In the Interest of M.T., H.T., R.T., K.T., and G.T., Children v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)·Decided September 17, 2026·No. 02-26-00186-CV·Published

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

No. 02-26-00186-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.T., H.T., R.T., K.T., AND G.T., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 322nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 322-732902-23

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother,1 acting pro se, raises eight issues in this appeal from a jury’s findings that her parent–child relationships with five of her six children should be terminated in this suit affecting the parent–child relationship (SAPCR) filed by the children’s Father.2 Because we overrule her dispositive issues, we affirm.

Sufficiency Issues3

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking termination must prove at least one predicate-conduct ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). Here, the jury found as predicate-conduct grounds that Mother had (1) endangered her children according to Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and (2) used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children and either failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program or, after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance. The jury also found that

1 To protect the identities of the children in this case, we refer to the parties by relationship and to the children by fictitious names. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d).

2 By the time of trial, David, the oldest, was already eighteen and not a subject of the SAPCR.

3 We dispense with a background-facts discussion because we set forth those facts in our discussion of the evidence’s sufficiency to support the jury’s findings.

terminating the children’s parent–child relationships with Mother was in their best interest. Mother challenges these findings in her first, second, and fifth issues. Standard of Review To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a Section 161.001(b) finding, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding to determine whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the finding is true. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex. 2024). In reviewing factual sufficiency of the same finding, we perform “an exacting review of the entire record,” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014), to determine whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved the finding, In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). We may not substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s “when considering the credibility of the evidence presented.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 276. However, we also may not disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Applicable Law–Endangerment Subsections (D) and (E) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) are the endangerment predicate-conduct grounds. Subsection (D) authorizes termination when a parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). To terminate a parent’s rights under Subsection

(E), the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

To endanger means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child.

R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. Endangerment involves “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, [but] it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). “A finding of endangerment is supported ‘if the evidence . . . shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child.’” In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 534).

The primary distinction between subsections (D) and (E) is the source of the endangerment to the child. In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d 452, 463–64 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Castaneda v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 509, 522 (Tex. App.––El Paso 2004, pet. denied)). Subsection (D) addresses the child’s surroundings and environment while subsection (E) addresses parental misconduct. Id. at 463.

Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical or emotional well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M.,

494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). “Evidence of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse by a parent is often cited as conduct which will support an affirmative finding that the parent has engaged in a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the child.” In re E.A.A., No. 12-26-00088-CV, 2026 WL 2122874, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 22, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op. on reh’g); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“Drug addiction and its effect on a parent’s life and ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct as well.”). In addition, generally, “conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Applicable Facts–Endangerment Trial in this case began at the end of January 2026 and continued into February.

It was undisputed that Mother has a history of drug and alcohol abuse. It was also undisputed that Mother had been sober from February 2025 until the trial. According to Mother, this was her longest period of sobriety since her October 2020 divorce from Father. Before that, her longest period of sobriety since the divorce had been six months.

Mother and Father’s agreed divorce decree gave Mother visitation with the children every other weekend provided that she continued to have clean hair-follicle

drug tests.4 Mother’s first visit was delayed because she was not able to provide a clean test; however, she was able to have her first visit with the children on December 17, 2020.

December 2020 Incident After Father dropped the children off for their December 17, 2020 visit with Mother, the children called and texted Father on their cell phones, and he tried to get them to stop and visit with Mother. However, “[a]t some point, they expressed concern” about Mother’s behavior. Father agreed to “stay up” with them “until everything kind of settle[d] down.” He called the police after the second oldest child, Grace, called him with the “highest tenure [sic] of fear and helpless[ness].” Sometime between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on December 18, Father called 911 and drove to Mother’s house.

When the first Mansfield police officer, Cameron Sly, arrived around 2 a.m., the children came running out of Mother’s house toward his patrol car. “They were scared for dear life” and crying; however, they did not have any visible injuries. One of the children said, “Mommy is trying to kill me.” “[T]here was talk[] of a gun,” so the children were placed in the patrol car. Other Mansfield police officers responded as well.

The decree also provided that the children were not to have any contact with 4

Mother’s then-boyfriend, whom she later married in 2021. We refer to him in this memorandum opinion as Husband.

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In the Interest of M.T., H.T., R.T., K.T., and G.T., Children v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

In the Interest of M.T., H.T., R.T., K.T., and G.T., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of M.T., H.T., R.T., K.T., and G.T., Children v. the State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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