Innovative Sports Management, Inc., d/b/a Integrated Sports Media v. Martha J. Martinez Polanias, d/b/a El Cielo Bar & Grill

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE 6 7 INNOVATIVE SPORTS MANAGEMENT, Case No. 25-cv-05060-BLF INC., d/b/a INTEGRATED SPORTS 8 MEDIA, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 Plaintiff, DENYING IN PART PLAINTIF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT v. 10 [Re: ECF 19] 11 MARTHA J. MARTINEZ POLANIAS, d/b/a EL CIELO BAR & GRILL, 12 Defendant. 13 14 Plaintiff Innovative Sports Management, a distributor and licensor of sporting events, sues 15 Defendant Martha J. Martinez Polanias for unlawfully intercepting the Colombia v. Bolivia Soccer 16 Match (“the Program”) aired on June 15, 2024, and exhibiting it at her commercial establishment, 17 El Cielo Bar & Grill. See Compl. ¶ 20, ECF 1. Plaintiff seeks damages under federal and state 18 law. 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF 19.1 The 20 Court previously vacated the hearing after finding the motion to be suitable for decision without 21 oral argument. See Order Vacating Hrg., ECF 24. The Court finds that Plaintiff has established 22 an entitlement to default judgment, but it declines to award all of the damages requested by 23 Plaintiff. 24 Accordingly, the motion for default judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 25 PART, as discussed below. 26 1 Plaintiff filed two copies its motion for default judgment on the same date, one docketed at ECF 27 19 and one docketed at ECF 20. The filings appear to be identical. The Court refers to the motion 1 I. BACKGROUND2 2 Plaintiff purchased the exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights to the Program, 3 including all interviews and game commentary. See Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff entered into 4 sublicensing agreements with various commercial entities throughout North America, allowing 5 them to publicly exhibit the Program at their commercial establishments. See id. ¶ 16. Defendant 6 owns and does business as the commercial establishment known as El Cielo Bar & Grill, located 7 at 2650 Alum Rock Ave., San Jose, California 95116. See id. ¶ 7. Defendant exhibited the 8 Program at El Cielo Bar & Grill on June 15, 2024, without sublicensing the rights to do so from 9 Plaintiff. See id. ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff’s investigator, Mario Galvez, observed the unlawful 10 exhibition of the Program at El Cielo Bar & Grill on June 15, 2024. See Galvez Decl., ECF 19-3. 11 Galvez states that El Cielo Bar & Grill has a capacity of approximately 60 people, and that 12 between 18 and 20 patrons were present while the Program was exhibited. See id. A sublicense to 13 show the Program would have cost Defendant $1,000. See Riley Decl. ¶ 8, ECF 19-2. 14 Plaintiff filed this action on June 13, 2025, asserting claims for: (1) unauthorized 15 publication or use of communications in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; (2) unauthorized reception 16 of cable service in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; (3) conversion; and (4) violation of Cal. Bus. & 17 Prof. Code § 17200. Defendant has not appeared, and the Clerk has entered her default. See 18 Clerk’s Notice, ECF 16. Plaintiff now seeks entry of default judgment against Defendant. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Default may be entered against a party who fails to defend an action, who is neither a 21 minor nor an incompetent person, and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. 22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, a court may, in its discretion, enter default 23 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 24 In deciding whether to enter default judgment, a court should consider the following 25 factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive 26 2 The Background section is drawn from the factual allegations of the complaint, which are 27 accepted as true with the exception of allegations related to damages, see TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 1 claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the 2 possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable 3 neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 4 decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 All factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, except those related to 6 the amount of damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 7 1987). Damages may be proved either through an evidentiary hearing, or through documentary 8 evidence submitted by the plaintiff. See Johnson v. Garlic Farm Truck Ctr. LLC, No. 20-CV- 9 03871-BLF, 2021 WL 2457154, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2021); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 10 Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(MSB), 2020 WL 7488067, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2020). