PI ALLEY, Chief Justice.
There are two cases involved here, which because of the similarity of issues, have, by our order of November 10, 1966, been consolidated for decision.
The first case is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County in sustaining a demurrer to the petition of Roy Isaacs, plaintiff in error here, who, for himself and others similarly situated, filed a declaratory judgment action against- the defendants in error, the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, the Urban Renewal Authority and the individual members of the Authority’s Board of Commissioners and its executive director, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Urban Redevelopment Law, 11 O.S. 1961, Section 1601 et seq., and for injunctive relief.
The second case is an appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County in sustaining the demurrer of the defendants in error, Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority and its officers, and the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma to the petition of the plaintiffs in error, S. M. Roof, L. C. Wilson and J. V. Garret. As in the Oklahoma City case, plaintiffs in error, in the Tulsa case sought a declaratory judgment against the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority, its officers, and against the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, decreeing the creation of the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority under the provisions of 11 O.S.1961, Section 1601-1620, to be void and violative of certain provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, and for injunctive relief.
In the Oklahoma City case, all defendants in error filed motions to strike and to make more definite and certain with respect to the petition of plaintiff. These motions were sustained in part and overruled in part by the trial court. Accordingly, the plaintiff in error filed an amended petition, to which each of the defendants in error demurred. All demurrers were sustained by the trial court and the Urban Redevelopment Law was held to be constitutional. Plaintiff in error filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he thereupon perfected his appeal here.
In the Tulsa case, the general demurrer to plaintiff’s in error petition was sustained. Plaintiff’s in error elected to stand on their petition. The trial court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs in error filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. Plaintiffs in error thereupon lodged their appeal here.
For convenience, plaintiffs in error in both cases shall be referred to herein as [233]*233plaintiffs and the defendants shall he referred to by their respective names, if necessary.
The statutory provisions under attack, 11 O.S.1961, Sec. 1601-1620, covers some thirty pages in the statutes, and we do not deem it necessary to set out the act in full, but reference will be made herein to the various sections of the act.
Generally it may be said, as stated in Section 1604 of the act, that the over-all purpose of the act is to enable certain cities to take steps to eliminate slum and blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of "the citizens of the state, the elimination of which is declared to.be a matter of public interest.
Many grounds are asserted by plaintiff for the unconstitutionality of the act, which we number and will discuss consecutively, for convenience and to meet the method of presentation.
Plaintiff, as his first ground, contends that the act attempts to confer legislative, executive and judicial authority upon the city and the authority. Other courts, in discussing this objection to similar Urban Renewal Acts, have uniformly rejected this contention, where the legislature has adopted the policy and set forth the guide lines which are to be utilized by the cities and the authority. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of State ex rel. Fatzer v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 179 Kan. 435, 296 P.2d 656, had the following to say about this point:
“We think it clear that while the legislature cannot delegate its constitutional power to make a law, it can make a law which delegates the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which such law shall become operative. In other words, the legislature may enact general provisions but leave to those who are to act certain discretion in “filling in the details,” so to speak, provided, of course, it fixes reasonable and definite standards which govern the exercise of such authority.”
In addition thereto, 'we have consistently held in the past, in a variety of factual situations that the legislature has no authority to delegate power to an administrative board to make laws, but it may delegate to an administrative board the authority' to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations to carry into effect and to aid in the enforcement of existing laws. See Rush v. Brown, 187 Okl. 97, 101 P.2d 262, and also in the case of Harris v. State, ex rel. Oklahoma Planning & Resources Board, 207 Okl. 589, 251 P.2d 799, we quoted with favor the following:
“The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power, but it may delegate authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. It may delegate power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own operation depend.”
The same argument was made in connection with the establishment of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, and in that case, styled Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795, we likewise held that such delegation of authority by the legislature to the Turnpike Authority did not violate the constitutional provision forbidding the delegation to any one of any of the powers of the state. We therefore hold that the first contention of the plaintiff to be without merit.
For his point No. 2, plaintiff asserts that the act allows a city and an authority to condemn land and property for other than public purposes. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27, (1954) passed upon the validity of the Urban Renewal Act of the District of Columbia. In connection with a similar objection raised as to the District of Columbia Act, the Court stated :
“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. * * * Here, one of the means chosen is the use [234]*234of private enterprise for the redevelopment of the area. Appellants urge that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established. * * * The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”
Likewise, the Kansas Court, in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, supra, stated:
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PI ALLEY, Chief Justice.
There are two cases involved here, which because of the similarity of issues, have, by our order of November 10, 1966, been consolidated for decision.
