Irwin v. Possehl

143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y.S. 597, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1111
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 2, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 143 Misc. 855 (Irwin v. Possehl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y.S. 597, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1111 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1932).

Opinion

Hammer, J.

The plaintiffs, 630 of the members of Local Union No. 125 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, by this action ask that defendant Commerford be restrained from continuing to exercise powers alleged to have been employed heretofore and now to be used illegally as supervisor over and in the conduct of the affairs of Local Union No. 125 and that the defendant officers and business agents appointed or selected by [856]*856him for said local union be similarly restrained; that said supervisor, officers and agents be required to account for the assets, moneys and property of said union and that in the meantime a receiver be appointed to conserve the same; that an election of officers be required to be held, and also a meeting of the local union for the adoption of by-laws prescribing the powers and duties of the new officers.

It is well settled that courts ordinarily do not concern themselves with the contentions and quarrels of members and subordinate or affiliated bodies of voluntary associations. Any of such who have grievances are usually required in the first instance to resort to the remedies for redress provided by the rules and regulations of such voluntary association.

The rule referred to and enunciated in innumerable cases is reasonable and salutary and with it I am in full accord. However, the reason for entertaining jurisdiction and authority for deciding the question here presented is so clearly stated in Rodier v. Huddell (232 App. Div. 531), another action between some of the parties in this action, decided by the Appellate Division of this court, First Department, in April, 1931, that it may be appropriately repeated here as completely answering defendants’ jurisdictional questions. The court there stated: “ The rule requiring that a member must exhaust his remedies within the organization before applying to a court of equity for relief is subject to the qualification that the suspension [or the act or acts complained of] must have followed a legal and regular proceeding within the organization. Where the proceeding is irregular, the association acquires no jurisdiction to make the order, and the person aggrieved thereby may seek redress by a direct appeal to the courts. (People ex rel. Deverell v. M. M. P. Union, 188 N. Y. 101; Kohler v. Klein, 39 Misc. 353, 354.) * * * (Wachtel v. Noah Widows & Orphans’ Society, 84 N. Y. 28.) * * * In any case an appeal within the organization would have been a vain thing. The only appeal provided is to the general executive board of the International. This board consists of seven members, of which the defendant Huddell was the head and in general control. A suspended member is not required to pursue his remedy by appeal within the organization when such appeal is to a board so constituted as to afford no likelihood of an impartial hearing. (Matter of Brown, 34 Misc. 556; affd., 176 N. Y. 132; Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71; Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405.)” (Italic words in brackets are mine.)

It cannot be held as a matter of law that the constitution of the parent union and its general laws and rules amply and adequately provide for the determination of the issues herein raised within [857]*857itself by resort to its own tribunals and that the court is accordingly without jurisdiction.

The question of jurisdiction raised by the defendants can only be determined upon a consideration of the facts alleged and proved.

In considering the matters at issue it is well to have in mind the basic background against which the facts herein may be viewed and thus properly evaluated.

A labor union is a society of its members. Its constitution is the conditions upon which such members become associated. If the members, by any of such conditions, were required to give, or to promise, blind obedience to the leaders, the society would be to that extent bad in its constitution, and such condition illegal,

Trade unions are either descendant from or are the outgrowth of the idea and form of the guilds of the middle ages. Modern industrial conditions and the capitalist system, however, are the direct reasons for the organization of workingmen into trade unions. The method at first was adopted for self protection, but the movement has grown into an organized means for the improvement, socially and economically, of the status and place of the worker, the acquirement and the maintenance of labor standards, and the changing of industry in accordance with labor ideals. Originally existing largely as secret bodies, trade unions universally have been given public recognition as moral, beneficent and constructive not alone for the good of the membership but also for the general human welfare. They aré an integral part of society, and regarded as responsible representative bodies, expressive of the workers’ point of view.

Since labor unions are recognized as moral and beneficial to workers and society, such construction should be given to a particular provision of the union’s constitution and laws that it will be legal and moral, rather than morally unlawful. Better working conditions, including wages, hours, sanitation, safety, and kindred subjects, and mutual insurance, are the chief aims of the union. The spirit and power of the working classes in their resistance to being crowded down is the only force from the economic point of view which can and will save economic society from progressive degradation. No economic advantage has been secured by any class of workers except by its own organized resistance and aggressiveness. Organizations act through leaders or officers or agents and it is usually through their endeavors backed by the organized effort of the members that results are accomplished. But the class is made up of its members, and each member is entitled, equally with each other member, to the right to seek and pursue, and the opportunity, rather than the absolute right, to become [858]*858possessed of any and every advantage thus secured. If any member is deprived of such equal right, not only is an injustice done to that individual, but the entire class suffers. The class injury results because such advantage, obtained through the organized effort, resistance and aggressiveness, is lost or taken away from the individual member who, to the extent of the injustice, is the representative unit of the class as an organization or representative whole. Multiply such injustice to the individual many times and the result might well be disintegration of the class organization back into the weak and unprotected status of the unorganized individual workers in unrestrained competition against one another, and subject to the employer’s direct dealing with each unprotected and unorganized worker. Weakened by internal dissentions the result of well-defined notions of official oppression, the union and its members may become vulnerable to the attack of organized employers and a ready prey of those pseudo labor groups who in times of distress are keenly active in attempts to lead the workers away from those safe moorings recognized in the expression of the ideals of union men by the leaders, past and present, of the American Federation of Labor.

The organization has the right to construe and pass upon any constitution and conditions designed for the mutual or common welfare of its members which are not violative of sound public law, reason or morality.

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Bluebook (online)
143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y.S. 597, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/irwin-v-possehl-nysupct-1932.