1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 INNOVATIVE SPORTS MANAGEMENT, 7 INC., Case No. 25-cv-05058-NW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
10 TIBISAY SANCHEZ, ET AL., Re: ECF No. 21 11 Defendants.
12 13 Plaintiff Innovative Sports Management (“Innovative”) owns the domestic commercial 14 exhibition rights to broadcast certain soccer games nationwide. Innovative sued Defendants 15 Tibisay Sanchez, Carlos Andres Garcia (individually and d/b/a La Terraza Grill & Bar (“La 16 Terraza”)), and Gs-LLC (an unknown business entity d/b/a La Terraza Grill & Bar) for displaying, 17 without a license, one of these soccer matches inside Defendants’ restaurant. Defendants have 18 failed to respond to any of the allegations made by Innovative in this case, and Innovative now 19 moves for default judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants default judgment against 20 Defendants. 21 I. BACKGROUND1 22 Innovative purchased exclusive commercial exhibition rights to license certain soccer 23 matches to business establishments, including bars and restaurants, across the United States. 24 Compl., ECF No. 1. Innovative owns the licensing rights to the June 15, 2024 soccer match 25 26 1 For the purposes of default judgment, the factual allegations in a complaint are accepted as 27 true except for those related to damages. See Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 1 between Colombia and Bolivia. Id. On that date, an agent of Innovative visited La Terraza in San 2 Jose, California, and observed La Terraza displaying the match on televisions for its patrons to 3 view. ECF No. 21-2. About 45 patrons were in La Terraza at the time. Id. Innovative does not 4 allege that La Terraza advertised the event in advance nor charged a cover fee for patrons to enter. 5 ECF No. 1. 6 On its California liquor license, La Terraza lists Gs-LLC as the primary owner and 7 licensee. ECF No. 1, ¶ 8. The license also lists Defendants Tibisay Sanchez and Carlos Andres 8 Garcia as managers and members of Gs-LLC. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. 9 Innovative filed this suit on June 13, 2025, seeking damages under the Communications 10 Act of 1934, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. § 605 or alternatively under the Cable & Television 11 Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. § 553, and 12 damages for conversion under California state law. ECF No. 1. On July 25, 2025, the Clerk of 13 the Court issued a summons as to Defendants at 6944 Almaden Expressway, San Jose, CA 95120. 14 ECF No. 11. According to the proof of service, on August 27, 2025, a process server for 15 Innovative served the Defendants by substitute service upon Andres Gomez, the competent 16 member at Defendants’ “home” at the 6944 Almaden Expressway address. ECF Nos. 12-14. On 17 September 3, 2025, Innovative mailed a copy of the complaint and summons to the same address 18 by first class, postage prepaid mail. ECF Nos. 12-14. 19 To date, Defendants have neither responded to Innovative’s complaint nor made any 20 appearance in this matter. On October 19, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default against 21 Defendants. ECF No. 18. On January 16, 2026, Innovative moved for default judgment against 22 all Defendants. ECF No. 21. The Court held a hearing on the motion on February 24, 2026, at 23 which Defendants did not appear. ECF No. 28. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Federal Rule 55(b)(2) allows a party “to apply to the court for a default judgment.” The 26 decision to enter a default judgment is entirely within the district court’s discretion. Aldabe v. 27 Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Courts consider the following factors in 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 2 plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 3 concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 4 Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 5 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Where a plaintiff seeks default against a 6 non-appearing defendant, the court “should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the 7 jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 The Court must also assess the adequacy of service of process on the non-appearing party. See, 9 e.g., Innovative Sports Management, Inc. v. Nunez, No. 22-cv-07136-JSC, 2023 WL 4551069, at 10 *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023). 11 III. ANALYSIS 12 A. Jurisdiction 13 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit because Innovative’s claims 14 arise under two federal statutes, Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 and § 605. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court 15 has supplemental jurisdiction over Innovative’s conversion claim because that claim arises from 16 the same facts that give rise to the Court’s original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also 17 has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendant Gs-LLC owns the La Terraza Grill 18 & Bar, the California-based establishment at which the display of the match occurred. Defendants 19 Sanchez and Garcia are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction by way of their roles as 20 managers of Gs-LLC. Venue lies properly within this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 21 B. Service of Process 22 Federal Rule 4(e)(1) allows a plaintiff to serve process on a defendant by “following [the] . 