2023 IL App (1st) 230011 No. 1-23-0011 Opinion filed November 22, 2023 Third Division ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ A.A., ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 OP 78104 ) NITA A., ) Honorable ) Beatriz Frausto-Sandoval, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE R. VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lampkin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Nita A. appeals from the trial court’s issuance of an order of protection against her and on
behalf of her adult child, A.A., pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Act) (750
ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2020)). Nita argues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear
A.A.’s petition for an order of protection, (2) the statute of limitations barred A.A. from filing such
a petition, (3) the trial court improperly admitted certain electronic messages between Nita and
A.A., and (4) the trial court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the
following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-23-0011
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 6, 2021, A.A filed a petition for an order of protection against their mother,
Nita. 1 A.A. alleged that, from 2014 through 2021, Nita harassed and abused A.A. because A.A. is
transgender.
¶4 At a hearing on the petition, A.A. testified that they began attending the California Institute
of Technology (Caltech) in 2013. Nita moved from New Jersey, where A.A. grew up, to live with
and provide housekeeping for A.A. while A.A. attended Caltech. A.A. maintained that Nita’s move
to California was unnecessary because A.A. could live independently without difficulty. During
this time, Nita “closely monitored” A.A.’s e-mails and text messages. If A.A. did not respond to
Nita’s messages, Nita would send a “barrage” of single-character text messages to make A.A.’s
phone “buzz 100 times in a row.” Nita told A.A. that she assumed A.A. was “off doing LGBT
behaviors” when A.A. did not respond to messages.
¶5 From March 2014 to May 2015, Nita sent A.A. Gmail chat messages criticizing A.A. for
being transgender and for associating with lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ)
individuals. Screenshots of these messages, which A.A. moved into evidence over Nita’s
objections, include the following: 2
“lay off lgbtq crap or else”
“you have been screwed by *** and caltech deans and dragged and drugged,
straight to lgbtq alter to be sacrificed”
1 The record and briefs indicate that A.A. uses they/them pronouns, so that is what we will use in this order. See People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640, ¶ 1 n.1. 2 We set out these text messages as they appear in the record, with no corrections of typographical errors or omissions of inappropriate language because they are evidence of Nita’s abuse of A.A. We have only omitted the names of individuals who are not involved in this case.
-2- No. 1-23-0011
“you are so mature to manipulate us parents, than [sic] you are equally mature to
protect your mind and your self from these lgbtq community and predators”
“I guess TAs don’t mind you emailing for tickets to alice in wormhole for your
lgbtq gang of goons but they do mind your mom talking to you for good things, right?”
“you are at Caltech for education and your degree with high gpa, above 3.5, not to
screw around with everything and go to hell and be a kept woman in lgbtq hell by the KKK
of lgbtqs are Caltech”
“young man go home to your mamma she make you a real girl or I beat the crap
out of you for leaving your mama in hell”
“stop being lgbtq”
“who ever is preaching that you should adopt male pronouns and live like a man
for one year before they can approve your sex change surgery, meaning you mutating your
body and becoming a major freak is taking you for a ride”
“sure, lgbtq away to death”
A.A. testified that these messages caused “significant stress, including depression, anxiety, [and
that they had] difficulty engaging with school.”
¶6 In the spring of 2016, A.A. moved to a dormitory on Caltech’s campus and asked Nita not
to contact them. Nita tried to find A.A. on campus and asked university staff, relatives, and
acquaintances how to contact A.A. Throughout 2016, Nita sent A.A. multiple e-mails, text
messages, and voicemails every day. A.A. routed Nita’s e-mails to a separate folder and checked
it occasionally.
-3- No. 1-23-0011
¶7 In the summer of 2016, A.A. obtained a prescription for hormone replacement therapy;
Nita somehow learned about this and e-mailed A.A. about “the dangers of testosterone.” Near the
end of 2016, A.A. briefly met Nita to retrieve A.A.’s belongings and “repeated that [they] had no
desire for further contact or to live with [Nita].” In 2017, Nita mailed A.A. a package, called the
campus mail center when it arrived, and waited on the phone to speak to A.A. Nita also went
uninvited to Caltech’s campus on A.A.’s graduation day in 2017 and asked to take a photograph
with A.A. A.A. was upset and returned to their dorm room despite wanting to be out with their
friends because they were worried about encountering Nita again.
