319 Ga. 505 FINAL COPY
S24Y0865. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for
voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent Curtis Lee Allen
(State Bar No. 009905), pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his
petition, Allen, who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia
and Florida since 1994, asks this Court to impose a ten-day
suspension, nunc pro tunc, as substantially similar discipline to a
ten-day suspension he received in Florida for his conduct in
representing an insurance company in two cases. In its response, the
State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition. We agree that
a ten-day suspension is appropriate as “substantially similar
discipline,” see GRPC 9.4 (b) (3), for the suspension Allen received
in Florida. Nevertheless, Allen’s petition contains several
deficiencies that preclude final resolution of this matter at this time. Accordingly, we reject his petition for voluntary reciprocal
discipline.
To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in
Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment,
pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on
December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten
days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one
year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and
entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the
cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him.1 Allen states that he
served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The
State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action
against Allen pursuant to GRPC 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed
this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-
227 (b).
1 Although Allen states in his petition that the Florida Supreme Court’s
order and the consent judgment are “attached,” neither of those documents appears in the record before this Court. In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary
matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a
published opinion that, while representing an insurance company,
Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the
insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under
oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance
company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about
the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the
high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found
to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor
Misconduct),2 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons),3 and 4-
2 Florida Rule 3-4.3 provides in relevant part that “[t]he commission by
a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of the lawyer’s relations as a lawyer or otherwise, whether committed within Florida or outside the state of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or a misdemeanor.” 3 Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” 8.4 (d) (Misconduct).4 Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is
analogous to GRPC 9.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary
rule equivalent to Florida Rule 3-4.3 or Rule 4-8.4 (d). Allen states
that in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to
four aggravating factors: prior disciplinary history, pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the
practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the
Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising
from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct,
full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the
4 Florida Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic[.] disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b),
(c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to
ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply
with disciplinary rules. Accordingly, he requests, as substantially
similar discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law
in Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his
Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon
the entry of its opinion.
The State Bar responds by agreeing with Allen’s recitation of
the disciplinary matters against him and by stating that it does not
contest the facts that Allen expressed remorse for his actions and
cooperated fully with the Florida Bar. Therefore, the State Bar
recommends that the Court accept Allen’s voluntary petition and
impose the requested discipline.
This Court has generally interpreted the Bar Rules governing
reciprocal discipline to require the imposition of substantially
similar discipline as was imposed in the other jurisdiction, and here,
the ten-day suspension Allen requests is identical to the suspension he served in Florida.5 See In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168,
177 (3) (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (noting “the nature of reciprocal
discipline matters[,] . . . wherein this Court must only impose
‘substantially similar’ discipline”). See also In the Matter of
Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894) (2023) (accepting
attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal discipline and imposing
ten-day suspension, which is generally not a disciplinary sanction
available in Georgia, because the requested suspension was
“identical” to discipline imposed in Florida). However, we decline to
accept Allen’s petition at this stage for two reasons. First, although
Allen’s petition references various documents associated with the
Florida disciplinary proceeding, no such documents were attached
for our review. See In the Matter of Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 754 (854
5 Allen is on disciplinary probation in Florida for one year, but the Georgia Bar Rules do not provide for probation as a sanction. However, this Court has previously approved reciprocal suspensions “without adding time for the probationary period” imposed by other jurisdictions, so this would not preclude our acceptance of his petition. See, e.g., In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 84 (880 SE2d 214) (2022); In the Matter of Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727, 728 (755 SE2d 758) (2014).
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319 Ga. 505 FINAL COPY
S24Y0865. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for
voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent Curtis Lee Allen
(State Bar No. 009905), pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his
petition, Allen, who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia
and Florida since 1994, asks this Court to impose a ten-day
suspension, nunc pro tunc, as substantially similar discipline to a
ten-day suspension he received in Florida for his conduct in
representing an insurance company in two cases. In its response, the
State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition. We agree that
a ten-day suspension is appropriate as “substantially similar
discipline,” see GRPC 9.4 (b) (3), for the suspension Allen received
in Florida. Nevertheless, Allen’s petition contains several
deficiencies that preclude final resolution of this matter at this time. Accordingly, we reject his petition for voluntary reciprocal
discipline.
To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in
Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment,
pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on
December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten
days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one
year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and
entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the
cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him.1 Allen states that he
served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The
State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action
against Allen pursuant to GRPC 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed
this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-
227 (b).