23 . . law for serving a summons” of the state in which the federal court sits. California authorizes 24 substitute service when the “summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be 25 personally delivered to the person to be served[.]” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20. Ordinarily, two or 26 three attempts at personal service at a proper place should fully satisfy the requirement of 27 reasonable diligence and allow substituted service to be made. Hearn v. Howard, 177 Cal. App. 1 attempt at physical service on a . . . person whose relationship with the person to be served makes 2 it more likely than not that they will deliver process to the named party.” Id., at 1202-03. To 3 satisfy substituted service, a plaintiff must also send the defendant a copy of the documents via 4 first-class mail at the same place where the process server left the documents. Cal. Code. Civ. P. 5 § 415.20(b). Service is deemed complete ten days later. Id. 6 Innovative’s process server unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve Defendants at La 7 Terraza on separate occasions, four days apart, and at different times of day. On the first and 8 second attempts, an employee of the restaurant told the process server that Defendants were not 9 there. When the server was unsuccessful, he left the service documents with an employee, Andres 10 Gomez, and then mailed the documents to the restaurant.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 INNOVATIVE SPORTS MANAGEMENT, 7 INC., Case No. 25-cv-05058-NW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
10 TIBISAY SANCHEZ, ET AL., Re: ECF No. 21 11 Defendants.
12 13 Plaintiff Innovative Sports Management (“Innovative”) owns the domestic commercial 14 exhibition rights to broadcast certain soccer games nationwide. Innovative sued Defendants 15 Tibisay Sanchez, Carlos Andres Garcia (individually and d/b/a La Terraza Grill & Bar (“La 16 Terraza”)), and Gs-LLC (an unknown business entity d/b/a La Terraza Grill & Bar) for displaying, 17 without a license, one of these soccer matches inside Defendants’ restaurant. Defendants have 18 failed to respond to any of the allegations made by Innovative in this case, and Innovative now 19 moves for default judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants default judgment against 20 Defendants. 21 I. BACKGROUND1 22 Innovative purchased exclusive commercial exhibition rights to license certain soccer 23 matches to business establishments, including bars and restaurants, across the United States. 24 Compl., ECF No. 1. Innovative owns the licensing rights to the June 15, 2024 soccer match 25 26 1 For the purposes of default judgment, the factual allegations in a complaint are accepted as 27 true except for those related to damages. See Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 1 between Colombia and Bolivia. Id. On that date, an agent of Innovative visited La Terraza in San 2 Jose, California, and observed La Terraza displaying the match on televisions for its patrons to 3 view. ECF No. 21-2. About 45 patrons were in La Terraza at the time. Id. Innovative does not 4 allege that La Terraza advertised the event in advance nor charged a cover fee for patrons to enter. 5 ECF No. 1. 6 On its California liquor license, La Terraza lists Gs-LLC as the primary owner and 7 licensee. ECF No. 1, ¶ 8. The license also lists Defendants Tibisay Sanchez and Carlos Andres 8 Garcia as managers and members of Gs-LLC. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. 9 Innovative filed this suit on June 13, 2025, seeking damages under the Communications 10 Act of 1934, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. § 605 or alternatively under the Cable & Television 11 Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. § 553, and 12 damages for conversion under California state law. ECF No. 1. On July 25, 2025, the Clerk of 13 the Court issued a summons as to Defendants at 6944 Almaden Expressway, San Jose, CA 95120. 14 ECF No. 11. According to the proof of service, on August 27, 2025, a process server for 15 Innovative served the Defendants by substitute service upon Andres Gomez, the competent 16 member at Defendants’ “home” at the 6944 Almaden Expressway address. ECF Nos. 12-14. On 17 September 3, 2025, Innovative mailed a copy of the complaint and summons to the same address 18 by first class, postage prepaid mail. ECF Nos. 12-14. 19 To date, Defendants have neither responded to Innovative’s complaint nor made any 20 appearance in this matter. On October 19, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default against 21 Defendants. ECF No. 18. On January 16, 2026, Innovative moved for default judgment against 22 all Defendants. ECF No. 21. The Court held a hearing on the motion on February 24, 2026, at 23 which Defendants did not appear. ECF No. 28. