314 Ga. 409 FINAL COPY
S22Y0691. IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL ANTHONY EDDINGS.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board, which
recommends disbarring respondent Michael Anthony Eddings
(State Bar No. 238751) for his violations of Rules 3.3 (false
statements to a tribunal), 4.1 (false statements to third persons in
connection with representation of a client), 4.2 (a) (communications
with persons represented by counsel), 8.1 (a) (false statements in
connection with a disciplinary proceeding), and 8.4 (a) (4)
(dishonesty in professional conduct) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum
penalty for a violation of any of these rules is disbarment. Although
Eddings vehemently denies violating any of these rules, the special
master, Thomas E. Cauthorn III, who had the opportunity to see and consider the testimony of the witnesses and to review the properly
admitted evidence, made credibility determinations adverse to
Eddings, and the Review Board adopted those credibility
determinations, finding that they were supported by the record.
Based on those determinations, which are not clearly erroneous, and
the other evidence in the record, we agree with the special master
and the Review Board that Eddings’s conduct violated the above-
mentioned rules and that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for
those violations.
In its formal complaint, the Bar asserted that, while
representing a client who had been charged in Muscogee County
with murder, Eddings tape-recorded his July 22, 2017 interview
with a material witness, who had been charged with making a false
statement in connection with the victim’s death. Because the
witness’s interview contained information exculpatory as to
Eddings’s client and inculpatory as to the witness, Eddings provided
a copy of the recording to the Assistant District Attorney in his
client’s case, who subsequently indicted the witness as a co-
2 defendant in the murder case. Apparently the two co-defendants
were tried separately, and both were acquitted. However, during the
witness’s May 2018 trial on the murder charge, Eddings was called
by the State to authenticate his recording of the witness’s statement
to him, and Eddings testified under oath that he knew at the time
he interviewed the witness that the witness was represented by
attorney Stacey Jackson; that he was unsuccessful in his attempts
to contact Jackson to obtain his consent to interview the witness;
and that he conducted the interview anyway because he believed he
did not need Jackson’s permission.
The very next day, however, on May 18, 2018, Eddings sent an
e-mail to the Judge who presided over the witness’s murder trial, to
the Chief Judge of the circuit, to the Assistant District Attorney in
the witness’s case, and to Jackson. In that e-mail, Eddings
attempted to disavow his sworn trial testimony from the day before,
asserting that he had “forgotten” that he actually had received
consent from Jackson to interview the witness; that he obtained that
consent in a June 30, 2017 telephone conversation with Jackson;
3 that there had been witnesses to the consent because he had
engaged in the conversation with Jackson via speakerphone while
he was in a meeting with his client’s family; and that his wife,
Cynthia Eddings, who was also his legal assistant, had reminded
him of the meeting and Jackson’s consent immediately after he
completed his testimony under oath at the witness’s trial. During
the Bar’s investigation of this matter, Eddings presented to the
State Disciplinary Board sworn affidavits from his wife and from
two men, both of whom are related to Eddings’s original client. In
those affidavits, the witnesses supported the version of events laid
out in Eddings’s e-mail.
As background, the Bar recounted that, prior to the incident
with this witness, Eddings had twice been held in contempt and
fined by the Superior Court of Muscogee County for intentionally
contacting represented persons without the consent of their lawyers:
the first time on July 19, 2013, for contacting his then-client’s co-
defendant, which resulted in a $500 fine, and the second time on
June 9, 2014, for contacting three different represented persons,
4 which resulted in a total fine of $3,000. In connection with the latter
contempt action, the court ordered that “Eddings never violate Rule
4.2 again, not in this case or in any future case whatsoever,” and
that he “never contact or interview a represented client again
without permission of that client’s attorney.” Moreover, as the Bar
noted, that latter incident formed the basis for one of Eddings’s two
prior public reprimands. See In the Matter of Eddings, 298 Ga. 434
(782 SE2d 445) (2016) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
and imposing a public reprimand for violation of Bar Rule 4.2)
(“Eddings I”); In the Matter of Eddings, 300 Ga. 419 (795 SE2d 183)
(2016) (imposing public reprimand for violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (c)
and 1.15 (II) (b) arising out of the theft of $2.3 million from Eddings’s
law firm’s trust account by his now-former wife, Sonya Eddings, who
was then the firm’s financial manager) (“Eddings II”). Based on
those facts, the Bar charged Eddings with violating Rules 3.3, 4.1,
4.2 (a), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4) and invoked Bar Rule 4-103 (“A finding
of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules
5 shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for
suspension or disbarment.”).
