In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas (In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
15-25-00017-CV ACCEPTED 15-25-00017-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/4/2025 10:05 PM No. 12-24-00317-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Austin, Texas 3/4/2025 10:05:14 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person
On Appeal from Cause No. G00074 County Court at Law Cherokee County, Texas
Appellant’s Brief KEAN | MILLER LLP Tracia Y. Lee State Bar No. 24013021 Tracia.Lee@keanmiller.com Laurel M. Smith State Bar No. 24113488 Laurel.Smith@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 844-3000 (713) 844-3030 (Fax) e-serve@keanmiller.com (E-Service)
Attorneys for Appellant, Candice Jeffcoat
Oral Argument Requested 15-25-00017-CV
No. 12-24-00317-CV
In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals Austin, Texas
In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person
On Appeal from Cause No. G00074 County Court at Law Cherokee County, Texas
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellant: Candice Jeffcoat
Trial and Appellate Counsel for KEAN | MILLER LLP Appellant: Laurel M. Smith State Bar No. 24113488 Laurel.Smith@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002
Appellate Counsel for Appellant: KEAN | MILLER LLP Tracia Y. Lee State Bar No. 24013021 Tracia.Lee@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002
__________________________________________________________________
i Appellee: Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Trial and Appellate Counsel for Jonathan Petix Appellee: Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) 350 Pine Street, 9th Floor Beaumont, Texas 77701 (409) 730-4087 (409) 730-4048 (Fax) Jonathan.petix@hhs.texas.gov
Appellate Counsel for Appellee: Alyssa N. Bixby-Lawson Assistant Attorney General General Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General 300 West 15th Street, 6th Floor Austin Texas 78701 Phone: (210) 270-1118 Fax: (512) 477-2348 Email: alyssa.bixby-lawson@oag.texas.gov
ii Table of Contents
Table of Authorities .................................................................................... 2 Statement of the Case ................................................................................ 4 Summary of the Argument ......................................................................... 5 Statement of Facts ...................................................................................... 8 Issues Presented ....................................................................................... 19 Argument .................................................................................................. 20 I. HHSC has the burden to prove that Candice is disqualified to serve as guardian of Landen’s person ............... 20 II. Texas law makes clear that HHSC should serve as guardian only as a last resort, when no alternative person is available to serve as guardian ................................................ 21 III. The Trial Court erred by allowing HHSC to intervene in Candice’s guardianship proceeding; Texas law requires HHSC to allow her to apply for guardianship without HHSC intervention ..................................................................... 25 IV. The Trial Court erred by determining Candice’s suitability without allowing her to fully make her case for her guardianship application ..................................................... 27 V. The Trial Court erred when it found Candice unsuitable to be Landen’s guardian; HHSC did not prove that Candice is unsuitable.................................................................. 28 A. Candice is suitable ............................................................... 31 B. The evidence is legally insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding ...................................... 33 C. Alternatively, the evidence is factually insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding .................. 35 D. There is no legal support for the Trial Court’s conclusion of law that Candice is unsuitable ..................... 36 VI. The Trial Court erred when it appointed HHSC as Landen’s guardian because the Trial Court did not comply with the statutory requirements ................................................ 37
1 Prayer ........................................................................................................ 42 Certificate of Compliance ......................................................................... 44 Certificate of Service................................................................................. 44 Appendix ................................................................................................... 45
Table of Authorities
Cases
Capps v. Nexion Health at Southwood, Inc., 349 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, no pet.) ................................... 35
Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................ 21, 28, 33
Hill v. Jones, 773 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ)............ 20
In re Guardianship of Rombough, No. 02-11-00181-CV, 2012 WL 1624027 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 10, 2012, no pet.) ...................................... 30
Matter of Guardianship of Jones, No. 02-15-00367-CV, 2016 WL 4474353 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) ...................................... 20
Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. 2017) ...................................................................... 35
Trimble v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv., 981 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) .......... 30
Statutes
Tex. Estates Code §104.002...................................................................... 37
Tex. Estates Code §1054.004.................................................................... 39
2 Tex. Estates Code §1054.054 .................................................................... 41
Tex. Estates Code §1054.151.................................................................... 41
Tex. Estates Code §1101.051.................................................................... 38
Tex. Estates Code §1101.101.................................................................... 20
Tex. Estates Code §1104.101.................................................................... 40
Tex. Estates Code §1104.102.................................................................... 37
Tex. Estates Code §1151.351.................................................................... 38
Tex. Estates Code §1203.151.................................................................... 24
Tex. Estates Code §1251.011.................................................................... 24
Tex. Gov’t Code §531.055 ......................................................................... 25
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101 ..................................................... 15, 22, 26
Tex. Hum. Res.
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15-25-00017-CV ACCEPTED 15-25-00017-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/4/2025 10:05 PM No. 12-24-00317-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Austin, Texas 3/4/2025 10:05:14 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person
On Appeal from Cause No. G00074 County Court at Law Cherokee County, Texas
Appellant’s Brief KEAN | MILLER LLP Tracia Y. Lee State Bar No. 24013021 Tracia.Lee@keanmiller.com Laurel M. Smith State Bar No. 24113488 Laurel.Smith@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 844-3000 (713) 844-3030 (Fax) e-serve@keanmiller.com (E-Service)
Attorneys for Appellant, Candice Jeffcoat
Oral Argument Requested 15-25-00017-CV
No. 12-24-00317-CV
In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals Austin, Texas
In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person
On Appeal from Cause No. G00074 County Court at Law Cherokee County, Texas
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellant: Candice Jeffcoat
Trial and Appellate Counsel for KEAN | MILLER LLP Appellant: Laurel M. Smith State Bar No. 24113488 Laurel.Smith@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002
Appellate Counsel for Appellant: KEAN | MILLER LLP Tracia Y. Lee State Bar No. 24013021 Tracia.Lee@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002
__________________________________________________________________
i Appellee: Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Trial and Appellate Counsel for Jonathan Petix Appellee: Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) 350 Pine Street, 9th Floor Beaumont, Texas 77701 (409) 730-4087 (409) 730-4048 (Fax) Jonathan.petix@hhs.texas.gov
Appellate Counsel for Appellee: Alyssa N. Bixby-Lawson Assistant Attorney General General Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General 300 West 15th Street, 6th Floor Austin Texas 78701 Phone: (210) 270-1118 Fax: (512) 477-2348 Email: alyssa.bixby-lawson@oag.texas.gov
ii Table of Contents
Table of Authorities .................................................................................... 2 Statement of the Case ................................................................................ 4 Summary of the Argument ......................................................................... 5 Statement of Facts ...................................................................................... 8 Issues Presented ....................................................................................... 19 Argument .................................................................................................. 20 I. HHSC has the burden to prove that Candice is disqualified to serve as guardian of Landen’s person ............... 20 II. Texas law makes clear that HHSC should serve as guardian only as a last resort, when no alternative person is available to serve as guardian ................................................ 21 III. The Trial Court erred by allowing HHSC to intervene in Candice’s guardianship proceeding; Texas law requires HHSC to allow her to apply for guardianship without HHSC intervention ..................................................................... 25 IV. The Trial Court erred by determining Candice’s suitability without allowing her to fully make her case for her guardianship application ..................................................... 27 V. The Trial Court erred when it found Candice unsuitable to be Landen’s guardian; HHSC did not prove that Candice is unsuitable.................................................................. 28 A. Candice is suitable ............................................................... 31 B. The evidence is legally insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding ...................................... 33 C. Alternatively, the evidence is factually insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding .................. 35 D. There is no legal support for the Trial Court’s conclusion of law that Candice is unsuitable ..................... 36 VI. The Trial Court erred when it appointed HHSC as Landen’s guardian because the Trial Court did not comply with the statutory requirements ................................................ 37
1 Prayer ........................................................................................................ 42 Certificate of Compliance ......................................................................... 44 Certificate of Service................................................................................. 44 Appendix ................................................................................................... 45
Table of Authorities
Cases
Capps v. Nexion Health at Southwood, Inc., 349 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, no pet.) ................................... 35
Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................ 21, 28, 33
Hill v. Jones, 773 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ)............ 20
In re Guardianship of Rombough, No. 02-11-00181-CV, 2012 WL 1624027 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 10, 2012, no pet.) ...................................... 30
Matter of Guardianship of Jones, No. 02-15-00367-CV, 2016 WL 4474353 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) ...................................... 20
Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. 2017) ...................................................................... 35
Trimble v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv., 981 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) .......... 30
Statutes
Tex. Estates Code §104.002...................................................................... 37
Tex. Estates Code §1054.004.................................................................... 39
2 Tex. Estates Code §1054.054 .................................................................... 41
Tex. Estates Code §1054.151.................................................................... 41
Tex. Estates Code §1101.051.................................................................... 38
Tex. Estates Code §1101.101.................................................................... 20
Tex. Estates Code §1104.101.................................................................... 40
Tex. Estates Code §1104.102.................................................................... 37
Tex. Estates Code §1151.351.................................................................... 38
Tex. Estates Code §1203.151.................................................................... 24
Tex. Estates Code §1251.011.................................................................... 24
Tex. Gov’t Code §531.055 ......................................................................... 25
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101 ..................................................... 15, 22, 26
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.102 ..................................................... 15, 23, 26
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.108 ................................................................. 23
Rules
Tex. R. Civ. P. 45 ………………………………………………………………28
Tex. R. Civ. P. 216..................................................................................... 28
3 Statement of the Case
Nature of the case: The underlying case is a guardianship proceeding. Appellant Candice Jeffcoat applied to guardian of her adult, disabled son.1 1CR 5. Appellee, Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) intervened in the guardianship proceeding and applied to be guardian. 1CR 193; 1CR 224.
