In the Matter of Mishra

Opinion

In the Matter of Anita Rani Mishra, No. 1068, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Woodward, J.

GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE AND RULES – LACK OF REQUIRED MEDICAL CERTIFICATES – CIRCUIT COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER AN ALLEGED DISABLED PERSON TO SUBMIT TO AN EXAMINATION OR EVALUATION AGAINST THEIR WISHES

GUARDIANSHIP – DISCOVERY – RULE 2-423 – ALLEGED DISABLED PERSON (“ADP”) NOT A “PARTY” WHERE NO SHOW CAUSE ORDER WAS SERVED ON ADP AND ADP DID NOT FILE AN ANSWER TO THE PETITION – CIRCUIT COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER ADP TO SUBMIT TO MENTAL OR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION UNDER RULE 2-423 WHEN ADP IS NOT A “PARTY”

In a guardianship action, Brother sought guardianship of the person of his Sister. Sister, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, was experiencing paranoid delusions, which caused her to refuse to eat, to take her medication, and to render proper personal care. She also neglected her finances and property, leading to a scheduled tax sale of her home. When Brother filed his petition for guardianship, he filed two medical certificates required by Estates and Trusts Article (“E&T”) § 13-705(c)(2) and Maryland Rule 10-202(a). One of the certificates, however, was not signed by a health care professional specified in E&T § 13-705(c)(2) or Rule 10-202(a). As a result, the trial court did not issue a show cause order under Rule 10-104. Brother filed a motion for a mental examination of appellee pursuant to Rules 10-202 and 2-423 in order to obtain a correct medical certificate. Sister, through court appointed counsel, opposed the motion, asserting that she was exercising her right to refuse medical examination and treatment. The trial court ultimately denied Brother’s motion and then granted Sister’s motion to dismiss Brother’s petition. Brother noted a timely appeal. Held: Affirmed. The Appellate Court first held that there is no language in the guardianship statute or rules authorizing the trial court to order an examination of an alleged disabled person (“ADP”) against their wishes, nor is there any language allowing a medical certificate that is signed by someone other than the health care professionals identified in E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a). Second, after tracing the history of guardianship law back to feudal times, the Appellate Court determined that the “equitable powers” accorded to the Court of Chancery in England and the courts of equity in the several states after the American Revolution did not extend to the adjudication of an individual as “non compos mentis;” rather, “equitable powers” were available to the court for the administration of a guardianship after the adjudication of incompetency or disability. Last, the Appellate Court held that Rule 2-423, which authorizes a trial court to order a mental or physical examination of a party, does not apply to this case because Sister was not a party to the proceeding. The trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Sister because the show cause order was never issued, and thus never served on her, and Sister never voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by filing an answer.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: C-15-FM-24-000290 REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1068

September Term, 2024

______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF ANITA RANI MISHRA

______________________________________

Graeff,

Arthur,

Woodward, Patrick L.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Woodward, J.

______________________________________

Filed: August 27, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.08.27

14:29:56 -04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

Appellant, Gyan Sagar Mishra, is the brother of appellee, Anita Rani Mishra. On January 12, 2024, appellant filed an Emergency Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Temporary Guardian of Person and Property of Anita Rani Mishra and a Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Permanent Guardian of Person and Property of Anita Rani Mishra (collectively, the “Petitions”) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Attached to the Petitions were two medical certificates evaluating appellee’s mental health, one by a licensed physician and the other by a licensed clinical professional counselor (“LCPC”). On January 22, 2024, the court issued a “Non-Compliance Notice” regarding the medical certificates. The court deemed the medical certificate signed by the LCPC insufficient under Maryland Rule 10-202(a). On February 28, 2024, appellant filed a motion for a mental examination of appellee pursuant to Rules 10-202 and 2-423 in order to obtain the correct medical certificate. On April 1, 2024, appellee, through court-appointed counsel, filed an opposition to the motion for a mental examination and a motion to dismiss the Petitions for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 2- 322(b)(2). The court denied appellant’s motion for a mental examination of appellee on April 16, 2024, and on April 24, 2024, appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Entered April 16, 2024. The court denied appellant’s motion to alter or amend by Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated June 26, 2024, and then granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the Petitions by Order dated June 28, 2024. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents two questions for our review, which as stated in his brief, are as follows:

1. Did the trial court err by dismissing the Emergency Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Temporary Guardian of Person and Property of [Appellee] and the Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Permanent Guardian of Person and Property of [Appellee]?

2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant]’s Motion to Alter or Amend Order Entered April 16, 2024 (Request for Hearing)?

BACKGROUND

The following facts, which are set forth in appellant’s Petitions and motion for a mental examination of appellee, are not in dispute for the purposes of this appeal.

At the time of the filing of the Petitions, appellee was a 55-year-old woman who resided alone in Germantown, Maryland. She was divorced and had one minor child, for whom her ex-husband had sole legal and physical custody. Appellee’s living relatives were her mother, two sisters, and a brother (who is appellant). Although appellee has a master’s degree and worked for eighteen years in a high-level position with a federal government contractor, she lost her job several years ago and has remained unemployed.

During 2023 appellee suffered a dramatic decline in her mental health. On or about December 17, 2023, appellee was involuntarily hospitalized at Brook Lane in Hagerstown, Maryland, for inpatient psychiatric care. At the time of her commitment, appellee was experiencing paranoid delusions, which caused her to refuse to eat, to take her medication, and to render proper personal care. Appellee was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Appellee was released from involuntary commitment at Brook Lane on December 27, 2023. Appellee refused to remain at Brook Lane voluntarily and returned home that day.

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Following appellee’s discharge from Brook Lane, appellant visited appellee at her home on multiple occasions. Because appellee did not have a phone or email address, appellant could communicate with her only through in-person visits at appellee’s home. But appellee would only open the door if appellant used an agreed upon knock. During those visits, appellant observed that appellee wore the same clothes, refused to turn on the main lights (instead using a few plug-in lights), used only paper plates and plastic utensils, and did not appear to be taking her prescribed medication.

Appellant also became aware that appellee had been neglecting her finances and property. For example, on April 19, 2023, a judgment was entered against appellee for $58,827.22 in unpaid income taxes for the 2018 and 2019 tax years. Appellee failed to pay her real property taxes for the year 2023, and her home was scheduled for a tax sale on June 10, 2024. Appellee also lost her car when it was towed to an impound lot in the District of Columbia and appellee took no action to recover it. Appellee did not check her mail or pay her utility bills, leading to termination notices. When appellant asked appellee about these debts, appellee stated that she had paid them but provided no proof. As of February 2024, appellee no longer allowed appellant to enter her home and only communicated with appellant through a window of her home.

On January 12, 2024, appellant filed the Petitions in the circuit court and attached two medical certificates evaluating appellee’s mental health, one by a physician and the other by a LCPC. The evaluations took place while appellee was involuntarily hospitalized at Brook Lane. On January 22, 2024, the court issued a “Non-Compliance Notice” with respect to the medical certificates. The court deemed the medical certificate signed by the

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LCPC to be insufficient under Maryland Rule 10-202(a)(1) because it was not signed by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, licensed certified social worker-clinical, or nurse practitioner. Because the Petitions lacked the two requisite medical certificates, the court did not issue a show cause order, and thus appellee was not served with a show cause order, the Petitions, or the Advice of Rights form under Rules 10-104 and 10-203(a).

