306 Ga. 385 FINAL COPY
S19Y0977. IN THE MATTER OF CHERYL JOYCE BRAZIEL.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter arises from a renewed petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No.
275115), after we rejected her earlier petition, which had been filed
before the issuance of a formal complaint. See In the Matter of
Braziel, 303 Ga. 154 (810 SE2d 476) (2018) (“Braziel I”). In Braziel
I, we noted uncertainty regarding the underlying facts and the
violations that could be established. Upon remand, the State Bar
filed a formal complaint, and we appointed S. Jeffrey Rusbridge as
special master. Following discovery, Braziel filed a renewed petition
for voluntary discipline, which she amended after an evidentiary
hearing. The amended renewed petition sought a Review Panel
reprimand or a public reprimand for Braziel’s admitted violations of
Rule 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2). The State Bar supported the petition.
The special master’s report recommends that the Court accept the petition and impose a public reprimand. Given the extensive record
generated on remand and the special master’s factual findings, we
agree that acceptance of the petition for voluntary discipline is
appropriate.
The special master made the following factual findings.
Braziel, who was admitted to the Bar in 2007, settled a client’s
personal injury claim with the liability insurer, and the client
executed a limited liability release to enable pursuit of a claim
against her own uninsured motorist (“UM”) carrier. The client’s UM
policy provided reduced-limits coverage, meaning the amount of
coverage was reduced by available liability insurance limits, but
coverage could be restored to the extent that certain federal liens,
such as a Medicaid lien, were satisfied from the liability settlement
proceeds. Braziel’s client had been treated at Grady Hospital,
incurring charges of $24,384.77, and Braziel believed that the client
was eligible to receive Medicaid and that the hospital charges should
have resulted in the filing of a Medicaid lien, which would have
2 allowed recovery under the UM policy. However, Braziel had been
unable to document the existence of a Medicaid lien.
Braziel recalled that she had received a lien letter from an
attorney who represented Grady Hospital in another client’s matter,
and she wanted to contact that lawyer to ask his assistance in
determining if a lien had been filed or would be filed with respect to
her current client’s hospital bill. Braziel testified that, while she was
traveling outside of Georgia to obtain medical treatment, she called
her assistant to ask her to pull the lien letter from the prior client’s
file, duplicate it, and place it in the new client’s file, so that Braziel
could contact Grady’s lawyer for assistance. Braziel made the call to
her assistant while driving in rural Mississippi, and, due to poor
reception for the call, poor instructions, and poor training of the
assistant, the assistant misunderstood her instructions. The
assistant created a new lien letter patterned after the old one, but
with the information for the new client and the expected amount of
the lien. The result was a letter purportedly from Grady’s lawyer to
Braziel about a lien held by Grady in connection with Braziel’s
3 representation of her current client. Braziel arrived at her office
later that evening and saw the letter that had been created. Braziel
admonished her assistant and gave her additional instructions in
her duties as a legal assistant.
Rather than destroying the letter, however, Braziel faxed it
that evening to Felecia Morris, an administrative service provider
who has a law degree but is not a member of the Georgia Bar, and
asked her to confirm the existence of the lien. Braziel testified that
she explained the nature of the document to Morris and sent her the
letter for internal, informational purposes only, as it contained the
information Morris would need to track down the lien information.
Six days later, Morris emailed the letter to the new client’s UM
carrier, which then forwarded the letter to Grady’s lawyer. When
Grady’s lawyer contacted Braziel, Braziel promptly admitted what
had occurred, took responsibility for the matter, and attempted to
explain how the situation occurred. Braziel also severed her ties
with Morris.
4 Morris was deposed and provided a materially different version
of her interactions with Braziel. But the special master found Morris
not credible and concluded that there was no credible evidence to
contradict Braziel’s assertion that she did not personally create the
lien letter, send it to the UM carrier, or engage in any effort to make
it appear that Grady had a lien on the case when it did not. Based
on his factual findings, the special master concluded that Braziel
violated Rules 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), but that there was
insufficient evidence to establish any violation of Rules 4.1 or 8.4 (a)
(2). Citing the pertinent American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), the special master also found
the following mitigating circumstances: Braziel’s lack of prior
disciplinary history, her lack of selfish motive or an intent to deceive,
the existence of personal health problems that may have led to the
misconduct, her efforts to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct, her acceptance of responsibility and demonstration of
remorse for what occurred, and her demonstration of a cooperative
5 attitude in the disciplinary proceedings. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (l); see also In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652,
653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (“[W]e look to the American Bar
Association’s standards for guidance in determining the appropriate
sanction to impose.”). The special master further noted that he found
Braziel’s statements of remorse and acceptance of personal
responsibility to be sincere. The only aggravating factor that the
special master found was Braziel’s substantial experience in the
practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22 (i). The special master
concluded that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction. See
ABA Standard 7.3.
