IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 20–0298
Submitted July 14, 2020—Filed September 4, 2020
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
JOHN P. BEAUVAIS JR.,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance
Commission.
In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission
recommends a three-month suspension for violation of attorney ethics
rules. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all
justices joined.
Tara van Brederode and Crystal W. Rink, Des Moines, for
complainant.
John P. Beauvais Jr., Sioux City, pro se. 2
McDERMOTT, Justice.
With trial looming and a discovery sanctions motion pending, a
woefully underprepared lawyer told opposing counsel and the court that
his client had accepted the opponent’s $15,000 settlement offer. But the
client had forcefully rejected that offer, saying she’d rather get nothing.
The lawyer then pressured the client into accepting the $15,000 settlement
using false information.
This case is a cautionary tale to the unprepared lawyer to avoid
attempts to whitewash one’s poor performance by pressuring a client to
settle to end the case. Here, the settlement ended the lawsuit but triggered
this attorney disciplinary matter.
A division of our grievance commission heard the evidence and
concluded the lawyer committed multiple violations of the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct and recommended a three-month suspension of the
lawyer’s license. Upon our review, we find all the same violations of our
ethics rules and impose the recommended three-month suspension.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
John Beauvais Jr. graduated from law school in 2013 and was
admitted to practice law in Iowa that same year. He started his legal career
as an associate with a Sioux City law firm, but after a couple years (in
March 2016), he left to start a solo practice.
In September 2014, while still at his prior firm, Beauvais filed a
personal injury lawsuit on behalf of Sharel Banks and her minor child
against the owner and manager of a rental property where Banks and the
child previously lived. The lawsuit sought damages for the child’s
exposure to lead paint while residing at the rental property.
Beauvais gave a phoned-in performance as Banks’s advocate in the
litigation. He had to file a motion to extend time for service because he 3
failed to serve one of the defendants within the required time period. On
November 23—shortly after Beauvais had served the lawsuit on both
defendants—the defendants’ counsel asked Beauvais to provide a
settlement demand. Beauvais failed to provide one. On January 7, 2015,
defendants’ counsel made the request again. Beauvais again failed to
provide one. On February 5, and again on February 26, defendants’
counsel made requests for a settlement demand. Beauvais failed to
respond each time.
On March 9, the defendants served discovery requests. Beauvais
didn’t contact Banks to discuss these requests or provide her a copy of
them. He never served any discovery requests on behalf of his clients at
any point. He also never requested or took depositions of the defendants
or any other witnesses.
On March 9, Beauvais did file an expert witness designation on his
clients’ behalf, identifying Heather Christiansen as an expert. The
problem: Christiansen and Beauvais had never communicated about the
matter. Beauvais didn’t know what opinions, if any, she would offer in the
case. On March 14, opposing counsel requested Christiansen’s expert
report. Beauvais didn’t respond.
On March 18, Beauvais notified the court that he’d left his law firm
and started his solo practice. But he didn’t notify Banks, who learned
Beauvais left when she later tried to contact Beauvais at his prior firm to
get an update on her case.
Defendants’ counsel sent Beauvais a letter on April 14, again
requesting Christiansen’s expert report, and another letter on April 25,
requesting the overdue discovery responses. Beauvais never responded to
either letter. On May 10, defendants’ counsel left Beauvais a phone
message. Beauvais didn’t return it. 4
On May 11, defendants’ counsel filed a motion to compel the overdue
discovery responses. The district court set a hearing for May 25. Beauvais
didn’t file a resistance to the motion and didn’t appear for the hearing. The
district court granted the motion to compel and gave Beauvais fifteen days
to provide responses. Beauvais didn’t provide responses by the deadline
but did provide responses several days after the deadline. Defendants’
counsel later filed motions to compel and for sanctions alleging deficiencies
in the discovery responses.
On June 8, Beauvais filed a designation of rebuttal expert witnesses
identifying Brett Kuhn and Cynthia Ellis as rebuttal experts. But these
designations had the same problem as the prior one: Beauvais hadn’t
communicated with Kuhn or Ellis and thus didn’t know what opinions, if
any, they might offer in the case.
On June 23, defendants’ counsel once again asked for a settlement
demand from Beauvais to resolve the case. Beauvais once again didn’t
respond to opposing counsel. Beauvais never informed Banks of the
defendants’ repeated requests for a settlement demand throughout the
case.