¶8 After graduating from Caltech, A.A. moved to San Bruno, California. A.A. briefly met
Nita in July 2018 to pick up a package from A.A.’s grandmother. In August 2018, A.A. filed
paperwork to legally change their name and gender. Nita sent A.A. e-mails claiming that people
would discover the name and gender change and would go to A.A.’s home to kill them.
¶9 A.A. then moved to Chicago to pursue a master’s degree at the University of Chicago. Nita
offered to pay A.A.’s rent, health insurance, and tuition. A.A. agreed because their parents had
already set aside certain funds for university expenses, which “would otherwise go to waste.” Nita
pretended to encounter difficulties sending money so that she could contact A.A. and obtain
information such as A.A.’s address. In November 2019, Nita insisted on meeting A.A. in person
to deliver debit and credit cards issued under A.A.’s former name. A.A. met Nita for approximately
five minutes at a bookstore in Chicago and left feeling “frustrated and harassed” and like they were
“being emotionally pressured into” allowing Nita to provide financial support. A.A. did not use
the cards that Nita gave them.
-4- No. 1-23-0011
¶ 10 In the spring of 2020, A.A. moved from Chicago to their parents’ home in New Jersey due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. A.A. asked Nita not to discuss medical or academic issues during that
time, but Nita “soon reverted back to discussing those topics.” A.A. moved out in late summer
2020 and asked Nita not to contact them. Nita continued to send A.A. e-mails and text messages
through the end of 2020.
¶ 11 In May 2021, A.A. traveled to Berkeley, California, for “top surgery,” which is a gender-
confirming bilateral mastectomy. In July 2021, A.A. unexpectedly encountered Nita on the street
in Berkeley. Nita told A.A. to travel to New Jersey to visit their grandmother; A.A. walked away.
A.A. later contacted Nita to arrange a Zoom video call with their grandmother, but Nita refused to
do so.
¶ 12 Between September and November 2021, A.A. received e-mails and voicemails in which
Nita said that she knew A.A. was pursuing a Ph.D. at Northwestern University, which A.A. had
not told her about. Nita also sent photographs of Northwestern’s campus and claimed that she had
visited it. On November 8, 2021, Nita left A.A. a voicemail saying that A.A. needed to move closer
to campus, which concerned A.A. because it implied that Nita knew where A.A. lived. As of the
hearing on the petition, Nita was not financially supporting A.A. A.A. testified that, without an
order of protection, Nita would continue to harass them.
¶ 13 Nita testified that she lived with A.A. in Pasadena, California, from 2013 to spring 2016.
Nita worried about A.A.’s allergies, health, and academic workload when they were an
undergraduate student, which was why she was concerned when A.A. did not respond to her
messages. Nita denied that she accessed A.A.’s e-mail and social media accounts. Nita paid A.A.’s
tuition and living expenses at Caltech. Nita testified that she could not remember whether she
-5- No. 1-23-0011
contacted A.A. after A.A. severed communication with her in the spring of 2016. Nita and A.A.’s
father attended A.A.’s graduation at Caltech in June 2017 because “it was a proud moment” and
they were not “told explicitly not to come.”
¶ 14 In 2020, Nita drove A.A. from Chicago to New Jersey, where they lived together for
approximately three months. When Nita and A.A. lived together in California and New Jersey,
Nita cooked, cleaned, did laundry, and provided transportation for A.A. In August 2020, Nita
drove A.A. back to Chicago, cleaned their apartment, and paid for movers and a new apartment.
When Nita encountered A.A. on the street in Berkeley in July 2021, it was a coincidence because
Nita was accompanying her husband on a trip to view real estate investments. During that
encounter, Nita asked A.A. to call their grandmother and then walked away. Nita financially
supported A.A. until at least October or November 2022 and may have been paying their phone
bill at the time of the hearing. Nita testified that she loved A.A. unconditionally.