In his response to the formal complaint, Eddings admitted that
he knew Jackson represented the witness “concerning anything
surrounding the murder case at hand” but noted that at that time,
the witness had not been charged with any crime in connection with
the murder itself. Eddings asserted that he had repeatedly tried to
contact Jackson in an effort to speak with the witness and that prior
to June 30, 2017, when he was able to speak with Jackson about the
witness, Jackson deflected his inquiries but never denied him
permission to speak to the witness. Eddings contended that, during
the June 30, 2017 phone conversation with Jackson, which Eddings
put on speakerphone in a room with Eddings’s wife and his client’s
father and uncle present, Jackson gave his consent for Eddings to
speak to the witness and stated that the witness had not paid
Jackson’s fee and that he therefore no longer represented the
witness. Eddings said that Jackson’s statements in the telephone
conversation eliminated, in Eddings’s mind, any further
6 responsibility to communicate with Jackson concerning the witness
and the murder case.
After discovery, the special master held a lengthy evidentiary
hearing, at which testimony was taken from Eddings, Jackson, and
the three witnesses who had submitted affidavits in support of
Eddings. Jackson testified at the hearing that he did not give
Eddings consent to speak with his client. The three witnesses
testified consistently with their affidavits, and the father and uncle
of Eddings’s client, who testified to their exemplary military service
and work histories, explained that their family owed no money to
Eddings; that they agreed to travel to Atlanta to testify because
Jackson had lied about his conversation with Eddings; and that
their affidavits were true. The special master issued his report and
recommendation in which he concluded, based on his consideration
of the testimony, exhibits, oral argument, and briefs, that Eddings
knew when he interviewed the witness, without Jackson, that the
witness had been charged with making a false statement in
connection with the murder. The special master recited that, during
7 the witness’s trial, Eddings testified under oath that he knew
Jackson represented the witness; that he had tried to get Jackson’s
consent for the interview, but was not able to obtain it; and that he
conducted the interview nonetheless. He recited Eddings’s adamant
sworn trial testimony to the effect he had not sought or received
permission from Jackson to interview the witness because he did not
believe that he needed such permission. And, although the special
master considered the evidence Eddings introduced to support his
current version of events, the special master found that version
implausible. In explaining why he believed Eddings’s testimony at
the witness’s trial over the e-mail’s version of events, the special
master did not articulate any basis for doubting the credibility of
Eddings’s witnesses, but instead pointed to four factors: (1) Jackson
unequivocally and consistently testified during the disciplinary
hearing that he did not give Eddings permission to interview the
witness; (2) Eddings’s prior violations of Rule 4.2, “which include[d]
two contempt findings, two fines totaling $3,500, and a direct order
from a Superior Court Judge to never again violate Rule 4.2 (a)”; (3)
8 Eddings did not request, send, or receive any kind of confirmation
from Jackson as to his alleged consent; and (4) during his sworn
testimony at the witness’s trial, Eddings displayed no signs of doubt,
equivocation, ambiguity, or questionable memory surrounding his
interview of the witness. Thus, the special master concluded that
Eddings’s testimony during the disciplinary proceedings and the
“affidavits and testimony from his wife and the two family members
of his client [were] demonstrably false.”
Based on his factual findings, the special master concluded
that Eddings violated Rule 3.3 (a) (1) by sending the May 18, 2018
e-mail to the judges; Rule 4.1 by sending the May 18, 2018 e-mail to
the judges, the prosecutor, and Jackson; Rule 4.2 (a) by
communicating with the witness without Jackson’s consent even
though Eddings knew that the witness was represented by Jackson
regarding the murder; Rule 8.1 (a) by falsely asserting that he had
received permission to interview the witness and submitting false
affidavits and testimony to support that claim during these
disciplinary proceedings; and Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by repeatedly making
9 false disavowals of his sworn trial testimony and enlisting witnesses
to repeat his false statements under oath. The special master
further found that Rule 4-103 applied in this case because this would
be Eddings’s third disciplinary infraction.