Course of the proceedings: The Trial Court held a hearing to determine whether HHSC could intervene in the guardianship proceeding Candice initiated. 2RR. But without any notice to the parties, the Trial Court decided, sua sponte, to receive evidence and determine the merits of Candice’s guardianship application.
Trial Court’s disposition: Trial Court granted HHSC’s Petition in Intervention (1CR 235), dismissed Candice’s application for guardianship (1CR 247), and appointed HHSC as the permanent guardian of Landen’s person (1CR 240).
1 Candice applied to be the guardian of the person for her son, Landen Griswold.
4 Summary of the Argument
This is a sad story of a mother who truly wants to care for her child
but has been thwarted by the system. She has taken every step to make
sure she is financially able, emotionally able, and knowledgeable to take
care of her severely disabled autistic adult child, Landen Griswold.
Due to some unfortunate events in her past, she had to make the
tough decision thirteen years ago to relinquish her parental rights to
Landen because (1) there was no one else to care for him at the time and
(2) she was told that relinquishing her parental rights was the only way
she could be reunited with him.
Long story short, Candice has turned her life around. Candice has
been “clean” for thirteen years. She is financially secure. She received
training to care for an autistic person and to serve as a guardian. She has
contributed to her community by founding a rehabilitation center to help
others with substance abuse issues. She is prepared and wants to care
for Landen.
Landen is now an adult and has “aged out of the system,” which
means he will no longer be cared for by foster parents. As such, Candice
5 applied to serve as the guardian of Landen’s person under the Estates
Code.
Her application was derailed from the start. She asked the Trial
Court several times to appoint a neutral officer of the court (e.g., court
investigator or guardian ad litem) to investigate Landen’s needs and
Candice’s ability to care for him. Because Landen is indigent, Candice
offered to post security for costs for this work or otherwise be responsible
for any expense that resulted from that person’s appointment. The Trial
Court denied her requests.
The Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) also
thwarted her application by improperly intervening. By law, HHSC must
allow Candice to pursue her guardianship application and obtain a ruling
before HHSC can apply to be Landen’s guardian. And, HHSC could only
intervene or request to be Landen’s guardian after the Trial Court
determined that there was no other available person. But HHSC did not
do that.
HHSC intervened, arguing that Candice is unsuitable to serve as
Landen’s guardian because she relinquished her parental rights thirteen
years ago. HHSC set its petition to intervene for a hearing.
6 Even though Candice’s guardianship application was not set for
hearing, she did not receive notice of a trial, and she was not prepared to
present all her evidence and did not know to ask her witnesses to be
present, the Trial Court considered her suitability and the merits of her
guardianship application at the hearing on HHSC’s petition to intervene
anyway.
Regardless, no evidence of unsuitability was presented. HHSC
presented no evidence that Candice’s current situation makes her
unsuitable. Candice’s testimony that she has taken all the steps to put
her in the best position and has the resources to care for Landen today
was uncontroverted. HHSC presented no witness with personal
knowledge of anything that makes Candice unsuitable. The witnesses
presented by HHSC relied completely upon hearsay in thirteen-year-old
CPS records. Because none of HHSC’s witnesses had participated in the
CPS investigation that formed the basis of those records, the records were
inadmissible.
Since the Trial Court appointed HHSC to serve as Landen’s
guardian, HHSC has removed him from foster care and refuses to let
Candice visit him. HHSC will not even tell her where he is.
7 As such, Candice asks this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s
erroneous order allowing HHSC to intervene, reverse the Trial Court’s
erroneous order dismissing her guardianship application based on
unsuitability, and reverse the Trial Court’s erroneous order appointing
HHSC to serve as Landen’s guardian.
Statement of Facts
Candice is the biological mother of Landen Griswold. Landen is
severely autistic. 2RR 68. There is no dispute that Landen cannot care
for himself and needs a guardianship.
Candice’s past was unfortunate. As a result of having several
surgeries, Candice became addicted to pain medication. 2RR 45. When
she was arrested for possession of a controlled substance in 2011 (2RR
71), she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Landon because
she believed at the time that it was in his best interest (2RR 45). She was
going to prison for a drug possession charge, and there was no one to take
care of him. 2RR 45.
At the time she relinquished her parental rights, she believed she
would have an opportunity to regain custody in the future. 2RR 46-47.
Child Protective Services (“CPS”) represented to her that voluntarily
8 relinquishing her parental rights was the only option if she ever wanted
to see Landen again. 2RR 57-58. CPS also represented to her that she
could regain her rights to Landen more quickly if she simply accepted her
punishment and went to prison, rather than waiting to complete her five
years’ probation. Candice voluntarily revoked her probation and chose a
prison sentence to enable her to regain custody of Landen more quickly.
2CR 260.
Candice served eleven months in prison and was released in May
2013. 2RR 45-46. Candice has been “clean” since 2011. 2RR 46. She has
not used any controlled substances since 2011. 2RR 46. She has not had
any drug offenses since 2013, nor has she failed a drug test since 2011.
2RR 46.
She has been trying to regain custody of Landen since 2013 when
she was released from prison. 2RR 46. She went to Anderson County and
spoke with CPS and the district attorney to see if anyone could help her
regain custody of Landen. 2RR 46.
In 2015, a CPS representative visited her at work and showed her
a photo of Landen and asked if she would like to try to regain her parental
rights. 2RR 46. Candice performed all the procedures and took a drug
9 test that day. 2RR 46. Even though Candice took all the steps, CPS ended
up telling her that there was no “open case.” 2RR 46.
Candice has “cleaned up” her life and given back to the community.
Candice has been helping others with drug addictions. 2RR 47. She even
started a rehabilitation center in Palestine, Texas. 2RR 47. She has
worked with the Palestine Police Department to help people with drug
addictions. 2RR 47.
She has developed friendships with the officers who had arrested
her and the district attorney who prosecuted her so many years ago. 2RR
47. The officers and the district attorney are witnesses who can describe
Candice’s life since being off drugs and opine that Candice is qualified to
take care of Landen. 2RR 47.
Candice has a house with four bedrooms and three bathrooms. 2RR
48. There is plenty of room for Landen. 2RR 48. Candice has financial
resources to care for Landen. 2RR 48. She has her own business and is
putting herself through real estate school. 2RR 48. (She recently received
her real estate license and is a Real Estate Sales Associate at Century 21
Parker and Scroggins Conway.)
10 Candice has studied autism and has taken classes on how to better
care for and understand Landen. 2RR 48. She has completed a
guardianship training course required by Texas Estates Code section
§1104.003 to be appointed a guardian. 1CR 35.
Candice is willing, able, and ready to provide care, support,
clothing, shelter, and whatever needs he has. 2RR 51. She is willing, able,
and ready to comply with court orders and submit reports to the court as
required. 2RR 51; 2RR 75-76. She is willing, able, and ready to submit to
court supervision. 2RR 51; 2RR 75. Candice is willing, able, and ready to
move to Texas to be with Landen. 2RR 52-53; 2RR 75. She designated a
Texas agent, as required by Texas Estates Code section 1104.357 to be a
guardian. 2CR 451.
Landen is nonverbal. 2RR 58. If the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (“HHSC”) takes him as a ward, and he goes to a
hospital or other institution, he would not be able to communicate if
something inappropriate was happening to him or if he was being
harmed. 2RR 59. This is a real fear for Candice.