The first case is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County in sustaining a demurrer to the petition of Roy Isaacs, plaintiff in error here, who, for himself and others similarly situated, filed a declaratory judgment action against- the defendants in error, the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, the Urban Renewal Authority and the individual members of the Authority’s Board of Commissioners and its executive director, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Urban Redevelopment Law, 11 O.S. 1961, Section 1601 et seq., and for injunctive relief.
The second case is an appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County in sustaining the demurrer of the defendants in error, Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority and its officers, and the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma to the petition of the plaintiffs in error, S. M. Roof, L. C. Wilson and J. V. Garret. As in the Oklahoma City case, plaintiffs in error, in the Tulsa case sought a declaratory judgment against the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority, its officers, and against the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, decreeing the creation of the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority under the provisions of 11 O.S.1961, Section 1601-1620, to be void and violative of certain provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, and for injunctive relief.
In the Oklahoma City case, all defendants in error filed motions to strike and to make more definite and certain with respect to the petition of plaintiff. These motions were sustained in part and overruled in part by the trial court. Accordingly, the plaintiff in error filed an amended petition, to which each of the defendants in error demurred. All demurrers were sustained by the trial court and the Urban Redevelopment Law was held to be constitutional. Plaintiff in error filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he thereupon perfected his appeal here.
In the Tulsa case, the general demurrer to plaintiff’s in error petition was sustained. Plaintiff’s in error elected to stand on their petition. The trial court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs in error filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. Plaintiffs in error thereupon lodged their appeal here.
For convenience, plaintiffs in error in both cases shall be referred to herein as [233]*233plaintiffs and the defendants shall he referred to by their respective names, if necessary.
The statutory provisions under attack, 11 O.S.1961, Sec. 1601-1620, covers some thirty pages in the statutes, and we do not deem it necessary to set out the act in full, but reference will be made herein to the various sections of the act.
Generally it may be said, as stated in Section 1604 of the act, that the over-all purpose of the act is to enable certain cities to take steps to eliminate slum and blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of "the citizens of the state, the elimination of which is declared to.be a matter of public interest.
Many grounds are asserted by plaintiff for the unconstitutionality of the act, which we number and will discuss consecutively, for convenience and to meet the method of presentation.
Plaintiff, as his first ground, contends that the act attempts to confer legislative, executive and judicial authority upon the city and the authority. Other courts, in discussing this objection to similar Urban Renewal Acts, have uniformly rejected this contention, where the legislature has adopted the policy and set forth the guide lines which are to be utilized by the cities and the authority. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of State ex rel. Fatzer v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 179 Kan. 435, 296 P.2d 656, had the following to say about this point:
“We think it clear that while the legislature cannot delegate its constitutional power to make a law, it can make a law which delegates the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which such law shall become operative. In other words, the legislature may enact general provisions but leave to those who are to act certain discretion in “filling in the details,” so to speak, provided, of course, it fixes reasonable and definite standards which govern the exercise of such authority.”
In addition thereto, 'we have consistently held in the past, in a variety of factual situations that the legislature has no authority to delegate power to an administrative board to make laws, but it may delegate to an administrative board the authority' to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations to carry into effect and to aid in the enforcement of existing laws. See Rush v. Brown, 187 Okl. 97, 101 P.2d 262, and also in the case of Harris v. State, ex rel. Oklahoma Planning & Resources Board, 207 Okl. 589, 251 P.2d 799, we quoted with favor the following:
“The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power, but it may delegate authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. It may delegate power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own operation depend.”
The same argument was made in connection with the establishment of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, and in that case, styled Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795, we likewise held that such delegation of authority by the legislature to the Turnpike Authority did not violate the constitutional provision forbidding the delegation to any one of any of the powers of the state. We therefore hold that the first contention of the plaintiff to be without merit.
For his point No. 2, plaintiff asserts that the act allows a city and an authority to condemn land and property for other than public purposes. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27, (1954) passed upon the validity of the Urban Renewal Act of the District of Columbia. In connection with a similar objection raised as to the District of Columbia Act, the Court stated :
“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. * * * Here, one of the means chosen is the use [234]*234of private enterprise for the redevelopment of the area. Appellants urge that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established. * * * The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”
Likewise, the Kansas Court, in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, supra, stated:
“It is elementary that the legislature possesses no power to authorize the appropriation of one’s property for a private use or purpose, but it is equally well settled that the right to take private property for a public ttse is inherent in the state, and that the legislature may authorize the acquisition and appropriation of private property for a public use provided the owner is compensated therefor.”
