2025 IL App (1st) 250228-U No. 1-25-0228 Order filed August 19, 2025 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re Z.S., a Minor, ) ) Appeal from the (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20 JA 166 ) Y.R., ) Honorable ) Debjani D. Desai, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights over her challenges to the trial court’s unfitness and best interests findings.
¶2 Respondent Y.R. appeals from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights.
Respondent contends that the trial court’s unfitness and best interests findings were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-25-0228
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Pre-Termination Hearing Proceedings
¶5 Respondent Y.R. gave birth to Z.S. on July 8, 2017. He is currently eight years old. Z.S.’s
father is R.S. The trial court entered a default judgment against R.S. and terminated his parental
rights. He is not a party to this appeal.
¶6 On January 27, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and a motion
for temporary custody of Z.S. The State alleged that respondent had two other children in
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) custody with findings of abuse or neglect
and that she had not completed services in those cases. In addition, the State alleged that police
responded to an incident on December 14, 2019, in which R.S. was intoxicated and locked
respondent and Z.S. out of their house. Later that day, R.S. brought Z.S. to a hospital and claimed
that respondent had been using illegal drugs. The trial court found probable cause that Z.S. was
abused or neglected, removed him from his parents’ home, and granted DCFS temporary custody
with the right to place him. On September 9, 2021, the court adjudicated Z.S. neglected due to an
injurious environment. On November 3, 2021, the court made Z.S. a ward of the court.
¶7 On March 14, 2024, at DCFS’s request, the court changed the permanency goal to
substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights “[d]ue to the length
of time this case ha[d] been open and due to the history and nature of this case coupled with
[respondent’s] behaviors in and out of court.”
¶8 On June 14, 2024, the State filed a petition seeking termination of respondent’s parental
rights. Relevant here, the State alleged that respondent was unfit under sections (b) and (m)(ii) of
the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m)(ii) (West 2020)), because she failed to maintain a
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reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to Z.S.’s welfare and failed to make
reasonable progress toward Z.S.’s return home. With respect to section (m)(ii), the State alleged
that respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the following nine-month periods:
September 9, 2021, to June 9, 2022; June 9, 2022, to March 9, 2023; March 9, 2023, to December
9, 2023; December 9, 2023, to September 9, 2024; and January 8, 2024, to October 8, 2024. The
State also alleged that Z.S.’s adoption by his foster parents was in his best interest because he had
been in their care since December 17, 2020.
¶9 B. Unfitness Hearing
¶ 10 The trial court held an unfitness hearing on October 29, 2024, and November 22, 2024.
¶ 11 1. Krystle Miller and Eleena Olaleye
¶ 12 DCFS child welfare specialist Krystle Miller testified that Z.S. entered DCFS care in 2020
due to concerns about domestic violence and substance abuse in his parents’ home. DCFS initially
placed Z.S. with his uncle. In December 2020, Z.S. was at respondent’s home unsupervised and
“was found wandering alone at a park without shoes on and had crossed a busy street to get there.”
As a result, respondent was charged with and pled guilty to child endangerment. A certified
statement of disposition entered into evidence reflects that respondent was arrested on December
17, 2020, and charged with child endangerment (720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a)(1) (West 2020)). On
February 23, 2021, she was sentenced to 18 months of conditional discharge. DCFS placed Z.S.
in a two-parent foster home, which remained his placement at the time of termination proceedings.
¶ 13 Miller’s first assignment to this case began in January 2022. At that time, respondent had
completed parent education, domestic violence services, and substance abuse services. She was
engaged in individual therapy and psychiatric services. Respondent initially had supervised
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daytime visits with Z.S., which progressed to unsupervised daytime visits in July 2022. However,
she never progressed to overnight visits due to inadequate housing. In the spring of 2022, Miller
told respondent that she had to inform DCFS if she was involved in a romantic relationship so
DCFS could assess whether Z.S. could be around respondent’s significant other. Miller’s first
assignment to this case concluded at the end of 2022.
¶ 14 DCFS investigator Eleena Olaleye was assigned to this case in January 2023. She testified
that respondent was engaged in medication monitoring and psychiatric services through the
University of Illinois-Chicago and individual therapy through Catholic Charities of Chicago.
