NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 12, 2025
S25Y0537, S25Y0538. IN THE MATTER OF DOMINIQUE MARC HENRI LEMOINE.
PER CURIAM.
These disciplinary matters are before the Court on the
consolidated report and recommendation of the State Disciplinary
Review Board (“Review Board”), which reviewed the report and
recommendation of Special Master Charles David Jones involving
Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine (State Bar No. 446455), who has
been a member of the State Bar since 1998, pursuant to Bar Rules
4-214, 4-215, and 4-216. The Review Board adopted the Special
Master’s factual findings, conclusions of law, and recommendation
that Lemoine be disbarred from the practice of law for his violations
of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a),
1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), 1.15(III)(a), and 8.4(a)(4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in Bar Rule 4-
102(d) in two separate matters. The maximum penalty for a
violation of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a),
1.15(III)(a), and 8.4(a)(4) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty
for a violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) is a public
reprimand. Lemoine filed in this Court exceptions to the Review
Board’s report, in which he challenges many of the Special Master’s
factual findings; asserts that the Special Master ignored his mental
state and that, when taking this into account, no sanction higher
than a suspension should be imposed; and argues, in the alternative,
that the State Bar’s formal complaints be dismissed pursuant to In
the Matter of Brown, 319 Ga. 465 (2024), because, according to
Lemoine, his conduct from which the violations arose was not in
connection with the legal representation of a client. The State Bar
responded, stating that the overwhelming evidence shows that
Lemoine violated the Rules with which he was charged, that he was
acting in connection with the legal representation of a client in both
matters, and that Lemoine should be disbarred.
2 Upon careful consideration of the record, we conclude that
Lemoine’s exceptions to the Review Board’s report and
recommendation are without merit, and disbarment from the
practice of law is the appropriate sanction.
1. Procedural History
(a) S25Y0537
In June 2022, the State Bar filed a formal complaint alleging
that Lemoine failed to properly maintain funds that he held in a
fiduciary capacity while representing a client and improperly used
such funds to reimburse other clients and for personal use. As such,
the State Bar charged Lemoine with violations of Rules 1.15(I)(a)
(lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons
that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own funds); 1.15(II)(a) (requiring lawyer
to maintain a trust account and all funds held for a client or in any
other fiduciary capacity be deposited in a trust account);
1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) (requiring client funds to be placed in an interest-
bearing account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar
3 foundation or client and providing that no earnings from such an
interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law
firm); 1.15(III)(a) (requiring lawyer to maintain a trust account
separate from any business or personal accounts); and Rule 8.4(a)(4)
(it is a violation of the Rules for a lawyer to engage in professional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
Lemoine acknowledged service of the complaint and filed his
answer, in which he denied all Rule violations but admitted some of
the State Bar’s factual allegations. The State Bar then filed a motion
seeking summary judgment regarding the violations of Rules
1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a), 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), and 1.15(III)(a). Upon
reviewing Lemoine’s answers to the State Bar’s several
interrogatories and requests for admissions, Lemoine’s deposition
testimony, the several bank statements introduced into evidence,
and both parties’ arguments, the Special Master granted summary
judgment on the Rule 1.15(I)(a) violation—finding that the evidence
undisputedly showed that Lemoine failed to hold funds owed to a
third party separate from his own funds in connection to his legal
4 representation of a client—but denied summary judgment on the
other counts.
(b) S25Y0538
In January 2023, the State Bar filed a second formal complaint
charging Lemoine with violations of Rules 1.2(a) (lawyer shall abide
by a client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of
representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued); 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client); 1.4(a) (lawyer
shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information); 1.15(I)(a); 1.15(I)(c) (lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client any funds that the client is entitled to receive); 1.15(II)(a);
1.15(II)(c)(1)(i); and 8.4(a)(4) in a separate client matter. The State
Bar alleged that Lemoine failed to properly maintain funds he held
for his clients by commingling the clients’ funds with his own,
improperly used client funds to reimburse other clients and for his
personal use, and failed to comply with the clients’ request for their 5 money back. Lemoine acknowledged service of the complaint and
filed his answer, in which he again denied all Rule violations but
admitted some of the State Bar’s factual allegations. The State Bar
then filed a motion seeking summary judgment regarding the
violations of 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a), and 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i).