• In this connection see also Delfield v. City of Tulsa, 191 Okl. 541, 131 P.2d 754, 143 A.L.R. 1032.
• Section 1604 of the act in question makes it clear that the purposes for which property may be condemned are public purposes, and •we hold therefore, that plaintiff’s second point is not well taken.
Plaintiff, for his 3rd point, maintains that the act confers on the city and the authority the power to arbitrarily ascertain and declare public purpose, without definite standards. This contention is not supported by a reading of the act. Sections 1603(g) (h), 1604, 1605 and 1607 make it apparent that neither the city nor the authority have the power to arbitrarily ascertain and declare public purposes. These sections set forth clear and definite standards to be followed. Similar standards were approved in the Berman v. Parker case, supra. We find that this is not a valid obj ection.
For his 4th objection, plaintiff argues that the act allows the city to “judicially” determine blighted areas. The act does authorize the city to declare and identify blighted areas, but only according to the-standards set forth in the act. Such determination is manifestly not an exercise of “judicial” authority. There is no “judicial” authority conferred upon the city by the act.
As objection No. 5, the plaintiff contends that the act allows the city and the authority to condemn property and then to sell it to private interests. A review of the authorities indicates that this is one of the most frequently raised objections to Urban Renewal Acts. Without exception, redevelopment programs have been upheld against this type of objection, usually on the grounds that the public use or public purpose is legitimately served by the legislative object of slum or blighted area clearance, and the fact that private interests benefit incidentally or that private parties acquire ownership after the public purpose of the elimination of the undesirable conditions has been served, is merely incidental to the main legislative purpose. Some 21 cases are cited by the annotator in 44 A.L.R.2d 1414, at page 1420, including the Berman v. Parker case, supra, rejecting the argument raised by plaintiff herein under his 5th point. We therefore, in accord with the weight of authority, hold plaintiff’s 5th objection to be without merit.
Plaintiff, in his 6th objection, asserts that the act gives to the city and the authority the power to create indebtedness and to issue bonds, all in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. He further asserts that the act unconstitutionally empowers the city or the authority to create debts. Plaintiff is correct in his assertion that the -act gives to the city the power to establish means for the financing of redevelopment programs, and also that the act grants to the authority the power to issue revenue bonds. However, such power, granted by the act to either the city or the authority, is not in derogation of the Constitution of Oklahoma, [235]*235but is in accord with it. Section 1611(e) of the act permits a city to issue and sell its general obligation bonds, but only in accordance with the limitations prescribed by the laws of the state. Section 1610 (k) (5) and (6) forbids an authority to issue general obligation bonds, but Section 1616(a) authorizes an authority to issue’ revenue bonds and sub-section (b) provides that such revenue bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of the state or any city. Also the purchasers of such bonds would be charged with knowledge that the’ bonds would not constitute an indebtedness of the state or any city. We must presume that any city or authority, issuing either general obligation bonds or revenue bonds would comply with the laws of the state with reference thereto. The legislative enactment is satisfactory as to form and content. We therefore find nothing of substance in plaintiff's 6th objection.
For his 7th point, plaintiff maintains that the act is invalid because it allows a city or the authority to exempt property from taxation. This position is not supported by the terms of the act itself. Section 1615 provides for the exemption of property from taxation which is owned by the authority, but Section 1615(b) provides that such exemption is valid only as long as the authority owns the property. A similár contention was raised in the Oklahoma Turnpike case, supra, and there we held contrary to the position of the plaintiff. We so hold here, and find that plaintiff’s contention is without merit.
Next, for point No. 8, plaintiff maintains that the act, in effect, precludes judicial review of findings made by a city or an authority. This contention is without merit, as the act, in Section 1613, sets out the manner in which there may be a judicial review of the actions of either the city or an authority.
Plaintiff, for his 9th point, asserts that the act is so vague and indefinite as to violate due process of law. A careful examination of the act reveals that the legislature has set forth definite and certain standards in the act in such a degree as to nullify any objection of indefiniteness, and we therefore hold that plaintiff’s point'Nó. 9 is without • merit. See Herzinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 203 Md. 49, 96 A.2d 3, 98 A.2d 87 (Md.1953).