Meanwhile, defendants’ counsel requested from Beauvais open
dates for depositions in the case. Beauvais didn’t respond, so defendants’
counsel unilaterally scheduled depositions, including the deposition of
Banks. After Banks’s deposition, defendants’ counsel twice requested a
lead paint pamphlet that Banks referenced in her testimony. Beauvais
never contacted Banks asking for the pamphlet and never responded to
opposing counsel’s request.
On August 8—the day before the scheduled hearing on defendants’
motions to compel and for sanctions, one month before the September 6
jury trial date, and more than eight months after defendants first 5
requested it—Beauvais finally sent a settlement demand to defendants’
counsel. The amount demanded: $356,000.
The next day, Banks asked Beauvais for a copy of the settlement
demand letter and an update on the case. Beauvais responded but didn’t
provide the email containing the settlement demand. He also didn’t
mention the impending hearing on the motions to compel and for
sanctions, or the need to supplement the discovery responses.
Defendants’ counsel made two more requests for the lead paint pamphlet,
again without action by Beauvais. When Beauvais later informed Banks
about the hearing on the motions, he misrepresented to her that its
scheduling was “very much a last minute thing.”
On August 23, defendants’ counsel presented Beauvais with a
settlement offer of $10,000. Beauvais never communicated the offer to
Banks. The next day, Beauvais filed a motion to continue the September 6
trial date. The defendants resisted the motion.
On August 30, the defendants also filed a motion in limine seeking
to prevent the plaintiffs from presenting testimony about damages based
on the failure to respond adequately to the defendants’ damages
interrogatory. The motion in limine also sought to prevent the plaintiffs’
designated experts from testifying about causation and to prevent
testimony from a potential as-yet undesignated medical expert who’d not
yet been disclosed. (The same day, well beyond the expert deadline,
Beauvais filed a supplemental expert designation listing a new doctor as
an expert.) Beauvais failed to file any trial witness or exhibit lists, or any
proposed jury instructions, seven days before the trial as required.
On August 31, the district court held a telephonic hearing on
Beauvais’s motion to continue the trial and on the defendants’ various
motions. The district court granted the motion to continue the trial but 6
noted the plaintiffs’ failures to disclose damages, experts, or any witnesses
on causation. In its order the court said the “entire cause” for the case
not being ready for trial was “Beauvais’s inexperience and unfamiliarity
with the rules.” Beauvais never provided this court order to Banks.
The next day, on September 1, the defendants made a $15,000
settlement offer. This time Beauvais promptly emailed Banks about it,
telling her, “I strongly advise you to accept this offer.” But Banks firmly
rejected the offer, emailing Beauvais that she’d “rather get NOTHING.”
Beauvais continued to urge Banks to accept the $15,000 settlement offer
and told her the court was likely to dismiss her lawsuit if she didn’t settle
it. Banks reiterated to Beauvais that she had no interest in settling for
$15,000.
Notwithstanding Bank’s decision, on September 2, Beauvais told
defendants’ counsel that Banks accepted the $15,000 settlement offer.
But Beauvais didn’t tell Banks. Four days later, Banks appeared at the
courthouse to attend the hearing scheduled on the pending motions. Only
then she learned—from courthouse staff—that there would be no hearing
because her case had settled.
On September 14, defendants’ counsel sent Beauvais the settlement
check, release, and dismissal with prejudice. On October 5, having
received no response from Beauvais, defendants’ counsel sent a follow-up
letter. Beauvais still didn’t respond. On October 21, defendants’ counsel
filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court
scheduled a hearing for November 18. Beauvais didn’t inform Banks of
the pending motion or the hearing.
At the hearing, Beauvais told the district court that Banks had
previously agreed to the $15,000 settlement offer. The court thus granted
the motion to enforce the settlement. The order required Banks to sign 7
the agreement, and if she didn’t, the court would dismiss her case with
prejudice. Beauvais didn’t provide Banks a copy of the order.
On November 29, Beauvais sent Banks both a letter and an email
informing her that if she didn’t sign the agreement she would be “in
contempt of the Court order.” But the court’s order made no mention or
threat of holding Banks in contempt. When Banks sent Beauvais a text
asking what would happen if she didn’t sign the agreement, Beauvais
responded that she could have to pay over $3000 in attorney fees and
could be assessed court costs. These repercussions, again, were nowhere
in the court’s order.