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff seeks default judgment on two of the four claims asserted in its complaint: 13 Count II for unauthorized reception of cable service in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 and Count III 14 for conversion. See Pl.’s Mot. at 6-10. Plaintiff does not seek default judgment on Count I for 15 violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 or Count IV for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. See id. 16 at 3 n.1; Riley Decl. ¶ 7. The Court therefore limits its evaluation of Plaintiff’s motion to Counts 17 II and III, and it dismisses Counts I and IV without prejudice. 18 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 19 defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 20 matter and parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court discusses in turn 21 subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, service, the Eitel factors, and the requested relief. 22 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 23 The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Count II for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 25 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 26 The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Count III for conversion. See 28 U.S.C. § 27 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district 1 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy[.]”). 2 B. Personal Jurisdiction 3 A federal district court may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over a 4 defendant. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). “For an individual, the 5 paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile[.]” Id. at 137. 6 A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has 7 sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state. Id. at 126. 8 It is unclear whether general personal jurisdiction exists, because the complaint does not 9 allege whether Defendant is domiciled in California. However, specific personal jurisdiction 10 exists based on the complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, that Defendant owned and 11 operated the El Cielo Bar & Grill in California and exhibited the Program there without 12 authorization from Plaintiff. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-13. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 13 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirements for specific personal jurisdiction). 14 C. Service of Process 15 When a plaintiff requests default judgment, the court must assess whether the defendant 16 was properly served with notice of the action. See Solis v. Cardiografix, No. 12-cv-01485, 2012 17 WL 3638548, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012). Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing that 18 Defendant was served by substitute service pursuant to California law. See POS, ECF 13. 19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow service of process pursuant to the law of the 20 state where the district court is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Under California law, 21 substitute service may be used under certain circumstances. See Cal. Civ. P. Code § 415.20. As 22 relevant here, if the defendant cannot be personally served despite reasonable diligence, service 23 may be effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s usual place of 24 business with a person apparently in charge and thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and 25 complaint to the defendant at the business. See Cal. Civ. P. Code § 415.20(b). Service is deemed 26 complete on the 10th day after mailing. See id. Two or three attempts at personal service 27 ordinarily suffice to establish reasonable diligence. See Hearn v. Howard, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1 Plaintiff’s process server attempted personal service on Defendant at El Cielo Bar & Grill 2 on three separate occasions. See POS. On the third attempt, the process server left the service 3 documents with an employee at El Cielo Bar & Grill. Id. The service documents thereafter were 4 mailed to Defendant at El Cielo Bar & Grill. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that 5 Defendant was properly served with process. 6 D. Eitel Factors 7 Next, the Court considers whether default judgment is warranted under the Eitel factors. 8 1. Factor 1 – Possibility of Prejudice 9 Under the first Eitel factor, the Court finds that Plaintiff would be prejudiced without a 10 default judgment against Defendant. Because Defendant did not respond to the complaint, 11 Plaintiff’s only recourse is default judgment. See Ridola v. Chao, No. 16-CV-02246-BLF, 2018 12 WL 2287668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (plaintiff prejudiced without default judgment 13 because she “would have no other means of recourse against Defendants for the damages caused 14 by their conduct”); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 15 2010) (“Here, denial of Plaintiff’s request for judgment and injunctive relief would leave Plaintiff 16 with no means to prevent further infringement by Defendants, and leave Plaintiff prone to 17 continued circumvention of its security measures by Defendants.”). 