For his 10th point, plaintiff main: tains that the act precludes cities embracing more than one county from acting under the statute. The section in question, 1608(j), provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the provisions of this'Act shall not apply across county lines, regardless of annexation of territory across county line by a city.” j
This section would appear to be only a jurisdictional limitation of a city’s power to approve an urban renewal project that extends across a county line, and does not affect, in any sense, the right of a multi-counj ty city, to participate in the urban renewal program. We do not consider that the Legislature would do a vain and useless thing. The interpretation asked for by the plaintiff would make the act inapplicable to both Oklahoma City and Tulsa, as they were both multi-county cities at the time of the passage of the act. Such could not have been the legislative intent, and we so hold. ■ j
For his next point, plaintiff draws our attention to the fact that the Legislature has, since 1955, enacted five Urban Renewal Acts. The first two of such acts were subsequently repealed, with the provisions contained therein being generally covered by 11 O.S.1961, Section 1601-1620, with which we are concerned here, which act was enacted by the Legislature in 1959, and numerically speaking is the third Urban Renewal Act promulgated. This Act is made applicable only to cities having a population over 100,000, and would of course, apply only to Oklahoma City and Tulsa. |
The fourth Act was also passed in 1959. It was designated as the “Urban Redevelopment Act” and was expressly made applicable to cities of 10,000 to 100,000 population. The last Act, enacted ill 1961, was designated as “Urban Redevelopment Act of 1961”. It is made applicable to cities of less than 10,000 population.
[236]*236Under express provisions contained in the last two Acts, it is provided that no such city shall exercise the authority granted by the Act until a majority of the qualified voters in such city shall have approved the same.
Under the provisions of the third Act, which is at issue here, no such voting rights are granted to the voters in cities with a population of 100,000, but the authority to exercise the rights granted by the Act, is vested in the governing body of such city, who shall, by appropriate resolution, proceed to exercise the authority granted by the Act.
Plaintiff argues that to deprive the citizens of a city with a population of 100,000 of the right to vote on such an issue is unreasonable and arbitrary and violates the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution and the requirement of the Oklahoma Constitution that laws of.a general nature shall have uniform application throughout the state.
Plaintiff further asserts that when determining whether the Act complies with the Constitutional requirement respecting uniform application of laws throughout the state, that these three acts must be considered as Legislative enactments in pari mate-ria. That when so considered, it is obvious that the voting restriction applicable to cities of a population of 100,000 is arbitrary and capricious and is a local or special law.
Keeping in mind that the constitutionality of only one Act, 11 O.S.1961, Section 1601-1620, is at issue here, we feel that the confidence placed by plaintiff in the rule of pari materia is misplaced. The rule of pari materia is a rule of judicial construction applicable only when the terms of a .statute are ambiguous or of doubtful significance. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes 366(b), p. 813: .We have heretofore applied the rule to harmonize or sustain conflicting statutes. Plaintiff does not suggest any ambiguity with respect to the statutes in question. We' therefore are not inclined to place much weight on his argument with respect to the rule of pari materia.
Neither are we inclined to attach great significance to the argument that the Act is an example of a special or local law which is prohibited by our Constitution. At the time of the enactment of the Act in question it applied only to Oklahoma City and Tulsa, as they were the only cities in Oklahoma with a population in excess of 100,000. Such a limitation does not of itself constitute an arbitrary or capricious classification. As we stated in the case of Lowden v. Oklahoma County Excise Board, 186 Okl. 706, 100 P.2d 448, at page 450:
“In order for a law to be general in its nature and to have a uniform operation, it is not necessary that it shall operate upon every person and every locality in the state. A law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted.”
The courts of other states, when faced with the same argument as espoused by plaintiff here have uniformly held that such classification, based on population, not to be violative of constitutional requirements similar to our own. See Williamson v. Housing Authority, etc., of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43; State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725; Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1952).
We therefore are constrained to hold against plaintiff on this point.
For his last point, plaintiff maintains that a city or an authority, under the Act, can encumber property by the issuance of bonds, without the vote of the people, has heretofore been disposed of in our ruling in connection with plaintiff’s point No. 6.
We therefore hold that the Urban Redevelopment Law, as set forth in 11 O.S. 1961, § 1601 et seq., to be valid and constitutional.
During the pendency of this case on appeal, it has been called to the attention of the court that there is presently pending in the District Court of Oklahoma County a case wherein the-constitutionality of the Ur[237]*237ban Redevelopment Law is being attacked on grounds other than the ones enumerated herein. Suffice it to say that our review of this matter has been limited to the points raised in this opinion and none other.
Our opinion herein makes it unnecessary for us to further consider the contention of the defendant city that plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed because of the failure of plaintiff to make defendant city a proper party to this appeal.
Judgments affirmed.
JACKSON, V. C. J., and DAVISON, WILLIAMS and BERRY, JJ., concur. •
BLACKBIRD, IRWIN, HODGES and LAVENDER, JJ., concur in part and dis.-sent in part.