Several days later, Banks emailed Beauvais stating she didn’t want
to owe $3000 in attorney fees, be assessed court fees, or have her case
dismissed. Saying she felt she had no “other option at this point,” Banks
signed the settlement agreement. Beauvais filed the dismissal with
prejudice ending the litigation. During the course of the case, Beauvais
never provided Banks with copies of any pleadings, court orders, or any of
the many pieces of correspondence from defendants’ counsel that he’d
received.
Banks complained to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary
Board. The Board thereafter filed a complaint against Beauvais with the
Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission alleging multiple violations of
the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Beauvais filed an answer
admitting to some facts and violations and denying others. A division of
the grievance commission held a hearing and found the Board proved all
the rule violations alleged and recommended a three-month suspension.
II. Standard of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of attorney disciplinary cases. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 8
2014). While we respectfully consider the findings of the grievance
commission, we aren’t bound by them. Id. The Board has the burden of
proving rule violations by a “convincing preponderance of the evidence,”
which is more demanding than the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard, but less demanding than proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456,
461 (Iowa 2014).
III. Ethical Violations.
A. Competence. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.1 requires
lawyers to provide “competent representation” to clients. “Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Id. To establish
a violation of this rule, the Board must prove the lawyer “did not possess
the requisite legal knowledge and skill to handle the case or that the
attorney did not make a competent analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the matter.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Iowa 2011)).
Beauvais admitted multiple times at the hearing that he lacked the
experience to handle this type of case. Although he was aware toxic tort
litigation generally required expert testimony on causation and damages,
Beauvais failed to secure an expert on either subject. He instead
designated four different experts at various points despite never speaking
to any of them about their opinions, preparing expert reports, or testifying
at trial. And despite the complexity of the claims in the case, he served no
written interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or
subpoenas, and took no depositions. 9
Both Beauvais’s actions and failures to act lay bare his admitted
lack of legal knowledge and skill to handle this case. The Board proved a
violation of rule 32:1.1.
B. Abiding by Client Decisions and Candor Toward the Court.
Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.2(a) states that “a lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation”
and “consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.” As to settlement, our ethics rules are explicit about who calls
the shots: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a
matter.” Id.; see also 16 Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, Iowa Practice
Series™: Lawyer and Judicial Ethics § 5:2(b) author’s cmt., at 162 (2020
ed.) [hereinafter Lawyer and Judicial Ethics] (“Rule 1.2(a) explicitly places
certain decisions under the client’s exclusive authority. The client in civil
litigation has the right to decide whether to settle a matter and on what
basis.”). The Board proved Beauvais failed to abide by his client’s firmly
held, and firmly stated, decision to reject the $15,000 settlement offer.
Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer
from “knowingly” making any “false statement of fact or law to a tribunal,”
or its corollary, failing to correct a previously made false statement.
“Knowingly” means “actual knowledge of the fact in question,” and “may
be inferred from circumstances.” Id. r. 32:1.0(f). The Board proved
Beauvais knowingly made a false statement to the district court when he
reported that his client had agreed to settle the case when he knew she
hadn’t.
C. Diligence. Rule 32:1.3 requires lawyers to “act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Id. r. 32:1.3. Beauvais
demonstrated neglect of Banks’s case most obviously in his failure to
pursue proof on the linchpin elements of causation and damages. 10
Neglect of a client’s case “often involves procrastination, such as a
lawyer doing little or nothing to advance the interests of a client after
agreeing to represent the client.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d 659, 666 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa
2004)). Examples of Beauvais’s procrastination in this case are many. He
failed to timely contact Banks concerning defendants’ counsel’s repeated
requests for a settlement demand. He failed to respond timely to discovery,
prompting a motion to compel, and then failed to respond by the court-
ordered response deadline after the district court granted the motion to
compel. After receiving a second motion to compel, he waited almost two
months to notify his client about the need to provide supplemental
responses. He failed to communicate with any expert witnesses, despite
designating four different ones, and filed a late supplemental expert
witness designation. And he failed to file a witness or exhibit list, or any
proposed jury instructions, by the deadline seven days before trial.
Beauvais didn’t act with reasonable diligence in this matter. The
Board proved a violation of this rule.
