Isaacson v. Carson

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 23, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00588·Unknown

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

8 KAREN ISAACSON, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00588-RAJ

9 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 10 v.

11 BEN CARSON,

12 Defendant. 13 14 This matter is before the Court sua sponte. On April 21, 2020, the Honorable 15 Brian A. Tsuchida, United States Magistrate Judge, granted pro se Plaintiff Karen 16 Isaacson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis while recommending review under 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Dkt. # 4. For following reasons, the Court DISMISSES 18 Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis 21 plaintiff’s case if the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 22 which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 23 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also See Lopez v. Smith, 203 24 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis 25 complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks a basis 26 in law or fact. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). 1 The following is taken Plaintiff’s complaint, which is assumed to be true for the 2 purposes of this motion to dismiss. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 In May 2016, Plaintiff visited Guild Mortgage to seek advice about obtaining a home 4 equity conversion mortgage (or “reverse mortgage”) for her manufactured home. Dkt. # 5 5 at ¶ 25. During the visit, a loan officer allegedly told Plaintiff that “HUD has a rule that 6 if you move your house you can’t get a reverse mortgage.” Dkt. # 5 at ¶ 26. Plaintiff 7 subsequently contacted HUD seeking a reinterpretation or waiver of the rule, but HUD 8 reiterated the requirement and confirmed there were no exceptions. Dkt. # 25 at ¶¶ 29-30. 9 On April 17, 2020, Plaintiff sued the Department of Housing and Urban 10 Development (“HUD”), the Secretary of HUD, and the Assistant Secretary of HUD and 11 the Fair Housing Administration (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s complaint 12 alleges: (1) Fifth Amendment due process violations, (2) Fifth Amendment equal 13 protection violations, (3) intentional interference with a prospective business expectancy, 14 (4) willful misconduct, (5) intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, (6) 15 violation of the Fair Housing Act, (7) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and 16 (8) unconstitutional pattern or practice. See generally Dkt. # 5. Each of Plaintiff’s claims 17 is based on her allegation that she was denied a reverse mortgage because of HUD’s 18 allegedly unlawful rules and regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 203.43f(d)(iii) and HUD Handbook 19 4235.1 REV-1 § 3-4(B)(4). 20 This is Plaintiff’s fourth action arising from her interactions with Guild Mortgage 21 and HUD.1 This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s three prior complaints for lack of subject 22 matter jurisdiction after determining that she lacked Article III standing to sue.2 Most 23 1 See Isaacson v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 16-cv-1254-JLR; Isaacson v. Sec’y of 24 Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 17-cv-1449-RSL; Isaacson v. Carson, et. al., No. 19-cv-2059- 25 RSL (dismissed as frivolous). 2 See Isaacson, No. 16-CV-1254-JLR (Dkt. #26); Isaacson, No. 17-CV-1449-RSL (Dkt. 26 #23), Isaacson, No. 19-cv-2059-RSL (Dkt. # 8). 1 recently, in an order dismissing Plaintiff’s third complaint, the Honorable Robert S. 2 Lasnik cautioned Plaintiff that “future actions involving these factual and legal 3 allegations, which again fail to establish Article III standing, may be dismissed with 4 prejudice.” Dkt. # 8 at 3. Notwithstanding this warning, Plaintiff filed the instant action. 5 For the reasons previously articulated to Plaintiff on several prior occasions, Plaintiff still 6 lacks standing to pursue this action. 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 Under Rule 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject- 9 matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 10 Constitutional standing is a “necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction.” Thomas v. 11 Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2009). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff 12 must show that (1) she suffered an injury in fact, (2) there is a causal connection between 13 the injury and the defendants’ conduct, and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by a 14 favorable decision from the Court. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 15 (1992). 16 An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 17 (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 18 hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff again fails to allege “an invasion of a legally protected interest which 20 is . . . concrete and particularized and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or 21 hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff does 22 not allege that she applied for a reverse mortgage with Guild Mortgage (or any other 23 lender), nor does she allege that HUD reviewed her application and declined to insure the 24 loan. Plaintiff’s speculation that she will be unable to obtain a reverse mortgage from 25 any lender as a result of HUD’s allegedly unlawful rule and regulation, does not create a 26 concrete injury in fact. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 1 Plaintiff also fails to show how her alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to 2 Defendants rather than the independent actions of a third party. Virginia Sur. Co. v. 3 Northrop Grumman Corp., 144 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1998). “[W]here the causal 4 chain involves [a] third part[y] whose independent decisions collectively have a 5 significant effect on plaintiffs’ injuries . . . the causal chain is too weak to support 6 standing.” Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 7 2012). HUD is not in the business of issuing reverse mortgage contracts. Instead, such 8 contracts are extended to applicants by third-party lenders and HUD provides optional 9 insurance to lenders of qualifying reverse mortgages. U.S.C. § 1715z-20(c). This is fatal 10 to Plaintiff’s complaint because even if she could establish an injury in fact, it would be 11 traceable to the lender, not HUD. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to 12 bring this action. 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 This is Plaintiff’s fourth bite at the apple. There will not be a fifth. Plaintiff was 15 informed on three prior occasions that she lacks standing, yet she continues to file 16 complaints without remedying this underlying defect.