318 Ga. 389 FINAL COPY
S24Y0267. IN THE MATTER OF CHERYL JOYCE BRAZIEL.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt, who
recommends that Respondent Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No.
275115) receive a two-year suspension with a condition on
reinstatement for her misconduct in relation to negotiations with
lienholders during the settlement of a personal injury case, in
connection with which she violated Rules 1.15 (I) (b),1 1.15 (I) (c),2
1 Rule 1.15 (I) (b) provides in relevant part that “[f]or the purposes of this
Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person’s interest in funds or other property in the lawyer’s possession if: (1) the interest is known to the lawyer, and (2) the interest is based upon one of the following: (i) a statutory lien[.]” 2 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that “[u]pon receiving funds or other property
in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.” and 4.13 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).4 The maximum sanction for a single
violation of any of these Rules is disbarment. Braziel, a member of
the State Bar of Georgia since 2007, is currently under
administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing
legal education requirements.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree that a two-year
suspension with a condition is the proper sanction for Braziel’s
misconduct in this matter, with the two-year suspension to begin
only after her current administrative suspension is lifted. See Bar
Rule 8-108 (setting out procedures for reinstatement following
administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing
legal education requirements).
3 Rule 4.1 provides in relevant part that “[i]n the course of representing
a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . .” 4 Because the misconduct took place in 2017, prior to the July 1, 2018
effective date of the revisions of the GRPC, the former rules apply. But as to the violations charged here, there is no material difference in the former rules and the current rules, and we quote the current rules.
2 In a formal complaint filed in 2021, the State Bar charged
Braziel with several violations of the GRPC, including Rules 1.15 (I)
(b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 4.1. After a hearing, the Special Master
concluded that Braziel violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 4.1 and found
facts demonstrating that Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b).5 Neither
Braziel nor the State Bar filed exceptions to or requested review by
the State Disciplinary Review Board.
The facts, as found by the Special Master and supported by the
record, show that Braziel was retained to pursue a personal injury
claim for a client who was injured in July 2016 in an automobile
collision in Texas, for which he received treatment at a hospital in
Texas.6 The client continued to receive medical treatment after he
5 In her pleadings before the Special Master, Braziel admitted a violation
of Rule 1.15 (I) (b). 6 We note that the record shows that Braziel is not admitted to practice
in Texas and that there is no indication in the record that Braziel was admitted pro hac vice for any court proceeding related to the representation. Although Braziel’s office was in Georgia at the time, there does not appear to be any other nexus between Braziel’s representation of the client and Georgia, given that the at-fault driver appears to be a Texas resident as well. Under Rule 8.5 (a), however, a “lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.” We are not aware of any case in which we have disciplined a
3 was released from the hospital, but he did not have health
insurance. Shortly thereafter, the hospital executed a notice of
hospital lien as to the client’s medical expenses. Additionally, the
Office of the Texas Attorney General Child Support Collections Unit
(“Texas Attorney General”) sent a notice of lien to Braziel reflecting
that the client owed child support (“child support lien”). Braziel
attempted to negotiate the amount of the liens with the hospital and
the Texas Attorney General. The hospital offered to settle its lien for
$5,425, but Braziel did not accept the offer on her client’s behalf. The
Texas Attorney General agreed to reduce the amount of the child
support lien to $0, relying on Braziel’s representation that the client
would not receive any portion of the personal injury settlement with
the at-fault driver.
lawyer pursuant to the authority outlined in Rule 8.5 (a), although we have, in at least one case, referenced that rule in noting that the State Bar may pursue a disciplinary matter against a Georgia lawyer who committed misconduct in another state. See In the Matter of Potts, 301 Ga. 789, 790-791 (804 SE2d 59) (2017). However, the text of Rule 8.5 (a) appears to apply to the facts of this case, and Braziel has not challenged this Court’s authority to impose discipline pursuant to it.
4 In August 2017, Braziel settled the client’s personal injury
claim with the at-fault driver’s insurance company for $31,440. After
receiving the settlement check, Braziel presented the client with a
settlement statement, which the client signed. The statement
indicated that the client would receive a total disbursement of
$10,743.76, the balance of the hospital lien was $5,425, the child
support lien had a zero balance, and other liens were being paid off.
However, Braziel did not notify the Texas Attorney General or the
hospital about the settlement; she did not pay the child support lien;
and she did not satisfy the hospital lien until September 2019, after
the hospital’s attorney filed a grievance with the State Bar.