Two years ago, CPS tried to reunify her with Landen and allow her
to see him every two weeks. 2RR 62; 2RR 70. The reunification plan was
11 for her to visit Landen every two weeks until she could regain custody.
2RR 70.
She visited Landen in 2022. 2RR 63; 2CR 422-423 (photos). Landen
remembered Candice. 2RR 65; 2RR 68. He grabbed Candice’s hand and
told her he loved her. 2RR 66. Even the CPS caseworker noticed that he
remembered Candice. 2RR 65-66.
Unfortunately, on the day she was to visit Landen the second time,
the CPS caseworker told Candice that the foster parents (the Sanchezes)
taking care of Landen did not want her to see him. 2RR 71.
Landen has been living with foster parents for twelve years. 2RR
29. However, he turned 20 years of age in December 2024 and has “aged
out of the system.” 2RR 71.
Even though the foster parents were served with Candice’s
application to be his guardian, they did not make an appearance or
contest her application. The foster parents have not adopted him and do
not intend to adopt him. 2RR 75. The foster parents have not applied to
be his guardians. 2RR 74.
As such, at the time of the Trial Court’s denial of Candice’s
guardianship application, Landen was about to leave the foster home
12 soon regardless of what happened with her guardianship application.
2RR 75.
Since the Trial Court appointed HHSC to be the guardian of
Landen’s person, HHSC will not allow Candice to visit him or even tell
her where he is. Based on information and belief, HHSC has removed
him from foster care and moved him into a group home or facility. His
new caseworker is in Austin. HHSC will not tell Candice where her child
is. Candice does not even know which county in Texas Landen is living
in.
HHSC’s primary argument that Candice is unsuitable to serve as
guardian of Landen’s person is because she relinquished her parental
rights thirteen years ago. 2RR. HHSC glosses over the fact that Candice
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights because she believed that it
was in Landen’s best interest for her to do so. 2RR. HHSC did not point
to a single event occurring in the last ten years that disqualifies Candice
or that can show she is not capable of caring for Landen. 2RR.
Procedural history
Candice applied to the Trial Court to be the permanent guardian of
Landen’s person.
13 The Trial Court appointed Jeffrey Clark as Landen’s Attorney ad
Litem to represent Landen’s legal interests.2
Candice asked the Trial Court to appoint a guardian ad litem to
serve as a neutral court appointee to investigate the need for a
guardianship for Landen and the circumstances underlying Candice’s
Application and make recommendations to the Trial Court. Since Landen
is indigent, Candice offered to post security for the costs incurred by the
guardian ad litem. 1CR 39. The Trial Court denied Candice’s request.
1CR 88.
Candice also asked the Trial Court to appoint a court investigator.
1CR 231. But the Trial Court denied that request as well.
Because the Trial Court did not appoint a court investigator or
guardian ad litem, there was no neutral person to investigate Candice’s
Application for a guardianship.
Subsequently, HHSC filed its Petition in Intervention and Motion
for Leave to Intervene,3 requesting to intervene in Candice’s
2 The Trial Court discharged Mr. Clark as Attorney ad Litem and released him from
his duties as Attorney ad Litem. 1CR 245.
3 “Motion” and “Petition” to intervene are used interchangeably in HHSC’s filings and
the Court’s Order.
14 guardianship proceeding. 1CR 224. HHSC also filed its own application
to be appointed permanent guardian of Landen’s person. 1CR 193.
Candice opposed HHSC’s intervention on the grounds that Texas
law does not allow HHSC to intervene or seek a guardianship if there is
an available person who has come forward and applied to be guardian
(which Candice did). 1CR 227. If there is an available person, HHSC must
refer the guardianship to that person. Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101;
161.102.
The Trial Court held a hearing on HHSC’s Petition in Intervention.
HHSC’s Petition in Intervention was the only matter in this case set on
the Court’s docket that day. 2CR 280.
Even though there were no fact issues for HHSC’s intervention,
since a request to intervene is a determination for the Trial Court as a
matter of law, the Trial Court allowed HHSC to call two witnesses to
testify: Beth Boon, a representative of HHSC, and Robin Hewitt, a
representative of CPS. 2RR 3.
Ms. Boon could not identify any law that would prevent HHSC from
considering a parent whose rights to a child had been previously
terminated as a candidate to be guardian of an adult. 2CR 312.
15 Ms. Boon admitted that Candice’s circumstances could have
changed in the twelve years since Candice had voluntarily relinquished
her rights to Landen, but Ms. Boon did not bother to investigate Candice’s
current situation. 2CR 312-313.
Ms. Boon further admitted that while it was her job to investigate
alternatives to guardianship and locate possible candidates to serve as
guardian (other than HHSC), she did not even consider Candice as an
option. 2CR 314-315.
Ms. Hewitt testified to circumstances leading up to Landen’s
removal by CPS from Candice’s custody between 2007 and 2011—
circumstances that occurred more than thirteen years ago. 2RR 32.
Not only was this testimony not relevant to HHSC’s intervention in the
guardianship and not even admissible (see below), but the events
occurred so long ago that this testimony was completely irrelevant to the
entire guardianship proceeding.
Ms. Hewitt also could not identify a statute that disqualifies a
person from serving as guardian of an adult based on their prior
termination of rights to a child. 2CR 323.
16 Ms. Hewitt admitted that she has no personal knowledge about the
events that occurred with Landen’s case at CPS from 2007 to 2011. 2CR
327.
Because Ms. Hewitt has no personal knowledge about the events
that occurred with Landen’s case at CPS from 2007 to 2011, the Trial
Court sustained Candice’s (lack of personal knowledge) objection to Ms.
Hewitt’s testimony.
To respond to HHSC’s Plea in Intervention and rebut the negative
and wholly irrelevant testimony from HHSC’s witnesses, Candice
testified about her recovery from her addiction more than a decade ago,
her efforts to gain custody, and now guardianship of Landen, and her
ability to care for and provide for Landen. 2CR 331-363.
HHSC presented no evidence to show that Candice is not an
available person to serve as guardian based on her current
circumstances. HHSC presented no evidence to show that Candice is
unsuitable to serve as guardian based on her current circumstances.
Nevertheless, at the end of the hearing on HHSC’s Petition in
Intervention, the Trial Court granted the Petition in Intervention. 2RR
83; 1CR 235. Then, after it granted the Petition in Intervention, the Trial
17 Court sua sponte found Candice unsuitable and denied her guardianship
application on the merits with no notice and no trial setting. 2RR 83.
A few weeks later, the Trial Court sent a written order dismissing
Candice’s application for guardianship based on unsuitability without
notice or a trial setting (1CR 247) and a written order appointing HHSC
as the permanent guardian of Landen’s person (1CR 240).
In response to Candice’s request, the Trial Court entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law. 2CR 438.4 The Trial Court simply stated:
“Based on the testimony and evidence presented, this Court made a
finding of fact that [Candice] is not suitable to serve as [Landen’s]
guardian and her parental rights were terminated on or about September
18, 2012, regarding [Landen] via a Final Order in Suit Affecting the
Parent-Child Relationship in Anderson County, Texas.” 2CR 439.
The Trial Court did not provide any reason for an unsuitability
finding other than her parental rights had been terminated thirteen
years ago:
4 Candice objects to all of the Trial Court’s findings in paragraph 6. 2CR 439. Not all
parties were properly served, Cherokee County Court At Law does not retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the suit, and intervention does prejudice Candice’s rights.
18 2CR 439 (emphasis added).
Candice moved for a new trial to ask the Trial Court to reconsider
its decision to allow HHSC to intervene in her guardianship application,
dismiss her guardianship application, and appoint HHSC to serve as
guardian of Landen’s person. 2CR 258. The Trial Court denied her
motion. 2CR 453. She then filed this Appeal.
Issues Presented
1. The Trial Court erred when it allowed HHSC to intervene in Candice’s application to be the guardian of Landen’s person. The statute makes clear that when a person is available to serve as guardian of a ward, HHSC must allow that person to apply for guardianship first. Candice is available to serve as guardian of Landen’s person.
2. The Trial Court erred when it found Candice unsuitable to serve as guardian of Landen’s person and dismissed her application. First,
19 Candice did not receive timely notice that she had to try the merits of her application at the hearing on HHSC’s intervention petition. Second, HHSC presented no evidence that she is unsuitable based on her current circumstances. The basis of HHSC’s unsuitability contention is that she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Landen in 2012.