On February 21, 2024, appellant filed a motion for a mental examination of appellee pursuant to Rules 10-202 and 2-423 in order to obtain a correct medical certificate. By order dated February 26, 2024, the circuit court appointed counsel for appellee pursuant to Rule 10-106(a)(2). Because of a deficiency in the filing of the motion for a mental examination, appellant refiled such motion on February 28, 2024. On April 1, 2024, appellee, through court-appointed counsel, filed an opposition to appellant’s motion for a mental examination on the ground, among others, that she was “exercis[ing] her right to refuse medical examination and treatment.” Appellee also filed, through counsel, a motion to dismiss the Petitions for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 2-322(b)(2). On April 15, 2024, appellant responded by filing a reply to appellee’s opposition to the motion for a mental examination and an opposition to appellee’s motion to dismiss. No answers to the Petitions were ever filed by or on behalf of appellee.

On April 16, 2024, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion for a mental examination of appellee. On April 24, 2024, appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Entered April 16, 2024. Appellee filed an opposition to the motion to alter or amend, to which appellant filed a reply. By Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated June 26, 2024, the court denied appellant’s motion, stating:

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Maryland Rule 10-202(a)(1) requires that two valid certificates be filed with a petition seeking guardianship of the person of a disabled person.

Rule 10-202(a)(3) addresses the absence of certificates and Rule 10-

202(a)(3)(A) and 10-202(a)(3)(B) provide a procedure to be followed if the requisite certificates are not filed AND the petition alleges that the disabled person is living with or under the control of someone who has refused to permit examination or evaluation. In such an instance, the [c]ourt is directed to issue an order directing the person allegedly refusing the evaluation to appear and show cause why the alleged disabled person should not be examined or evaluated (10-202(a)(3)(A)). A hearing on the issue is to be conducted and if the court finds that examinations are necessary, the court is to appoint appropriate professionals to conduct examinations or evaluations.

The Rule does not authorize entry of an order compelling an examination or evaluation over the objection of the alleged disabled person himself. In the instant matter, the Petitioner does not allege that the Respondent is living with or under the control of another and the Respondent, through counsel, objects to submitting to an evaluation.

Maryland Rule 2-423 is a discovery rule providing in pertinent part that when the mental condition of a party is in controversy, and for good cause shown, the court may order the party to submit to an examination. In the instant matter, the mental condition of the Respondent is not yet at issue as the Petitioner has not met the filing requirements necessary for the action to proceed and a motion to dismiss has been filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2). Application of this discovery rule at this stage of the proceedings would circumvent the express language of Estates and Trusts 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202[(a)](1) and render pointless the requirements set forth therein.

(Emphasis added).

By Order dated June 28, 2024, and entered July 1, 2024, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the Petitions. Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court.

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DISCUSSION

I. Did the Trial Court Err by Dismissing the Emergency Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Temporary Guardian of Person and Property of [Appellee] and the Verified Petition for the Appointment of a Permanent Guardian of Person and Property of [Appellee]?

A. Standard of Review The decision to grant a motion to dismiss is a legal question, and therefore we review the decision without deference to the trial court. Grueff v. Vito, 229 Md. App. 353, 376 (2016). “The grant of a motion to dismiss is proper if the complaint does not disclose, on its face, a legally sufficient cause of action.” McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 597 (2005) (citation omitted).

B. Statutory Scheme for Guardianship Proceedings in Maryland Guardianship proceedings in Maryland are governed by Title 13 of the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Annotated Code and by Title 10 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure. See Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts Article (“E&T”) §§ 13-101, et seq. (1974, Repl. Vol. 2022); Md. Rules 10-101, et seq. (Repl. Vol. 2026). Title 13 of the Estates and Trust Article and Title 10 of the Rules divide proceedings for the appointment of a guardian into two separate and distinct components—guardianship of the person and guardianship of the property. See E&T §§ 13-701, et seq. and Md. Rules 10-201, et seq. (person); E&T §§ 13-201, et seq. and Md. Rules 10-301, et seq. (property). The general provisions set forth in E&T §§ 13-101 to 13-107 and Rules 10-101 to 10-113 apply to both guardianships of the person and property. Although the Petitions in the instant case sought guardianship of both person and property of appellee, the issues raised on appeal relate

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only to the guardianship of appellee’s person. Accordingly, we will focus our analysis on those provisions of the statute and rules governing guardianship of the person.

E&T § 13-705, entitled “Appointment of guardian of disabled person,” sets forth the following relevant provisions:

(a) On petition and after any notice or hearing prescribed by law or the Maryland Rules, a court may appoint a guardian of the person of a disabled person.

(b) A guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines from clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) A person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible personal decisions, including provisions for health care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental disability, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs; and

(2) No less restrictive form of intervention is available that is consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.

(c)(1) Procedures and venue in these cases shall be as described by Title 10, Chapters 100 and 200 of the Maryland Rules.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a petition for guardianship of a disabled person shall include signed and verified certificates of competency from the following health care professionals who have examined or evaluated the disabled person:

(i) Two licensed physicians; or (ii) 1. One licensed physician; and 2. A. One licensed psychologist;

B. One licensed certified social worker-clinical; or C. One nurse practitioner.[1]

1 By 2026 Maryland Laws Ch. 222 (S.B. 326), the General Assembly amended E&T §13-705(c)(2)(ii)2 by adding to the categories of health care professionals who can sign and verify certificates of competency a “licensed physician assistant.” S.B. 326, 2026 Leg., 449th Sess. (Md. 2026). Such amendment is effective October 1, 2026.

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(3) An examination or evaluation by at least one of the health care professionals under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall occur within 21 days before filing a petition for guardianship of a disabled person.

In accordance with E&T § 13-705(c)(2), Rule 10-202(a)(1) reiterates the requirements that in a proceeding for guardianship of the person, “the petitioner shall file with the petition signed and verified certificates” by two of the same persons specified in E&T § 13-705(c)(2)2 “who have examined or evaluated the alleged disabled person,” and the “examination or evaluation by at least one of the health care professionals shall have been within 21 days before the filing of the petition.”

Rule 10-104 then directs that “upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue a show cause order directing persons on whom it is served to show cause in writing on or before a specified date why the court should not take the action described in the order.” Rule 10-104 also requires that a “copy of any related petition or document” shall be served with a copy of the show cause order. Rule 10-203(a) follows up with the requirement that “[t]he petitioner shall serve a show cause order issued pursuant to Rule 10-104 on the . . . alleged disabled person” and on other persons specified therein, “accompanied by an ‘Advice of Rights’ [for the alleged disabled person] in the form set forth in Rule 10-204.”3

2 Rule 10-202(a)(1) will be amended at some time in the future to include a “licensed physician assistant” in order to be in conformity with E&T § 13-705(c)(2)(ii)2. See supra note 1.

3 Under Rule 10-205(b), if the petition is for guardianship of the person of an alleged disabled person, the trial court is directed to set the matter for a jury trial, unless the alleged disabled person, or their attorney, waives a jury trial. Rule 10-205(b), however, “clearly contemplates that a hearing will be held and evidence taken on the issue of competency even if it amounts to only the admission of the doctors’ certificates.” In re Sonny Lee, 132

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From the above provisions of the statute and rules, it is clear that before a show cause order can be issued by the circuit court and served on the alleged disabled person, the petitioner must file with the petition for guardianship of the person two “signed and verified certificates of competency” by certain specified health care professionals “who have examined or evaluated the alleged disabled person,” at least one of which certificate shall be for an examination or evaluation within 21 days before the filing of the petition (“valid medical certificates”). See E&T § 13-705(c)(2) (first quotation); Md. Rule 10- 202(a)(1) (second quotation); Md. Rule 10-104. In other words, without two valid medical certificates filed with the petition for guardianship of the person, the trial court cannot issue a show cause order, and the alleged disabled person cannot be required to file a written response to such order.

