Isaac O. v. City of New York
This text of 2024 NY Slip Op 51757(U) (Isaac O. v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, Kings County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
| Isaac O. v City of New York |
| 2024 NY Slip Op 51757(U) |
| Decided on December 23, 2024 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| Frias-Colon, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 23, 2024
Isaac O., et. al.[redacted], Plaintiff,
against The City of New York and Joseph E. Kenny, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
Index No. 510515/2022
For Plaintiffs: Rehan Nazrali, 299 Broadway Floor 17, New York, NY, 10007, 646-331-9378.
For Defendants: Kenneth Sasmor of the New York City Law Department, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007, 917-356-7112.
Patria Frias-Colon, J.
Recitation as per CPLR §§ 2219(a) and/or 3212(b) of papers considered on review of this motion:
NYSCEF Doc #s 34-35, 44-45 by Defendants
NYSCEF Doc #s 41-43, 46 by Plaintiff
Upon the foregoing cited papers and after oral argument on June 12, 2024, Defendants The City of New York ("City") and Joseph E. Kenny (in his individual and official capacities) ("Kenny" and collectively with the City, "Defendants") move for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7), dismissing the Second Cause of Action of Plaintiffs Isaac O., et. al. [redacted] (collectively with Isaac O., "Plaintiffs") against the City (Mot. Seq. # 4). Plaintiffs cross-move for leave, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), to serve their proposed Amended Complaint, dated June 5, 2024 (Mot. Seq. # 5). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On or about December 12, 2017, members of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), executed a "no knock warrant" at [redacted], in Far Rockaway, New York (the "underlying incident"),[FN1] Plaintiffs' then residence. On March 4, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an action in Supreme Court, Queens County, against the City and certain individual officers in connection [*2]with the underlying incident.[FN2] See O., et al. v City of New York, et al.[FN3] (the "Queens County action"). The Queens County action is currently in the discovery stage.[FN4]
On April 15, 2021, more than three years after the underlying incident, Defendant Kenny participated in a press conference at the NYPD's headquarters (the "press conference incident").[FN5] At said April 15th press conference, Defendant Kenny allegedly stated to the media that "[t]here was no mistake made, we were absolutely 100% in the right spot....[The] police hit two apartments that day—one in search of a dealer selling crack in another [redacted] building and another in search of a Chase Gang associate selling drugs out of O.'s [residence]."[FN6]
On April 11, 2022, Plaintiffs commenced the instant action against the City and Kenny (among others) in connection with the press conference incident. As relevant herein, Plaintiffs assert against the City a "Second Cause of Action for Monell Violations under 42 USC § 1983 [and the] 14th Amendment Violations" (the "original Monell claim").[FN7] On July 29, 2022, Defendants joined issue by filing their Verified Answer raising, among other defenses, the expiration of the statute of limitations as to the original Monell claim.[FN8]
Thereafter, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint to "add a claim against Kenny [to the effect] that [their] constitutional rights were violated under 42 USC § 1983" (the "proposed Monell claim") and to "add additional supporting facts to their [original] Monell claim regarding existing systemic racial bias in the NYPD in the promulgation and enforcement of the No-Knock Warrant policy."[FN9]
By Decision and Order dated October 5, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve their amended complaint as devoid of merit because both the original and proposed Monell claims were time-barred pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) ("prior order").[FN10] In that prior Order, the Court held that:
"Here, it is apparent that Plaintiffs' original and proposed Monell claims are based upon the execution of the no-knock warrant on December 12, 2017. Thus, the original Monell claim accrued on December 12, 2017. As such, the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' original Monell claim would have expired on December 12, 2020. Since the instant action was commenced by the filing of a summons and verified complaint on April 11, 2022, the original Monell claim is time-barred. Thus, even if Plaintiffs' proposed Monell claim provided Defendants with sufficient detail of the incident, it would also be time-barred pursuant to CPLR § 203(f) because there would be no cause of action that is timely interposed in the original complaint for it to relate back to and the proposed [*3]Monell claim itself would not be timely if interposed in the original complaint."[FN11]
Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to reargue their motion for leave to amend. By Decision and Order dated March 29, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion and adhered to its prior Order (the "reargument Order").[FN12] In said reargument Order, the Court held that
"given the arguments made in [Plaintiffs'] initial motion to amend the complaint, the arguments made on February 7, 2024 [at oral argument on the motion to reargue,] and the undisputed dates of the no-knock warrant (December 12, 20[17]) and the subsequent press conference (April 15, 2021) where Defendants affirmed their position regarding [the legality of] the no-knock warrant, the Court's [prior Order] is still warranted pending further instructions from the appropriate Appellate Division."[FN13]
DISCUSSION
Untimeliness of the Original Monell Claim, Pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5)
"The doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of practice, an articulation of sound policy that, when an issue is once judicially determined, that should be the end of the matter as far as Judges and courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are concerned." U.S. Bank N.A. v Tenenbaum, 228 AD3d 696, 699 (2d Dept 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). The law of the case doctrine applies "only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision and to the same questions presented in the same case." U.S. Bank N.A. v Moss, 186 AD3d 1753, 1753 (2d Dept 2020) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
Based on the Court's prior Order addressing a motion seeking similar relief and since Plaintiffs "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the initial determination,"[FN14] the law of the case doctrine precludes Plaintiffs from relitigating the Court's extant ruling that the original Monell claim is untimely. See Kanes v Kanes, 230 AD3d 662, 664 (2d Dept 2024); U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v Longo
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2024 NY Slip Op 51757(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isaac-o-v-city-of-new-york-nysupctkings-2024.