IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0298 Filed May 7, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF A.S., Minor Child,
D.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Jessica R. Noll,
Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Kevin J. Huyser of Rensink Pluim Vogel and Huyser, Orange City, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Debra Sue De Jong, Orange City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, A.S., born
in 2014.1 He contends that the State failed to establish the statutory grounds for
termination, the State failed to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification, and
termination is not in the child’s best interests. Upon our de novo review, we affirm
termination of the father’s parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
From 2016 to 2023, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
(the department) was intermittently involved with this family.2 The allegations
focused primarily on the parents’ illegal substance use, including reports that the
father administered one of the children’s medications using a “drug needle.” But
additional child abuse assessments were founded due to physical abuse, domestic
violence, and failure to provide the children with proper food and utilities.
Throughout these earlier proceedings, the juvenile court removed the children,
including A.S., from their parents’ custody and placed them in a guardianship with
their maternal grandmother.
In May 2023, the department became involved again after the mother
pushed A.S.’s elder sister out of a moving vehicle. The department opened
another investigation and discovered that A.S. was not living with her guardian as
expected. Instead, A.S. was sleeping in a tent with her father in a nearby city park.
1 The mother’s parental rights to A.S. were also terminated. Because she does not appeal, we do not address her further other than to describe the facts leading up to termination. 2 There were additional children living in the home during this time period, who are
not the subjects of this appeal. 3
Due to these events and the grandmother’s desire to relinquish her role as
guardian, the court terminated the guardianship. The court then removed A.S. and
placed her with a foster family.
In 2023, the father was homeless, unemployed, and lacked a driver’s
license. And while he eventually secured housing, a stable job, and a temporary
license, he never addressed the department’s primary concern, which was his
illegal substance use. Throughout the proceedings, the father refused drug testing
several times; when he did comply, on one occasion, he tampered with the sweat
patch, and on another, he tested positive for methamphetamine. And despite
completing a substance use evaluation that recommended treatment, the father
never consistently participated. In the week leading up to the termination hearing,
the father missed two appointments alone. The department testified that the father
had to participate in remedial programming twice as a consequence for missed
appointments. Yet the father still maintained at the termination hearing that he had
no problems with substance use and testified he should not “have to prove his
sobriety to anyone.”
After the juvenile court determined that the father “has been his own barrier
to making progress,” it directed the State to proceed to termination. The State
complied, and a termination hearing occurred December 2024, after which the
juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights. The father appeals.
II. Review.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s 4
findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility
of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Discussion.
Iowa courts use a three-step analysis to review termination proceedings, in
which we determine whether: (1) the statutory grounds for termination have been
established, (2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) a permissive
exception applies. Id. at 472–73. However, “[o]ur primary concern in termination
proceedings has always been the best interests of the child.” In re L.T.,
924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). We review each of the father’s arguments in
turn.
A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of the father’s parental rights was appropriate under paragraphs
(f), (i), and (l) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2024). While the father argued
against each ground, “we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we
find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We
therefore confine our analysis to paragraph (f), in which the court may terminate if
it finds all of the following:
(1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. 5
The father challenges only the fourth element: whether A.S. could be returned to
his custody.
We agree with the juvenile court that A.S. could not be returned to her
father’s custody. The father cites his more recent progress, such as securing
housing and employment, as evidence that A.S. could return home.3 But while the
father made some progress in other areas, he refused to cooperate with the
department with drug testing and other substance-use services. The court
described the father’s approach to services as “openly def[ying] court orders.” The
father refused to comply with drug testing, citing privacy concerns. When he finally
cooperated, the father tested positive for methamphetamine, although he denied
any substance use. When he was recommended to complete substance-use and
mental-health treatments, he never consistently participated.
Instead of taking accountability for his actions, the father blames the
department for failing to provide certain services. The father specifically cites
transportation issues, lack of visitation, and his denied request for a parent partner
as evidence the department did not provide reasonable efforts. But we find the
department offered a litany of services, most of which the father refused. To
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0298 Filed May 7, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF A.S., Minor Child,
D.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Jessica R. Noll,
Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Kevin J. Huyser of Rensink Pluim Vogel and Huyser, Orange City, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Debra Sue De Jong, Orange City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, A.S., born
in 2014.1 He contends that the State failed to establish the statutory grounds for
termination, the State failed to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification, and
termination is not in the child’s best interests. Upon our de novo review, we affirm
termination of the father’s parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
From 2016 to 2023, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
(the department) was intermittently involved with this family.2 The allegations
focused primarily on the parents’ illegal substance use, including reports that the
father administered one of the children’s medications using a “drug needle.” But
additional child abuse assessments were founded due to physical abuse, domestic
violence, and failure to provide the children with proper food and utilities.
Throughout these earlier proceedings, the juvenile court removed the children,
including A.S., from their parents’ custody and placed them in a guardianship with
their maternal grandmother.
In May 2023, the department became involved again after the mother
pushed A.S.’s elder sister out of a moving vehicle. The department opened
another investigation and discovered that A.S. was not living with her guardian as
expected. Instead, A.S. was sleeping in a tent with her father in a nearby city park.