Rule 10-202(a)(3), however, addresses a particular situation where “the petition is not accompanied by the required certificate.” Rule 10-202(a)(3) reads in its entirety:

(3) Absence of Certificates.

(A) Refusal to Permit Examination. - If the petition is not accompanied by the required certificate and the petition alleges that the alleged disabled person is residing with or under the control of a person who has refused to permit examination or evaluation by a physician, psychologist, licensed certified social worker-clinical, or nurse practitioner, and that the alleged disabled person may be at risk unless a guardian is appointed, the court shall defer issuance of a show cause order. The court shall instead issue an order requiring that the person who has refused to permit the alleged disabled person to be examined or evaluated appear personally on a date specified in the order and show cause why the alleged disabled

Md. App. 696, 712-13 (2000) (interpreting similar language in Rule 10-205(b)(1), which is the predecessor to Rule 10-205(b)). In other words, “the issue of competency cannot be waived, either by failing to file the appropriate objection or otherwise, and a hearing must be held on that issue.” Id. at 715.

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person should not be examined or evaluated. The order shall be personally served on that person and on the alleged disabled person.

(B) Appointment of Health Care Professionals by Court. - If the court finds after a hearing that examinations are necessary, it shall appoint (i)

two physicians or (ii) one physician and one psychologist, licensed certified social worker-clinical, or nurse practitioner to conduct the examinations or the examination and evaluation and file their reports with the court. If both health care professionals find the person to be disabled, the court shall issue a show cause order requiring the alleged disabled person to answer the petition for guardianship and shall require the petitioner to give notice pursuant to Rule 10-203. Otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed.

Rule 10-202(a)(3) does not provide an “exception” to the statutory and rule requirement of filing two valid medical certificates with the petition. Rather, Rule 10- 202(a)(3) authorizes a deferral of the issuance of a show cause order under Rule 10-104 when the petition lacks two valid medical certificates and “alleges that the alleged disabled person is residing with or under the control of a person who has refused to permit examination or evaluation[.]” Md. Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A). In that event, the court shall issue an order requiring such person to show cause why the alleged disabled person should not be examined or evaluated. Id. Only if, after a hearing, the court finds that an examination or examinations are necessary will the alleged disabled person be examined or evaluated, and if found disabled, the show cause order under Rule 10-104 shall be issued and service thereof shall be effected by the petitioner under Rule 10-203. Md. Rule 10-202(a)(3)(B). Rule 10-202(a)(3) is the only rule that permits the deferral of the issuance of the show cause order under Rule 10-104 when two valid medical certificates are not filed with the petition for guardianship of the person. And, if two valid medical certificates showing the

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alleged disabled person to be disabled are not produced in accordance with the procedure set forth in Rule 10-202(a)(3), “the petition shall be dismissed.” Rule 10-202(a)(3)(B).

C. Arguments of the Parties Appellant argues that “[t]he trial court erred when it did not issue a Show Cause Order and hold a Show Cause Hearing compelling [a]ppellee to appear and show cause on why she should not be examined or evaluated pursuant to Md. Rule 10-202.” Appellant points to Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A) as an “exception” to the statutory and rule requirement that a petition be filed with two valid medical certificates where “the petition alleges that the [alleged] disabled person is residing with or under the control of a person who has refused to permit examination or evaluation[.]”4 In such event, according to appellant, Rule 10- 202(a)(3)(A) directs the court to issue a show cause order “requiring that the person who has refused to permit the [alleged] disabled person to be examined or evaluated appear personally . . . and show cause why the [alleged] disabled person should not be examined or evaluated.”5 Conceding that appellee “does not reside with a person who is objecting to her examination as stipulated in the Rule,” appellant, nevertheless, contends that because the “court is permitted to compel an objecting third party to show cause, then such authority

4 A 2025 amendment to Rule 10-202(a) substituted “alleged disabled person” for “disabled person” wherever it appears in subsection (a). Rule 10-202 Committee Note (2026). Rule 10-202 (Repl. Vol. 2026) (Effect of amendments).

5 See supra note 4.

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should be extended when, as is the case here, the alleged disabled person refuses to be examined.”6 Appellant also argues that allowing the circuit court to issue a show cause order only when the alleged disabled person is residing with an objecting third person disregards the intent of the Rule, which is to protect alleged disabled persons. Citing for support to Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 118 (1979), appellant states that “the court’s role in guardianship cases [is] to ‘protect those who, because of illness or other disability, are unable to care for themselves.’” Appellant concludes that a narrow interpretation of Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A) will undermine the intent of the Maryland Rules and guardianship statute.

Appellant next argues that the medical certificates filed with the Petitions substantially complied with the intended purpose of Title 13 of the Estates and Trusts Article, and thus should have been accepted by the trial court. According to appellant, the circuit court has “equitable authority” in guardianship matters to protect the person and property of alleged disabled persons. Appellant cites for support to E&T § 13-704(a), which states that a court may “(1) [s]uperintend and direct the care of a disabled person; (2) [a]ppoint a guardian of the person; and (3) [p]ass orders and decrees respecting the person

6 Appellant claims that his argument is supported by Matter of Jacobson, 256 Md.

App. 369, 388 n.4 (2022), which states that “[w]hen such certificates are not provided because the petitioner has been unable to access or examine the ward, then a show cause proceeding is held.” Appellee responds that in Jacobson there was a third person who had complete control of the medical treatment, health, and wealth of the alleged disabled person. Although a show cause hearing was held in Jacobson under Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A), it is unclear from the opinion the reason for such hearing. More importantly, no issue was raised by either party, either in the trial court or on appeal, regarding the propriety of the show cause order or hearing under Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A). Accordingly, Jacobson does not provide authority for appellant’s argument.

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as seems proper, including an order directing the disabled person to be sent to a hospital.” Appellant also cites to E&T § 13-102(b), which states that “[t]his article shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,” and argues that “[g]iven the liberal construction afforded to the provisions of the Estates and Trusts Article, the trial court should have accepted the certificates submitted by [a]ppellant.” Appellant claims that “[t]his is not a case in which [a]ppellant failed to submit any certificates[;]” the deficient certificate was completed “by a licensed clinical mental health professional employed at a psychiatric hospital[.]” Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by dismissing his Petitions based on one deficient certificate.

Appellee, on the other hand, argues that Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A) provides no avenue for the circuit court to compel the examination of alleged disabled persons when they are not residing with or under the control of a third person preventing an examination or evaluation. Appellee distinguishes Kicherer by asserting that in Kicherer, the alleged disabled person had already been adjudicated to be in need of a guardianship and the dispute was between co-guardians who already had been appointed by the court. Appellee concludes that the circuit court becomes the ultimate guardian only after it has been determined that the alleged disabled person needs a guardian.

Appellee next argues that although E&T § 13-102(b) does allow a court to interpret the article “liberally,” E&T § 13-705(c)(2) is unambiguous and thus there is nothing for the court to interpret. Appellee asserts that because “the statute contains no grant of authority for a court to admit certificates from other experts at its discretion,” the trial court correctly determined that the Rules do not allow a LCPC to complete a certificate.