3. The Trial Court erred when it appointed HHSC to serve as guardian of Landen’s person. The Trial Court did not comply with Texas law when it made this decision. Landen was not present at the hearing on HHSC’s intervention, and the Trial Court did not consider Landen’s preference for guardian or his best interests. There was no indication that anyone had even spoken with Landen about his preferences or best interests. The Trial Court also failed to appoint a court investigator or guardian ad litem to evaluate Candice’s guardianship application.
Argument
I. HHSC has the burden to prove that Candice is disqualified to serve as guardian of Landen’s person.
HHSC has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Candice is disqualified to serve as guardian of Landen’s person.5 Hill
v. Jones, 773 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no
writ); Tex. Estates Code §1101.101(a)(2)(B).
5 A court can appoint a guardian if it has been shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the applicant is qualified. Tex. Estates Code §1101.101(a)(2)(B).
20 II. Texas law makes clear that HHSC should serve as guardian only as a last resort, when no alternative person is available to serve as guardian.
Texas statutes make clear that HHSC is the guardian of last resort.
We review matters of statutory construction as questions of law
with the goal of determining and giving effect to the Legislature’s intent.
Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020). In doing
so, we look first and foremost to the plain and common meaning of the
statute's words and to the definitions it provides, “unless a different
meaning is apparent from the context.” Id. When the words read in
context are clear, they determine intent; a court must never rewrite them
under the guise of interpretation. Id. at 41. Only when there is more than
one reasonable interpretation of the statutory text, or when its plain
meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results, may we look beyond that
language for assistance in determining intent. Id.
Texas law requires HHSC to refer Landen’s case to Candice so
Candice could apply to serve as guardian of Landen’s person without
interference from HHSC. Per Texas law, the Trial Court should have
denied HHSC’s Petition to Intervene and allowed Candice’s application
to proceed to resolution. If the Trial Court does not appoint Candice to
21 serve as guardian, HHSC can then apply to be Landen’s guardian. This
makes good policy; when a disabled person can live with a private
individual who wants to care for them, it takes the burden off the public
health system.
Texas Human Resource Code section 161.101 requires HHSC to
refer the ward to an alternative person to apply to be guardian if HHSC
determines that an alternative person is available to serve as guardian:
§ 161.101. Guardianship Services
(c) Subject to Subsection (c-1), if after conducting an assessment of an elderly person or person with a disability under Subsection (b) the department determines that: (1) guardianship is appropriate for the elderly person or person with a disability, the department shall: (A) file an application under Section 1101.001 or 1251.003, Estates Code, to be appointed guardian of the person or estate, or both, of the individual; or (B) if the department determines that an alternative person or program described by Section 161.102 is available to serve as guardian, refer the individual to that person or program as provided by that section;
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101(c) (emphasis added).
Section 161.102 of the Texas Human Resources Code also requires
HHSC to refer a ward to a person willing and able to provide
guardianship services:
22 (a) If the department becomes aware of a guardianship program, private professional guardian, or other person willing and able to provide the guardianship services that would otherwise be provided by the department to an individual referred to the department by the Department of Family and Protective Services under Section 48.209, the department shall refer the individual to that person or program for guardianship services.
Tex. Hum. Res. Code 161.102 (emphasis added).
Even if HHSC is already appointed as guardian, HHSC must
review their guardianship cases at least annually, and it must notify the
court if it discovers that any other person is willing and able to serve as
successor guardian:
§ 161.108. Successor Guardian
The department shall review each of the department’s pending guardianship cases at least annually to determine whether a more suitable person, including a guardianship program or private professional guardian, is willing and able to serve as successor guardian for a ward of the department. If the department becomes aware of any person’s willingness and ability to serve as successor guardian, the department shall notify the court in which the guardianship is pending as required by Section 1203.151, Estates Code.
Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.108 (emphasis added).
The Estates Code requires HHSC to notify the court if another
person is willing and able to serve as successor guardian:
§ 1203.151. Notice of Availability of Successor Guardian
(a) If a guardianship program or governmental entity serving as a guardian for a ward under this title becomes aware of a family
23 member or friend of the ward, or any other interested person, who is willing and able to serve as the ward’s successor guardian, the program or entity shall notify the court in which the guardianship is pending of the individual’s willingness and ability to serve.
Tex. Estates Code §1203.151 (emphasis added).
Also, HHSC can serve as a temporary guardian only as a last
resort:
§ 1251.011. Certain Agency as Temporary Guardian
A court may not ordinarily appoint the Department of Aging and Disability Services as a temporary guardian under this chapter. The appointment of the department as a temporary guardian under this chapter should be made only as a last resort.
Tex. Estates Code §1251.011 (emphasis added) (the Department of
Aging and Disability Services is part of HHSC).
HHSC’s representative, Ms. Boon, concedes that a guardianship
by HHSC is intended to be the last resort. 2RR 24-25.
Based on information and belief, since HHSC was appointed
guardian of Landen’s person, HHSC has removed Landen from foster
care and has placed him in a residential or institutional group home.
Candice has not been allowed to visit her son at all, despite multiple
requests. HHSC will not even tell her where her son is.
The Government Code specifies that HHSC should use residential
or institutional care settings only as a last resort:
24 § 531.055. Memorandum of Understanding on Services for Persons Needing Multiagency Services
(a) The Health and Human Services Commission, the Department of Family and Protective Services, the Department of State Health Services,… shall enter into a joint memorandum of understanding to promote a system of local-level interagency staffing groups to identify and coordinate services for persons needing multiagency services to be provided in the least restrictive setting appropriate, using residential, institutional, or congregate care settings only as a last resort…
Tex. Gov’t Code §531.055 (emphasis added).
III. The Trial Court erred by allowing HHSC to intervene in Candice’s guardianship proceeding; Texas law requires HHSC to allow her to apply for guardianship without HHSC intervention.
The permissibility of HHSC’s intervention is a question of law.
Texas law requires HHSC to refer the guardianship matter to a person
available to serve as guardian. See supra.
The procedure for guardianship for an individual in governmental
care is set out in the Human Resources Code:
• Step 1: Determine if an individual has a disability and if a guardianship would be appropriate:
“[I]f after conducting an assessment of… person with a disability… the department determines that… guardianship is appropriate for… person with a disability, the department shall… if the department determines that an alternative person… described by Section 161.102 is available to serve
25 as guardian, refer the individual to that person or program as provided by that section…” Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101(c)(1)(B).
• Step 2: If there is a person available to serve as guardian, refer to that available person:
“the department shall… if the department determines that an alternative person… described by Section 161.102 is available to serve as guardian, refer the individual to that person or program as provided by that section…” Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101(c)(1)(B);
and
“If the department becomes aware of a… person willing and able to provide the guardianship services that would otherwise be provided by the department to an individual referred to the department…, the department shall refer the individual to that person… for guardianship services.” Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.102.
• Step 3: Allow the available person to apply for guardianship:
“If the department determines that an alternative person… described by Section 161.102 is available to serve as guardian, the department shall refer… the person with a disability to that alternative person… in a manner that would allow the alternative person… sufficient time to file, not later than the 70th day after the date the department received the referral, an application to be appointed guardian.” Tex. Hum. Res. Code §161.101(c-1).
The statute does not allow HHSC to intervene in Candice’s
guardianship proceeding. Nor does it allow HHSC to litigate a
guardianship contest against Candice.
26 The only determinations HHSC can make are whether an
individual needs a guardianship and whether there is a person available
to serve as a guardian. HHSC’s inquiry into guardianship for Landen
should have ended when HHSC became aware of Candice’s Application,
and HHSC had to allow Candice to proceed with her Application.
As other sections of the Human Resource Code (and other statutes)
make clear, a guardianship by HHSC is to be a last resort. Thus, if there
is any possibility that Candice could care for Landen so the State of Texas
would not have to carry that burden, that option must be explored.
IV. The Trial Court erred by determining Candice’s suitability without allowing her to fully make her case for her guardianship application; her due process rights were violated.
The Trial Court circumvented the statutory process and jumped
straight to determining her suitability without allowing Candice to make
her case in her guardianship application, e.g., conduct discovery, demand
a jury, prepare for trial, and call witnesses.
Candice did not receive due process. Candice received no notice that
her Application was going to be tried and considered at the Intervention
Hearing. Her Application was not set for hearing or trial, and Candice
27 did not receive the requisite 45-day notice of trial per Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 245. Tex. R. Civ. P. 45.
Because the Trial Court gave no notice, Candice did not have an
opportunity to prepare her case for trial. She did not have an opportunity
to prepare or call witnesses. She did not even have time to demand a jury.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 216 (litigant must make a written request for a jury
with a reasonable time before the date set for trial of the cause on the
non-jury docket, but not less than thirty days in advance; a jury fee must
be deposited with the clerk of the court within the time for making a
written request for a jury trial).