18 The first factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 19 2. Factors 2 and 3 – Merits and Sufficiency of Claims 20 The second and third Eitel factors address the merits and sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 21 claims. Courts often analyze these two factors together. See Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 22 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Under an Eitel analysis, the merits of plaintiff’s 23 substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint are often analyzed together.”). “[T]he 24 general rule is that well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true.” 25 Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 26 a. Count II – Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 27 In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553, which prohibits the 1 delivered television programming. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (“No person shall intercept or receive 2 or assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, 3 unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically 4 authorized by law.”). “To prove a violation of § 553 a plaintiff must establish three elements: 5 (1) an interception of a cable transmission or broadcast, (2) lack of authorization, and 6 (3) publication.” Innovative Sports Mgmt. Inc. v. Ochoa, No. CV-20-01127-PHX-SPL, 2022 WL 7 22864989, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2022). 8 The complaint’s allegations, accepted as true, establish that Defendant intercepted the 9 cable transmission or broadcast of the Program, Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s authorization 10 for such interception, and Defendant published the Program by exhibiting it at El Cielo Bar & 11 Grill. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-12. Plaintiff also offers evidence on these elements. Plaintiff’s president 12 submits a declaration stating that Plaintiff owns the exclusive nationwide licensing rights to 13 exhibit the Program, and that Plaintiff did not authorize Defendant to exhibit the Program at El 14 Cielo Bar & Grill. See Jacobs Decl. ¶¶ 1-7, ECF 19-1. Plaintiff’s investigator submits a 15 declaration stating that the Program was exhibited on two televisions inside El Cielo Bar & Grill. 16 See Galvez Decl. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence are sufficient to 17 establish the merits and sufficiency of Count II for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. 18 b. Count III – Conversion 19 In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a claim for conversion under California law. “In California, 20 conversion has three elements: ownership or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition 21 of the property right and damages.” G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 22 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). The complaint’s allegations, accepted as true, establish that 23 Plaintiff owns the nationwide distribution rights for the Program, Defendant misappropriated that 24 ownership right by intercepting the Program and exhibiting it at El Cielo Bar & Grill, and Plaintiff 25 was damaged because it was not paid a sublicensing fee for Defendant’s exhibition of the 26 Program. See Compl. ¶¶ 34-36. Plaintiff also offers evidence on these elements, in particular, 27 evidence that Plaintiff owns the nationwide distribution rights for the Program and did not 1 the Program at El Cielo Bar & Grill, see Galvez Decl. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations 2 and evidence are sufficient to establish the merits and sufficiency of Count III for conversion. 3 Because Plaintiff has established the merits and sufficiency of Counts II and III, the second 4 and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 5 3. Factor 4 – Sum of Money at Stake 6 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court must consider the amount of money at stake in 7 relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. “Default judgment is disfavored when a 8 large amount of money is involved or unreasonable in light of the potential loss caused by the 9 defendant’s actions.” Operating Engineers’ Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. California v. 10 Hansen, No. 19-CV-08344-JSC, 2024 WL 3558851, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2024) (internal 11 quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “when the sum is tailored to the specific 12 misconduct of the defendant, default judgment may be appropriate.” Id. (internal quotation marks 13 and citation omitted). 14 With respect to Count II for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553, Plaintiff seeks $4,000 in 15 statutory damages, plus $20,000 in enhanced damages, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees. With 16 respect to Count III for conversion, Plaintiff seeks $1,000 in damages, which is the amount of the 17 licensing fee Defendant would have had to pay to exhibit the Program at El Cielo Bar & Grill. See 18 Riley Decl. ¶ 8 (stating that a sublicense to show the Program would have cost Defendant $1,000). 19 The damages sought under § 553 are much greater that the potential loss caused by Defendant’s 20 actions, that is, the loss of the $1,000 sublicensing fee. However, the damages, enhanced 21 damages, and attorneys’ fees recoverable under § 553 are completely within the Court’s 22 discretion. With that guardrail in place, the Court finds that the sum of money at stake is 23 sufficiently tailored to Defendant’s conduct to make this factor favorable to Plaintiff. 