The special master then applied the framework set out in the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, which requires (1) identification of the ethical duty
violated by the lawyer; (2) identification of the lawyer’s mental state;
and (3) examination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996)
(noting that this Court looks to the American Bar Association’s
standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to
impose). The special master concluded that Eddings violated various
duties he owed to the legal system, ABA Standards §§ 6.0
(addressing violations of duties owed to the legal system), 6.1 (false
statements), and 6.3 (improper communication with individuals in
the legal system); that he communicated improperly with the
witness intentionally or knowingly for the purpose of influencing or
10 affecting the outcome of a legal proceeding; and that his improper
interference significantly affected the outcome of a legal proceeding.
The special master further concluded that Eddings thereafter
knowingly and intentionally made false statements and submitted
false documents with the intent to deceive superior court judges, the
State Bar, the State Disciplinary Board, and the special master; that
he also persuaded others to make false statements under oath for
him; and that Eddings’s false statements had a serious, or
potentially serious, adverse effect on this disciplinary proceeding.
For those reasons, the special master concluded that disbarment
was the presumptive sanction for Eddings’s violations. In weighing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the special master
concluded that no factors in mitigation existed, but determined that
almost all of the aggravating factors identified in ABA Standard
9.22 applied to this case, including: prior disciplinary history since
this was Eddings’s third disciplinary infraction; dishonest or selfish
motive; vulnerable victim since Eddings knowingly interviewed a
represented witness who was in a precarious legal position outside
11 of the presence of that witness’s counsel; pattern of misconduct;
multiple offenses; bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary process;
submission of false evidence during the disciplinary process; refusal
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; and substantial
experience in the practice of law, having been a member of the Bar
since 2002. See ABA Standards § 9.22 (a)-(i). Ultimately, the special
master recommended disbarment as the appropriate discipline for
Eddings’s violations, particularly given application of Bar Rule 4-
103.
Eddings filed exceptions and requested review by the Review
Board, and the Bar responded. The Review Board then issued its
report and recommendation, noting that the Bar bears the burden
of proving each element of a rule violation by clear and convincing
evidence, Bar Rule 4-221.2 (a) and (b), and that it is required to
review the special master’s conclusions of law de novo and accept
the special master’s factual findings unless they are “clearly
erroneous” or “manifestly in error.” See Bar Rule 4-216 (a). The
Review Board concluded that the special master’s factual findings
12 were not clearly erroneous or manifestly in error, and it adopted
those factual findings as its own. The Review Board further agreed
with the special master’s conclusions that Eddings had violated the
identified rules; that he did so knowingly and with the intent to
affect the outcome of either the legal proceeding or the subsequent
disciplinary proceeding; and that those proceedings were
significantly affected. The Review Board essentially agreed with
most of the special master’s conclusions as to which aggravating and
mitigating factors applied to the case. Noting that Rule 4.2 is meant
to protect represented individuals from overreaching by opposing
counsel, to safeguard the client-lawyer relationship from
interference by adverse counsel, and to reduce the likelihood that
clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm
their interests, see Comment 7 to Rule 4.2, the Review Board held
that, here, Eddings violated the very essence of the Rule’s
protections and that he did so despite having already been warned
at least twice that such behavior was an unacceptable violation of
the disciplinary rules. Deferring to the special master’s findings that
13 Eddings’s post-trial efforts to disavow his sworn trial testimony
were not credible, the Review Board also concluded that Eddings
violated Bar Rules 3.3, 4.1, 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4) by engaging in a
pattern of deceit following his violation of Rule 4.2. Ultimately, after
taking into consideration Eddings’s prior disciplinary history and
this Court’s stated lack of “tolerance for a lawyer who lies during
disciplinary proceedings or engages in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,” In the Matter of Friedman, 270
Ga. 5, 6-7 (505 SE2d 727) (1998), the Review Board agreed with the
special master that disbarment was the appropriate discipline in
this case.