Upon reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both
parties, the Special Master granted summary judgment on the Rules
1.15(I)(a) and 1.15(I)(c) violations—finding that the evidence
undisputedly showed that Lemoine failed to hold funds owed to his
clients separate from his own and failed to promptly deliver funds
owed to his clients—but denied summary judgment on the other
counts. The Special Master then scheduled a consolidated
evidentiary hearing on the remaining counts for both matters and,
following the evidentiary hearing, issued his report and
recommendation.
2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
(a) Factual Findings
(i) S25Y0537
6 The Special Master recounted that in 2020, Lemoine became a
lawyer for a limited liability company engaged in facilitating and
securing transactions involving personal protective equipment (the
“LLC”). In August 2020, a consultant for the LLC worked with a
seller and a buyer to facilitate a large sale of surgical gloves. The
buyer was hesitant to send money directly to the seller, so the LLC’s
owner asked Lemoine if his IOLTA account could be used for the
transaction. The buyer agreed to Lemoine’s acting as the escrow
agent because Lemoine was an attorney and because the funds
would be transmitted through Lemoine’s “attorney escrow account.”
The LLC prepared the invoice for the sale of thousands of boxes of
surgical gloves, which listed Lemoine’s IOLTA account as the
account where the funds were to be sent. On September 1, 2020, the
buyer emailed Lemoine and requested that he not disburse any
funds until the goods were inspected; Lemoine acknowledged the
request and told the buyer that the funds would be released after
validation and transmission of the surgical gloves. On September 2,
the buyer wired approximately $222,400 into Lemoine’s account.
7 After the buyer wired the funds to the account, the LLC
instructed Lemoine to disburse 40% to the seller and, despite his
prior agreement with the buyer not to disburse any funds until the
goods were inspected, Lemoine wired $63,360 to the seller. At the
LLC’s direction, Lemoine also made three payments totaling
$17,200 from the wired funds to the LLC’s consultant for her work
on the transaction.
On September 28, 2020, the buyer received the goods,
determined that they were not what he ordered, sent an email to
Lemoine notifying him that the products were not compliant, and
asked him not to disburse the funds in his account. On that same
day, Lemoine responded to acknowledge that he had received this
email. In October 2020, the buyer emailed Lemoine several times
requesting his money back. Lemoine sent the seller a letter, stating
that he was the LLC’s attorney and demanding return of the
$63,360. Lemoine also responded to the buyer, informing the buyer
that he would return the funds by October 31, 2020. Lemoine failed
to return any portion of the buyer’s funds by this date.
8 In early November 2020, the buyer emailed Lemoine that he
had not received the funds. Lemoine responded that he had already
sent the funds back, and upon the buyer’s request, sent a copy of a
wire transfer purporting to show that he had wired the buyer
$132,483.40. However, Lemoine did not send that wire transfer.
And, although he told the buyer that he would send the funds,
Lemoine was aware that this would not be possible given the fact
that there was not enough money in the IOLTA account, as the
balance in the account was only $102,293.32 at this time. In late
November 2020, the buyer retained two lawyers to assist him with
getting his money back. Around this same time, Lemoine sent the
buyer a payment for $33,120.85—almost two months after the buyer
first requested that the funds be returned. Lemoine then made a
second payment of $20,000 to the buyer in December 2020. Shortly
thereafter, one of the buyer’s lawyers requested that Lemoine return
the rest of the funds and provide a complete accounting of the funds.
Lemoine failed to provide an accounting of the funds but told the
lawyer that he was fully committed to seeing all the funds returned
9 before the end of January. However, Lemoine did not return any
additional funds until May 2021, at which time he made a third wire
transfer for $79,362.55. Lemoine failed to make any further
payments.