In any event, the evidence at the hearing does not support a finding
that Candice is unsuitable.
V. The Trial Court erred when it found Candice unsuitable to be Landen’s guardian; HHSC did not prove that Candice is unsuitable.
There is no factual or legal support for the Trial Court’s finding that
Candice is unsuitable.
We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings
of fact for sufficiency of the evidence. Hegar, 605 S.W.3d at 40.
28 The only fact findings the Trial Court made about Candice are that
she is unsuitable and that her parental rights were terminated nearly 13
2CR 439 (emphasis added).6
The Trial Court provided no other explanation to support its finding
The statute does not define “unsuitable.” Merriam-Webster defines
“unsuitable” as “not appropriate for a particular occasion or situation.”
See https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/unsuitable.
Case law gives us examples of what constitutes “unsuitable”:
6 A person may not be appointed guardian if a court finds the person to be unsuitable.
Tex. Estates Code § 1104.352.
29 • In re Guardianship of Rombough, No. 02-11-00181-CV, 2012 WL 1624027, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 10, 2012, no pet.) (finding applicant unsuitable to care for ward with mild to moderate mental retardation, diabetes, hypertension, and hyperthyroidism because applicant was incapable of following visitation guidelines set up by Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, even upon court order to do so; ward’s behavior improved when his contact with applicant was limited; ward called 911 when he “was stressed” and had called 911 over a hundred times in the year with applicant; applicant could not keep Bryan from calling 911 and had no concerns with him calling 911 repeatedly in order to have someone to talk to; applicant left ward alone and unsupervised for extended periods of time and allowed ward to wander the neighborhood; applicant sometimes failed to disclose ward’s medical issues with his medical providers; applicant did not feed ward proper diet and did not give him his medications; applicant failed to notify the Social Security Administration of ward’s new residence after removing ward from his group home so ward’s Social Security and Medicaid benefits were suspended.)
• Matter of Guardianship of Jones, No. 02-15-00367-CV, 2016 WL 4474353, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) (finding applicant unsuitable because she refused to acknowledge that a guardianship was necessary despite ward’s dementia diagnosis, she misused ward’s Social Security funds, disobeyed temporary guardian’s orders, and failed to comply with court’s injunction).
• Trimble v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv., 981 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no
30 pet.) (finding applicant unsuitable because he was incapable of controlling and managing ward and her estate, lacked ability to follow through with recommendations from Protective Service and with court orders).
None of these types of circumstances exist in Candice’s case, and
HHSC did not prove otherwise.7 Instead, the facts demonstrate that
Candice is suitable.
A. Candice is suitable.
Candice’s current abilities demonstrate that she is more than
suitable to care for Landen:
• Candice has been “clean” since then. 2RR 46.
7 The Estates Code provides circumstances that disqualify a person to serve as guardian: The person’s conduct is notoriously bad. Tex. Estates Code §1104.353(a). The person has been finally convicted of (1) any sexual offense, including sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and prohibited sexual conduct; (2) aggravated assault; (3) injury to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual; (4) abandoning or endangering a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual; (5) terroristic threat; or (6) continuous violence against the family of the ward or incapacitated person. Tex. Estates Code §1104.353(b). The person: (1) is a party to a lawsuit concerning or affecting the welfare of the proposed ward, (2) is indebted to the proposed ward; or (3) asserts a claim adverse to the proposed ward or the proposed ward's property. Tex. Estates Code §1104.354. The proposed ward or ward disqualified the person in a declaration. Tex. Estates Code §1104.355. The person does not have the certification to serve as guardian. Tex. Estates Code §1104.356. The person is a nonresident who has not designated a resident agent to accept service of process in all actions or proceedings relating to the guardianship. Tex. Estates Code §1104.357. The person has been found to have committed family violence. Tex. Estates Code §1104.358. None of these circumstances exist in Candice’s case, and HHSC did not prove otherwise.
31 • She has not used any controlled substances for more than 11 years. 2RR 46.
• She has not had any drug offenses since 2013, nor has she failed a drug test since 2011. 2RR 46.
• Candice has been helping others with drug addictions, even founded a rehabilitation center in Palestine, Texas. 2RR 47.
• She has worked with the Palestine Police Department to help people with drug addictions. 2RR 47.
• The police officers who had arrested and the district attorney who prosecuted her can describe Candice’s life since being off drugs and opine that Candice is qualified to take care of Landen. 2RR 47.
• Candice lives in a house with four bedrooms and three bathrooms, with plenty of for Landen. 2RR 48.
• Candice has financial resources to care for Landen. 2RR 48.
• She has her own business and is putting herself through real estate school. 2RR 48. (She has since received her real estate license.)
• She has studied autism and has taken classes on how to better care for and understand Landen. 2RR 48.
• She has completed a guardianship training course as required by Texas Estates Code section §1104.003 to be appointed a guardian. 1CR 35.
32 • Candice is willing, able, and ready to provide care, support, clothing, shelter, and whatever needs he has. 2RR 51.
• She is willing, able, and ready to comply with court orders and submit reports to the court as required. 2RR 51; 2RR 75-76.
• She is willing, able, and ready to submit to court supervision. 2RR 51; 2RR 75.
• Candice is willing, able, and ready to move to Texas to be with Landen. 2RR 52-53; 2RR 75.
• She designated a Texas agent as required by Texas Estates Code section 1104.357 to be appointed a guardian. 2CR 451.
Simply stated, Candice has turned her life around and is willing,
able, and ready to care for her child.
B. The evidence is legally insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding.
Because the statute does not allow HHSC to intervene in Candice’s
guardianship proceeding, and the statute does not allow HHSC to make
its own determination of her suitability,8 the Trial Court erred by
8 Nothing in the statute provides that HHSC can make its own determination of a
person’s suitability. Statutes are interpreted based on the plain and common meaning of the statute’s words. Hegar, 605 S.W.3d at 40.
33 allowing HHSC to present evidence to disparage her and by considering
evidence (other than Candice’s Application) to support HHSC’s motion to
intervene.
Regardless, HHSC’s “evidence” is legally insufficient. HHSC’s
primary objection against Candice is that she voluntarily relinquished
her parental rights. But that was thirteen years ago, and she voluntarily
relinquished her rights in the best interests of her child. 2RR 21-44. This
shows that Candice loves her child, has his interests at heart, and is
willing to do what she believes is right and best for him.
The only “evidence” HHSC presented on unsuitability was hearsay
about events that supposedly occurred more than thirteen years ago. 2RR
21-44. But neither of HHSC’s witnesses has any personal knowledge of
the events on which HHSC based its unsuitability claim. 2RR 41-42. As
such, this “evidence” was excluded (the Trial Court sustained Candice’s
personal-knowledge objection). 2RR 41-42.
HHSC did not present any evidence from anyone with personal
knowledge of Candice’s ability (or inability) to care for Landen.
Evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding when (1) the
record bears no evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of
34 law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove
a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than
a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite
of a vital fact. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex.
2017).
Because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the Trial
Court’s unsuitability finding, the Court must reverse the Trial Court’s
dismissal of her Application.
C. Alternatively, the evidence is factually insufficient to support the Trial Court’s unsuitability finding.
If a party is attacking the factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support an adverse finding on an issue on which the other party had the
burden of proof, the attacking party must demonstrate that there is
insufficient evidence to support the adverse finding. Capps v. Nexion
Health at Southwood, Inc., 349 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011,
no pet.). In addressing a factual sufficiency of the evidence challenge, an
appellate court must consider and weigh all of the evidence in a neutral
light. Id. at 855-856. The verdict should be set aside only if it is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly
wrong and unjust. Id. at 856. However, an appellate court is not a fact
35 finder, and it may not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if a different
answer could be reached upon review of the evidence. Id.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence of Candice’s current
ability to care for Landen (as discussed above) makes the Trial Court’s
unsuitability finding clearly wrong and unjust, especially when there is
no controverting evidence.
D. There is no legal support for the Trial Court’s conclusion of law that Candice is unsuitable.
There is no legal support for the Trial Court’s conclusion of law that
Candice is unsuitable (2CR 441).
HHSC did not point to a single statute or case that says a mother
is not suitable to serve as her child’s guardian simply because she had
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights in her child’s best interests
thirteen years ago. None of HHSC’s witnesses could point to any legal
authority, statute, case, or policy. Candice is not aware of any.