24 The Court finds that the fourth Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 25 4. Factors 5 and 6 – Possibility of Factual Dispute or Excusable Neglect 26 Under the fifth and sixth Eitel factors, the Court considers whether there is a possibility of 27 dispute over any material fact and whether the default was due to excusable neglect. See Ridola, 1 material fact or that Defendant’s failure to appear was due to excusable neglect. 2 The fifth and sixth Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 3 5. Factor 7 – Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 4 The seventh Eitel factor, which is the policy favoring decisions on the merits, weighs 5 against default judgment. In cases where the other factors weigh in favor of default judgment, the 6 seventh factor will not be an impediment to granting default judgment. See Ridola, 2018 WL 7 2287668, at *13 (“Although federal policy favors decision on the merits, Rule 55(b)(2) permits 8 entry of default judgment in situations, such as this, where a defendant refuses to litigate.”). 9 6. Conclusion 10 The Court finds that the first through sixth Eitel factors favor granting default judgment, 11 and that those factors outweigh the seventh Eitel factor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 12 Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment against Defendant on Count II for unauthorized reception 13 of cable service in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 and Count III for conversion. 14 E. Relief Requested 15 Having determined that Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment, the Court must consider 16 whether the requested relief is warranted. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $24,000 under 17 47 U.S.C. § 553 (Count II), damages in the amount of $1,000 for conversion (Count III), and 18 attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined. 19 1. Damages on Count II – Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 20 A plaintiff who establishes a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 may obtain either: (1) actual 21 damages suffered as a result of the violation and any profits of the violator that are attributable to 22 the violation that are not taken into account when computing actual damages; or (2) statutory 23 damages in a sum not less than $250 and not more than $10,000 as the court considers just. See 24 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A). If the court finds that the violation was committed willfully and for the 25 purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain, the court in its discretion may enhance the 26 damages award by up to $50,000. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B). 27 a. Statutory Damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A) 1 awarded statutory damages in the amount of the lost sublicensing fee. See, e.g., G & G Closed 2 Cir. Events, LLC v. Segura, No. C 20-07576 WHA, 2021 WL 3141191, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. July 3 26, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-16381, 2022 WL 1499650 (9th Cir. May 12, 2022) (collecting cases and 4 awarding $1,400 cost of sublicense in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553); G & G Closed 5 Cir. Events, LLC v. Macias, No. 20-CV-02916-BLF, 2021 WL 2037955, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 6 2021) (awarding $875 cost of sublicense in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553). Some 7 courts have increased the sublicensing fee by a modest multiplier, including one court addressing a 8 prior suit by the same Plaintiff against the same Defendant for the interception and exhibition of a 9 different soccer match at El Cielo Bar & Grill. See Innovative Sports Mgmt., Inc. v. Polanias 10 (“Polanias I”), No. 24-CV-06435-EJD, 2025 WL 1017931, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2025) 11 (awarding $4,000 – four times the cost of the sublicense – in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 12 605). The Polanias I court awarded damages under a different statute, 47 U.S.C. § 605, which 13 also provides for statutory and enhanced damages for piracy of television programs. 14 Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the amount of $4,000 based on a 4x multiplier of the 15 lost sublicensing fee of $1,000. Plaintiff points out that the Polanias I court applied a 4x 16 multiplier under similar circumstances and argues that at least the same multiplier is warranted 17 here based on Defendant’s second unauthorized exhibition of a program in violation of Plaintiff’s 18 rights. The Court agrees that Defendant’s repeated misconduct should be taken account in 19 determining an appropriate damages award, but in the Court’s view Defendant’s apparent pattern 20 of pirating soccer matches should be addressed in the context of Plaintiff’s request for enhanced 21 damages rather than the base statutory damages. Accordingly, the Court will grant statutory 22 damages in the amount of $1,000, the cost of the sublicense Defendant would have paid to exhibit 23 the Program. 