D. Communication. The Board charged several violations relating
to Beauvais’s failures to communicate with Banks. Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.4(a)(1) commands a lawyer to “promptly inform
the client of any decision or circumstance” that requires the client’s
informed consent. Rule 32:1.4(a)(3) requires a lawyer to “keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(3).
And rule 32:1.4(b) compels a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4(b). 11
Settlement decisions require a client’s informed consent. When an
opposing party makes a settlement offer, a lawyer “must promptly inform
the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that
the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the
lawyer to accept or to reject the offer.” Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 2. Banks testified
that she never discussed with Beauvais a “zone of possible settlement” and
had never given him authority to accept any particular settlement amount.
The commission didn’t find credible Beauvais’s claim that Banks
preemptively told Beauvais she wouldn’t accept a $10,000 settlement offer,
and the commission thus determined Beauvais committed an ethics
violation in failing to contact her about that offer. We agree with the
commission’s finding and its related determination that the Board proved
a violation of rule 32:1.4(a)(1) based on Beauvais’s failure to communicate
the defendants’ $10,000 settlement offer.
Beauvais admitted that he generally failed to keep Banks reasonably
informed about her case. But Beauvais failed in particular to
communicate about subjects that would have alerted Banks to Beauvais’s
lack of diligence throughout the case. For example, Beauvais didn’t
provide Banks copies of court orders and motions that negatively
portrayed his performance in the case, including the motions to compel
and motion for sanctions, the district court order stating the entire cause
for the trial delay was Beauvais’s “inexperience and unfamiliarity with the
rules,” and the motion to enforce settlement related to Banks’s made-up
acceptance of the $15,000 settlement offer. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 200 (Iowa 2019) (finding violation
when lawyer failed to disclose a motion to compel). A lawyer’s duty to keep
clients reasonably informed “applies even when the information to be 12
shared does not cast the lawyer in a positive light.” Lawyer and Judicial
Ethics § 5:4(e) author’s cmt., at 198.
The Board proved Beauvais similarly failed to explain matters to
enable Banks to make informed decisions in the case. Beauvais’s failure
to inform Banks of the motions to compel or sanctions—or the
ramifications of those motions—ensured she didn’t have enough
information to make informed decisions or to participate in those aspects
of her case. See Noel, 933 N.W.2d at 200.
At a minimum, lawyers in litigation “should explain the general
strategy and prospects of success.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4 cmt. 5.
But it’s not clear Beauvais developed, let alone communicated, much of
any strategy about how he intended to advance her case. Beauvais
testified that he never figured out how he’d prove causation or damages.
Beauvais’s failure to inform and involve Banks understandably spurred
Banks’s confusion and anger when Beauvais later pushed her to accept
settlement to avoid dismissal of the case or payment of attorney fees and
court costs.
E. Discovery Response Failures. Rule 32:3.4(d) prohibits a lawyer
from failing to make “a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request.” Id. r. 32:3.4(d). In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board v. Noel, we found a violation of this rule when a lawyer
failed to respond to discovery, forcing opposing counsel to inquire
repeatedly about the missing responses; failed to timely respond to
opposing counsel’s reasonable inquiries; provided late responses despite a
court order granting a motion to compel that gave a specific date for
production; and delayed in responding, causing the opposing party to file
a motion for sanctions and motion in limine to exclude evidence not 13
produced in discovery. 933 N.W.2d at 202–03. Beauvais’s conduct checks
each of these boxes.
Beauvais said he didn’t timely respond to opposing counsel’s
requests because he was “trying to cover for the fact that we did not have
the evidence, the link, the proof of damages that we needed.” But the
defendants had a right to obtain evidence and information about
Beauvais’s clients’ claims, and his stonewalling to prevent disclosure of
the lack of evidence likely drove up unnecessary costs for the defendants
and certainly caused unreasonable delay as they sought to defend against
the claims. The Board proved a violation of this rule.
F. Misrepresentation. Rule 32:8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from
engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To show a violation,
the Board must prove that the attorney “acted with ‘some level of scienter’
rather than mere negligence.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Meyer, 944 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Green, 888 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Iowa 2016)). We must
sort out “whether the effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to mislead rather
than to inform.” Id. at 404.
Beauvais misrepresented to opposing counsel, and later to the court,
that his client had accepted the $15,000 settlement offer when she hadn’t.