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Appellee also contends that the circuit court’s equitable authority does not apply to this case because the court had not ruled that appellee was disabled. According to appellee, E&T § 13-704 allows the court to exercise authority for the care of a “disabled person,” not an “alleged” disabled person. Appellee asserts that she had not been determined to be a “disabled person,” and thus E&T § 13-704 could not apply. Appellee concludes that because the trial court lacked the authority to issue the show cause order requested by appellant under “the clear language of the Rule,” the court correctly dismissed the Petitions.

In his Reply Brief, appellant asserts that the fact that Kicherer was an appeal from a guardianship appointment whereas the instant case never reached that stage is factually irrelevant. Appellant, citing to Kicherer, states “‘that a court of equity assumes jurisdiction in guardianship matters.’” 285 Md. at 118. Therefore, appellant argues, the court sitting in a guardianship matter has equitable authority whether it is in the pre- or post-appointment stage. Appellant also responds that the liberal construction granted to the trial court by E&T § 13-102(b) applies to the entire Estates and Trusts Article, including the provisions concerning an alleged disabled person and petitioners seeking a guardianship. Appellant contends that he cited E&T § 13-704 as an example of the trial court’s equitable authority, not to avail himself of its protections. Appellant concludes that the trial court has the authority to accept medical certificates or to compel appellee to undergo an examination.

D. Analysis (1) Circuit Court’s Authority under the Statute and the Rules Distilled to its essence, appellant’s first argument claims that (1) the language of Rule 10-202(a)(3) authorizes the trial court to issue an order directing an alleged disabled

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person to show cause why they should not be examined or evaluated by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, licensed certified social worker-clinical, or nurse practitioner when the alleged disabled person has refused to undergo such examination or evaluation; and (2) the language of E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) authorizes the trial court to accept a signed and verified certificate by a LCPC as substantially complying with one of the two required valid medical certificates. To determine whether appellant’s argument is legally sound, we must engage in a statutory construction analysis of E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1), (3).

In the recent case of In re K.K., this Court summarized the principles of statutory construction, as follows:

The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language. Thus, all statutory interpretation starts with the text, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. We do not read the text in isolation, however, instead viewing it within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs.

Our review is holistic, seeking to give effect to all of what the General Assembly included and not to add anything that the General Assembly omitted. In other words, we take the statutory language as we find it, neither adding to nor deleting from it; we avoid forced or subtle interpretations; and we avoid constructions that would negate portions of the language or render them meaningless. Presuming the General Assembly intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, we also seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.

The first step of our analysis is determining whether the statute is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Even when words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, they may become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory

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scheme. Generally, if the text is plain and unambiguous, our analysis ends, and we apply the statute as written.

On the other hand, if the statute is ambiguous, we seek to resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. Such sources include the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it.

266 Md. App. 161, 180-82 (2025) (cleaned up).

Regarding the Maryland Rules, “[t]he canons of rule construction and interpretation are well settled and frequently stated. ‘To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of construction used to interpret statutes.’” State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194, 206 (2006) (quoting State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274 (1993)). Our search for the meaning of a rule “must start with and, if the words are clear and unambiguous, end with, the words of the rule.” State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 24 (1994). “We are also to give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.” Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75.

(a) Rule 10-202(a)(3) - Deferred Issuance of Show Cause Order Rule 10-202(a)(3) is clear and unambiguous. Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A) directs the circuit court to defer the issuance of a show cause order under Rule 10-104 only when the petition lacks two valid medical certificates and “alleges that the alleged disabled person is residing with or under the control of a person who has refused to permit examination or evaluation” by specified health care professionals. There is no language in Rule 10- 202(a)(3)(A) that authorizes the court to defer the issuance of the required show cause order

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when the alleged disabled person is not residing with or under the control of a third person and it is the alleged disabled person who refuses to undergo the examination or evaluation. For the court to have such authority, we would have to add language to Rule 10- 202(a)(3)(A) through statutory construction. If we did so, we would violate the basic canon of statutory construction that prohibits “adding [or] deleting [] words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.” Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75.

Further, there is no language in Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A) authorizing the trial court to issue an order requiring that the alleged disabled person “appear personally on a date specified in the order and show cause why the alleged disabled person should not be examined or evaluated.” Again, to grant such authority we would have to add language to Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A), thus violating the above-mentioned canon of statutory construction.

Finally, even if we went beyond the plain language of Rule 10-202(a)(3) and considered the history of the rule, we would reach the same result. See In re K.K., 266 Md. App. at 181 (stating that “if the statute is ambiguous, we seek to resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.” (citation omitted)). Subsection (a)(3) of Rule 10-202 first appeared in the Maryland Rules in 1997 as Rule 10- 202(b). See Rule 10-202(b) (Repl. Vol. 1997). The language of then Rule 10-202(b) is virtually identical to the current Rule 10-202(a)(3). The Reporter’s Note for Rule 10- 202(b), prepared by the Supreme Court of Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, states:

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Section (b) is new and was added because of problems that have been encountered in accomplishing the examination of disabled persons. The Committee provided for court intervention when individuals obstruct the guardianship process by preventing medical examinations of the disabled person from taking place. Compare Rule 2-423.

It is clear from the history of Rule 10-202 that the purpose of subsection (a)(3) is to permit the court to intervene “when individuals obstruct the guardianship process by preventing medical examinations of the disabled person from taking place.” Id. Therefore, this Court concludes that Rule 10-202(a)(3) does not authorize the circuit court to issue an order requiring appellee to appear and show cause why she should not be required to submit to an examination or evaluation.

(b) E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) - the Medical Certificates Regarding the persons who are authorized to sign and verify the certificates that must be filed with the petition, E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) are clear and unambiguous. Section 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) both require the certificates to be signed and verified by the following health care professionals who have examined or evaluated the alleged disabled person: (1) two licensed physicians,7 or (2) one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist, licensed certified social worker-clinical, or nurse practitioner.8 A LCPC is not listed among the health care professionals that are authorized to sign and verify certificates under E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1). Nor is there any language in the statute or rule that would indicate a legislative intent to include,

Rule 10-202(a)(1) adds the requirement that the physicians be “licensed to practice 7

medicine in the United States.”

8 See supra note 1.

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as authorized certificate signers, health care professionals with similar or related education, training, or experience to the listed health care professionals. As with of Rule 10-202(a)(3), we would have to add language to E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) to provide that a valid medical certificate include a certificate signed and verified by a LCPC. Thus the plain language of E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) demonstrates an intent to limit the health care professionals authorized to sign and verify a certificate filed with a petition to those persons listed in the statute and rule.

Even if the language of E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1) is deemed to be ambiguous, a review of the history of the statute and rule leads us to the same result. The first appearance of the certificate requirement in the statute occurred in 1999 when the General Assembly enacted House Bill 290 as Chapter 618 of the 1999 Laws of Maryland. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 618, E&T § 13-705(c) provided simply that “[p]rocedures and venue in [guardianship of the person] cases shall be as described by Title 10, chapters 100 and 200 of the Maryland Rules.” E&T § 13-705(c) (1998). Rule 10-202(a) at that time required, among other things, that the petitioner file with the petition certificates of two physicians licensed to practice medicine in the United States. The purpose of House Bill 290, as stated in the Bill Analysis prepared by the Department of Legislative Services, was to

broaden[] who may provide a certificate of competency by allowing the required certificates to come from either two licensed physicians or one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist.

H.B. 290, 1999 Leg., 413th Sess. (Md. 1999) (emphasis in original).