Based on these facts, we agree with the Special Master that
Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) because she did not promptly give
notice of her receipt of the settlement funds to either the hospital or
the Texas Attorney General and she did not promptly satisfy the
negotiated liens. We further agree that Braziel violated Rule 4.1 in
the course of negotiating the amount of the child support lien to zero,
when she advised the Texas Attorney General that the client would
5 receive nothing from the settlement. Additionally, Braziel admitted
she violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by her failure to satisfy the child
support lien out of the settlement proceeds.
Looking to factors in mitigation and aggravation, see American
Bar Association Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA
Standards”),7 we accept the Special Master’s factual finding that
Braziel “has been cooperative,” which may be considered in
mitigation. See ABA Standard 9.32 (e) (cooperative attitude toward
disciplinary proceeding may be mitigating factor). We also agree
with the Special Master that Braziel’s prior disciplinary history is
an aggravating factor.
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318 Ga. 389 FINAL COPY
S24Y0267. IN THE MATTER OF CHERYL JOYCE BRAZIEL.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt, who
recommends that Respondent Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No.
275115) receive a two-year suspension with a condition on
reinstatement for her misconduct in relation to negotiations with
lienholders during the settlement of a personal injury case, in
connection with which she violated Rules 1.15 (I) (b),1 1.15 (I) (c),2
1 Rule 1.15 (I) (b) provides in relevant part that “[f]or the purposes of this
Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person’s interest in funds or other property in the lawyer’s possession if: (1) the interest is known to the lawyer, and (2) the interest is based upon one of the following: (i) a statutory lien[.]” 2 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that “[u]pon receiving funds or other property
in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.” and 4.13 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).4 The maximum sanction for a single
violation of any of these Rules is disbarment. Braziel, a member of
the State Bar of Georgia since 2007, is currently under
administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing
legal education requirements.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree that a two-year
suspension with a condition is the proper sanction for Braziel’s
misconduct in this matter, with the two-year suspension to begin
only after her current administrative suspension is lifted. See Bar
Rule 8-108 (setting out procedures for reinstatement following
administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing
legal education requirements).
3 Rule 4.1 provides in relevant part that “[i]n the course of representing
a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . .” 4 Because the misconduct took place in 2017, prior to the July 1, 2018
effective date of the revisions of the GRPC, the former rules apply. But as to the violations charged here, there is no material difference in the former rules and the current rules, and we quote the current rules.
2 In a formal complaint filed in 2021, the State Bar charged
Braziel with several violations of the GRPC, including Rules 1.15 (I)
(b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 4.1. After a hearing, the Special Master
concluded that Braziel violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 4.1 and found
facts demonstrating that Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b).5 Neither
Braziel nor the State Bar filed exceptions to or requested review by
the State Disciplinary Review Board.
The facts, as found by the Special Master and supported by the
record, show that Braziel was retained to pursue a personal injury
claim for a client who was injured in July 2016 in an automobile
collision in Texas, for which he received treatment at a hospital in
Texas.6 The client continued to receive medical treatment after he
5 In her pleadings before the Special Master, Braziel admitted a violation
of Rule 1.15 (I) (b). 6 We note that the record shows that Braziel is not admitted to practice
in Texas and that there is no indication in the record that Braziel was admitted pro hac vice for any court proceeding related to the representation. Although Braziel’s office was in Georgia at the time, there does not appear to be any other nexus between Braziel’s representation of the client and Georgia, given that the at-fault driver appears to be a Texas resident as well. Under Rule 8.5 (a), however, a “lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.” We are not aware of any case in which we have disciplined a
3 was released from the hospital, but he did not have health
insurance. Shortly thereafter, the hospital executed a notice of
hospital lien as to the client’s medical expenses. Additionally, the
Office of the Texas Attorney General Child Support Collections Unit
(“Texas Attorney General”) sent a notice of lien to Braziel reflecting
that the client owed child support (“child support lien”). Braziel
attempted to negotiate the amount of the liens with the hospital and
the Texas Attorney General. The hospital offered to settle its lien for
$5,425, but Braziel did not accept the offer on her client’s behalf. The
Texas Attorney General agreed to reduce the amount of the child
support lien to $0, relying on Braziel’s representation that the client
would not receive any portion of the personal injury settlement with
the at-fault driver.
lawyer pursuant to the authority outlined in Rule 8.5 (a), although we have, in at least one case, referenced that rule in noting that the State Bar may pursue a disciplinary matter against a Georgia lawyer who committed misconduct in another state. See In the Matter of Potts, 301 Ga. 789, 790-791 (804 SE2d 59) (2017). However, the text of Rule 8.5 (a) appears to apply to the facts of this case, and Braziel has not challenged this Court’s authority to impose discipline pursuant to it.