Respondent completed an assessment through the Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic (CCJCC),
which indicated that she was not taking her psychiatric medication at times. The CCJCC
assessment also stated that respondent’s visits with Z.S. went well; she had “a good strategy to
elicit [Z.S.’s] compliance and asked age-appropriate questions.”
¶ 15 Respondent was “livid” when she learned that Z.S. had to repeat kindergarten. She blamed
the foster parents and claimed that they were “not teaching him anything.” Respondent was more
focused on the foster parents than her own services.
¶ 16 In July 2023, respondent told Olaleye that her boyfriend, a man with the last name Herrera,
died of a drug overdose in her apartment on July 2, 2023. 1 Neither respondent nor Z.S. were in the
apartment when Herrera died, but respondent was having unsupervised visits with Z.S. at that
apartment in July 2023. Prior to Herrera’s death, respondent never told DCFS or her therapist that
Some exhibits in the record spell his last name “Barrera.” It is not clear which spelling is correct. We 1
will use the spelling the parties used in court during termination proceedings, which is “Herrera.”
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she had a boyfriend. Due to Herrera’s death, respondent’s visits with Z.S. changed from
unsupervised to supervised. Thereafter, she never returned to unsupervised visitation.
¶ 17 Also in the summer of 2023, Olaleye created a group text between herself, respondent, and
Z.S.’s foster parents because the foster parents expressed concerns about respondent threatening
them. In that group text, respondent accused Z.S.’s foster parents of not properly caring for him
and “trying to steal” him. Olaleye advised respondent that those texts did not help her efforts to
reunite with Z.S.
¶ 18 A CCJCC assessment dated September 15, 2023, was entered into evidence. The
assessment reflects that clinical psychologist Dr. Phillip O’Donnell reviewed DCFS’s case file,
which included service plans, records from respondent’s service providers, and Z.S.’s medical and
educational records. He also interviewed respondent, Olaleye, respondent’s therapist Shanna
Arceo, and the foster parents. Based on his review of the records and his interviews, Dr. O’Donnell
opined that there was “a low likelihood that [respondent] would be able to make the gains
necessary to achieve a return home goal” and that achieving Z.S.’s return home would take at least
one more year. Dr. O’Donnell acknowledged that termination of respondent’s parental rights could
“temporarily cause [Z.S.] anxiety and worry, as [foster mother E.B.] reported occurred when
unsupervised visits were recently suspended,” but Z.S.’s foster parents and his individual therapist
could manage those concerns.
¶ 19 In late October or early November 2023, respondent sent threatening texts to the foster
mother, E.B. The State moved a screenshot of these text messages into evidence. We set out these
text messages as they appear in the record, with no corrections of typographical errors or omissions
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of inappropriate language. See A.A. v. Nita A., 2023 IL App (1st) 230011, ¶ 5 n. 2. Respondent
sent E.B. the following texts, all in succession without responses from E.B.:
“[E.B.] I can’t you miss treated my son girl you bad I beat your ass”
“I promise I’m going to the court system on Monday”
“You better move I gonna find you [E.B.] you did son bitch you fucked”
“I’m telling bitch you better fucken move I’m send all find you and family bitch”
“Gall GA Bitch they save ass you wrong bitch”
“That’s my son”
“I’m taking my medicine keep calm”
Based on these text messages, Olaleye was concerned that respondent’s behavior was becoming
more erratic. Olaleye’s assignment to this case ended in December 2023. She concluded that
respondent “was not in a position to be full-time parenting unsupervised.”
¶ 20 Krystle Miller was assigned to this case again in January 2024. She interviewed respondent
regarding Herrera’s death. Respondent claimed that Herrera was “not someone *** of
significance” and that she was just “getting to know him” when he died. However, respondent
acknowledged that she established a Go Fund Me account, in which she claimed to be Herrera’s
fiancée, to raise money for his family.
¶ 21 Respondent also told Miller that she sent Z.S.’s foster parents threatening text messages in
the fall of 2023 because she believed the foster parents were not caring for Z.S. properly. Miller
had no concerns that Z.S.’s foster parents were mistreating him. Miller concluded that respondent
was more focused on the foster parents then her own reunification with Z.S., and her interactions
with the foster parents evidenced her inability to regulate her emotions and behavior, which
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prevented Z.S.’s return home. However, in 2024, respondent apologized to the foster parents for
threatening them and their relationship has improved.