Further, the Special Master found that the account Lemoine
used in the transaction was not properly constituted as an IOLTA
account because it did not contain the Tax ID number for the
Georgia Bar Foundation, nor was it an interest-bearing account with
the interest paid to a client. And, although Lemoine claimed that he
told the bank to designate the account as an IOLTA account, he
admitted during the evidentiary hearing that he did nothing to
ensure that the interest was going to the Georgia Bar Foundation
and he acknowledged that the Tax ID Number associated with the
account is the Tax ID Number for Lemoine’s law firm. The Special
Master also noted that the evidence showed that Lemoine moved
money back and forth from this account and his two operating
accounts, and he testified during the evidentiary hearing that he
used the buyer’s funds to pay other clients and third parties as well
10 as his own personal expenses. Moreover, the Special Master found
that, although Lemoine asserted that he did not represent anyone
in the transaction, the evidence—including his own actions and
testimony—demonstrated that he was acting as the LLC’s lawyer,
which was an intermediary in the transaction.
(ii) S25Y0538
As for the second matter, the Special Master recounted that in
April 2021, Lemoine was retained by two elderly French citizens
who do not reside in the United States—a husband and wife
(collectively, the “Clients”)—to represent them in a tax dispute with
the IRS. Lemoine informed the Clients that the IRS could seize
money they maintained in their accounts and advised them to
transfer funds to him to maintain in another one of his IOLTA
accounts.1 The Clients wired $175,000 into Lemoine’s IOLTA
account to be used, among other things, to pay any IRS penalties
and for Lemoine’s attorney fees. In May 2021, Lemoine transferred
1 The Special Master found that this account was a properly constituted
IOLTA account.
11 $115,000 of the $175,000 from the IOLTA account to his operating
account. On this same day, Lemoine transferred $80,000 of the
Clients’ money to the improperly constituted IOLTA account used
for the surgical glove transaction in an attempt to reimburse the
buyer. Throughout the month, Lemoine used the Clients’ funds to
reimburse other clients, as admitted by Lemoine in his deposition.
By the end of May, the balance in Lemoine’s IOLTA account was
$98.73, and the balance in Lemoine’s operating account to which he
transferred the Clients’ funds was -$62.75.
Regarding the IRS dispute, Lemoine requested a penalty
abatement, which the IRS denied in November 2021. Lemoine filed
an appeal but did not communicate with the Clients about the
matter. The Clients ended up resolving the IRS dispute themselves
in November 2023.
Additionally, in November 2021, while Lemoine was
representing the Clients in the IRS dispute, they requested that
Lemoine use a portion of the $175,000 they had wired to his account
12 to pay the property taxes on a home they owned in Florida.2 The
Clients sent Lemoine a copy of a tax bill they had received and
requested that he use their funds to pay the property tax bill as soon
as possible to avoid a late fee. Lemoine did not abide by the Clients’
directive to use the funds they had wired to him to pay the property
taxes and did not explain to them why he did not do so. Between
November 2021 and January 2022, the Clients asked Lemoine on
four occasions to wire them $30,000 from the funds they had sent
him so that they could pay for certain utilities and expenses
associated with the Florida property and continued to request that
he pay the property taxes. In mid-January 2020, after the Clients’
fourth request, Lemoine transferred $5,000 from his operating
account to the IOLTA account, and then sent the Clients $5,000 from
the IOLTA account, without explaining why he did not send them
the entire $30,000 that they had requested. The Clients sent
2 During his deposition, Lemoine testified that the Clients had specifically hired him to represent them in the IRS dispute and that their request that Lemoine use the money they had wired to him in relation to the IRS dispute to pay the property taxes on their Florida home “wasn’t discussed at the time” he was retained.