4 In August 2017, Braziel settled the client’s personal injury
claim with the at-fault driver’s insurance company for $31,440. After
receiving the settlement check, Braziel presented the client with a
settlement statement, which the client signed. The statement
indicated that the client would receive a total disbursement of
$10,743.76, the balance of the hospital lien was $5,425, the child
support lien had a zero balance, and other liens were being paid off.
However, Braziel did not notify the Texas Attorney General or the
hospital about the settlement; she did not pay the child support lien;
and she did not satisfy the hospital lien until September 2019, after
the hospital’s attorney filed a grievance with the State Bar.
Based on these facts, we agree with the Special Master that
Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) because she did not promptly give
notice of her receipt of the settlement funds to either the hospital or
the Texas Attorney General and she did not promptly satisfy the
negotiated liens. We further agree that Braziel violated Rule 4.1 in
the course of negotiating the amount of the child support lien to zero,
when she advised the Texas Attorney General that the client would
5 receive nothing from the settlement. Additionally, Braziel admitted
she violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by her failure to satisfy the child
support lien out of the settlement proceeds.
Looking to factors in mitigation and aggravation, see American
Bar Association Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA
Standards”),7 we accept the Special Master’s factual finding that
Braziel “has been cooperative,” which may be considered in
mitigation. See ABA Standard 9.32 (e) (cooperative attitude toward
disciplinary proceeding may be mitigating factor). We also agree
with the Special Master that Braziel’s prior disciplinary history is
an aggravating factor. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a) (prior disciplinary
offense may be aggravating factor).8 See In the Matter of Braziel, 306
7 We have long considered the ABA Standards as “generally instructive
as to the question of punishment.” In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (857 SE2d 212) (2021) (cleaned up); In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). 8 Although the State Bar has not alleged a violation of Rule 5.5 (a)
(lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of regulations governing the practice of law in that jurisdiction), some of us question whether the State Bar could have pursued discipline on the basis of Rule 5.5 (a). Some of us also question whether Braziel’s apparent unauthorized practice of law should be considered in aggravation. See ABA Standard 9.22 (k) (“Aggravating factors include . . . illegal conduct . . . .”); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.102 (a)
6 Ga. 385 (830 SE2d 730) (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing public reprimand for failure to adequately
supervise nonlawyer employee).
Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the
applicable ABA Standards, we agree with the Special Master that,
given Braziel’s prior disciplinary history and the lack of significant
mitigating factors, our cases support the imposition of a two-year
suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon her participation
in the State Bar’s Law Practice Management Program for Braziel’s
violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c) and 4.1. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Van Johnson, 313 Ga. 151, 152-154 (868 SE2d 794) (2022)
(imposing six-month suspension where attorney with no prior
disciplinary history filed petition for voluntary discipline, admitting
various violations of GRPC, including in connection with settling
client’s personal injury case and failing to pay medical providers
funds they were entitled to, where there were substantial mitigating
(“Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person may not practice law in this state unless the person is a member of the state bar.”). But we need not answer these questions to resolve this matter.
7 circumstances and where reinstatement was conditioned on
participation in Law Practice Management Program); In the Matter
of Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 471-473 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (imposing an
18-month suspension where attorney with no prior disciplinary
history filed petition for voluntary discipline, admitting violations of
Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (II) (b), and 8.4 (a) (4) for misconduct including
failing to disburse money to a lienholder and where there were
significant mitigating circumstances); In the Matter of Berry, 310
Ga. 158, 158-159 (848 SE2d 71) (2020) (disbarring attorney, who was
in default and had prior disciplinary history, where attorney agreed
to resolve medical lien upon settlement of personal injury claim but
failed to do so and misappropriated funds that he was supposed to
remit to a medical provider); In the Matter of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737,
737-738, 740-742 (791 SE2d 776) (2016) (disbarring attorney, who
was in default, for violating Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 4.1 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and
9.3 where attorney executed false affidavit and subsequently failed
to satisfy hospital lien and where there were aggravating factors and
no mitigating circumstances of significant weight).
8 Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Cheryl Joyce Braziel is
suspended from the practice of law in Georgia for two years, with
reinstatement conditioned upon her participation in the State Bar’s
Law Practice Management Program.9 At the conclusion of the two-
year suspension, Braziel may seek reinstatement by demonstrating
to the State Bar’s Office of General Counsel that she has met the
condition on reinstatement. If the State Bar agrees that the
condition has been met, it will submit a notice of compliance to this
Court, and this Court will issue an order granting or denying
reinstatement. Braziel is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule 4-
219 (b).
Two-year suspension with condition. All the Justices concur.
9 Braziel’s two-year suspension will begin to run only after she is in compliance with the requirements for continuing legal education.
9 Decided February 20, 2024.
Suspension.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K.
Mittelman, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State
Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.