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Federal Rule 55(b)(2) allows a party “to apply to the court for a default judgment.” The 26 decision to enter a default judgment is entirely within the district court’s discretion. Aldabe v. 27 Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Courts consider the following factors in 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 2 plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 3 concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 4 Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 5 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Where a plaintiff seeks default against a 6 non-appearing defendant, the court “should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the 7 jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 The Court must also assess the adequacy of service of process on the non-appearing party. See, 9 e.g., Innovative Sports Management, Inc. v. Nunez, No. 22-cv-07136-JSC, 2023 WL 4551069, at 10 *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023). 11 III. ANALYSIS 12 A. Jurisdiction 13 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit because Innovative’s claims 14 arise under two federal statutes, Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 and § 605. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court 15 has supplemental jurisdiction over Innovative’s conversion claim because that claim arises from 16 the same facts that give rise to the Court’s original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also 17 has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendant Gs-LLC owns the La Terraza Grill 18 & Bar, the California-based establishment at which the display of the match occurred. Defendants 19 Sanchez and Garcia are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction by way of their roles as 20 managers of Gs-LLC. Venue lies properly within this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 21 B. Service of Process 22 Federal Rule 4(e)(1) allows a plaintiff to serve process on a defendant by “following [the] . 23 . . law for serving a summons” of the state in which the federal court sits. California authorizes 24 substitute service when the “summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be 25 personally delivered to the person to be served[.]” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20. Ordinarily, two or 26 three attempts at personal service at a proper place should fully satisfy the requirement of 27 reasonable diligence and allow substituted service to be made. Hearn v. Howard, 177 Cal. App. 1 attempt at physical service on a . . . person whose relationship with the person to be served makes 2 it more likely than not that they will deliver process to the named party.” Id., at 1202-03. To 3 satisfy substituted service, a plaintiff must also send the defendant a copy of the documents via 4 first-class mail at the same place where the process server left the documents. Cal. Code. Civ. P. 5 § 415.20(b). Service is deemed complete ten days later. Id. 6 Innovative’s process server unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve Defendants at La 7 Terraza on separate occasions, four days apart, and at different times of day. On the first and 8 second attempts, an employee of the restaurant told the process server that Defendants were not 9 there. When the server was unsuccessful, he left the service documents with an employee, Andres 10 Gomez, and then mailed the documents to the restaurant. This is sufficient service of process. 11 B. Eitel Factors 12 The Eitel factors support entering default judgment against Defendants. 13 Factor 1: Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 14 The first Eitel factor supports default judgment because without judgment, Innovative will 15 be left without a remedy. See Innovative Sports Mgmt., Inc. v. Gutierrez, No. 22-CV-05793-BLF, 16 2023 WL 4157627, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2023) (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. 17 Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 18 Factors 2 and 3: Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the 19 Complaint 20 Innovative’s complaint alleges (1) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; (2) violation of 47 U.S.C. 21 § 553; and (3) conversion.2 ECF No. 1. A plaintiff may recover under either Section 605 or 22 Section 553, but not both. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Ro, No. C-09-02860-WHA, 2010 WL 23 668065, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010). Where Section 553 prohibits unlawful interception of a 24 cable signal, Section 605 prohibits unlawful interception of a satellite broadcast. A defendant 25 “cannot violate both by a single act of interception.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Manzano, No. c- 26 2 Innovative’s complaint alleges a fourth claim for violation of California Business and 27 Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. However, Innovative does not seek default judgment as 1 08-01872-RMW, 2008 WL 4542962, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008). 2 The Court concludes that the second Eitel factor weighs against awarding default judgment 3 under Section 605. The complaint’s sole allegation purportedly giving rise to liability under 4 Section 605 is that the soccer match “originated via satellite uplink and was subsequently re- 5 transmitted to cable systems and satellite companies via satellite signal to Plaintiff’s lawful sub- 6 licensees.