¶ 22 Also in early 2024, Miller learned that respondent made comments to Z.S. “about what
would happen when he was returned to her care.” Miller advised respondent that such comments
were inappropriate because it was uncertain whether Z.S. would in fact return to respondent’s care,
and such statements confused him.
¶ 23 On March 14, 2024, DCFS changed the permanency goal from return home to court
determination on termination of parental rights. Miller’s March 2024 permanency report
recommending this goal change was entered into evidence. The report stated that respondent was
making some, but not satisfactory, progress toward reunification with Z.S. Respondent had
completed domestic violence services, substance abuse treatment, and parent education. She was
negative for drugs and alcohol at all the tests she attended, but she missed three tests in the six
months prior to the report, which DCFS treated as positive tests. Respondent’s unsupervised visits
with Z.S. ended on July 29, 2023, due to her boyfriend’s death. Z.S. was happy after visits with
respondent and they showed love and affection to each other during visits. Miller recommended
“termination of parental rights” because of respondent’s (1) missed drug and alcohol tests, (2)
intelligence quotient (IQ) in the “borderline impaired range” that made it difficult for her to
exercise judgment, (3) threats toward the foster parents and difficulty coping with stress, and (4)
romantic partners that put Z.S. at risk. However, Miller concluded that termination of parental
rights was appropriate only if Z.S.’s contact with respondent continued.
¶ 24 Following the permanency goal change, Miller advised respondent to engage in
community-based services and provide documentation of her psychiatric care. Respondent did
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neither. DCFS offered respondent weekly visitation with Z.S., but her visits were inconsistent. She
missed visits in September 2024 and did not participate in makeup visits. In October 2024,
respondent missed a visit because she had an eye infection, and she did not accept DCFS’s offer
of a virtual visit. Respondent also canceled a visit in October 2024 because she and her older sons
were going to Six Flags. Respondent ended her final visit with Z.S. before the termination trial 45
minutes early, claiming that Z.S. “expressed he was ready to go.” In total, respondent attended
four or five visits with Z.S. out of seven or eight that DCFS made available in September and
October 2024.
¶ 25 As of late October 2024, respondent was engaged in individual therapy and family therapy
with Z.S., but Miller did not know whether she was in psychiatric treatment. Miller concluded that
Z.S. could not return to respondent’s care due to her failure to make substantial progress, especially
her failure to progress to overnight visitation, and concerns about her judgment and decision-
making.
¶ 26 2. Shanna Arceo
¶ 27 Shanna Arceo testified that she was a therapist and licensed clinical social worker at
Catholic Charities of Chicago. She provided trauma-focused and relational therapy to respondent.
Between September 2021 and January 2022, Respondent missed 10 therapy sessions and did not
communicate with Arceo because she was in jail. Upon her release from jail in January 2022,
respondent did not take her psychotropic medication and made strange phone calls to Arceo.
Respondent also abused substances from January through August 2022. As a result, Arceo moved
respondent’s therapy discharge date from December 2022 to June 2023, and then again to August
2023.
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¶ 28 In the summer of 2023, respondent informed Arceo that “a friend” had died in her home.
Respondent had not told Arceo that she was in a romantic relationship with that “friend,” which
would have been a safety concern given respondent’s history of domestic violence in relationships.
Throughout the summer of 2023, respondent’s therapy sessions focused on her grief due to
Herrera’s death and her concerns about Z.S.’s foster parents rather than Z.S.’s return home. On
July 20, 2023, Arceo informed respondent that her visitation with Z.S. would change from
unsupervised to supervised and respondent “appeared to be in a panic and not understanding how
her decision would impact her son.” During a phone call with respondent’s attorney on July 24,
2023, Arceo expressed concerns about respondent’s judgment and irrational thoughts. The
following day, respondent said “she was upset because no one [was] on her side and everyone was
working against her.”
¶ 29 Respondent continued to fixate on the foster parents in therapy sessions from July through
November 2023. She believed the foster parents were “working to try to prevent her from spending
time with” Z.S. and that Z.S.’s foster mother “was out to get her and take her son.” Respondent
was not receptive to Arceo’s efforts to rationalize such thoughts. Arceo increased the frequency of
therapy sessions due to respondent’s anxiety, stress, and depression. In December 2023,
respondent disrupted a child and family team meeting to talk about the foster parents and refused
to discuss her reunification services. The meeting had to end due to respondent’s disruptiveness.