The General Assembly continued to expand the list of health care professionals

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authorized to sign and verify certificates by adding “licensed certified social worker- clinical” in 2007 (H.B. 672, 2007 Leg., 423rd Sess.), “nurse practitioner” in 2020 (S.B. 576 § 1, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess.), and “physician’s assistant” in 2026 (S.B. 326, 2026 Leg., 449th Sess., (effective Oct. 1, 2026)). The Supreme Court of Maryland followed the legislature’s lead by amending Rule 10-202(a) to include a “psychologist” in 1999, “certified clinical social worker” in 2008 (to be replaced by “licensed certified social worker-clinical” in 2017)), and “nurse practitioner” in 2021. Rule 10-202 (Repl. Vol. 2026) (Effect of amendments).

In sum, beginning in 1999, the General Assembly, followed by our Supreme Court, has expanded the list of health care professionals who are authorized to sign and verify the medical certificates by designating specific categories of such professionals, one at a time. This process evinces an intent to limit the signers of certificates to specifically identified categories of health care professionals. Because a LCPC is not included as one of those categories, this Court concludes that a medical certificate signed and verified by a LCPC is not a valid medical certificate under E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10-202(a)(1).

(2) The Circuit Court’s “Equitable” Powers Maryland’s guardianship law has its origin in the parens patriae authority of the King of England under feudal English Law. Joan L. O’Sullivan and Diane E. Hoffmann, THE GUARDIANSHIP PUZZLE: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO DUE PROCESS?, 7 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 11, 13 (Fall/Winter 1995-96) [hereinafter O’Sullivan and Hoffmann, The Guardianship Puzzle]. “Under that doctrine, the king was literally the ‘parent of the country,’ and had a fiduciary duty to protect the property of his subjects who were non

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compos mentis.” Id. The Supreme Court of Maryland discussed in detail one aspect of this origin in Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 29-30 (1893), as follows:

Lunacy or mental unsoundness[9] did not give the English Court of Chancery jurisdiction over the person or estate of a lunatic[10] until after an inquisition of a jury, adjudging the person to be a non compos mentis had been regularly found. The authority directing the inquisition to be taken did not pertain to that court, but was derived by delegation from the crown—it was a portion of the King’s executive power as parens patriae[11] and did not belong to the Court of Chancery by virtue of its inherent and general judicial functions. This branch of the regal authority was delegated to the Chancellor, as the personal representative of the crown, by means of an official instrument called the “sign manual,” signed by the King’s own signature, and sealed with his own privy seal, and was exercised by the Chancellor alone, and not by the Court of Chancery.

The Chancellor would exercise this “regal authority” by issuing a “writ de lunatico inquirendo;”12 a jury of twelve men would inquire into the matter; and if the individual was found to be non compos mentis,13 the person and property of such person were committed

9 In the past, judicial opinions and statutes have used terms to identify individuals with disabilities that, by modern standards, are pejorative and hurtful. We use those terms only as necessary to accurately reflect the law at that time. We mean no disrespect.

10 “The law differentiated between idiots, those who were incompetent from birth, and lunatics, those who had lost their reason. A lunatic was defined as one who has had understanding, but by disease, grief, or accident, has lost the use of his reason. A lunatic may have lucid intervals and might be expected to recover his reason.” O’Sullivan and Hoffmann, The Guardianship Puzzle, at 14 (footnotes omitted).

11 “Patriae” was misspelled in the opinion as “patrice.”

12 The Chancellor would issue such writ in a case involving a “lunatic.” For a case involving an “idiot,” the Chancellor would issue a writ de idiota inquirendo. See O’Sullivan and Hoffmann, The Guardianship Puzzle, at 14; see supra note 10.

13 In Greenwade v. Greenwade, 43 Md. 313, 315 (1875), the Supreme Court of Maryland stated that “[t]he terms non compos mentis used by the Code, embraces not only lunatics and idiots, but all persons of unsound mind.”

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to the care of a committee. O’Sullivan and Hoffmann, The Guardianship Puzzle, at 14. And “by adjudging an individual to be a lunatic, and by appointing a committee of his person and property, a further jurisdiction then arose in the Court of Chancery to supervise and control the official conduct of the committee.” Hamilton, 78 Md. at 30-31.

After the American Revolution, the courts of equity of the various states were vested with jurisdiction over the person and property of those individuals found to be non compos mentis, either by inheritance from the English court of chancery or by express constitutional or statutory provisions. Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 70-71 (1918). In Maryland, the Act of 1785, Ch. 72 § 6, and its progeny, conferred on courts of equity general jurisdiction with respect to persons non compos mentis, but did not prescribe the method by which the incapacity was to be ascertained. In re Bristor’s Estate, 115 Md. 614, 619 (1911). As a result, our Supreme Court noted that “[t]he course of procedure leading up to an adjudication of mental unsoundness remains as it existed, independently of statute, under the English practice[.]” Id. The English practice in Maryland took the form of the Chancellor of a court of equity, upon an affidavit or sworn petition, issuing a writ de lunatico inquirendo to the Sheriff of the county or Baltimore City to impanel a jury to inquire into the competency of the subject individual. See id.; Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612, 614 (1944). In Purdum, the Supreme Court concluded that the jurisdiction of equity under the Maryland Code “depends upon the party being non compos mentis and that the adjudication must be based upon the finding of a sheriff’s jury under a writ [] de lunatico inquirendo.” Id. at 617-18. Such “jurisdiction cannot be assumed until there has been an adjudication of incompetency by a sheriff’s jury.” Id. at 618. The writ de lunatico

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inquirendo and the Sheriff’s jury have been abolished in Maryland, to be replaced by E&T §§ 13-101(f) & 13-705 and Rules 10-103 to 10-104 & 10-201 to 10-205. See Rule R73 Committee Note (1961) (“writ de lunatico inquirendo under that name is abolished”); Md. Code Ann., Art. 16 § 124A (1947 Supp.) (Sheriff’s jury abolished).

The above history shows that a guardianship proceeding involved two sequential stages—adjudication and administration. The adjudication of a person’s competency derived its authority from the King, and not from the court of chancery, and required a determination by a jury. See Hamilton, 78 Md. at 30-31. Our Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of the consequences of such adjudication in Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, 104 Md. 472, 479 (1906). The Court said:

It is difficult to overestimate the gravity and seriousness of the consequences to the citizen which necessarily flow from an adjudication declaring him to be non compos mentis. He is divested of his property, and may be restrained of his liberty and incarcerated in an insane asylum. To assert that this can be done, under the general principles of American law, without notice, or opportunity to be heard, is shocking to one’s sense of justice and humanity.

No such general rule of procedure can be recognized by the American courts.

By contrast, the administration of the person and property of a person adjudged to be non compos mentis was committed to the English court of chancery, Hamilton, 78 Md. at 30, and thereafter to the courts of equity of the various states. Bliss, 133 Md. at 70. But, as stated above, the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of equity had to await the adjudication of incompetency.

The history of guardianship law in Maryland thus establishes that the circuit court does not have any equitable authority when conducting the adjudication of competency of an alleged disabled person under a petition for guardianship of a person. The equitable

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powers accorded to the court by inheritance from the English court of chancery or by express statutory provision arise only after the alleged disabled person has been determined to be a disabled person under E&T §§ 13-101(f)(2) & 13-705 and Rules 10-103 to 10-104 & 10-201 to 10-205. These statutory and rules provisions set forth the procedure to be used by a court to adjudicate the competency of an alleged disabled person. Therefore, this Court holds that the authority of the circuit court to adjudicate whether an alleged disabled person is a disabled person in a guardianship of the person proceeding is the language of E&T §§ 13-101(f)(2) & 13-705 and Rules 10-103 to 10-104 & 10-201 to 10-205, nothing more- nothing less.