1 The mother’s parental rights to A.S. were also terminated. Because she does not appeal, we do not address her further other than to describe the facts leading up to termination. 2 There were additional children living in the home during this time period, who are
not the subjects of this appeal. 3
Due to these events and the grandmother’s desire to relinquish her role as
guardian, the court terminated the guardianship. The court then removed A.S. and
placed her with a foster family.
In 2023, the father was homeless, unemployed, and lacked a driver’s
license. And while he eventually secured housing, a stable job, and a temporary
license, he never addressed the department’s primary concern, which was his
illegal substance use. Throughout the proceedings, the father refused drug testing
several times; when he did comply, on one occasion, he tampered with the sweat
patch, and on another, he tested positive for methamphetamine. And despite
completing a substance use evaluation that recommended treatment, the father
never consistently participated. In the week leading up to the termination hearing,
the father missed two appointments alone. The department testified that the father
had to participate in remedial programming twice as a consequence for missed
appointments. Yet the father still maintained at the termination hearing that he had
no problems with substance use and testified he should not “have to prove his
sobriety to anyone.”
After the juvenile court determined that the father “has been his own barrier
to making progress,” it directed the State to proceed to termination. The State
complied, and a termination hearing occurred December 2024, after which the
juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights. The father appeals.
II. Review.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s 4
findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility
of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Discussion.
Iowa courts use a three-step analysis to review termination proceedings, in
which we determine whether: (1) the statutory grounds for termination have been
established, (2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) a permissive
exception applies. Id. at 472–73. However, “[o]ur primary concern in termination
proceedings has always been the best interests of the child.” In re L.T.,
924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). We review each of the father’s arguments in
turn.
A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of the father’s parental rights was appropriate under paragraphs
(f), (i), and (l) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2024). While the father argued
against each ground, “we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we
find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We
therefore confine our analysis to paragraph (f), in which the court may terminate if
it finds all of the following:
(1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. 5
The father challenges only the fourth element: whether A.S. could be returned to
his custody.
We agree with the juvenile court that A.S. could not be returned to her
father’s custody. The father cites his more recent progress, such as securing
housing and employment, as evidence that A.S. could return home.3 But while the
father made some progress in other areas, he refused to cooperate with the
department with drug testing and other substance-use services. The court
described the father’s approach to services as “openly def[ying] court orders.” The
father refused to comply with drug testing, citing privacy concerns. When he finally
cooperated, the father tested positive for methamphetamine, although he denied
any substance use. When he was recommended to complete substance-use and
mental-health treatments, he never consistently participated.
Instead of taking accountability for his actions, the father blames the
department for failing to provide certain services. The father specifically cites
transportation issues, lack of visitation, and his denied request for a parent partner
as evidence the department did not provide reasonable efforts. But we find the
department offered a litany of services, most of which the father refused. To
alleviate transportation issues, the department made referrals to telehealth
treatment, which the father never participated in, and utilized at-home drug testing.
3 The father also shifts blame for his lack of substance-use cooperation on the
department in what we interpret as a reasonable-efforts challenge. See Iowa Code § 232.102(6) (requiring the department “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child”). Because the reasonable-efforts requirement is “part of [the State’s] ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent,” we consider the services offered and the father’s response to determine whether the statutory grounds have been met. See L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 527 (citation omitted). 6
But the department also testified that it had to resort to in-person drug testing after
the father refused to show. The department also offered regular visitation, and
while the father was more consistent with visitation than with treatment, he
declined additional visits based on his work schedule. As to the father’s request
for peer support, the department testified that while it made efforts to obtain one,
there were no eligible parent partners in the area. Upon our own review of the
record, we do not agree with the father’s attempts to shift blame to the department;
instead, we find the department went above and beyond to support the father’s
reunification with A.S. Because the father failed to take advantage of the services
offered and address the department’s concerns, we find that A.S. could not be
returned to his custody. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (considering a “parent’s past
performance” to indicate “the quality of the future care that parent is capable of
providing” (citation omitted)).
B. Best Interests of the Child.
The father also contends that termination is not in A.S.’s best interests. To
determine the best interests of the child, we “give primary consideration to the
child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs
of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive
a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination . . . by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (citation omitted). The father has
made limited progress, and after nearly ten years of uncertainty, A.S. deserves
permanency. While the record supports the father’s argument that he and A.S. 7
are very bonded, see In re L.A., No. 24-2086, 2025 WL 855764, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2025) (finding evidence of a parent-child bond is relevant to the
best-interests analysis), this does not outweigh his inability to care for her, see In
re A.G., No. 18-1161, 2018 WL 6131920, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018)
(finding a parent’s “refus[al] to acknowledge or address the concerns giving rise to
removal” support termination). Further, in the two years since her removal and
placement into foster care, A.S. has become very bonded with her foster family,
who testified they would “strongly consider adopting” should termination occur.
See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (considering the child’s
favorable integration into their foster placement to support termination).
Accordingly, we find termination of the father’s parental rights is in A.S.’s best
interests.
IV. Disposition.
Because the statutory grounds for termination have been met and
termination is in the best interests of the child, we affirm the termination of the
father’s parental rights to his child.