13 Lemoine an email acknowledging receipt of the $5,000, requesting
that he send the remainder of the $30,000, and renewing their
request for Lemoine to use the funds they had wired in relation to
the IRS dispute to pay the property taxes. Lemoine responded,
sending them a copy of a check dated January 14, 2022, for $5,615.63
made payable to the county tax collector, which led the Clients to
believe that Lemoine had paid the property taxes. And, although
Lemoine contended that he sent the check, he also acknowledged
that he only had $60.57 in the account at this time, that the check
was never debited from the account, and that he provided no
evidence that he sent the check. In his response, Lemoine also
informed the Clients that they should receive another transfer,
which led the Clients to believe that he had sent them the remainder
of the requested funds. However, he never did so and, as a result,
the Clients had to sell personal property and borrow money from
friends to pay the maintenance expenses on their Florida home.
In late January 2022, the wife emailed Lemoine, informing him
that her husband was hospitalized and requesting that he
14 immediately send her the balance of the funds in his possession after
deducting his attorney fees. Lemoine did not respond. On that same
day, a Florida attorney emailed Lemoine, informing Lemoine that
he had been contacted by the Clients and requesting the return of
the funds and an accounting of the funds. In February 2022,
Lemoine emailed the attorney an accounting ledger and invoice, and
told the attorney that once the Clients approved the invoice, he
would transfer the balance of their funds. Around the same time
that the Clients received this invoice, they became aware that
Lemoine had still not paid the property taxes, and their Florida
attorney requested a conference call. During this call, Lemoine
failed to explain why he had not paid the property taxes, but he
“committed to sending a new check to the [county tax collector], to
sending a final invoice to the [Clients,] and to return the balance of
the funds.” On March 11, 2022, Lemoine wrote a check for the
property tax bill, which was marked as paid on March 16, 2022—
almost four months after the Clients had first requested him to do
15 so. And, because Lemoine failed to timely pay the property taxes,
the Clients incurred late payment penalties.
In December 2023, shortly before the evidentiary hearings,
Lemoine contacted the Florida attorney regarding making payments
that he owed the Clients and sent two wire transfers for $1,000.
However, despite telling the Clients and the Florida attorney that
he would return the remainder of the funds owed, he did not do so
and has still not returned the funds.
(b) Rule Violations
Based on the factual findings, the Special Master concluded
that, in addition to violating Rule 1.15(I)(a) (as the Special Master
had already granted the State Bar summary judgment as to this
count), Lemoine violated Rules 1.15(II)(a) by depositing client and
fiduciary funds into an improperly constituted trust account;
1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) by maintaining an IOLTA account with the interest
not disbursed to a client or the Georgia Bar Foundation, noting that
Lemoine set up the account such that the interest went to his law 16 firm; 1.15(III)(a) by failing to maintain a trust account separate from
his business and personal accounts and using his IOLTA account for
multiple purposes including for his personal expenses; and 8.4(a)(4)
by misrepresenting to the buyer that he had wired funds when he
did not do so, fraudulently converting the buyer’s funds to pay other
clients and for his personal expenses, and allowing the buyer to be
misled into believing that his funds were being wired into a properly
constituted IOLTA account.
that, in addition to violating Rule 1.15(I)(a) and 1.15(I)(c) (as the
Special Master had already granted the State Bar summary
judgment as to these counts), Lemoine violated Rules 1.2(a) by
failing to consult with the Clients about the developments in their
IRS case and failing to abide by the Clients’ decisions on how to
disburse their funds; 1.3 by failing to timely use the funds they had
wired to Lemoine in relation to the IRS matter to pay the tax
collector as they had requested; 1.4(a) by failing to respond to the
17 Clients’ requests regarding how to disburse their funds and failing
to provide honest, reasonable, and necessary communication
regarding the Clients’ funds; 1.15(II)(a) by depositing client funds
into an improperly constituted trust account, as he transferred the
Clients’ funds into the improperly constituted IOLTA account he
used for the glove transaction; 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) by maintaining an
IOLTA account with the interest not disbursed to a client or the
Georgia Bar Foundation; and 8.4(a)(4) by misrepresenting to the
Clients that he had sent the payment to the county tax collector
when he never sent the check and knew that he had insufficient
funds to provide the payment.