Nevertheless, in support of his argument that the circuit court has the equitable authority under the statute and rules to order appellee to undergo an examination or evaluation against her own wishes, appellant cites to Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114 (1979) and to E&T §§ 13-102(b) and 13-704. We disagree.

Appellant asserts that in Kicherer, “the Supreme Court of Maryland emphasized the importance of the court’s role in guardianship cases to ‘protect those who, because of illness or other disability, are unable to care for themselves.’” 285 Md. at 118. Thus, according to appellant, “[i]f a court is permitted to compel an objecting third party to show cause [under Rule 10-202(a)(3)(A)], then such authority should be extended when, as is the case here, the alleged disabled person refuses to be examined.” As appellee correctly points out, however, Kicherer “arose after the Respondent had been adjudicated in need of guardianship, the dispute being between two already-appointed guardians as to the propriety of the other’s appointment.” As we have seen, the circuit court does not have

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equitable powers at the adjudication stage of the guardianship proceeding; it is at the administration stage that the court assumes full and complete jurisdiction over guardianship matters. See Bliss, 133 Md. at 71.

Section 13-102(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article provides that “[t]his article shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes.” E&T § 13-102(a) states:

(a) The purposes of this title are:

(1) To simplify the administration of the estates of minors and disabled persons;

(2) To reduce the expenses of administration;

(3) To clarify the law governing the estates of minors and disabled persons;

and

(4) To eliminate certain provisions of existing law which are archaic, often meaningless under modern procedures, and no longer useful.

As can be readily noted, all of the purposes of “this title” relate to the administration of the estates of “disabled persons.” A “disabled person” is defined in E&T § 13-101(f) as a person, other than a minor who “[h]as been judged by a court to . . . require[] a guardian of the person.” E&T § 13-101(f)(2). In other words, the purposes of “this title” focus only on the administration stage of a guardianship proceeding, not the adjudication stage, as in the instant case. Moreover, this Court has held that the statutory and rules provisions at issue here are clear and unambiguous. Thus there is nothing to “liberally” construe.

Finally, appellant relies on E&T § 13-704(a) to show that “a court has equitable authority to protect the person and property of alleged disabled persons.” Again, this section of the statute involves only the administration stage of guardianship proceedings. Section 13-704(a) states that

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The court may:

(1) Superintend and direct the care of a disabled person;

(2) Appoint a guardian of the person; and (3) Pass orders and decrees respecting the person as seems proper, including an order directing the disabled person to be sent to a hospital.

Therefore, E&T § 13-704(a) does not grant equitable authority to the circuit court for the adjudication stage of a guardianship proceeding.

For the above reasons, this Court holds that the circuit court does not have any equitable powers to supplement, amend, or add to the language of E&T § 13-705(c)(2) or Rule 10-202(a)(1) & (3) to authorize the court to order appellee to submit to an examination or evaluation against her wishes or to accept an invalid medical certificate filed with the guardianship petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss the Petitions for failure to file two valid medical certificates with the Petitions.

II. Did the Trial Court Err in Denying [Appellant]’s Motion to Alter or Amend Order Entered April 16, 2024 (Request for Hearing)?

A. Standard of Review We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Md. Rule 2-534. Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 384-85 (2009).

B. Discovery in Guardianship Proceedings The Maryland discovery rules, set forth in Chapter 400 of Title 2, are applicable to guardianship proceedings. Md. Rule 1-101(b) (“Title 2 [‘Civil Procedure-Circuit Court’] applies to civil matters in the circuit courts, except for Juvenile Causes under Title 11, Chapters 100, 200, 400, and 500 of these Rules and except as otherwise specifically

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provided or necessarily implied.”); Md. Rule 10-102(b). Rule 10-102(b) provides:

(b) Applicability of Title 2. Any interested person may obtain discovery in a contested matter pursuant to Title 2, Chapter 400 of these Rules, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except as otherwise provided in this Title, a court may apply any of the rules in Title 2 as appropriate.

In the instant case, appellant filed a motion asking the trial court to order a mental examination of appellee pursuant to Md. Rule 2-423; the trial court denied the motion, as well as appellant’s motion to alter or amend such denial. On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in so doing. Rule 2-423 reads as follows:

When the mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a mental or physical examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to produce for examination the person in the custody or under the legal control of the party. The order may be entered only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties. It shall specify the time and place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made. The order may regulate the filing and distribution of a report of findings and conclusions and the testimony at trial by the examiner, the payment of expenses, and any other relevant matters.

C. Arguments of the Parties Appellant argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to have appellee submit to an examination pursuant to Rule 2-423. According to appellant, the trial court’s reasoning for denying the motion was that (1) appellee’s mental or physical condition was not yet in controversy; and (2) Rule 2-423 was not applicable because it is a discovery rule.

Appellant cites to the United States Supreme Court case of Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964), for the proposition that “the requirements of ‘in controversy’

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and ‘good cause’ [of Rule 35, the federal analog to Rule 2-423] ‘require an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular examination.’” Appellant asserts that appellee’s mental condition was “in controversy” because the Petitions claimed that appellee needed a guardian due to her deteriorating mental state, and appellee objected to an examination. Appellant also claims that because the Maryland Rules should be afforded the same liberal construction as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a request for examination pursuant to Md. Rule 2-423 during a pending motion to dismiss was appropriate.”

Appellee responds that appellee’s mental condition was not at issue because appellant had not filed two valid medical certificates to the Petitions. Appellee contends that Schlagenhauf does not support appellant’s position. According to appellee, Schlagenhauf dealt “with mental state as it related to negligence actions, in which a plaintiff or defendant asserts their physical or mental condition to establish their own claim or defense.” Appellee explains that in Schlagenhauf one party was seeking to compel another party to submit to an examination where the latter did not assert his mental or physical condition either in support or defense of a claim. Appellee contends that “[t]o hold that moving to dismiss on procedural grounds puts [a]ppellee’s mental condition in controversy would be to disregard the ‘plainly expressed limitations’ set forth in the Rule, which would not pass muster under Schlagenhauf.” Appellee concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the order for an evaluation.

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In reply, appellant points out that appellee failed to address his argument that the Petitions on their face placed appellee’s mental condition at issue. Appellant contends that unlike in Schlagenhauf, he provided ample evidence that appellee’s mental condition was in controversy, including the two medical certificates, and thus met the affirmative showing required by Rule 2-423.

D. Analysis As stated above, the Maryland discovery rules, including Rule 2-423, apply to guardianship proceedings. Md. Rules 1-101(b), 10-102(b). The issue raised in the instant appeal is whether Rule 2-423 applies to appellee such that the circuit court may order her “to submit to a mental or physical examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner” in accordance with the provisions of the rule. To resolve that issue, we must begin with the words of the rule.

Rule 2-423 provides that “[w]hen the mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party . . . is in controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a mental or physical examination[.]” (Emphasis added). In other words, the person to be examined must be a party to the case. See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 115 (stating that under FRCP 35 (the federal analog to Rule 2-423) “it is clear that the person to be examined must be a party to the case[.]”); Maryland Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 582 (1989) (stating that the trial court “correctly concluded” that it had no authority under Rule 2-423 to order a medical examination of children who were not parties to an action to revoke the license of a day care center because of physical and sexual abuse of the children).