Falsehoods have a tendency to metastasize like cancers, as happened
here: When the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement,
Beauvais emailed Banks with unsupported threats that if she didn’t sign
the agreement the court would hold her in contempt, make her pay over
$3000 in attorney fees, and assess court costs against her. The district
court’s order said none of this. 14
Beauvais testified that he misused the word “contempt” and wasn’t
trying to misrepresent the court’s order. But he also testified that his
threat about Banks risking payment of $3000 concerned his potential
refusal to lower his own fee, not a fee shifting in which Banks would be
made to pay defendants’ legal fees. This appears at odds with their
communications in the written correspondence. And we must view all of
these statements in the context of the litigation. Beauvais had done hardly
any of the necessary work on the case when, with trial imminent, he falsely
told opposing counsel that his client had accepted the $15,000 settlement
offer. There’s a strong link between Beauvais’s misrepresentations to
convince Banks to settle to end the case and his earlier performance
failures in the litigation. The Board proved Beauvais knowingly and
intentionally made misrepresentations in violation of the rule.
G. Prejudice to the Administration of Justice. Rule 32:8.4(d)
prohibits conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). While there is no “typical” conduct that
prejudices the administration of justice, it includes conduct that hampers
“the efficient and proper operation of the courts,” such as unnecessary
court proceedings, delays, or dismissals. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d 659, 666 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa
2010)).
Beauvais’s repeated failures to respond to discovery requests
required the defendants to file two motions to compel and a motion for
sanctions and for the court to hold hearings on these motions. More
importantly, the district court delayed the trial in this matter days before
the scheduled start date, blaming Beauvais. Beauvais’s neglect and
“untimely handling of discovery matters resulted in additional court 15
proceedings and caused other court proceedings to be delayed.” Noel, 933
N.W.2d at 204 (finding violation of rule 32:8.4(d)). The Board proved a
violation of this rule.
IV. Sanction.
The purposes of lawyer discipline include protection of the public,
the need for deterring other lawyers from similar misconduct, upholding
the integrity of the legal system, and assuring the fair administration of
justice. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kozlik, 943
N.W.2d 589, 595 (Iowa 2020); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 109 (Iowa 2012); see also Am. Bar Ass’n,
Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 1.1, at 1 (2015).
We have no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 660
(Iowa 2013). We determine the appropriate sanctions based on the unique
circumstances of the case before us, but we aim for consistency with our
prior cases in imposing sanctions. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 182 (Iowa 2013); McGinness, 844 N.W.2d
at 464. In determining the appropriate sanction, we analyze the nature of
ethical duty the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the extent of
the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and any
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Schall, 814 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Iowa 2012); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Iowa
2010); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions § 3.0, at 113.
We give respectful consideration to the commission’s findings and
recommendations but may impose a greater or lesser sanction than what
the commission recommends. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 16
Stoller, 879 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2016). The commission recommended
a three-month suspension. The Board asks us to follow the commission’s
recommendation, while Beauvais argues for a one-month suspension.
Attorney neglect cases typically result in sanctions anywhere from a
public reprimand to a six-month suspension. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d at
675. “In cases involving neglect in one or two cases and other misconduct
such as misrepresentations associated with the neglect, the suspensions
have been in the range of three months.” Id. (quoting Van Ginkel, 809
N.W.2d at 109).
Sanctions for misconduct involving misrepresentations have varied
depending on the nature of the misrepresentation and other unethical
conduct proved in the case. See, e.g., McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 467 (six-
month suspension for falsifying civil discovery and making repeated
misrepresentations about it); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Kallsen, 814 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Iowa 2012) (one-year suspension for forging
guilty plea document); Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 110–11 (two-month
suspension for filing interlocutory report with a false statement and other
violations); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452,
454 (Iowa 1990) (six-month suspension for alteration and backdating of
partnership documents with false notarization). As we noted in Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. McGinness, a number of our
disciplinary cases imposing six-month suspensions for dishonesty or
misrepresentation have involved additional unethical conduct. 844
N.W.2d at 465 (six-month suspension for misrepresentations as well as
neglect and other violations); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 288–89 (Iowa 2009) (per curiam) (same);
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 726 N.W.2d 397, 408
(Iowa 2007) (six-month suspension for misrepresentation and various 17
other disciplinary violations); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Stein, 586 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Iowa 1998) (six-month suspension
for intentional misrepresentations and neglect).
