the claims are brought by an employee who failed to exhaust the 4 || grievance and arbitration procedures of the applicable CBA. Accordingly, the Court 5 ||GRANTS Defendant Bulwark Construction’s motion to dismiss all claims WITH 6 || PREJUDICE. (Min. to Dismiss [Doc. 4].) 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: April 23, 2026 \ ° 11 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan Unted States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12