Instead, the law gives Candice priority over HHSC to serve as
Landen’s guardian.
As Landen’s mother, Candice is Landen’s nearest next of kin. By
statute, Candice is entitled to be his guardian over HHSC:
36 § 1104.102. Appointment Preferences
If the court finds that two or more eligible persons are equally entitled to be appointed guardian of an incapacitated person: (1) the incapacitated person’s spouse is entitled to the guardianship in preference to any other person, if the spouse is one of the eligible persons; (2) the eligible person nearest of kin to the incapacitated person is entitled to the guardianship, if the incapacitated person’s spouse is not one of the eligible persons…
Tex. Estates Code §1104.102 (emphasis added).
VI. The Trial Court erred when it appointed HHSC as Landen’s guardian because the Trial Court did not comply with the statutory requirements.
Because there is no evidence of Landen’s preference for a guardian,
the Trial Court did not comply with Texas Estates Code section 1104.002.
Per Texas Estates Code section 1104.002, the Trial Court was
required to consider Landen’s preference for his guardian:
§ 1104.002. Preference of Incapacitated Person
Before appointing a guardian, the court shall make a reasonable effort to consider the incapacitated person’s preference of the person to be appointed guardian…
Tex. Estates Code §104.002.
The Trial Court, however, made no effort to determine Landen’s
preference of guardian. HHSC did not proffer evidence of Landen’s
preference. There is no indication that the Trial Court ever considered
37 the Ward’s Bill of Rights when making determinations about Landen
without his involvement. See Tex. Estates Code §1151.351(a), (b)(3) (“A
ward has all the rights, benefits, responsibilities, and privileges granted
by the constitution and laws of this state and the United States…” and
“to be treated with respect, consideration, and recognition of the ward’s
dignity and individuality”).
Landen did not attend the intervention hearing. See Tex. Estates
Code §1101.051(b) (“A proposed ward must be present at the
[guardianship] hearing unless the court, on the record or in the order,
determines that a personal appearance is not necessary.”). There is no
indication that Landen knew about the intervention hearing or was given
an opportunity to attend.
There is also no indication from the record that the Attorney ad
Litem asked for Landen’s appearance to be waived, or that the Court
found it to be in Landen’s best interests for him not to appear. This alone
is a violation of Landen’s due process rights.
There is no indication that anyone had even spoken to Landen
about his preference. A court-appointed attorney ad litem must interview
the proposed ward before a guardianship hearing, and, to the greatest
38 extent possible, discuss with the proposed ward the law and facts of the
case, the proposed ward’s legal options, and the grounds on which
guardianship is sought. Tex. Estates Code §1054.004(a). But there is no
indication that Mr. Clark, who was supposed to be Landen’s court-
appointed Attorney ad Litem, ever met with Landen, spoke with Landen,
or explained to Landen that his mother is ready, able, willing, and
prepared, and that she wants, to care for him and provide individual love
and attention to him.
It is apparent from the record that no one (except Candice) cares
about Landen’s interests and preferences. Not once did Mr. Clark say
anything about Landen’s preferences. Thus, not only were Candice’s due
process rights violated, but Landen’s due process rights were also
violated.
Not only did the Trial Court make no effort to determine Landen’s
preference, but the Trial Court did not consider the circumstances or
Landen’s best interests either:
§ 1104.101. Appointment According to Circumstances and Best Interests
The court shall appoint a guardian for an incapacitated person other than a minor according to the circumstances and considering the incapacitated person's best interests.
39 Tex. Estates Code §1104.101.
HHSC did not proffer any evidence of Landen’s best interests.
Evidence of what allegedly occurred thirteen years ago is not evidence of
what is in Landen’s best interests today.
Candice, however, presented evidence that living with her today
would be better for Landen than being under HHSC’s guardianship
because she has the means and training to care for him and give him
individual attention and most importantly, the desire to care for him.
HHSC contended that it would not be good for Landen to have to
move away from his foster home. But Landen was going to be removed
from the foster home either way, whether he moves in with Candice or
whether he remains under HHSC’s care.
Landen’s foster parents did not exhibit any interest in continuing
to care for Landen. The foster parents have not adopted him and do not
intend to adopt him. 2RR 75. The foster parents have not applied to be
his guardians. 2RR 74. Even though the foster parents were served with
Candice’s application to be his guardian, they did not make an
appearance or contest her application.
40 Based on information and belief, HHSC has removed him from
foster care and moved him into a group home or facility in an undisclosed
county.
Further, the Trial Court erred by failing to appoint a neutral officer
of the court (e.g., court investigator or guardian ad litem) to investigate
Candice’s guardianship application and assist the Trial Court in
determining Landen’s best interests. See Tex. Estates Code §1054.151
(requiring appointment of a court investigator to investigate the
circumstances alleged in a guardianship application); Tex. Estates Code
§1054.054 (guardian ad litem protects incapacitated person, investigates
guardianship application, and assists court in determining that person's
best interests).
It is apparent from the record that no one (except Candice) cares
about Landen’s best interests. Because no one was evaluating Landen’s
best interests in a neutral manner for the Trial Court, the Trial Court
should have appointed a court investigator or guardian ad litem.
Not only did the Trial Court err by sua sponte deciding to consider
the merits of Candice’s guardianship application without giving her
41 proper notice, violating her due process rights, but the Trial Court erred
by failing to protect Landen.
Because the Trial Court violated several statutes and rules of civil
procedures when it considered Candice’s guardianship application with
no notice, found her unsuitable with no or insufficient evidence,
dismissed her guardianship application, allowed HHSC to intervene, and
appointed HHSC as the permanent guardian of Landen’s person, the
Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Candice’s Motion for
New Trial.
Prayer
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant, Candice Jeffcoat, prays
that the Court:
a. Reverse the Trial Court’s July 15, 2024 Order permitting the Texas Health and Human Services Commission to intervene in her guardianship proceeding and render an order denying the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s motion to intervene in her guardianship proceeding;
b. Reverse the Trial Court’s August 1, 2024 Order appointing the Texas Health and Human Services Commission to serve as guardian of Landen Griswold’s person and render an order denying the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s application to be appointed as guardian of Landen Griswold’s person;
42 c. Reverse the Trial Court’s August 1, 2024 Order dismissing Candice Jeffcoat’s application to be appointed as guardian of Landen Griswold’s person and render an order appointing Candice Jeffcoat to be guardian of Landen Griswold’s person;
d. Or, alternatively, reverse the Trial Court’s July 15, 2024 and two August 1, 2024 orders and remand to the Trial Court for a trial on the merits of Candice Jeffcoat’s application to be appointed as guardian of Landen Griswold’s person; and
e. Grant any other relief to which Candice Jeffcoat is entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
KEAN | MILLER LLP
By: /s/ Tracia Y. Lee Tracia Y. Lee State Bar No. 24013021 Tracia.Lee@keanmiller.com Laurel M. Smith State Bar No. 24113488 Laurel.Smith@keanmiller.com Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 844-3000 (713) 844-3030 (Fax) e-serve@keanmiller.com (E-Service)
43 Certificate of Compliance
I certify that I drafted the foregoing using Microsoft Word for Mac 2021 using Century Schoolbook 14-point font for the text, 12-point font for the footnotes, and Garamond 14-point font for statute quotes, and that the Brief contains 7504 words.
/s/ Tracia Y. Lee Tracia Y. Lee
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent via e-serve to the following on March 4, 2025:
Alyssa N. Bixby-Lawson Jonathan Petix Assistant Attorney General Texas Health and Human Services General Litigation Division Commission (HHSC) Office of the Attorney General 350 Pine Street, 9th Floor 300 West 15th Street, 6th Floor Beaumont, Texas 77701 Austin Texas 78701 (409) 730-4087 Phone: (210) 270-1118 (409) 730-4048 (Fax) Fax: (512) 477-2348 Jonathan.petix@hhs.texas.gov Email: alyssa.bixby-lawson@oag.texas.gov Counsel for Appellee, Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC)
44 Appendix
1. Trial Court’s Order granting HHSC’s Petition in Intervention (1CR 235)
2. Trial Court’s Order dismissing Candice’s application for guardianship (1CR 247)
3. Trial Court’s Order appointing HHSC as the permanent guardian of Landen’s person (1CR 240)
45 Appendix 1 NO. G00074
IN THE MATl'ER OF § IN TUE COUNTY COUltT AT LA \Y § TRF. CUARDIA:,jSRIP 01-' § OF § LANDEN THOMAS GR!SWOLO § CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS AN lNCAPACl'fATED PERSON §
ORI>ER ON MOTION TO INTF.RVENE
On this day, the Court con~idcrcd the Texas Health nnd Human Services Commission's
(HHSC), Motion tu 1ntcrvcnc.