(c) ABA Standards
After finding that Lemoine violated the provisions of the GRPC
with which he was charged in both disciplinary matters, the Special
Master applied the framework set out in the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”), which
provide that, when imposing a sanction, “a court should consider the
following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; 18 (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct;
and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” ABA
Standard 3.0. Regarding S25Y0537, the Special Master determined
that Lemoine had a duty to preserve the funds in a properly
constituted trust account and had not only failed to deposit the funds
in a proper account but failed to safeguard the funds. Regarding
S25Y0538, the Special Master determined that Lemoine had a duty
to communicate and consult with the Clients, diligently perform the
services that he had been hired to perform, and preserve his Clients’
funds, but had failed to meet these obligations. In assessing
Lemoine’s mental state, the Special Master determined that
Lemoine’s actions were knowing rather than inadvertent or
negligent. Specifically, the Special Master determined that Lemoine
was “acutely aware” that he was converting client and fiduciary
funds for his own use or to pay others, as he testified at the
evidentiary hearing that he used money that did not belong to him
to fill a “hole” that had been created by his own conduct in not
monitoring his bank account and used these funds to pay the client
19 “that screams the loudest.” Further, Lemoine knowingly
disregarded the Clients’ direction to return their money. In
assessing the injury caused, the Special Master determined that the
Clients, who were elderly and vulnerable, suffered significant harm
and had to sell other property to satisfy financial obligations due to
Lemoine stealing their money, and that Lemoine caused harm to the
legal system and profession by converting hundreds of thousands of
dollars that did not belong to him.
As for aggravating circumstances, the Special Master
determined that the following factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.22
applied: dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct;
multiple offenses; vulnerability of the victim; and substantial
experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22(b), (c), (d),
(h), and (i). Additionally, the Special Master concluded that, out of
the 13 mitigating factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.32, only one
applied, as before these two matters, Lemoine had no prior discipline
history. See ABA Standard 9.32(a).
(d) Recommended Discipline 20 The Special Master then concluded that given the Rules
violated and significant aggravating factors, disbarment is the
appropriate discipline for Lemoine’s conduct, noting that
“[Lemoine’s] conduct was dishonest, it was constant, and it was
harmful.” In making this recommendation, the Special Master relied
on several cases in which this Court has imposed disbarment for
similar rule violations. See In the Matter of Sicay-Perrow, 310 Ga.
855 (2021) (disbarment for lawyer who violated Rules 1.15(I)(a) and
(c), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), and 8.4(a)(4)); In the Matter of Turner, 311
Ga. 204 (2021) (disbarment for lawyer who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a),
1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II), 1.15(III), 8.4(a)(4), and 9.3 in two matters); In the
Matter of Cheatham, 304 Ga. 645 (2018) (disbarment for lawyer who
violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(I)(a) and (c), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), 5.5(a),
and 8.4(a)(4)).
3. The Review Board’s Report and Recommendation
Lemoine filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and
recommendation, as well as a motion to dismiss the State Bar’s
formal complaints. In addition to challenging many of the Special
21 Master’s factual findings, Lemoine argued that the State Bar’s
allegations were barred by Brown—which was issued after the
Special Master’s report and recommendation—in which this Court
held that Rules 1.15(I)(c) and 1.15(II)(b) “do not apply to lawyers
when they are acting as fiduciaries not in connection with the legal
representation of a client or otherwise in the practice of law.” 319
Ga. at 466. The Review Board rejected this argument, concluding
that Brown is distinguishable because Brown was acting solely as a
fiduciary and was not practicing law, whereas, in these matters, the
Special Master specifically found that Lemoine was retained as the
LLC’s attorney, which was an intermediary in the transaction, and
by the Clients. The Review Board then adopted the Special Master’s
factual findings and conclusions of law and recommended that
Lemoine be disbarred for his violations of the GRPC provisions.
