Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 6, 2022
Docket7:22-cv-04757
StatusUnknown

This text of Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc. (Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

Hs fe □ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CALL RULES: □ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ee ggeente poss vue a 6-22 ILYA FELIKSOVICH IOSILEVICH, gasiygsumerrn Plaintiff, 22-CV-4757 (VB) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE WALMART INC,, ef al., Defendants. VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights and his rights under state law. By order dated June 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. Named as Defendants are Walmart, Inc.; Walmart store #2531 Asset Protection Associate Joseph Negron; Jane Doe, General Manager of Walmart store #2531; Jane Doe or “Beatriz,” an “exit door host” or “store associate” at Walmart store #2531; the State of New York; the New York State Police; Superintendent of New York State Police Kevin P, Bruen; New York State Trooper John T. Reicherter; John and Jane Doe partners of Trooper Reicherter; Westchester County Government; Westchester County Executive George Latimer; Westchester County Office of the District Attorney; and Westchester County District Attorney Miriam E. Rocah. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against the State of New York, the New York State Police, Rocah, Latimer, and the Westchester District Attorney’s Office; directs the New York State Police to assist Plaintiff in identifying the John and Jane Doe troopers who assisted in his arrest; and directs service on Walmart, Negron, Reicherter, Bruen, and Westchester County.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. The Eleventh Amendment The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York and the New York State Police. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman vy. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York and the New York State Police because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief and, therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see

Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New York waived its immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”). B. Claims against the Westchester District Attorney’s Office and Rocah The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office. “Under New York State law, the Office of the District Attorney does not itself have a legal existence separate from the District Attorney.” Jones v. City of New York, 988 F. Supp. 2d 305, 314 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Woodward v. Office of DA, 689 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Plaintiff’s claims against the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office must therefore be dismissed because it lacks the capacity to be sued.! The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against District Attorney Rocah in her role as a prosecutor, Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Giraldo

v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In

! A district attorney is “a state rather than a local representative ‘when prosecuting a criminal matter[.]’” Bellamy v. City of N.Y., 914 F.3d 727, 757 (2d Cir. 2019) (alteration omitted and quoting Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988)). On the other hand, where the challenged conduct is the policies and customs of the district attorney’s office, “‘the district attorney is a municipal policymaker,’ because in making decisions other than whether to prosecute the ‘district attorney acts as the manager of the district attorney’s office, which... isa municipal function.’” Jd. (quoting Walker v, City of N.Y, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992)). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting that the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office had a policy, custom, or practice that violated his constitutional rights, those claims would be asserted against Westchester County, which Plaintiff also names as a defendant in this action.

addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 US. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir.

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572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
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Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iosilevich-v-walmart-inc-nysd-2022.