However, respondent’s fixation on the foster parents improved thereafter.
¶ 30 Respondent’s therapy sessions with Arceo ended on May 29, 2024. Overall, respondent
made progress in that she voluntarily enrolled in drug classes, secured housing and employment,
attended drug testing, and improved her anger and tone of voice in interactions with others.
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¶ 31 Arceo’s reports of her therapy sessions with respondent were entered into evidence. These
reports reflect that Arceo diagnosed respondent with post-traumatic stress disorder. Reports from
April through June 2023 reflect that respondent was making moderate to positive progress toward
Z.S.’s return home, but she was often anxious about this case and her relationship with the foster
parents.
¶ 32 3. E.B.
¶ 33 E.B. is Z.S.’s foster mother. She testified that Z.S. came to live with her and her husband
J.B. on December 17, 2020.
¶ 34 When E.B. picked up Z.S. from an unsupervised visit with respondent on April 1, 2023,
Z.S. said that “a loud man” was at the visit. Z.S. said that the man was not his older brother Julian;
it was a man who had been “mean to [respondent] sometimes, but he’s funny.” That night, E.B.
texted respondent to ask about the man, and respondent “got really angry and came back with some
angry texts about [E.B.] accusing [respondent] of doing things.” Z.S. later identified the “loud
man” as respondent’s boyfriend, Herrera.
¶ 35 Also in April 2023, Z.S. said that respondent told him he would return to her home soon.
That made Z.S. anxious because he thought he might be moving to Z.S.’s home the next day or
week. Respondent told Z.S. not to tell his foster parents she said he would be coming home soon.
Z.S. also told E.B. that he sat on respondent’s lap without a seatbelt in the back seat of a car
belonging to someone he did not know.
¶ 36 In June 2023, respondent texted E.B. and J.B. that she was upset because she saw a crack
in Z.S.’s toenail. She accused E.B. and J.B. of not taking care of Z.S. and “taking in foster kids for
the money.” In August 2023, respondent failed to attend a visit with Z.S., so E.B. checked on
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respondent at her home. Respondent’s front door was open and one of her windows was broken.
Respondent explained that she was moving out because someone had broken into her apartment
that day.
¶ 37 In October 2023, respondent texted E.B. at midnight and accused her of hurting Z.S. The
text message also said, “I’m coming after you, bitch. You better move. I’m coming after your
family,” and threatened to beat E.B. E.B. reported this text to police and installed a home security
system. Respondent apologized for this text in March 2024. Thereafter, her relationship with E.B.
improved.
¶ 38 Z.S. was angry when he returned from a visit with respondent on October 21, 2023. He
told E.B., “[Y]ou are not my real parents. My mom says I’m coming home soon, and I will never
see you again and you are hurting her and I hate you because you’re hurting her.” In December
2023, Z.S. said that respondent suggested it was his fault he entered DCFS custody. E.B. explained
to Z.S. that was untrue.
¶ 39 Respondent canceled a visit with Z.S. on October 5, 2024, and did not accept E.B.’s offer
of a makeup visit. Respondent also canceled a visit on October 19, 2024, because she was taking
her older sons to Six Flags, and did not accept E.B.’s offer of a makeup visit for that date either.
Aside from these missed visits in October 2024, respondent visited with Z.S. regularly.
¶ 40 4. Respondent
¶ 41 Respondent testified that, in addition to Z.S., she has two sons and two daughters.
Respondent’s parental rights were terminated as to one of her daughters. Aside from Z.S., all of
respondent’s children are now adults.
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¶ 42 Respondent testified that she was just “getting to know” Herrera when he died in her
apartment but acknowledged that he was her boyfriend. Herrera did not live with her.
¶ 43 During an unsupervised visit in the summer of 2023, respondent noticed that Z.S.’s toenail
was cracked, he had a blister on his foot, and his shoes did not fit. Respondent told Z.S.’s foster
father, J.B., that she was upset and sent angry text messages to E.B. Respondent acknowledged
that one of Z.S.’s brothers was present at an unsupervised visit but denied that her boyfriend was
present at any visits with Z.S. Respondent participated in parenting classes, domestic violence
services, drug classes, individual therapy, counseling, and family therapy with Z.S. Through
individual therapy, she was learning how to control her anxiety. She also voluntarily enrolled in
additional drug classes because she struggled with addiction.