4. Lemoine’s Exceptions
Lemoine filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report, arguing
that the Special Master failed to consider all the evidence which, if
fully examined, shows that the State Bar failed to establish by clear
22 and convincing evidence that Lemoine violated the Rules with which
he was charged. Lemoine also contends that the Special Master
erred by failing to consider his mental state which, when taken into
account, demonstrates that he should receive a sanction no higher
than a suspension. Additionally, Lemoine argues in the alternative
that the State Bar’s formal complaints should be dismissed under
Brown because, according to Lemoine, his conduct in both matters
was not connected to the representation of a client or the practice of
law. As explained in our analysis section below, we reject Lemoine’s
arguments.
5. Analysis
(a) First, Lemoine challenges the Special Master’s factual
findings in both disciplinary matters, arguing that the Special
Master ignored several facts which, if fully examined, show that the
State Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Lemoine violated the Rules with which he was charged. Specifically,
as for S25Y0537, Lemoine argues that the Special Master failed to
consider that he directed the bank to designate the account to which
23 the buyer wired the funds as an IOLTA account; that he commingled
fiduciary funds with his own and used fiduciary funds to compensate
other clients because he was “targeted by scammers,” which left a
deficit in his account; that he never used fiduciary funds for personal
use; that there was no evidence that he allowed the LLC to use his
status as a lawyer to receive the fiduciary funds; and that he was
required by contract to wire 40% of the buyer’s funds to the seller.
As for S25Y0538, Lemoine argues that the Clients never stated that
they were unsatisfied with Lemoine’s communication regarding the
IRS matter or that they hired another lawyer due to Lemoine failing
to respond to their requests, and that he did not intentionally steal
the Clients’ money and had always intended to pay them back.3
However, this Court has explained that “the special master is
in the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility,” and that
it “generally defers to the factual findings and credibility
determinations made by the special master unless those findings or
3 Lemoine also repeats his assertion that the Special Master failed to
consider the fraudulent activity regarding his IOLTA account.
24 determinations are clearly erroneous.” In the Matter of Tuggle, 317
Ga. 255, 258 (2023) (citations omitted). Here, the Special Master
considered the evidence, and, upon our review of the record, we
conclude that his subsequent findings and determinations are not
clearly erroneous. Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special
Master failed to consider that he directed the bank to designate the
account to which the buyer wired the funds as an IOLTA account,
the Special Master explicitly considered this assertion in his report
and recommendation and explained that Lemoine admitted during
the evidentiary hearing that he did nothing to ensure that the
account was properly set up and that the Tax ID Number Lemoine
provided for the account was the Tax ID Number for Lemoine’s law
firm, rather than for the Georgia Bar Foundation. Further, we have
explained that even inadvertent violations of the Rules relating to
trust accounts are subject to discipline. See In the Matter of Howard,
292 Ga. 413, 414 (2013) (“a trust account is a high honor and
privilege afforded to a member of the Bar, so even a technical
25 violation should have public discipline so as to protect clients, courts,
and the public”).
Additionally, the record shows that the Special Master
considered Lemoine’s claim that he commingled client and fiduciary
funds with his own and used fiduciary funds to compensate other
clients because he was “targeted by scammers,” and found that any
fraudulent issues with Lemoine’s account was created by his own
conduct in failing to monitor the account. Lemoine testified that he
received and deposited into his IOLTA account a “fake check”
received from a client in the amount of $140,092 and then disbursed
funds from his account before realizing he had been given “a bad
check,” such that “a hole of $140,000 in [his] IOLTA account” was
created. However, during the evidentiary hearing, in response to
counsel for the State Bar asking Lemoine how long it took for him to
notice the deficit in his account, Lemoine replied “five or six
months.” Further, Lemoine admitted that he was “[n]ot always”
looking at his IOLTA account on a monthly basis, and that, upon his
contacting the client who delivered the fake check after several
26 months, the client had “disappeared.” See Tuggle, 317 Ga. at 258
(noting this Court’s authority to rely on undisputed material facts,
even when not contained in the Special Master’s report).