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Unfortunately, the Maryland Rules do not define the term “party.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “party” as “anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.” Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). By filing the Petitions, and thereby subjecting himself to the personal jurisdiction of the circuit court, appellant, as the named petitioner, gained the right to control the proceedings, make a motion under Rule 2-423, and appeal from an adverse judgment. Therefore, we conclude that appellant was a “party” in the instant case before the trial court.

On the other hand, “[i]t is a basic principle of law ‘that before a court may impose upon a defendant a personal liability or obligation in favor of the plaintiff or may extinguish a personal right of the defendant it must have first obtained jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.’” Chapman v. Kamara, 356 Md. 426, 438 (1999) (quoting Lohman v. Lohman, 331 Md. 113, 125 (1993)). Personal jurisdiction can be obtained either by proper service of process on the defendant or a waiver of such service “by a voluntary appearance by the defendant, either personally or through a duly authorized attorney.” Lohman, 331 Md. at 130. In guardianship proceedings, proper service of process is effectuated on the alleged disabled person by the petitioner serving the show cause order issued under Rule 10-104, along with any related petition or document and an “Advice of Rights” form, in accordance with Rule 2-121(a). Md. Rule 10-203. Waiver of such service by voluntary appearance occurs when a named defendant or respondent files an answer without raising the defense of insufficiency of service of process. See Md. Rule 2-322(a); Chapman, 356 Md. at 438. Rule 2-322(a) also provides that the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction,

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improper venue, and insufficiency of process are waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss before the answer and an answer is filed. See Smith v. Cylus, 147 Md. App. 78, 81 (2002) (improper venue); Pinner v. Pinner, 240 Md. App. 90, 106 (2019) (lack of jurisdiction over the person). When no answer is filed, none of these defenses are waived. Pinner, 240 Md. App. at 106; Cylus, 147 Md. App. at 81.

In Pinner, the defendant was served with process outside the State of Maryland. 240 Md. App. at 102. When the defendant failed to plead, the trial court entered an order of default. Id. The defendant than moved to vacate the order of default without moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, took testimony on damages, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $99,856.84. Id. at 102-03.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had waived the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it pursuant to Rule 2-322(a). Id. at 105. This Court rejected plaintiff’s argument, noting that under Rule 2-322(a) the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction was waived if not made by a motion to dismiss “filed before the answer” and “the answer is filed.” Id. at 106 (emphasis in original). Because the defendant never filed an answer in the trial court, this Court held that the defendant “did not waive her right to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by her failure to assert it below.” Id.

In the instant case, a show cause order was never issued by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 10-104 because two valid medical certificates were not filed with the Petitions. As a result, appellee was never served with the show cause order, along with the Petitions and

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the “Advice of Rights” form, required by Rule 10-203. Therefore, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over appellee through proper service of process. In addition, appellee never waived the defense of insufficient service of process because she never filed answers to the Petitions. See Pinner, 240 Md. App. at 106; Cylus, 147 Md. App. at 81; Md. Rule 2-322(a). Because the circuit court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over appellee, it did not have the authority under Rule 2-423 to impose on appellee the obligation to undergo a mental examination or to deprive appellee of her civil right of privacy to decline to undergo such examination. See Chapman, 356 Md. at 438. Therefore, this Court holds that appellee was not a “party” in the guardianship proceedings before the trial court within the meaning of Rule 2-423.

Nevertheless, in support of his contention that appellee was subject to Rule 2-423, appellant cites to In re Sophia E. Foley, 373 Md. 627 (2003) and Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). We are not persuaded.

In re Sophia E. Foley is a guardianship case in which the trial court granted a motion for an examination of the alleged disabled person under Rule 2-423. 373 Md. at 632. On appeal, this Court, in an unreported opinion, “held that the order for an examination was appealable under the collateral order doctrine, held that the Circuit Court had abused its discretion in ordering an examination, and vacated the Circuit Court’s order.”14 Id. The

14 No issue was raised by the parties before the circuit court or in the appeal to this Court as to whether the trial court had the authority under Rule 2-423 to order the alleged disabled person to submit to a mental or physical examination without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over said person. The parties and this Court simply assumed that the

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Supreme Court of Maryland, however, reversed our decision “on the ground that the order was not appealable. Accordingly, we shall not reach the merits of the controversy.” Id. Because our Supreme Court never addressed any issue relating to the circuit court’s authority to order an alleged disabled person to submit to an examination under Rule 2- 423, In re Sophia E. Foley does not support appellant’s position.

Schlagenhauf involved a diversity action in federal court for negligence arising out of a bus-tractor trailer accident. 379 U.S. at 106. The named defendants were the owner of the bus, the driver of the bus, the owner of the tractor, the driver of the tractor, and the owner of the trailer. Id. at 106-07. Each of the defendants filed an answer denying negligence. Id. at 107. After the bus owner cross-claimed for negligence against the owners of the tractor and trailer, the tractor owner petitioned the District Court for an order directing the bus driver to submit to both a mental and physical examination under Rule 35(a)15 on the ground that the bus driver was not mentally or physically capable of driving

trial court had such authority. See In re Sophia E. Foley, No. 222, Sept. Term 2001, at 20, 22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 20, 2001) (unreported).

15 At the time that Schlagenhauf was rendered in 1964, Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided:

Physical and Mental Examination of Persons. (a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.

379 U.S. at 106.

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the bus at the time of the accident. Id. Without holding a hearing, the District Court granted the petition, ordering the bus driver to submit to nine examinations. Id. at 108-09. Upon a denial of a writ of mandamus by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to review undecided questions concerning the validity and construction of Rule 35.” Id. at 109.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court had the power to apply Rule 35 to a party defendant in an appropriate case. Id. at 114. Because there was no doubt that the bus driver was a party to the action, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 35 permitted an examination of him, “provided, of course, that the other requirements of the Rule were met.” Id. at 115-16. The Supreme Court then held that because the bus driver “did not assert his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim[,]” the parties seeking the examination must “make an affirmative showing that petitioner’s mental or physical condition was in controversy and that there was good cause for the examinations requested.” Id. at 119-20.

In sum, the person sought to be examined in Schlagenhauf was a party to the action and thus was subject to Rule 35(a). As a result, the Supreme Court did not address the question raised in the instant appeal, namely when and under what circumstances does a named defendant become a party under Rule 2-423. Accordingly, Schlagenhauf does not inform our decision.

Finally, two days before oral argument in this appeal, appellant filed a Notice of Supplemental Citation, in which he directs us to the case of Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612 (1944). Appellant argues:

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In Purdum, the Court was faced with a similar predicament, that is, the Court could not assume control over the person and estate until an adjudication of incompetency. Id. at 618. The Court found that there were “no more compelling circumstances for the application of the rule for the procuring of mental examination of a party prior to the actual trial of the case than those presented.” Id. at 619. Here, like Purdum, the circumstances supported an examination, and the Court had the authority under Md. Rule 2-423 to order the examination.

We respectfully disagree, concluding that Purdum is both factually and legally distinguishable from the instant case.

