Invensys Systems, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co.

63 F. Supp. 3d 663, 2014 WL 3884165, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107928
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 6, 2014
DocketCase No. 6:12-cv-799
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 63 F. Supp. 3d 663 (Invensys Systems, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Invensys Systems, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co., 63 F. Supp. 3d 663, 2014 WL 3884165, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107928 (E.D. Tex. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEONARD DAVIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This Memorandum Opinion construes the disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,124,646 (“the '646 Patent”); 7,136,-761 (“the '761 Patent”); 6,311,136 (“the '136 Patent”); 7,505,854 (“the '854 Patent”); 6,754,594 (“the '594 Patent”); 7,571,062 (“the '062 Patent”); and 8,000,906 (“the '906 Patent”) (collectively, “the Invensys Patents”), asserted in this suit by Invensys Systems, Inc. (“Invensys”). Also before the Court is Micro Motion’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness (Docket No. 144).

On May 1, 2014, the parties presented arguments on the disputed claim terms at a Markman hearing and also presented oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the constructions set forth below and DENIES Micro Motion’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Invensys alleges Micro Motion and Emerson infringe' the seven patents it asserts here. Micro Motion brought counterclaims accusing Invensys of infringing two patents it has asserted. All nine patents are generally related to Coriolis'flow-meters—devices that measure the properties (including mass, volume, and density) of fluids flowing through a conduit. Micro Motion’s asserted patents are construed in a contemporaneously issued Memorandum Opinion and Order.

APPLICABLE LAW

Claim Construction

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define the patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313-1314; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the claims, the rest of the specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2003).

Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as additional limitations iii dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.

“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ ” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construe[668]*668tion analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ ” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002). In the specification, a pat-entee may define. his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning that it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed.Cir.2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed.Cir.2004).

The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’ ” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elam Computer Group Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. Home Diagnostics Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent”). The well-established doctrine of prosecution disclaimer “precludes] patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003). The prosecution history must show that the paten-tee clearly and unambiguously disclaimed or disavowed the proposed interpretation during prosecution to obtain claim allowance. Middleton, Inc. v. 3M Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed.Cir.2002); see also Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (“The disclaimer ... must be effected with ‘reasonable clarity and deliberateness.’ ”) (citations omitted)). “Indeed, by distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.” Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed.Cir.1998) (quotation omitted). “As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1324.

Although “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on the relevant art.” Phillips,

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63 F. Supp. 3d 663, 2014 WL 3884165, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107928, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/invensys-systems-inc-v-emerson-electric-co-txed-2014.