Additionally, the record supports the Special Master’s finding
that Lemoine used fiduciary funds for his personal use, as during
his deposition testimony, when Lemoine was asked about several
transfers he made from his IOLTA account containing the buyer’s
funds to his operating account, he stated that he did not remember
what those transfers were for or why he had made them, but that
the transfers had been authorized and he had not used client or
fiduciary funds for his own personal use. Yet, later during his
deposition, Lemoine testified that only “some” of the transfers from
the IOLTA account were authorized and that he was “defrauded by
a crook” and “in the meantime, [he] still ha[s] to eat.” Thus, based
on this testimony, the Special Master was authorized to infer that
Lemoine used the funds for his own personal expenses and
livelihood.
27 Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that there is no evidence that
he allowed the LLC to use his status as a lawyer to receive the
fiduciary funds, a review of the transcript from the evidentiary
hearing reveals that the buyer testified that he agreed to the
transaction with the LLC only because Lemoine was a lawyer; that
“[he] never would have done the deal” otherwise; and that, when he
sent the money to what he believed to be an attorney escrow account,
he thought it was guaranteed that his funds would be released only
upon giving Lemoine confirmation to do so.
Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special Master failed
to consider that he was required by contract to wire 40% of the
buyer’s funds to the seller, we note that the Special Master was
entitled to discredit Lemoine’s claim, as the buyer testified at the
evidentiary hearing that, although this was customary practice
when conducting an international transaction with a factory, the
seller in this case was a company with which he was not familiar
such that he would not have agreed to this initial 40% payment.
Moreover, regardless of whether Lemoine was required to wire 40%
28 of the buyer’s funds, we note that the Special Master found that by
November 2020, the balance in the IOLTA account in which
Lemoine was holding the buyer’s initially wired $222,400 was only
$102,293.32, and that Lemoine had testified during the evidentiary
hearing that he improperly used the buyer’s funds to pay other
clients and third parties. Further, the Special Master’s
determination that Lemoine’s conduct in this disciplinary matter
violated Rules 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a), 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), 1.15(III)(a), and
Rule 8.4(a)(4) did not hinge on this 40% transfer.
As for S25Y0538, the Special Master was authorized to find
that Lemoine did not adequately communicate with the Clients
regarding the IRS matter and that they hired another lawyer due to
Lemoine’s failure to respond to their requests. The wife testified at
the evidentiary hearing that Lemoine would send them copies of
documents that he sent to the IRS but they did “not have a lot of
communications” about what those documents meant; that she
began receiving correspondence from the IRS through her
accountant because Lemoine “never sent [the Clients] the answers
29 … that the IRS would give him” regarding their case; and that she
realized she “could no longer have trust in [Lemoine]” based on his
failure to communicate with the Clients.
Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special Master
disregarded Lemoine’s testimony that he did not intentionally steal
the Clients’ money and had always intended to pay them back,
again, we determine that the Special Master’s finding is supported
by the record. The wife testified at the evidentiary hearing that the
Clients have still not received all the funds they originally
transferred to Lemoine and that, from the original $175,000 they
transferred, he still owed them $146,217.63. Moreover, during cross-
examination, Lemoine admitted that he owed the Clients “$146,000
and something” and, when asked if he believed that his failure to
refund the Clients’ money is inconsistent with his obligations as a
lawyer, he responded “Yes, it is, of course.” Accordingly, this
enumeration of error fails.
(b) Additionally, Lemoine asserts that the Special Master
failed to consider his mental state and, when taking this into
30 account, he should receive a sanction no higher than a suspension.