¶ 44 5. Ruling
¶ 45 The court found respondent unfit under section (b) because she failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of responsibility as to Z.S.’s welfare. Respondent did not comply with DCFS
reporting requirements regarding other individuals being present at visits and she was not
forthright with DCFS about her relationship with Herrera. Respondent put Z.S. at risk because
DCFS could not conduct a background check of Herrera. The court also highlighted respondent’s
threatening texts to the foster parents and her failure to take her psychotropic medication as risks
to Z.S.
¶ 46 The court also found respondent unfit under section (m)(ii) for failing to make reasonable
progress toward Z.S.’s return in all nine-month periods the State alleged. The court reasoned that
respondent was incarcerated at least twice in 2021 and 2022 and had two relapses of substance
abuse in 2022. Her fixation on the foster parents hindered her progress in therapy. Most
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importantly, respondent regressed to supervised visitation and never returned to unsupervised
visitation. The court acknowledged that respondent attended services but reasoned that her
attendance did not translate to meaningful progress toward Z.S.’s return home.
¶ 47 C. Best Interests Hearing
¶ 48 The court held a best interests hearing on January 13, 2025.
¶ 49 1. Krystle Miller
¶ 50 Krystle Miller testified that she visited Z.S. in his foster home on December 10, 2024. The
foster home was safe and appropriate. Z.S.’s interactions with his foster parents were caring,
nurturing, and comfortable. Z.S. referred to his foster parents as “Mommy” and “Daddy.” They
supported him participating in sports, including swimming and gymnastics, through the local park
district. Z.S. expressed no concerns about living in the foster home. His medical, dental, and vision
records were up to date.
¶ 51 Z.S. was in first grade and had an individualized education plan (IEP) due to developmental
disabilities. He received support services through the IEP, and the foster parents hired additional
tutoring for him. As a result, Z.S. was keeping up with his peers academically. The foster parents
also ensured that Z.S. attended play therapy, family therapy, and visits with respondent. The foster
parents supported Z.S.’s continued contact with respondent.
¶ 52 Miller concluded that adoption was in Z.S.’s best interest because he was bonded with and
attached to his foster parents, they met all his needs, and he had connections to their extended
family and community.
¶ 53 2. E.B.
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¶ 54 E.B. testified that Z.S. was nonverbal when he came into her and J.B.’s care on December
17, 2020. Z.S. enrolled in an early intervention plan at school and had an IEP. E.B. and J.B.
attended his IEP meetings. E.B. also enrolled Z.S. in private tutoring, which improved his reading
and writing abilities from the fifth percentile at the end of his first year of kindergarten to the fifty-
eighth percentile by the end of his second year of kindergarten. Z.S. was at grade level and was
“making leaps and bounds” in his academic progress. Outside of school, Z.S. enjoyed playing with
other children in the neighborhood, swimming, and individual sports.
¶ 55 E.B. and J.B. took Z.S. to regular medical and dental appointments. Z.S. had cavities when
he came into their care in 2020. E.B. applied anti-cavity medication and followed up with his
dentist thereafter.
¶ 56 Before bedtime, Z.S. took a bath, brushed his teeth, and read books with E.B. and J.B. One
of them stayed with him until he fell asleep because he was afraid of sleeping by himself. When
Z.S. was upset, he cuddled with E.B. and J.B. and talked about what was bothering him.
¶ 57 Z.S. referred to E.B. and J.B. as “Mommy” and “Daddy,” and they referred to him as their
son. Z.S. referred to E.B.’s siblings as his aunts and uncles, and her parents as grandma and
grandpa. He enjoyed visiting and having video calls with his extended foster family. Z.S. also had
a bond with respondent and talked about her. E.B. and J.B. encouraged Z.S. to talk about
respondent and to call her if he wanted to.
¶ 58 E.B. and J.B. would adopt Z.S. if respondent’s parental rights were terminated. E.B.
explained that Z.S. was “already family.” She and J.B. loved and adored Z.S., planned their family
outings around him, and wanted to raise him. If E.B. and J.B. adopted Z.S., they would continue
his relationship with respondent so long as those interactions were appropriate. E.B. and J.B. “fully
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believe[d] in open adoption” and believed that Z.S.’s “connection with [respondent was] extremely
important.” E.B. collected photographs of Z.S.’s biological family so he could stay familiar with
them. E.B.’s relationship with respondent had improved in the six months prior to the best interests
hearing.