1 Although Allen states in his petition that the Florida Supreme Court’s
order and the consent judgment are “attached,” neither of those documents appears in the record before this Court. In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary
matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a
published opinion that, while representing an insurance company,
Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the
insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under
oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance
company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about
the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the
high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found
to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor
Misconduct),2 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons),3 and 4-
2 Florida Rule 3-4.3 provides in relevant part that “[t]he commission by
a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of the lawyer’s relations as a lawyer or otherwise, whether committed within Florida or outside the state of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or a misdemeanor.” 3 Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” 8.4 (d) (Misconduct).4 Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is
analogous to GRPC 9.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary
rule equivalent to Florida Rule 3-4.3 or Rule 4-8.4 (d). Allen states
that in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to
four aggravating factors: prior disciplinary history, pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the
practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the
Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising
from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct,
full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the
4 Florida Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic[.] disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b),
(c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to
ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply
with disciplinary rules. Accordingly, he requests, as substantially
similar discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law
in Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his
Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon
the entry of its opinion.
The State Bar responds by agreeing with Allen’s recitation of
the disciplinary matters against him and by stating that it does not
contest the facts that Allen expressed remorse for his actions and
cooperated fully with the Florida Bar. Therefore, the State Bar
recommends that the Court accept Allen’s voluntary petition and
impose the requested discipline.
This Court has generally interpreted the Bar Rules governing
reciprocal discipline to require the imposition of substantially
similar discipline as was imposed in the other jurisdiction, and here,
the ten-day suspension Allen requests is identical to the suspension he served in Florida.5 See In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168,
177 (3) (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (noting “the nature of reciprocal
discipline matters[,] . . . wherein this Court must only impose
‘substantially similar’ discipline”). See also In the Matter of
Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894) (2023) (accepting
attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal discipline and imposing
ten-day suspension, which is generally not a disciplinary sanction
available in Georgia, because the requested suspension was
“identical” to discipline imposed in Florida). However, we decline to
accept Allen’s petition at this stage for two reasons. First, although
Allen’s petition references various documents associated with the
Florida disciplinary proceeding, no such documents were attached
for our review. See In the Matter of Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 754 (854
5 Allen is on disciplinary probation in Florida for one year, but the Georgia Bar Rules do not provide for probation as a sanction. However, this Court has previously approved reciprocal suspensions “without adding time for the probationary period” imposed by other jurisdictions, so this would not preclude our acceptance of his petition. See, e.g., In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 84 (880 SE2d 214) (2022); In the Matter of Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727, 728 (755 SE2d 758) (2014). Instead, as explained below, we reject his petition because of his failure to make certain showings in connection with his request for reciprocal discipline. SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting attorney’s voluntary petition for
reciprocal suspension for, inter alia, failing to provide documents
from his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Second, although Allen
requests that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates
he served his suspension in Florida, he has failed to show that he is
entitled to a retroactive suspension. This Court has held that
when an attorney requests entry of a suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date on which their law practice ended, and that they complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in such a decision, such as assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating the transfer of client files and critical information about ongoing cases to new counsel.
In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010).
This Court has imposed retroactive suspensions as reciprocal
discipline when the attorney made a showing that he or she stopped
practicing law in Georgia while suspended in another jurisdiction,
which the State Bar did not contest or dispute. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. at 177 (3) (imposing retroactive
suspension as reciprocal discipline where attorney provided evidence that he stopped practicing law in Georgia in February
2019); In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 85 (880 SE2d 214)
(2022) (imposing retroactive suspension as reciprocal discipline
where attorney showed that he was not practicing law in Georgia
and the State Bar indicated that he was on inactive status). Here,
in contrast, Allen failed to provide any evidence that he stopped
practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida.
Accordingly, he has not made the necessary showing to have his
suspension imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates of his Florida
suspension. When this Court finds a voluntary petition for discipline
deficient, our practice is to reject the petition. See In the Matter of
Thompson, 310 Ga. at 754 (rejecting petition for voluntary reciprocal
discipline, even though the State Bar recommended the Court accept
the petition, due to several deficiencies in the petition, including
that the attorney referenced, but failed to attach, documents
associated with his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Accordingly, we
reject Allen’s petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline. Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
Decided July 2, 2024.
Petition for voluntary discipline.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, James S. Lewis,
Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General State Bar, for State Bar of
Georgia.