The Court fin& that HHSC is an interested in this guardianship proceeding and that I-IHSC
has stated sufficient grounds for intervention in tho proceeding. The Court further finds that the
intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the oni;inal parties' rights and
I IIISC does not have an adverse relationship with the proposed ward that would unduly prejudice
the adjudicaiion of the original parties· rishtS.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that HHSC's Motion 10 Intervene is granted.
SIGNEDon~ G;.~~+-
JU
FILED at y ·.12, o'clockL.-M JUL15 202~ LAVERNE LUSK ~lf!Y COIJRT Cl!El!OIIEE~
Gri-s•olcl,t...Officeon Motion10lnttrvcM ha 235 Appendix 2 CAUSE NO. G00074 IN THE MATTER OF § IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW § THE GUARDIANSHIP OF § OF § LANDEN THOMAS GRISWOLD § CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS Al'/INCAPACITATI::0PERSON § ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FORGUA.RDIANSHlP DUETO UNSUITABILITY On the 15°' day of July 2024, came to be considered the Application for Appointment of Candice Nichole Jeffcoat AKA Candace Jeffcoat as Pennanenl Guardian or Landen Thomas Griswold. This Coun considered the question of suitability porsuanl to Section 1104.352of the Texas Esta1esCode. Based on the testimonyand evidence presented, this Court finds that Candice NicholeJeffcoat AKA Candace Jeffcoat is not suirable 10 be appointed guardian of Landen Thomas Griswold. Therefore, this Court denies Candice Nichole Jeffcoat AKA Candace Jcffc(),lt's Applicationfor Appointment as Guardian of Landen Thomas Griswold. IT JS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Appointment of Candice Nichole Jeffcoat AKA Candace Jcffco!lt as Permanent Guardian of Landen Thomas Griswold Application is denied due to1-unsuitabilily to serve as guardian. SIGNEDthis-1...!!::..&y of...J../)LJ.-"-'"-"'c,f--''--"::=-=-- Ot1:crOo\1111& ,\pplicsalion for O\l,,)rdf4ptl,I~ Out to U1UU-lt1bality ..,., C.UK llo CCCO~ l.ANDEHTIIOMASGKISWA~O. 247 APPROVEDAS TO FORi\4: Jo ln Petix tomey For HHSC ~u(:RtvL .e la . Attorney Ad Li1cmFor Landen Thomas Griswold @~ Kean I Milier LLP Allomey for Candice Jeffcoat Candice Jeffcoatdisagr= with the Court's findings. conclusions, and determinations and support a new trial However, th,c Court is askingaUparties to feds there arc defcru th11.t sign this proposed order before the Court willsign it. Ai such, Candice Jeffcoat signs this proposed order so the Cou,rt will sign it, so that post-judgment and appellate deadlines an start, so that she can move forward with a motion for new trial and appellate remedies. Candice Jeffcoat agrees only to the form of this order but disagrees, and should not be construed as concurring, with the content or result. '° Or4n Oc~ylnaApplioeioflFo, Outrdi.ii.uhip0110 U11av\1,3bllrty LANDENTIIOMAS OlllSW,._U>.C"',c No, 00007◄ h1itl 248 Appendix 3 NO. G08074 rNTHE MATT£R 01' § IN71'H£COUNTVCOURT AT LAW § THE GUARDIANSHIP OF § OF § LANDENTIIOMAS GRISWOLD § CHEROKEECOUNTY, TEXAS AN INCAPACITATEDPERSON § ORDER APPOINTING PERMANi:.NTGUARDIAN OF THE PERSON WlTII FOLL Al.ffHOR[J'V Onthe Is"'day of July2024,came10 Ii¢ consideredthe applicationfiledinthe above-entitledand •munbuedcauseby theTexasHealthand HumanServicesCommission("HHSC"or"Guarditn" herein), requestingthe appointmentof the TexasHealthand HumanSen,icesCommiS&ion as FullGuardianof the Personof, LandenThomasGriswold("Ward"herein),an IncapacitatedPc:rsoo. ApPlicant,the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, appeared by and through its Beth Boon,and its attorneyof record, JonathanPetix.The Ward, designatedemployee-representative, LandenThomasGriswold,Ward, appearedby and throughhis Ccort-appointedattorneyad !item,Jeffery The followingpctWns&PllC8.fed in pccsonat the hearing: I. Pursuant10 Estates Code§ 1101.I0l(a)(l), the Court finds by clear and convincing evidenceas followa: That LandenThomasGriswold,Ward,is a male,bom December2, 2004; That Wardis incapacitatedand thereforea Guardianshipof the l'c.rsongivingfullauthorityto the Guardianshouldbe granted; That it is in the best interestof the Ward to have the Court appoint a fullGuardianof the Personfor the Ward; 0lid' A~ Pdlnl.--,Gurd;u or'-"IC ~"" F..nA.tMt!Of.lJ LANOEI!TIIOMASORISWA.l.D,C.,Uk No.000074 240 That the right~ of person and property willbe protected by the appointment of a full Guardian; and That alternatives to guardianship and available suppom and services to a'l'Oidguardianship were considered and no alternatives to guardianship or supports or services are available 10 the Proposed Ward or are feasible to avoid the need for guardianship. Pun\Bntto EstatC$CodC§ I 101.10\(aXl), the Court further finds by a prepondeftnce of the evidenceas follows: That this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Estal«:$Code § I022.002 and venue of the cue punuanl lo Estates Code§ 1023.001; That the Texas Health and Human Services Commission is qualified by law to act as Full Guardian of the Person and no other suitable, eligible, and qualified person is available; That Candice Nichole Jeffcoat AJ That the Ward Is totally without capacity to care for himself; The C,ounfurther finds by the preponderance of the evidence that Landen Thomas Griswold, Ward, is totally incapaciUltedb:cause of a men11Icondition andlacks c.pacity IOvote in an election, to operate a motor vehicle, and to make personal decisions regarding residence. The Court further finds by the prepondcn.ncc of evidence that HHSC hu DCtCd in good failh in the filing and prosecution of the application for guardianship. Pursuant to Estates Code § 1101.102,the Court furtller finds that the detennination of incapacity is evidtllCCdby =mng acts or oc:currenceswithin the preceding six-month periodandnot by isolated insrancesof negligence or bad judgment IL That citation and notice of HHSC's application for guardianship has bew given as provided by law and all persons required to be pccsooallyserved with process have been properly sen'~ as required by law, have signed waivers, or have appeared in person a< through their a.tlomeyin Court Or.kl'Ap,poietioc~ OuMlia-• or Ille "'"°"'d, F\J1lAIHl\ority C.- l'HOMASORJ.SWALO. LA.,\w.OE)f NG\00001◄ grantedand that the Texas HealthandHumanSaviccs Commusioois appointedGuardianwithFull Authorityof lhc Personof LandenThomasGriswold,for an indefinite1enn,subject 10 furtherDtdcrs of this Court.The tenn of this guardianshipshall be untilthe ward is restoredto lull capacity,dies, or witilthe Court dc1enninesthis mattershall be tenninati:d.The Guardianof the Personis hereby grantedfull powers and duties to act in the Ward's behalfas set fonh in EstatesCode § 1151.051, including.but notlimited to, thefollowing: a) the powerto review,to takepossessionof and consentto thediscloiureof the Ward's medical, dental,and psychologicalrecord.