However, this is not an accurate statement, as the record shows that
the Special Master considered the evidence in its entirety and found
that Lemoine acted knowingly in intentionally converting the
fiduciary funds for an improper use, as he admitted to using these
funds to pay back other clients and his own living expenses, and
intentionally misleading the buyer and his Clients that he would
return their funds when he was aware that he did not have enough
money in his accounts to do so, as he had already converted these
funds for other uses. Further, although Lemoine contends that he
should receive a sanction no higher than a suspension, he does not
cite any authority to support such a sanction. And the cases cited by
the Special Master—Turner, Sicay-Perrow, and Cheatham—support
the recommendation of disbarment. Accordingly, this enumeration
of error fails.
(c) Alternatively, Lemoine argues that he cannot be found to
have violated the Rules with which he was charged in either matter
pursuant to Brown, in which we held that Rules 1.15(I)(c) and
31 1.15(II)(b) (providing that no personal funds shall ever be deposited
in a lawyer’s trust account) do not apply to lawyers when they are
acting as fiduciaries not in connection with the legal representation
of a client or otherwise in the practice of law. See 319 Ga. at 466.
According to Lemoine, he was not acting in connection with the legal
representation of a client because he did not represent the LLC
during the surgical glove transaction and the funds that the Clients
wired to him were unrelated to the IRS matter for which he was
hired.
However, although the Special Master’s report was issued
prior to Brown, the Special Master specifically found that the LLC
served as an intermediary in the transaction and that Lemoine acted
as the LLC’s attorney during this time, as he held himself out as the
LLC’s attorney to the buyer and seller and both the LLC’s owner and
consultant testified to such. And the fact that Lemoine did not
represent the buyer does not mean that his actions were not in
connection with the legal representation of a client. See In the
Matter of McDonald, 319 Ga. 197, 206–08 (2024) (attorney violated
32 Rules with which she was charged where attorney was “acting in her
capacity as a lawyer in connection with [a] transaction,” received
money from a third party “into her escrow account in a ‘fiduciary
capacity,’” and commingled the funds that she received and failed to
keep and maintain records of the trust account used for the
transaction). Cf. Brown, 319 Ga. at 466 (attorney could not be found
to have violated Rules 1.15(I)(c) and 1.15(II)(b) where attorney “was
contacted and asked if she would consider acting as successor
trustee for the Trusts, and she agreed to do so for a fee in her
‘individual capacity,’ rather than as a lawyer”). The Special Master
also specifically found that Lemoine was hired by the Clients to
represent them in the IRS matter; that he advised the Clients to
wire him money from their accounts so that the funds could not be
seized by the IRS; that based on Lemoine’s advice, the Clients wired
him $175,000; and that the Clients later made requests regarding
how Lemoine disburse these funds, including paying their property
taxes and wiring them money so that they could pay for certain
utilities and expenses associated with their home. Thus, while
33 Lemoine was initially retained to represent the Clients in their
dispute with the IRS, his conduct in failing to disburse the Clients’
funds as directed is clearly connected with the legal representation
of a client. Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.
Therefore, after considering the record, we agree with the
Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this
matter and that this sanction is consistent with prior cases
disbarring lawyers for similar conduct. See In the Matter of Raines,
319 Ga. 820 (2024) (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules
1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(b), 1.15(I)(c), and 1.15(II)(b) where attorney failed
to safeguard client funds, disregarded the interests of third parties
in the settlement funds, failed to promptly deliver the funds owed to
the clients and third parties, and converted the funds for personal
use); In the Matter of Doeve, 303 Ga. 672 (2018) (disbarring attorney
for violations of Rules 1.15(I), 1.15(II), 1.15(III)(b)(2), and 8.4(a)(4)
where attorney agreed to act as an escrow agent, received funds from
an investor in connection with his client’s transaction, disbursed the
investor’s funds without approval, failed to communicate with the
34 investor about the status of the funds, repeatedly issued
insufficient-funds checks to those involved in the transaction, and
misled those involved in the transaction about when they could
expect to be paid). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of
Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Lemoine
is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not participating.