¶ 59 3. Respondent
¶ 60 Respondent testified that she was living with a friend but planned to move to an apartment
in Elmhurst on February 1, 2025. She was self-employed as a housecleaner.
¶ 61 Several weeks or months before the best interests hearing, respondent went roller skating
with Z.S. and his foster parents. She also had several visits with Z.S., E.B., and Krystle Miller.
Respondent and Z.S. talked and did activities during these visits, which respondent enjoyed.
Respondent spoke to Z.S. on the phone three to four times over four to five months. Z.S.’s speech
had improved from school and therapy.
¶ 62 Respondent acted out toward E.B. because one of respondent’s other children had a
negative experience in foster care. However, respondent loved E.B. and appreciated what she did
for Z.S.
¶ 63 4. Julian Cortez
¶ 64 Julian Cortez, Z.S.’s older brother, was a senior at DePaul University at the time of the best
interests hearing. He testified that he wanted to have a relationship with Z.S. and “help him grow
up in life.” Respondent talked to Julian about Z.S.; she “bragg[ed] about how much she loves him
and missed him.”
¶ 65 5. Ruling
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¶ 66 The trial court found that termination of respondent’s parental rights and adoption by the
foster parents was in Z.S.’s best interests. The court reasoned that Z.S. was in a safe and appropriate
foster home with up-to-date medical care and all necessary educational services. He was bonded
with his foster parents and referred to them as his mother and father. The court acknowledged that
Z.S. had an emotional bond with respondent but explained that his foster parents had taken care of
his daily needs for years. The court highlighted Z.S.’s academic and social progress while in foster
care and his bonds with his extended foster family. The court terminated respondent’s parental
rights and subsequently entered a goal of adoption.
¶ 67 Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 68 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 69 On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court’s unfitness and best interests findings
were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 70 Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29
(West 2020)) creates a two-step process for the termination of parental rights. In re M.I. v. J.B.,
2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
is unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). Id.; 705
ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). If the State establishes unfitness, the court then considers whether
it is in the best interests of the child that parental rights be terminated. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232,
¶ 20.
¶ 71 A. Unfitness Hearing
¶ 72 In termination proceedings, the trial court must first determine the parent’s fitness without
considering the child’s best interests or the likelihood of adoption. In re J.W., 2024 IL App (1st)
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231918, ¶ 18. The State must establish the parent’s unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. ¶ 20 (citing In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001)). However, the State need establish only one
ground of unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. Id. In this case, the trial court found
respondent unfit under sections (b) and (m)(ii).
¶ 73 On appeal, we consider whether the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 21. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence
only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. (citing McAllister v. Illinois Workers’
Compensation Comm’n, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 30). We give great deference to a trial court’s unfitness
finding because the trial court has the best opportunity to view and evaluate parties, witnesses, and
their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). Moreover, “[e]ach case
concerning parental unfitness is sui generis, requiring close analysis of its individual facts;
consequently, factual comparisons to other cases by reviewing courts are of little value.” Id.
¶ 74 Under section (m)(ii), a parent is unfit when she fails to make reasonable progress toward
the child’s return home during any nine-month period following the adjudication of abuse or
neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020). Whether a parent has made reasonable progress
“is judged by an objective standard” and is “measured from the conditions existing at the time
custody was taken from the parent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted) In re Je. A., 2019 IL App
(1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Reasonable progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement toward
the goal of reunification. Id. “Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude that it
will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
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¶ 75 The evidence established that respondent made little progress, and in some respects
regressed, from the beginning of April 2023 through the end of December 2023, which was a nine-
month period after the adjudication of abuse or neglect. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020).
