Ingram v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis Pension Plan

812 F.3d 628, 61 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2930, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1454, 2016 WL 362091
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 29, 2016
Docket14-3589
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 812 F.3d 628 (Ingram v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis Pension Plan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ingram v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis Pension Plan, 812 F.3d 628, 61 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2930, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1454, 2016 WL 362091 (8th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In 2006, Theodore Ingram was employed by Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”) and living in Los Angeles. On July 1, he was hired to be the Superintendent of Transportation of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (“Terminal”) and moved to St. Louis. Ingram elected to receive early retirement benefits from Union Pacific beginning January 1, 2010. When he retired from Terminal at the end of 2010, he became eligible for retirement benefits under Terminal’s Pension Plan for Nonschedule Employees (the “Plan”). In this action under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), Ingram alleges that the Plan erroneously determined his pension benefits by (i) excluding a 2006 sign-on bonus from pension-qualifying earnings and (ii) improperly inflating the offset for retirement benefits Ingram receives from Union Pacific. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan, concluding that the administrator’s decisions were reasonable. Ingram appeals. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm.

I. The ERISA Standard of Review.

We review de novo whether the district court applied the appropriate standard of review to the Plan administrator’s decision. Jobe v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 478, 480-81 (8th Cir.2010). Applying trust law principles, the Supreme Court held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-13, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), that the administrator’s interpretation of an ERISA plan is reviewed de novo unless the plan expressly grants discretionary authority to make benefit determinations. If the administrator has discretionary authority, the plan’s decision is subject to abuse-of-discretion *631 review. In this case, § 14.6 of Terminal’s Plan unquestionably granted discretion to interpret the Plan, providing that the administrator “shall perform its duties as the Plan Administrator in its sole discretion shall determine is appropriate.”

Ingram argues that we should nonetheless apply a less deferential de novo standard of review because “a palpable conflict of interest or a serious procedural irregularity existed, which ... caused a serious breach of the plan administrator’s fiduciary duty.” Anderson v. U.S. Bancorp, 484 F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court largely overruled our prior cases applying this principle in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). Again applying the law of trusts as adopted in Firestone and reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 cmt. d (Am. Law. Inst. 1959), the Court in Glenn affirmed a Sixth Circuit decision that considered an alleged conflict of interest and various alleged procedural regularities as factors to be weighed in determining whether a plan administrator with discretionary authority had abused that discretion. Id. at 116-19, 128 S.Ct. 2343. As the Court explained, “We do not believe that Firestone’s [reference to an administrator’s financial conflict of interest] implies a change in the standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review. Trust law continues to apply a deferential standard of review to the discretionary decisionmaking of a conflicted trustee, while at the same time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict when determining whether the trustee, substantively or procedurally, has abused his discretion.” 554 U.S. at 115, 128 S.Ct. 2343.

Here, none of the conflicts of interest and procedural irregularities alleged by Ingram “caused a serious breach of the plan administrator’s fiduciary duty” which warranted departure from the abuse-of-discretion standard of review under Glenn. Johnson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 775 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir.2014). The district court correctly reviewed the decision of the Plan administrator, Terminal CFO Kerry Paubel, for abuse of discretion. 2

II. The Sign-On Bonus Issue.

A. The Ruling at Issue. When Ingram retired, § 5.1(a) of the Plan provided that retirement benefits were calculated based on “1.5% ... of the Average Monthly Earnings of the Participant,” defined in § 2.6 as the average monthly earnings in the five consecutive calendar years in which Ingram’s earnings were the highest. Ingram worked at Terminal only fifty-four months, the 2006 part year and full years 20072010. Section 2.14 defined earnings as:

The total earnings paid during the applicable period by an Employer subject to income tax withholding as reported on Treasury Department Form W-2, excluding reimbursement of moving expenses, reimbursements or other expense allowances and fringe .benefits ....

The Plan gave retiring Participants benefit payment options. Ingram chose the Single Life Annuity monthly payment op *632 tion. Plan administrator Paubel determined that Ingram’s Average Monthly-Earnings for the fifty-four months were $15,357.60. This produced a Gross Pension of $9,214.56 per month, an Eligible Pension of $7,400.71 per month, and, after the offset discussed in Part III of this opinion, a Single Life Annuity benefit of $3,170.71 per month. Paubel rejected Ingram’s contention that his Average Monthly Earnings should include a July 2006 “Sign On Bonus” of $142,737.20 (“the July 2006 payment”), concluding that the Sign On Bonus was an excludable moving expense allowance. Including that amount in the calculation would apparently have increased Ingram’s Average Monthly Earnings by 17.2% and his Single Life Annuity monthly benefit by nearly 50%.

B. Procedural Background. When Ingram advised Paubel in July 2010 that he planned to retire at the end of the year, Paubel said that the July 2006 payment would not be included as earnings under Plan § 2.14 because it fell within the moving expenses exclusion. Ingram submitted a claim for benefits under the Plan, arguing that the Sign On Bonus should be included in calculating his pension annuity:

When I signed on to work for [Terminal] in 2006 I was provided with a Sign On bonus for the following reasons:
1. I took a cut in pay to take the job.
2. [Terminal] had no relocation or moving expense policy.

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812 F.3d 628, 61 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2930, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1454, 2016 WL 362091, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingram-v-terminal-railroad-assn-of-st-louis-pension-plan-ca8-2016.