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 23. Innovative incorrectly argues that this claim meets the threshold 7 finding required for liability under Section 605. To prevail under Section 605, the complaint 8 needs to allege that the defendants “intercepted a satellite transmission[] as opposed to a cable 9 signal[.]” G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC, v. Macias, No. 20-cv-02916-BLF, 2021 WL 10 2037955, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2021). The focus is on the defendants’ manner of interception, 11 not the plaintiff’s manner of transmission. The complaint states that the match was transmitted via 12 both cable and satellite, meaning that the defendants might have intercepted either a cable or 13 satellite display of the soccer match. “Indeed, the fact that violations of both 605 and 553 were 14 alleged in the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff is unable to specify the type of transmission.” See 15 J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Coria, No. c-12-05779-JSW, 2015 WL 1089044, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16 27, 2015) (cleaned up). 17 Innovative has failed to provide any clear evidence as to how the soccer match was 18 intercepted. Innovative’s investigator only attested to his presence at the bar during the display of 19 the match and said nothing about investigating the means of transmission. See J & J Sports 20 Prods., Inc. v. Segura, No. c-12-01702-JSW, 2014 WL 1618577 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014) (“[I]f 21 plaintiff wanted to prove this, they could have filed a third party subpoena or requested an order 22 for inspection . . . a defendant’s default does not eliminate the opportunity to take third party 23 discovery.”) (citations omitted). 24 Given the lack of factual allegations supporting liability under Section 605, the Court finds 25 it inappropriate to enter default judgment under that provision. Instead, the Court concludes that 26 entering default judgment under Section 553 is more appropriate.3 27 1 Innovative filed an affidavit and declaration of investigator Mario Galvez demonstrating 2 that Defendants displayed the match at La Terraza on June 15, 2024. ECF No. 21-2. Innovative 3 also filed an affidavit and declaration of Doug Jacobs, Innovative’s President, demonstrating both 4 Innovative’s ownership of the licensing rights to the match and Defendants’ failure to procure a 5 commercial license. ECF No. 21-3. This is sufficient to establish a basis for relief under Section 6 553. 7 Innovative has not adequately alleged its conversion claim. In the complaint, Innovative 8 does not identify the legal basis for its claim. Instead, Innovative simply states that Defendants 9 “tortuously obtained possession of the Program and wrongfully converted same for his own use 10 and benefit.” Compl. ¶ 38. Conclusory allegations are insufficient and not well pleaded. Alan 11 Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (default judgment reversed 12 on appeal where complaint failed to allege required elements of a claim). Because Innovative has 13 not adequately pled the elements nor identified the law upon which it relies, the Court finds that 14 Innovative has not established a basis for default judgment for its conversion claim. 15 Factor 4: Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 16 The fourth factor, sum of money at stake, also favors default judgment. Innovative 17 requests $3,500 in statutory damages and an additional $18,000 in “enhanced” damages under 47 18 U.S.C. § 605. ECF No. 21. Section 605 empowers courts to award up to $10,000 in statutory 19 damages and $100,000 in enhanced damages. Alternatively, Innovative seeks the same damages 20 under 47 U.S.C. § 553, which empowers courts to award up to $10,000 in statutory damages and 21 up to an additional $50,000 in enhanced damages. Id. Finally, Innovative seeks $750 in damages 22 for its conversion claim. Innovative seeks a total of $22,250 in damages. Id. This is a substantial 23 sum, but it remains within the statutory range. The fourth factor therefore slightly favors default 24 judgment. 25 Section 553 is more likely than a violation of Section 605 given the relative ease of a defendant 26 hiding a cable box compared to a satellite dish. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Guzman, No. c- 08-05469, 2009 WL 1034218, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009) (“[G]iven that a cable box is more 27 easily hidden, the court finds that defendants violated section 553, but not section 605.”). 1 Factor 5: Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts 2 The fifth factor is neutral because it is impossible to know whether there will be a dispute 3 concerning material facts given Defendants’ failure to appear in this action. 4 Factor 6: Whether the Default was Due to Excusable Neglect 5 The sixth factor, excusable neglect, also supports default judgment because Innovative 6 served Defendants with the complaint and summons pursuant to California substitute service. 7 There is no indication that Defendant’s default is due to excusable neglect. 