The special master’s factual findings are supported by the
record, and we are not in a position to second-guess his credibility
determinations. See In the Matter of Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 376 (695
SE2d 573) (2010) (“We have reviewed the record in this case and
conclude that the Special Master was in the best position to observe
the parties’ demeanor and credibility.”); In the Matter of Wright, 294
Ga. 289, 293-294 (751 SE2d 817) (2013) (noting that “the special
6 master was in the best position to determine the witnesses’
credibility” and determining that his findings “do not appear to be
unreasonable, given the testimony in this case”). Based on those
findings, we agree with the special master’s legal conclusion as to
the rules violations supported by the evidence. We also conclude
that, consistent with this Court’s precedents, a reprimand is the
appropriate sanction on the facts presented here. See In the Matter
of Heitmann, 297 Ga. 280 (773 SE2d 278) (2015) (public reprimand
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306 Ga. 385 FINAL COPY
S19Y0977. IN THE MATTER OF CHERYL JOYCE BRAZIEL.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter arises from a renewed petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No.
275115), after we rejected her earlier petition, which had been filed
before the issuance of a formal complaint. See In the Matter of
Braziel, 303 Ga. 154 (810 SE2d 476) (2018) (“Braziel I”). In Braziel
I, we noted uncertainty regarding the underlying facts and the
violations that could be established. Upon remand, the State Bar
filed a formal complaint, and we appointed S. Jeffrey Rusbridge as
special master. Following discovery, Braziel filed a renewed petition
for voluntary discipline, which she amended after an evidentiary
hearing. The amended renewed petition sought a Review Panel
reprimand or a public reprimand for Braziel’s admitted violations of
Rule 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2). The State Bar supported the petition.
The special master’s report recommends that the Court accept the petition and impose a public reprimand. Given the extensive record
generated on remand and the special master’s factual findings, we
agree that acceptance of the petition for voluntary discipline is
appropriate.
The special master made the following factual findings.
Braziel, who was admitted to the Bar in 2007, settled a client’s
personal injury claim with the liability insurer, and the client
executed a limited liability release to enable pursuit of a claim
against her own uninsured motorist (“UM”) carrier. The client’s UM
policy provided reduced-limits coverage, meaning the amount of
coverage was reduced by available liability insurance limits, but
coverage could be restored to the extent that certain federal liens,
such as a Medicaid lien, were satisfied from the liability settlement
proceeds. Braziel’s client had been treated at Grady Hospital,
incurring charges of $24,384.77, and Braziel believed that the client
was eligible to receive Medicaid and that the hospital charges should
have resulted in the filing of a Medicaid lien, which would have
2 allowed recovery under the UM policy. However, Braziel had been
unable to document the existence of a Medicaid lien.
Braziel recalled that she had received a lien letter from an
attorney who represented Grady Hospital in another client’s matter,
and she wanted to contact that lawyer to ask his assistance in
determining if a lien had been filed or would be filed with respect to
her current client’s hospital bill. Braziel testified that, while she was
traveling outside of Georgia to obtain medical treatment, she called
her assistant to ask her to pull the lien letter from the prior client’s
file, duplicate it, and place it in the new client’s file, so that Braziel
could contact Grady’s lawyer for assistance. Braziel made the call to
her assistant while driving in rural Mississippi, and, due to poor
reception for the call, poor instructions, and poor training of the
assistant, the assistant misunderstood her instructions. The
assistant created a new lien letter patterned after the old one, but
with the information for the new client and the expected amount of
the lien. The result was a letter purportedly from Grady’s lawyer to
Braziel about a lien held by Grady in connection with Braziel’s
3 representation of her current client. Braziel arrived at her office
later that evening and saw the letter that had been created. Braziel
admonished her assistant and gave her additional instructions in
her duties as a legal assistant.