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Kennedy, a
lawyer severely neglected multiple client matters and failed to
communicate with his clients, violating five of the same ethics violations
as in this case. 837 N.W.2d at 667–72. We suspended the lawyer’s license
for one year. Id. at 678. But Kennedy involved neglect of many more
clients that suffered harm than in this case, and the lawyer had a
disciplinary history with similar prior ethics violations, suggesting the
lawyer hadn’t adequately addressed the problems. Id. at 677 (noting prior
sixty-day suspension primarily for neglect).
In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Hohenadel, a lawyer neglected two client matters and made
misrepresentations to the court and his clients about the status of those
matters. 634 N.W.2d 652, 653 (Iowa 2001). We determined the conduct
warranted a four-month suspension. Id. at 657; see also Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Horn, 379 N.W.2d 6, 9–10 (Iowa 1985) (finding a
lawyer’s failure to cooperate in his disciplinary matter, neglect of a client
matter, and misrepresentations warranted a three-month suspension).
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Van Ginkel, a
lawyer neglected an estate case and made false statements to the court,
violating multiple ethics rules. 809 N.W.2d at 109–10. We considered
Van Ginkel’s misrepresentation to the district court “a particularly
disturbing factor” in our analysis of the sanction. Id. at 111. We
suspended his license for sixty days. Id. But unlike here, there was no
evidence the ethics violations in Van Ginkel harmed the client. Id. at 110. 18
We turn to aggravating and mitigating factors. Multiple rule
violations, as we have here, are an aggravating factor. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 925 N.W.2d 163, 181 (Iowa 2019). Client
harm, also present here, is likewise an aggravating factor. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 122 (Iowa 2015).
There are also several mitigating factors to consider. The foremost
is Beauvais’s acute inexperience when he took on this case. A lawyer’s
inexperience can be a mitigating factor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 155 (Iowa 2018). Beauvais
now recognizes that he had no business taking on a complicated toxic tort
case of this type considering his lack of training and support. He had no
experience evaluating, engaging, and assisting the types of expert
witnesses he was relying on to prove causation and damages, and he
apparently had no mentors or other experienced hands available to help
train or assist him on these things as the case proceeded.
Beauvais expressed remorse and admitted to many of his failures in
this case. Remorse is a mitigating factor, as are admissions to violations.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813,
820–21 (Iowa 2018). Although Beauvais could have been more fulsome in
his admission of certain mistakes he made (as the Board points out), his
acknowledgment of mistakes on many aspects of his conduct is
noteworthy. His admissions are borne out in his self-limitation of practice
areas in the future to avoid repeating the mistakes in this case. Voluntary
remedial efforts are, similarly, mitigating factors. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 528 (Iowa 2017).
Beauvais testified to suffering from depression, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, and anxiety. Beauvais testified that each played a
role in some aspect of his misconduct in this case. Each can constitute a 19
mitigating condition if the lawyer seeks treatment to address it. See
Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 156. Beauvais disclosed the steps he’s taking to
address them.
Finally, Beauvais’s legal work with an underserved part of the
community is a mitigating factor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627, 643 (Iowa 2015). Beauvais provides
substantial services to indigent people and clients, and he provided free
legal assistance at the self-help desk at the Woodbury County Courthouse
and in two different legal aid clinics. We’ve recognized such service as a
mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ackerman,
786 N.W.2d 491, 497–98 (Iowa 2010).
While Beauvais’s inexperience when he handled this case is a
significant mitigating factor, “neglect compounded by misrepresentation
will warrant a more severe sanction because of the critical importance of
honesty in our profession.” Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting
Thomas, 794 N.W.2d at 294). Even inexperienced lawyers must know
better than to make misrepresentations to their clients, opposing counsel,
and the court.
His inexperience in the practice and lack of support had Beauvais
in a hole seemingly from the outset. His severe neglect only deepened the
hole. Having found himself in a hole as trial drew near, he would have
been wise to abide the adage to “stop digging.” But he instead pursued a
path to paper over his failures with misrepresentations that harmed his
clients. We find the commission’s recommendation of a three-month
suspension is appropriate.
V. Disposition.
We suspend the license to practice law of John P. Beauvais Jr. with
no possibility for reinstatement for three months. This suspension applies 20
to all facets of the practice of law. He must comply with the notification
requirements in Iowa Court Rule 34.24. We tax the costs of this action to
Beauvais under Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.