In Purdum, on August 2, 1943, the appellant, who was the niece of Sophia Lilly, filed a petition under oath in the circuit court, sitting as a court of equity, seeking “as a part of the relief sought, that a writ [] de lunatico inquirendo be issued to the Sheriff of Baltimore County to inquire into the lunacy of the said Sophia Lilly.” 182 Md. at 614. The petition alleged, among other things, that (1) Ms. Lilly was “of unsound mind and non compos mentis”; (2) Ms. Lilly possessed a considerable estate, consisting of real estate, mortgages, and cash; (3) Ms. Lilly was prevailed upon to convey her home and to transfer a large amount of cash to the defendant, Frank Wilson; and (4) the court’s assumption of jurisdiction is necessary to prevent irreparable loss and injury. Id.

Upon consideration of the sworn petition, “the Chancellor passed an order directing the writ [] de lunatico inquirendo to issue to the Sheriff of Baltimore County and requiring the defendants to show cause, on or before August 16, 1943, why the other relief prayed for in the petition should not be granted.” Id. On August 16, 1943, Mr. Wilson filed two answers under oath, one in his individual capacity and the other as next of friend of Ms. Lilly. Both answers alleged, among other things, that (1) Ms. Lilly was living with Mr.

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Wilson in his home; (2) Ms. Lilly was “not of unsound mind and non compos mentis”; (3) Mr. Wilson had always taken care of Ms. Lilly’s affairs under her direction and the advice of her private counsel; and (4) there was no danger of Ms. Lilly’s estate suffering loss or injury. Id. at 614-15. Mr. Wilson also filed two physicians’ certificates, both of which recommended that Ms. Lilly not appear before the Sheriff’s jury and one of which opined that she was “not of unsound mind.” Id. at 615.

On August 18, 1943, the appellant filed a petition seeking an order of court directing two physicians to interview Ms. Lilly so that they could testify before the Sheriff’s jury. Id. at 616. The petition also alleged that Mr. Wilson was not willing without a court order to permit such interviews with Ms. Lilly. Id. That same day, the Chancellor denied the petition for examination. Id. at 617.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland stated that Section 123, Article 16, Code of 1939 conferred on the circuit court equity jurisdiction with respect to “persons non compos mentis,” but that such “jurisdiction cannot be assumed until there has been an adjudication of incompetency by a sheriff’s jury.” Id. at 617-18. Nevertheless, the Court decided that in light of the admissions contained in Mr. Wilson’s sworn answers and the facts set forth in his physicians’ certificates, “this record presents a case for the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court of Equity.” Id. The Court pointed to Discovery Rule 5 of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, (which is the predecessor to Rule 2-423), as the

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embodiment of the existing practice in this State.16 Id. at 619. The Court held that the Chancellor “abused the discretion vested in him by the rule, and that his order refusing the examination should be reversed.” Id. at 620.

In our view, Purdum is distinguishable factually from the instant case because Purdum involved the alleged disabled person residing with a third person who refused to permit an examination.17 Our Supreme Court has viewed such circumstances to be serious enough to warrant the adoption of Rule 10-202(a)(3), which, as discussed above, provides a mechanism for remedying the absence of the require certificates in that specific situation.

More importantly, Purdum is legally distinguishable from the instant case because Ms. Lilly was clearly a party to the guardianship proceeding and thus subject a court ordering her to submit to a mental or physical examination under Discovery Rule 5. In

Discovery Rule 5 of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, adopted by the 16

Supreme Court of Maryland on January 30, 1941, read as follows:

Whenever the mental or physical condition of a party is material to any matter involved in any proceeding, the court may, upon motion by any party and notice to all other parties, for good cause shown, order such party to submit to a mental or physical examination by a physician or physicians. The order (1) shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made and (2) may regulate the filing of a report of findings and conclusions and the testimony at the trial by the examining physician or physicians, the payment of the expenses of the examination and any other relevant matters.

Purdum, 182 Md. at 619.

Unlike in the instant case, the petition in Purdum also alleged that Mr. Wilson, the 17

party who refused to permit the examination of Ms. Lilly, prevailed upon Ms. Lilly to convey her home and transfer a large amount of cash to him. Purdum, 182 Md. at 614.

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1943 the “procedure leading up to an adjudication of mental unsoundness remain[ed] as it existed, independently of statute, under the English practice.” Id. at 617. As discussed above in Section I.D.(2), the English practice permitted the Chancellor, based only on the allegations in a petition, to order the issuance of a writ de lunatico inquirendo to the Sheriff to convene a jury, and to order the alleged disabled person, as a named defendant, to show cause why the relief prayed in the petition should not be granted. See id. at 614. In Purdum, the Chancellor passed such orders; the show cause order was served on Ms. Lilly and Mr. Wilson;18 and Mr. Wilson filed answers to the petition on behalf of himself and Ms. Lilly. Id. at 614. In the instant case, no show cause was issued or served on appellee requiring her to answer the allegations of appellant’s petition for guardianship, and no answer was ever filed by or on behalf of appellee.

For the above reasons, this Court concludes that the cases of In re Sophia E. Foley, 373 Md. 627 (2003), Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), and Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612 (1944) do not provide a legal basis for the circuit court to order appellee to submit to a mental or physical examination pursuant to Rule 2-423. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion for a mental examination of appellee under Rule 2-423, and did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Entered April 16, 2024.

18 The opinion in Purdum does not expressly state that the show cause order was served on Mr. Wilson and Ms. Lilly. We can infer such service by the filing of answers that respond in detail to the allegations in the petition. See Purdum, 182 Md. at 614-15.

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III. Final Thoughts We recognize that this opinion will not be of assistance to those petitioners in guardianship proceedings who are acting under a good faith belief that the alleged disabled person is in need of a guardian but cannot obtain that relief because the alleged disabled person refuses to submit to an examination or evaluation. As correctly noted by the trial court in its opinion, Maryland law does provide for the emergency evaluation of an individual who may, because of a mental disorder, present a danger to the life and safety of the individual or of others. See Md. Code Ann., Health-General Article (“HG”) §§ 10- 620 to 10-625. The only relief available, however, is an examination by a physician to determine “whether the emergency evaluee meets the requirements for involuntary admission[,]” and if so, the “involuntary admission of the emergency evaluee to an appropriate facility, which may be a general hospital with a licensed inpatient psychiatric unit.” HG § 10-624(b)(3) (first quotation); HG § 10-625(a) (second quotation). There is no requirement in the statute for the examining physician to conduct an evaluation of the individual’s capacity to make responsible personal decisions or for that physician to sign and verify a valid medical certificate as required by E&T § 13-705(c)(2) and Rule 10- 202(a)(1).

In our view, the only remedy for a petitioner who seeks guardianship under circumstances similar to the instant case is an amendment to the statute or rules that would authorize the circuit court to order the alleged disabled person to submit to an examination or evaluation against their own wishes. We express no opinion on the propriety of such amendment. We are mindful, however, that valid medical certificates are a critical first step

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in the adjudication of an individual as a disabled person under E&T § 13-705(b), and that there are serious consequences to the civil rights and liberty of a disabled person, as expressed by our Supreme Court in Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 104 Md. at 479, and more recently by the late Florida Congressman, Claude Pepper, who said:

The typical [person subject to guardianship] has fewer rights than the typical convicted felon—they can no longer receive money or pay their bills. They cannot marry or divorce. By appointing a guardian, the court entrusts to someone else the power to choose where they will live, what medical treatment they will get and, in rare cases, when they will die. It is, in one short sentence, the most punitive civil penalty that can be levied against an American citizen, with the exception, of course, of the death penalty.

Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace, H.R. 641, Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care, House Special Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. 4 (1987).

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.