Ingram-Robinson v. Department of Social Services

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 10, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-11072
StatusUnknown

This text of Ingram-Robinson v. Department of Social Services (Ingram-Robinson v. Department of Social Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ingram-Robinson v. Department of Social Services, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KAHARI SHA-MEL INGRAM-ROBINSON, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-11072 (CM) COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Westchester County; ORDER OF DISMISSAL WORKER ON CASE & SUPERVISOR; WORKER ON CASE & SUPERVISOR, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Kahari Sha-Mel Ingram-Robinson, a Westchester County resident, is proceeding pro se. He invokes the Court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and alleges that Defendants have denied him public assistance benefits. He sues the Westchester County Department of Social Services (“DSS”), the Commissioner of DSS, and two unidentified DSS emergency assistance workers. By order dated December 16, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint, which is not a model of clarity: Plaintiff Kahari Shamel Ingram-Robinson asserts his claims using the Court’s general complaint form. He checks the box to indicate he brings his claims under the Court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and, in the space to state which of his rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes that he has been in homeless shelters “totaling 150 days with no food, Medicaid and no cash assistance with autism and pending disability.”1 (ECF No. 2, at 2.) He further asserts that he was “discriminated against by DSS” and “denied transportation to places required by DSS.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a “Notice of Fair Hearing” addressed to him from the New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. (Id. at 8.) The document indicates that

Plaintiff had a hearing scheduled for November 14, 2019, and that the issues to be addressed at the hearing include a “failure to verify any factor relating to eligibility” for Medicaid and SNAP benefits, as well as a notation stating “whereabouts unknown.” (Id.) Plaintiff hand-wrote on the notice, “Need a fair hearing date when mom showed up was told I need to be there of POA papers. Need a date.” (Id.) He filed this complaint on November 26, 2019. Plaintiff seeks “Food Stamps for 4 months[,] Medicaid guaranteed[, and] public assistance” as well as $2000.00 in damages. (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants denied Plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). To state a § 1983 due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998); see Nnebe v. Daus, 644

1 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. The Court has edited Plaintiff’s capitalization for readability. F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted). Generally, due process requires some kind of hearing prior to a final deprivation of an individual’s liberty or property interest. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); DiBlasio v. Novello,

344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). “[W]here a plaintiff alleges a deprivation of property in violation of the due process clause, the federal court’s initial inquiry must be whether the state has provided adequate remedies to redress such unlawful acts. If so, there will be no claim before the federal court, whether or not plaintiff took advantage of the state procedure.” Vialez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Goldberg v. Kelly
397 U.S. 254 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Vialez v. New York City Housing Authority
783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. New York, 1991)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
M.K.B. v. Eggleston
445 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D. New York, 2006)
Diblasio v. Novello
344 F.3d 292 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Kapps v. Wing
404 F.3d 105 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Ingram-Robinson v. Department of Social Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingram-robinson-v-department-of-social-services-nysd-2020.