Respondent’s unsupervised visits with Z.S. became problematic in April 2023. During a visit on
April 1, 2023, Z.S. met a “loud man” who was mean to respondent. Z.S. later identified this man
as Herrera, respondent’s boyfriend who died of a drug overdose in her apartment. Herrera’s
unauthorized presence at a visit put Z.S.’s safety at risk, as did respondent concealing her
relationship with Herrera from her DCFS caseworker and therapist. The service providers could
not evaluate whether it was safe for Z.S. to be around Herrera if they did not know Herrera was in
a relationship with respondent. When E.B. asked respondent about the “loud man” at the April 1,
2023, visit, she replied with angry, accusatory text messages, which began the deterioration of
respondent’s relationship with the foster parents. Also in April 2023, respondent caused Z.S.
anxiety by telling him that he would return to her care soon, which was untrue. Additionally, she
allowed Z.S. to ride in a stranger’s car without a seatbelt. This evidence indicated that, in April
2023, Z.S.’s visits with respondent were more dangerous and stressful than productive.
¶ 76 The key turning point in this case occurred in early July 2023, when Herrera died of a drug
overdose in respondent’s apartment. Respondent had not disclosed Herrera’s existence to DCFS
or her therapist. As a result of that incident, respondent lost unsupervised visitation with Z.S. on
July 29, 2023, and never progressed back to it. She also never progressed to overnight visitation
at any point. A parent who regresses to supervised visitation months after adjudication despite
engaging in services has not reasonably progressed to achieving reunification.
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¶ 77 The following month, August 2023, respondent’s inadequate housing disrupted at least one
visit with Z.S. After respondent failed to appear for the visit, E.B. found her moving out of her
apartment because someone had broken into it. This break-in, combined with Herrera’s death by
drug overdose in the apartment the month prior, indicated that respondent’s environment was
unsafe for Z.S. In September 2023, CCJCC psychologist Dr. O’Donnell concluded that respondent
was unlikely to achieve Z.S.’s return home.
¶ 78 Later in the fall of 2023, respondent’s relationship with the foster parents broke down. The
text messages respondent sent E.B. late at night in October or November 2023 threatened physical
violence for no apparent reason. E.B. took these threats so seriously that she reported them to
police and installed a home security system. Respondent developed and fixated on a baseless belief
that E.B. and J.B. were trying to “steal” Z.S. from her or exploit him for money. Respondent spent
most of her therapy sessions in the fall of 2023 fixating on this unfounded belief rather than
focusing on reunification with Z.S. Respondent’s irrational anger toward the foster parents also
affected Z.S. during this time. After a visit on October 21, 2023, Z.S. told E.B. that he hated her
because she was hurting respondent, and in December 2023, respondent told Z.S. that it was his
own fault he was in DCFS custody. Also in December 2023, respondent was so disruptive at a
child and family team meeting that she forced the meeting to end. This evidence showed that, in
respondent’s mind, Z.S.’s welfare was secondary to her “winning” an imagined dispute with the
foster parents. At the end of 2023, Olaleye concluded that respondent could not parent Z.S. without
supervision.
¶ 79 Between April 1, 2023, and the end of December 2023, there was no indication that Z.S.
could be returned to respondent in the near future. Therefore, respondent did not make reasonable
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progress during that nine-month period. See In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. The State
established unfitness under section (m)(ii).
¶ 80 Respondent argues that the State failed to establish unfitness because she completed most
services. Although respondent attended most services, she did not make reasonable progress in the
substance of those services. For example, respondent attended individual therapy with Arceo but
spent most therapy sessions in 2023 fixating on the foster parents rather than her reunification with
Z.S. Merely participating in services does not constitute reasonable progress if the parent does not
make progress in the underlying reasons for those services.
¶ 81 Respondent also contends that “poor judgment in her communication [with the foster
parents] does not equate with parental unfitness.” We disagree. Communication and conflict
resolution are some of the most important skills children learn from their parents. A parent who
addresses disputes—imagined, one-sided “disputes” in this case—by threatening violence and
using profanity against the people caring for her child is not demonstrating reasonable progress.
¶ 82 Because we conclude that the trial court properly found respondent unfit under section
(m)(ii), we need not consider unfitness under section (b). See In re J.W., 2024 IL App (1st) 231918,
¶ 20 (“any one ground, if properly proven, is sufficient to support a finding of parental unfitness”).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding of unfitness.
¶ 83 B. Best Interests Hearing
¶ 84 Respondent also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
and adoption by the foster parents was in Z.S.’s best interests.
¶ 85 Once the trial court has found a parent unfit, the State must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. In re Faith S., 2019
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IL App (1st) 182290, ¶ 93. At the best interests hearing, the trial court focuses on the needs of the
child, and the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship yields to the child’s
interest in a stable and loving home life. Id.
