In the Matter of Curtis Lee Allen

907 S.E.2d 637, 320 Ga. 104

Opinion

320 Ga. 104 FINAL COPY

S25Y0025. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the amended

petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent

Curtis Lee Allen (State Bar No. 009905) after this Court rejected his

first petition due to “several deficiencies that preclude[d] final

resolution of th[e] matter.” See In the Matter of Allen, 319 Ga. 505,

506 (904 SE2d 354) (2024) (“Allen I”). In his amended petition, Allen,

who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia and Florida

since 1994, has corrected the deficiencies in his original petition. He

again requests that this Court impose a ten-day suspension, nunc

pro tunc to the date of a ten-day suspension he received in Florida

for his conduct in representing an insurance company in two cases.

The State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition, and, given

the current record before us, we do so.

As recited in Allen I: To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment, pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him. Allen states that he served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action against Allen pursuant to [Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”)] 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a published opinion that, while representing an insurance company, Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct), 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), and 4-8.4 (d) (Misconduct). Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is analogous to GRPC 4.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary rule equivalent to Florida Rule 3-4.3 or Rule 4-8.4 (d). Allen states that in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to four aggravating factors: prior

2 disciplinary history, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct, full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b), (c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply with disciplinary rules.

Allen I, 319 Ga. at 506-507 (footnotes omitted).

Based on those facts, Allen requested, as substantially similar

discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law in

Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his ten-day

Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon

the entry of its opinion. But this Court rejected his original petition

because Allen attached none of the Florida documents associated

with the Florida discipline and because he failed to show that he

stopped practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida,

as was necessary to establish his entitlement to suspension nunc pro

3 tunc. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136)

(2010) (explaining that when a lawyer requests discipline nunc pro

tunc, it is his responsibility to demonstrate that he voluntarily

stopped practicing law, the date on which his law practice ended,

and that he complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in

such a decision).

In his amended petition, Allen attaches the documents

associated with the Florida discipline, which confirm the facts and

resolution of the Florida disciplinary matter, and he explains that,

after graduating from a Georgia law school, he was admitted to the

bars of both Georgia and Florida in 1994, but he immediately moved

to Florida and has practiced law exclusively within that state

throughout his career. Allen notes that, because he has never

practiced law in Georgia in any capacity, he has no Georgia clients

to notify of his suspension and no Georgia office to close, but states

that he did promptly notify his Florida clients of his suspension.

Based on that showing, Allen again requests that this Court suspend

his license for ten days, nunc pro tunc, and concurrent with the

4 Florida suspension, noting that such an action will allow automatic

reinstatement upon entry of this Court’s opinion.

The State Bar admits that Allen has corrected the issues that

this Court identified with his original petition and asserts that it

has found no record of Allen ever practicing law in Georgia or

representing Georgia clients. It thus urges this Court to accept the

petition and impose the requested discipline.

Given the record currently before this Court, it appears that

the imposition of a suspension nunc pro tunc is appropriate here.

See Onipede, 288 Ga. at 157; In the Matter of Hutt, 291 Ga. 171, 172

(728 SE2d 552) (2012) (instating suspension nunc pro tunc to the

date of the Florida suspension where “the record indicate[d] that

[lawyer] did not practice law in Georgia during the period of his

Florida suspension and instead promptly sought the imposition of

reciprocal discipline,” and the Bar “support[ed] the request”). See

also In the Matter of Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894)

(2023) (accepting attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal

discipline and imposing ten-day suspension, which is generally not

5 a disciplinary sanction available in Georgia, because the requested

suspension was “identical” to discipline imposed in Florida).

Accordingly, we accept Allen’s amended petition for voluntary

reciprocal discipline and suspend him from the practice of law for

ten days, nunc pro tunc to January 29, 2024, the date his suspension

became effective in Florida. Allen is also hereby reinstated, given

that his ten-day suspension will have been completed by the date on

which this opinion will be issued.

Petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline accepted. Ten-day suspension, nunc pro tunc to January 29, 2024; reinstated. All the Justices concur.

Decided October 15, 2024.

Reinstatement.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.

NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, James S. Lewis,

Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State

Bar of Georgia.