24 b. Enhanced Damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B) 25 Courts in this district addressing similar cases generally have awarded enhanced damages 26 of twice the statutory damages. See, e.g., Segura, 2021 WL 3141191, at *4-5 (collecting cases and 27 awarding twice the cost of the sublicense as enhanced damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553); Macias, 1 47 U.S.C. § 553). The Polanias I court declined to award any enhanced damages. See Polanias I, 2 2025 WL 1017931, at *4. 3 Plaintiff seeks enhanced damages of $20,000. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s conduct 4 was willful, pointing out that Defendant pirated another soccer match in violation of Plaintiff’s 5 rights on an earlier occasion as discussed in Polanias I. See generally, Polanias I, 2025 WL 6 1017931. Plaintiff acknowledges that the Polanias I default judgment was entered after the 7 exhibition of the soccer match giving rise to the present suit, and the Court notes that in fact 8 Defendant had not even been served with the summons and complaint in Polanias I at the time she 9 broadcast the Program at issue in this case. See Polanias I, 24-cv-6435, ECF 13. Thus, the 10 evidence at most establishes that Defendant had a pattern of misconduct. Plaintiff also cites to a 11 number of cases observing that defendants generally benefit from the illegal interception of 12 sporting matches by avoiding paying sublicensing fees and, presumably, attracting patrons to the 13 establishment. See, e.g., Macias, 2021 WL 2037955, at *6. 14 This Court finds that Plaintiff has established willfulness on the part of Defendant. 15 However, the Court does not agree that Defendant’s conduct warrants enhanced damages of 16 $20,000 – a 20x multiplier of the sublicensing fee Defendant should have paid. Plaintiff’s 17 evidence of willfulness is modest – certainly Defendant benefitted from broadcasting the Program 18 without paying the sublicensing fee. But there is no other indicia of willful violation. Plaintiff 19 submits no evidence that Defendant charged a cover fee; the restaurant was less than a third full; 20 and there is no evidence of increased food or beverage charges. Thus, the only reasonable 21 inference the Court can draw is that Defendant did not profit from the unlawful broadcast of the 22 Program. See Macias, 2021 WL 2037955, at *5-6. The Court will award enhanced damages 23 totaling three times the statutory damages, resulting in an award of enhanced damages of $3,000 in 24 this case. The treble enhancement is primarily based on Defendant’s pattern of violation. 25 2. Count III – Conversion 26 Plaintiff seeks damages for conversion in the amount of $1,000. Plaintiff submits evidence 27 that the commercial sublicensing fee to broadcast the Program would have cost Defendant $1,000. 1 damages for conversion. 2 The Court notes that some courts in this district have declined to award conversion 3 damages in similar circumstances, finding that the sublicensing fee sought as conversion damages 4 is subsumed in the award of statutory damages. See, e.g., Polanias I, 2025 WL 1017931, at *5. 5 Other courts in this district have awarded both statutory damages and conversion damages. See, 6 e.g., Segura, 2021 WL 3141191, at *6; Macias, 2021 WL 2037955, at *6. This Court finds it 7 appropriate to award conversion damages, particularly in light of the Court’s award of only 8 modest enhanced damages. 9 3. Attorneys’ Fees 10 Plaintiff asks for leave to file a motion for attorneys’ fees. Reasonable attorneys’ fees may 11 be awarded under to 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C). Plaintiff may file a properly supported request for 12 reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs within 14 days after issuance of this order. Any such motion 13 must be accompanied by an attorneys’ fees chart in compliance with this Court’s Standing Order 14 Re Civil Cases. 15 IV. ORDER 16 (1) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 17 PART, as follows: 18 (a) Plaintiff is GRANTED default judgment on Count II for violation of 47 19 U.S.C. § 553 in the amount of $4,000, comprising $1,000 in statutory 20 damages and $3,000 in enhanced damages. 21 (b) Plaintiff is GRANTED default judgment on Count III for conversion in the 22 amount of $1,000. 23 (2) Count I for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and Count IV for violation of Cal. Bus. & 24 Prof. Code § 17200 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 25 (3) A separate default judgment will be entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant in 26 the total amount of $5,000 plus an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be 27 determined by separate motion. ] (4) Plaintiff may file a properly supported motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees within 2 14 days of this order. Any such motion must be accompanied by an attorneys’ fees 3 chart in compliance with this Court’s Standing Order Re Civil Cases. 4 (5) This order terminates ECF 19. 5 6 || Dated: May 12, 2026

Beth Labson Freeman 8 United States District Judge 9 10 1] a 12

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