~ b) the powerto apply for, WTange for>and c:onsecil to any and all psychologiC11I, psychiatric,or medicalexaminations,trcannents,tests,or cvaluatioMfor the Ward, but not the authorityto consentto in-patientpsychiatriccommitmentof theWard; c) the power to consentor to objectto all medicaland dentalh'Clltmentand procedurefor the Ward,includingsurgery,unlessconsentby a guardianis prohibitedby othcrlaw; d) pursuantto Healthand SafelyCode §§ 166.039and 166.088,the power to makea autment decisionth&tmay includea decisionto withholdor withdrawlife-sustainingtmitmentfrom the Ward and the powerto executean Out-of.HospitalDo-Not-Resuscitate(DNR)Orderon behalfof the Ward; e) the righl to takechargeof and supervisethe pc,;on of the Ward,have physicalpossessionof the Ward,establishthe legaldomicileof the Ward,placethe Ward in appropriateliving facilil:ies,andmake pcnonaldecisionsregardingthe residenceof the ProposedWord; ~ tnc powerto oon.scntto ,ppcopri.ateeducational,vocationaland recreationalservicesforthe Ward; g) the powerto accessall governmentfundsand ser,,iccsto whichthe Ward may be entitled; h} the powerto apply for and to securean identificationcard for the ward; and ~ the power10 sign documentsnecessaryor appropri:iteto facilitateemploymentof lhe Ward. On:krAppoWincPcnotna11 Owtdiano( lh~PeBO'll withFull,\utho1hy l.AIIDEJ 242 NOTICETOANYPEACEQFfl(ER QFTHESTATEOFTEXAS;YOUMAY USE8£ASONARl,E EfFOBTSIQ ENfORCtIHt RICHT()f A CllABOlANC)FTHE rEBSQN Of lttE WARDQBW QFt\ WARPIO HAYE ruys1cA1. POSSfSSION f:5J:ARf dSH·mt: WARD'S LWAI,DOMICJl,E ASSPECIFIED INTHISOBOE& A PE.AC£ OFFlCERWHOBELJES ONTHE TERMSOFt\ COURTORDERAND'CtlE· OEEIC&B'S AGENO:AREfNIITl,ED TO TUEAPPIJCARI ,ERrtMlJNIIYAGAINST ANYCJYJI« PB OTHERCLAIMBt;GABPING THEOFFICER'S GOODEt\lili Acts PEBEOBMED INDiE SCOPE Of THEQff!CEB'SPPilfS IN ENfORC[NCTHE TERMS OFTHISORDERTHAI BELATEIO Tit& ABOYt:·MENTIONEO BIGHTSOF THECQJJRT-APPQINJ&P Gl/ARQJAN ot· THf. WARD,ANY Of THEPERSON Pt;RSQN WHOKNQWJNGt,¥ PRESENTS FQR'ENFORCEMENJ AN ORDER TJIAI JS JNY61,IP ORNQLONGER !N EFfECTCQMMIJ'S ANOFFENSE J'HATJ't1AY BE BY CQNt'!NEMENIIN JAi), f'QRA;SLONGASTWOYt:t\BSANDt\ PJJNl511ABLE flNE QEASMUCHASSJQ.QOQ," lV. The CouM lmeoses those limltarlons on lht Ward that ue consiuenc with lht prtttdlng gr•nl of powers to the Guardian in paragraph.If I. of thlsorder. IT 1S FURTHERORDERED,ADJUDGEDand DECREEDthat the Ward no tonger ha"e the rtcbt to: a) vole in a publicelectionor any othcrmaller; b) own, possess,pun:haS(!, or use a firearmor ammunition; c) operatea mo10rvehicleor hold or obisin a licenseto operatea mot0r vehicleundc:r Transponntion CodeChapter521; d) consent ro marriage; Oidrt AppoAtMlll,h,mai,c:M (,uatd.at1of t"t PfflDn wtd! F\IIJAud\orily 1.A!COEII TllOMASGllSWAIJ),C, ... No. 00007< 243 c) exe<.'Ute a willor makea codicilor amendmentto anyexistingwill; O executea trustor makean amendmentto anyexistingtrust g) executea powerof attorneyor maxean amendmentto any existingpowerof attorney; II) makedecisionsor givecxmscntto medicalor surgicalIT'tatment; O choosehis or her domicileor residenceor makepersonaldecisionsregardingresidence; D per.;,onally to soelcemployment,obtaingovernmentassistanceor accessgovernmentbcnefiis or funds. In compliancewith EstatesCode§ 1151.001,the Wardn:rainsall legal and civilrightsand powersexceptthosedesignatedby this orderas beingspecificallygrantedto the guardian. Medical Power of Attorney issued by the Ward is revoked and the power to make medical decisionson behalf of the Ward is vested in the Guardian upon qualificationof the Guardian pursuantto Healthand SafetyCode§ 166.156. VI. THE COURT FURTHER FINDSthat pursuant10 HumanResourcesCode§ 161.107,no boodbe m:iuircdoflhe TexasHealthand HumanSaviccsCommission.The GuardianshipSpecialist shalltakethe oath forthe Commission.The Agentor GuardianshipSpecialistassign.edby HHSCto thiscase is &th Boon. tT lS FURTHER ORDERED tlrntthis order shall not constituteauthorityfor 1heTexas HcallhandHumanScrvi~s Commission(HHSC),the Guardianof the Pciwn to act as guardianW1til theyhavequalifiedacoord_ing 10law by tilingan oathwilh the CherokeeCountyClerk•s office.Upon SaviccsCommissioo(HHSC)qualificationas auardian,~ Oicrokee lbeTexasHealthand HWI131l enter A~ias PMIUl!lff't' c-,dia1111(Chc PtaOII\-ilh r\i!JA~C'f U.1'D£11 nt()MAS Ol1$WAt.0. Cauk llo ~14 244 CountyClerkshall issue Lelttrs of Ouaroianship,witha certifiedcopy of this Orderattached,that SHALLRE EVIDENCE'TO ALL CONCERNEDof the Tcx_u Health and Human SctVices Commission (HHSC)authorityto actas Guardianof the Pmon of theWaro. IT IS FURTHER ORDER£0 ihat within 12 months&omthe date of its qualification,md annuallythereafter,HHSCshallsubmitto theCourtan annualreportof the person;andthatthe letters of guaidianshipshall cxpin one year and four monthsafter !heir date of issuanceunlessrenewed acoordingto law. THE COURT FURTHER FINDSthatputSUant lO HumanResourcesCode§ 161.107,no fee including,but not limitedto, ad !itemfees,filingfees,costsof certifyingorders,andservicecosts,shall be assessed1gainstthe Tcxas Healthand HumanServicesCommission. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JeN'c,yClark,auomey ad litem is herebydischargedand releasedfrom his duties as auomey ad !itemin this matter. IT TS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Coun shall prepare and transmit an abstract of judgm.cntfor this proceeding Cherokee County Voter Registrar and lO the Texas Departmentof Public Safety. IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDth1tlhe Clerkof the Courtihell rq,on 10 the Texas Departmentof Public Safety pursuantto GovernmentCode§§ 411.052and 411.0521. SIGl' ~ Ap;,c,Whtt PCl'\Tlanfflto(dic ~ Wt. f u,i i\ulhotiry (i~iu LV 245 APPROVED ASTO FORM: at Fl Lo'~ck~ M AUS 05 2024 LAVERNE LUSK Jo . Peti1t CI.Elttte'WOURT CkEROl\ElCO., 11 er_..:..ff,.,,,_ ____ ce,un llomcy For tlHSC Clrr4i6:::J-¥cf&vL J c lar AttorneyAd Lit • or Landen Thomas Griswold LaurelM. Smith KeanJ MillerLLP Altorneyfor Candice Jeffcoat Candice Jdfcoat disagrees with the Court', findings, conclusions, and determinations and feels there are defects that support a new trial. However, the Court is asking all parties to sign this proposed order befQrethe Court willsi811iL As such, Candice Jeffcoatsigns this proposed order so the Court will sign ii, so that post• j11dgmtotand appellate deadlines can start, so that she can move forward with a motion for r.cw trial and appellate mnedies. Candice Jeffcoat agrees only to the form of this order but disagrees, and should not be construed as cQncurring, with the content or result ~ App0Wt.,. PC"ODlr..td runAIIHlority Ou.""1tt1ot•~ P'u.lH widll I.AMllll nlC)t.4AS GatSWAU>, C-C llo.GC007◄ 246 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Tracia Lee on behalf of Tracia Lee Bar No. 24013021 tracia.lee@keanmiller.com Envelope ID: 98068774 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Appellant's Brief Status as of 3/5/2025 7:21 AM CST Associated Case Party: Texas Health and Human Services Commission Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jonathan Petix 24027728 jonathan.petix@hhs.texas.gov 3/4/2025 10:05:14 PM SENT Alyssa Bixby-Lawson 24122680 alyssa.bixby-lawson@oag.texas.gov 3/4/2025 10:05:14 PM SENTI. CandiceNicholeJeffcoatAKACandaceJeffcoat,and her attorneyLaurelM. Smith.
2. RobinHewitton behalfof DFPS
I I
I 241 IT IS THRREFORE ORDERED,ADJUDGED,AND DECREED that the applicationbe
V. lT IS FURTHERORDERED,ADJUDGEDAND DECREEDby the Courtthat any
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-guardianship-of-landen-thomas-griswold-an-incapacitated-person-v-texapp-2025.