Although Eddings has filed exceptions to the Review Board’s
Report and Recommendation, asserting that the Bar and the special
master have acted dishonorably in labeling him and his witnesses
as liars without any proof, he simultaneously accuses Jackson of
maliciously lying throughout these disciplinary proceedings, the Bar
of engaging in some ill-defined and unsubstantiated conspiracy with
Jackson to see Eddings fail, and the special master of demonstrating
14 bias and partiality in favor of the Bar — all with little or no
evidentiary support other than the fact that they disagree with his
version of events.1 At the core of most of Eddings’s exceptions is his
assertion that the special master — without providing any real
explanation or rationale — erred (or overreached his discretion or
exhibited bias) by finding Eddings’s own sworn testimony at the
witness’s trial and Jackson’s testimony at the hearing more credible
than the physical evidence and the testimony presented at the
hearing by Eddings and, what he characterizes as, his three
respectable, law-abiding citizens, who had no motive to lie.
1 We agree with the Bar’s criticism of Eddings’s claim of bias or partiality
on the part of the special master, specifically that Eddings raised this claim for the first time in his exceptions; that he supported his assertion with no citation to authority; that he based his assertion on the fact that the special master ruled against him; and that he not only failed to show that the special master’s rulings were erroneous, but also failed to support his claim that erroneous trial-related rulings can serve as determinative proof of bias or partiality. See Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 115 (218 SE2d 846) (1975) (explaining that, even where adverse rulings may be error on appeal, they do not demonstrate a judge’s bias); Gibson v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 235 Ga. App. 160, 166 (3) (508 SE2d 788) (1998) (to be disqualifying, the alleged bias must come from some extra-judicial source and must result in an opinion based on something other than what the judge learned from his participation in the trial).
15 As an initial matter, we note that Eddings did not actually
introduce any physical evidence into the record at the hearing. 2
Moreover, his efforts to attack the credibility of Jackson’s testimony
are unpersuasive as Jackson’s alleged failure to volunteer, during
his direct examination, that he spoke with Eddings on the phone on
June 30, 2017, is not suspect when, as even Eddings admits, Jackson
was not asked any questions during his direct examination that
would call for him to reveal such information. Further, the alleged
“inconsistencies” identified by Eddings in Jackson’s testimony, when
considered in context, do not so much reveal different stories or
inconsistent responses, but instead appear to be nuanced responses
to differently phrased questions or premature responses that were
amended after Jackson obtained additional clarification of the
question. And although Eddings faults Jackson for failing to present
2 Although the Bar tendered into evidence Eddings’s response to the grievance, which included as attachments certain phone records, screenshots of text messages, and affidavits, neither party laid the necessary foundation for admission of any of those exhibits as substantive evidence at the hearing. See Bar Rule 4-221.2 (the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia apply in disciplinary proceedings occurring after a finding of probable cause).
16 additional evidence to corroborate his testimony that he represented
the witness or that he is telling the truth about his interactions with
Eddings, Eddings himself admitted that he knew Jackson
represented the witness, and, regardless, Jackson bore no burden of
proof in this case. Finally, to the extent that Eddings attempts to
establish inconsistencies in Jackson’s version of events based on
quotes attributed to Jackson in a newspaper article, the record
shows that Eddings never laid the necessary foundation to have the
newspaper article admitted into evidence, and, in any event,
Jackson’s testimony was that the author of the newspaper article
may have taken his statements out of context.
As for the testimony presented by Eddings’s three witnesses,
whose credibility Eddings contends was not even challenged,
because this Court recognizes that the special master is in the best
position to determine the witnesses’ credibility, it generally defers
to the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the
special master unless those findings or determinations are clearly
erroneous. See In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 207 (857 SE2d
17 212) (2021); In the Matter of Braziel, 306 Ga. 385, 387 (830 SE2d
730) (2019) (this Court does not second-guess special master’s
credibility determinations if they are supported by the record); see
also OCGA § 24-6-620 (“[t]he credibility of a witness shall be a
matter to be determined by the trier of fact”). In short, it is the
special master who is in the best position, as the finder of fact, to
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and, here, he saw fit to
believe Eddings’s sworn trial testimony and Jackson’s sworn
hearing testimony, over the sworn hearing testimony of the other
witnesses, and, despite Eddings’s assertions to the contrary, that
decision is not clearly erroneous given the evidence admitted at the
hearing.