Rather than destroying the letter, however, Braziel faxed it
that evening to Felecia Morris, an administrative service provider
who has a law degree but is not a member of the Georgia Bar, and
asked her to confirm the existence of the lien. Braziel testified that
she explained the nature of the document to Morris and sent her the
letter for internal, informational purposes only, as it contained the
information Morris would need to track down the lien information.
Six days later, Morris emailed the letter to the new client’s UM
carrier, which then forwarded the letter to Grady’s lawyer. When
Grady’s lawyer contacted Braziel, Braziel promptly admitted what
had occurred, took responsibility for the matter, and attempted to
explain how the situation occurred. Braziel also severed her ties
with Morris.
4 Morris was deposed and provided a materially different version
of her interactions with Braziel. But the special master found Morris
not credible and concluded that there was no credible evidence to
contradict Braziel’s assertion that she did not personally create the
lien letter, send it to the UM carrier, or engage in any effort to make
it appear that Grady had a lien on the case when it did not. Based
on his factual findings, the special master concluded that Braziel
violated Rules 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), but that there was
insufficient evidence to establish any violation of Rules 4.1 or 8.4 (a)
(2). Citing the pertinent American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), the special master also found
the following mitigating circumstances: Braziel’s lack of prior
disciplinary history, her lack of selfish motive or an intent to deceive,
the existence of personal health problems that may have led to the
misconduct, her efforts to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct, her acceptance of responsibility and demonstration of
remorse for what occurred, and her demonstration of a cooperative
5 attitude in the disciplinary proceedings. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (l); see also In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652,
653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (“[W]e look to the American Bar
Association’s standards for guidance in determining the appropriate
sanction to impose.”). The special master further noted that he found
Braziel’s statements of remorse and acceptance of personal
responsibility to be sincere. The only aggravating factor that the
special master found was Braziel’s substantial experience in the
practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22 (i). The special master
concluded that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction. See
ABA Standard 7.3.
The special master’s factual findings are supported by the
record, and we are not in a position to second-guess his credibility
determinations. See In the Matter of Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 376 (695
SE2d 573) (2010) (“We have reviewed the record in this case and
conclude that the Special Master was in the best position to observe
the parties’ demeanor and credibility.”); In the Matter of Wright, 294
Ga. 289, 293-294 (751 SE2d 817) (2013) (noting that “the special
6 master was in the best position to determine the witnesses’
credibility” and determining that his findings “do not appear to be
unreasonable, given the testimony in this case”). Based on those
findings, we agree with the special master’s legal conclusion as to
the rules violations supported by the evidence. We also conclude
that, consistent with this Court’s precedents, a reprimand is the
appropriate sanction on the facts presented here. See In the Matter
of Heitmann, 297 Ga. 280 (773 SE2d 278) (2015) (public reprimand
for violation of Rule 5.3 where independent contractor employed by
attorney made unsolicited contact with prospective clients); In the
Matter of Ellis, 296 Ga. 83 (764 SE2d 856) (2014) (Review Panel
reprimand for violation of Rule 5.3 where staff member signed
client’s name on medical-financing application without client’s
knowledge); In the Matter of Mashek, 295 Ga. 179 (758 SE2d 309)
(2014) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 5.3 (a), (b)
and 7.3 (d) for staff’s client solicitation of which lawyer should have
known); In the Matter of Grant, 287 Ga. 131 (694 SE2d 647) (2010)
(Review Panel reprimand for misconduct related to mishandling of
7 real estate closing and title insurance policies, and improper
supervision of paralegal who stole client funds). And we agree with
the special master that a public reprimand is the appropriate type
of reprimand in this matter. Accordingly, the Court accepts the
petition for voluntary discipline and directs that Cheryl Joyce
Braziel be administered a public reprimand in open court pursuant
to Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for her admitted violations
of Rule 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2).
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
8 Decided July 1, 2019.
Public reprimand.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William
D. NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K.
Mittelman, William J. Cobb, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,
for State Bar of Georgia.
Finch McCranie, Richard W. Hendrix, for Braziel.