8 Factor 7: Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 9 The seventh factor weighs against default judgment because the Federal Rules embrace a 10 “strong policy” of deciding cases on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Where one party fails to 11 litigate a case, it is impossible to decide a case on the merits. 12 On balance, the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth factors favor default judgment. For 13 the foregoing reasons, the Eitel factors support entering default judgment against Defendants on 14 Innovative’s claim under 47 U.S.C. § 553. 15 IV. SCOPE OF RELIEF 16 A. Conversion 17 Innovative’s allegations do not support its conversion claim. Accordingly, Innovative is 18 not entitled to recover the $750 it seeks for that claim. 19 B. Damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553 20 The complaint’s factual allegations, when taken as true, state a claim for relief under 21 Section 553. Innovative is therefore entitled to damages. Under Section 553, a plaintiff may 22 recover actual damages or “an award of statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $250 or 23 more than $10,000 as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A). Where the court 24 concludes that the “violation was committed willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage 25 or private financial gain,” the court may award enhanced damages of up to $50,000. Id. 26 § 553(c)(3)(B). Although the Ninth Circuit has not set forth specific factors to determine an 27 appropriate figure for damages, district courts consider a range of factors, including “use of cover 1 number of televisions used, and impact of the offender’s conduct on the claimant.” J & J Sports 2 Prods., Inc. v. Concepcion, No. c-10-05092 2011 WL 2220101, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011). 3 Often, “courts award statutory damages in an amount equal to the actual loss based on the 4 licensing fee[.]” Nunez, 2023 WL 4551069, at *6. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that district 5 courts should consider the effect that a damages award might have in deterring the defendants’ 6 unlawful activities in the future. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 7 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 Innovative seeks $3,500 in statutory damages and $18,000 in enhanced damages. As to 9 statutory damages, Innovative provided an affidavit demonstrating that Defendants would have 10 paid $750 to display the soccer match in a bar the size of La Terraza. ECF No. 21-3. The Court 11 agrees that it is reasonable to award statutory damages such that Innovative is compensated for the 12 licensing fee it lost by virtue of the unauthorized broadcast. See Nunez, 2023 WL 4551069, at *6. 13 Here, the usual factors for determining an appropriate sum for damages are not implicated. There 14 is no indication that Defendants increased the food prices, advertised, or charged a cover fee. In 15 light of the above, the Court finds that an award of modest damages is just and provides a 16 deterrence. Accordingly, the Court awards Innovative $3,500 in statutory damages. See 47 17 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A). 18 As to enhanced damages, and as noted above, Innovative’s briefs do not allege that 19 Defendants advertised the match, charged a cover fee, or increased food prices during programs. 20 Nor does Innovative allege that Defendants have engaged in this conduct previously. As the Ninth 21 Circuit has counseled, a district court’s award of damages should focus on deterring future 22 unlawful conduct. See Kingvision, 168 F.3d at 350. The Court does not view the circumstances 23 here as meriting any greater deterrent measures than statutory damages and does not award 24 enhanced damages. 25 The Court awards Innovative $3,500 on its Section 553 claim against all Defendants. 26 C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 27 Innovative seeks leave to file a motion for costs and attorneys’ fees. Though Section 605 1 to the court’s discretion. Concepcion, 2011 WL 2220101, at *5 (“Under Section 605, an award is 2 mandatory, but under Section 553, it is not.”). Should the Court choose to make such an award, 3 Section 553(c)(2)(C) allows for “recovery of full costs .. . [and] reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 4 Should Innovative wish to recover its fees and costs, its motion for costs and attorneys’ fees must 5 || be filed within 14 days of this Order. Innovative’s motion should explain why the Court should 6 || exercise its discretion to award fees and costs and provide the evidentiary basis for the claimed 7 || fees and costs. 8 || V. CONCLUSION 9 The Court ORDERS as follows: 10 (1) Innovative’s motion for default judgment is denied as to the claims under 47 U.S.C. 11 § 605 and for conversion; 12 (2) Innovative’s motion for default judgment is granted as to the claim under 47 U.S.C. 3 § 553: 5 14 (3) The Court awards Innovative $3,500 in damages in total, specifically $3,500 in 5 15 statutory damages against all Defendants; and 16 (4) Innovative shall file its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs within 14 days of this 5 7 Order. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 Dated: March 17, 2026 20 Noél Wise 7] United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28