Eddings next argues that the special master’s credibility
determinations do not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that
clear and convincing evidence exists that he made false statements.
In doing so, he seems to suggest that objective evidence, or a better
quality of evidence, should be required to support the conclusion
that an attorney has violated the rule against making a false
18 statement. For example, he distinguishes his case from In the Matter
of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737 (791 SE2d 776) (2016) and In the Matter
of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152, 153 (765 SE2d 361) (2014), which were two
of the “false statement” disciplinary cases relied upon by the special
master in his report and recommendation. Namely, Eddings argues
that his case relies exclusively on credibility determinations while
the records in Nicholson and Minsk included physical evidence —
either independent medical/billing records or a forged client
signature on a court filing — which definitively proved that those
attorneys were making a false statement. He also points to Florida
Bar v. Rightmyer, 616 S2d 953 (Fla. 1993), where the Florida
Supreme Court disbarred an attorney whose dishonesty was
supported by his convictions for perjury, and to In the Matter of
Jefferson, 307 Ga. 50, 52 (834 SE2d 73) (2019), where the record
included evidence that witnesses had taken contemporaneous steps,
in court and with the Bar, to complain about Jefferson’s alleged false
statements. But we are unswayed by Eddings’s effort to require that
false-statement disciplinary cases be established via some higher
19 quantity or quality of proof. And we agree with the Bar that the
record in this case proves each rule violation, including those having
to do with making false statements, by clear and convincing
evidence. See OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single witness
is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”).
Finally, Eddings suggests that the Bar’s counsel and the
special master acted improperly and in bad faith by objecting and
making rulings, respectively, which precluded him from being able
to introduce favorable evidence and to present additional witness
testimony at the hearing, thereby prejudicing his case. But
Eddings’s assertions are belied by the record, which shows that
Eddings made no effort to introduce any physical evidence prior to
the close of evidence and that the special master properly excluded
the testimony and evidence because the deposition transcripts
Eddings attempted to introduce in the midst of his closing argument
had not been listed in the stipulated pre-trial order; because Eddings
did not even try to make the showings necessary to allow admission
of the transcripts; and because the additional witnesses Eddings
20 sought to call had not been listed in the stipulated pre-trial order.
Moreover, the record shows that after Eddings made a proffer of the
testimony to be offered by those additional witnesses, even he agreed
with the special master’s alternative ruling that their testimony
would be cumulative.
Ultimately, after a close review of the record in this case, we
agree with the special master and the Review Board that the facts
support a finding that Eddings violated Rules 3.3, 4.1, 4.2 (a), 8.1
(a), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.
Further, we agree with the special master and the Review Board
that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for Eddings’s
violation of those rules, particularly where this is Eddings’s third
disciplinary infraction.3 See Bar Rule 4-103; In the Matter of
Jefferson, 307 Ga. at 55-56; In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794,
796 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarring attorney who, among other
3 We note that because we have concluded that Eddings violated Rule 8.1
by his submission of false evidence during the disciplinary process, we have not relied on that same conduct in aggravation of discipline under either ABA Standard 9.22 (e) or (f).
21 things, violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by making materially deceitful and
misleading statements in court filings, without prior discipline); and
In the Matter of Mays, 269 Ga. 100 (495 SE2d 30) (1998) (disbarring
attorney with prior disciplinary history because, among other
things, he deliberately lied to clients, to the Investigative Panel, and
during the hearing before the special master). Accordingly, it is
hereby ordered that the name of Michael Anthony Eddings be
removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the
State of Georgia. Eddings is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule
4-219 (b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.
Decided August 9, 2022.
Disbarment.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K.
Mittelman, William Van Hearnburg, Jr., Assistant General Counsel
State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.