¶ 86 In determining the best interests of a child under the Juvenile Court Act, the trial court must
consider the following factors in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs: (1) the
physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (2) the
development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,
cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including (i) where the child actually
feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child
should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued), (ii) the child’s sense of security,
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity, (iv) continuity of affection for the child, and (v) the least
disruptive placement alternative for the child; (5) the child's wishes and long term goals; (6) the
child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence,
which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and
with siblings and other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks
attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available
to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 87 The court may also consider the length and nature of the child’s relationship with his
present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon his emotional and
psychological well-being. In re Faith S., 2019 IL App (1st) 182290, ¶ 95. The court’s best interests
determination need not include explicit references to each of these factors, and a reviewing court
need not rely on any basis used by the trial court in affirming its decision. Id.
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¶ 88 We will not reverse a trial court’s best interests finding unless it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re J.W., 2024 IL App (1st) 231918, ¶ 21.
¶ 89 In this case, the best interest factors favor termination of respondent’s parental rights so
that E.B. and J.B. can adopt him. Z.S. has been in the care of his foster parents since he was three
years old, i.e., his entire conscious life. There is no dispute that Z.S. is safe, happy, healthy, and
well cared for in their home, and there is no question that E.B. and J.B. want to adopt him. Z.S.
calls them “mommy” and “daddy” and is attached to them. E.B.’s description of Z.S.’s bedtime
routine and how he cuddles with her and J.B. when he is upset is compelling evidence of his bond
with them. Z.S. also has bonds with E.B. and J.B.’s extended family and refers to them as his aunts,
uncles, and grandparents. Z.S. has made significant academic progress in E.B. and J.B.’s care,
going from nonverbal at age three to essentially grade level in first grade. Z.S.’s academic progress
is due in large part to the private tutoring E.B. and J.B. hired and their involvement with his IEP.
It is entirely reasonable to make the only consistent home Z.S. has ever known, and a home where
he is happy and thriving, his permanent home. There is no reason to disrupt Z.S.’s life again by
placing him in substitute care. The trial court’s best interests finding was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 90 Respondent argues that she has a strong bond with Z.S. and he enjoys their visits. That may
be, but Z.S.’s best interests also include a safe and consistent home environment, medical care,
education, and extracurricular activities. E.B. and J.B. can and do provide these things; respondent
cannot and will not be able to do so in a time frame that makes sense. A parent’s emotional bond
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with her child is only one factor of the best interests analysis and, standing alone, it is not enough
to prevent termination of parental rights. See In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶¶ 82-84.
¶ 91 Respondent also contends that Z.S. “would clearly be harmed if that contact were to cease.”
There is no reason to think that Z.S.’s contact with respondent will cease when his foster parents
adopt him. On the contrary, E.B. testified that she and J.B. fully support Z.S. having a relationship
with respondent and that they take steps to ensure that occurs. The record contains no support for
respondent’s speculation that contact between her and Z.S. will end if her parental rights are
terminated.
¶ 92 We also reject respondent’s suggestion that the only way to ensure contact between her
and Z.S. is for this case to continue until Z.S. is an adult, i.e., for 10 more years. That is contrary
to Z.S.’s interest in permanency, which is the focus of the best interests analysis. See In re D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d 347, 358 (2004) (children should not be left in “legal limbo” or “forced to confront
years of uncertainty about whom [they] should call ‘mom’ and what place [they] should call
‘home’ ”).
¶ 93 Respondent cites this court’s decision in In re D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d 133 (2003), to argue
that a trial court should not terminate a parent’s rights when there is evidence that the parent is
bonded with his or her child. To the extent the appellate version of In re D.T. is still good law—
our supreme court reversed it in part in In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 350—it suggests that termination
of parental rights may not be warranted if evidence such as therapist testimony establishes that
breaking the bond between the parent and child would harm the child. In re D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d
at 155; In re L.G., 2025 IL App (1st) 241464, ¶ 42. As explained above, in this case, there is no
risk that respondent and Z.S.’s bond will be severed. On the contrary, all witnesses agreed that
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Z.S. should and will maintain a relationship with respondent. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s best interests finding and its termination of parental rights.
¶ 94 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 95 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 96 Affirmed.
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