¶ 15 The court issued a plenary order of protection that ordered Nita to stay away from and not
threaten or abuse A.A. for six months. 3 The court described Nita’s text messages to A.A. as
“hurtful,” “judgmental,” and “mean” and explained that any reasonable person would feel harassed
upon receiving those messages. The court reasoned that A.A. occasionally communicating with,
living with, and accepting financial support from Nita did not negate the abuse that occurred. The
court issued a six-month order of protection as opposed to a two-year order because the strongest
evidence of abuse was from 2014 and it was possible that Nita could have a loving relationship
with A.A. in the future.
3 A plenary order of protection is the longest type of order of protection authorized by the Act and can last up to two years. See 750 ILCS 60/220(b)(0.05) (West 2020).
-6- No. 1-23-0011
¶ 16 Nita filed a motion to vacate or reconsider the order of protection. She argued that (1) the
general five-year statute of limitations for civil claims barred A.A.’s allegations of abuse that
occurred in 2014 and 2015, (2) A.A. voluntarily maintained contact with Nita and relied upon her
for financial support, (3) the order of protection was a “severe penalty” that did not achieve
“substantial justice,” and (4) A.A. did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Nita
abused A.A. In response, A.A. argued that (1) under Richardson v. Booker, 2022 IL App (1st)
211055, the court properly considered evidence of abuse that occurred more than five years prior
to A.A. filing the petition; (2) A.A. explicitly severed contact with Nita in the spring of 2016;
(3) Nita failed to explain how the order of protection was a “severe penalty”; and (4) the trial court
did not err in finding that Nita abused A.A.
¶ 17 The trial court denied Nita’s motion to vacate or reconsider. The court found that the
general civil five-year statute of limitations did not apply to A.A.’s petition and that the court
properly considered evidence of abuse that occurred more than five years before A.A. filed the
petition. The court also rejected Nita’s argument that A.A. invited communication and accepted
financial support from Nita, finding that A.A. could not be “penalized on that basis.” In addition,
the court rejected Nita’s claim that the order of protection was a “severe penalty,” explaining that
she had not been charged criminally and the order of protection was unlikely to cause further
negative consequences for her. Finally, the court reiterated that A.A. met their burden of proof.
¶ 18 Nita timely appealed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, Nita argues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear A.A.’s petition for
an order of protection, (2) the statute of limitations barred A.A.’s petition, (3) the trial court
-7- No. 1-23-0011
improperly admitted Nita’s messages to A.A., and (4) the trial court’s decision to grant an order
of protection was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 21 The Act provides that “any person abused by a family or household member” may file a
petition for an order of protection. 750 ILCS 60/201(a)(i), (b)(i) (West 2020). A family or
household member includes parents and “persons who share or formerly shared a common
dwelling.” Id. § 103(6). Abuse under the Act includes “harassment” (id. § 103(1)), which means
“knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the
circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional
distress to the petitioner” (id. § 103(7)). “If the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a
family or household member *** an order of protection prohibiting the abuse, neglect, or
exploitation shall issue.” Id. § 214(a).
¶ 22 A. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶ 23 Before we turn to Nita’s arguments, we must address A.A.’s contention that this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. A.A. argues that this appeal is moot because the order of protection
expired on February 9, 2023.
¶ 24 An appeal is moot “where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in
the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the
reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-
50 (2006). In general, an appeal that challenges an order of protection that has expired is moot.
Landmann v. Landmann, 2019 IL App (5th) 180137, ¶ 11; see also Creaser v. Creaser, 342 Ill.
App. 3d 215, 219 (2003) (once an order of protection expires, the respondent is no longer subject
-8- No. 1-23-0011
to a court order and any decision would be “essentially advisory”). The order of protection in this
case expired on February 9, 2023, so it appears that this appeal is moot.
¶ 25 However, we will review this matter pursuant to the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine. Under the public interest exception, a court may review a moot issue when
“ ‘(1) the moot question is public in nature, (2) it is desirable to provide an authoritative
determination so as to offer guidance for public officers, and (3) it is likely that the question will
reappear.’ ” Landmann, 2019 IL App (5th) 180137, ¶ 12 (quoting Whitten v. Whitten, 292 Ill. App.
3d 780, 784 (1997)). Protecting transgender individuals from abuse by family members is a matter
of public interest, and unfortunately, it is likely that transgender individuals will face abuse from
family members in the future. There appear to be no reported appellate decisions that address how
the Act applies to transgender victims of domestic abuse, so it is necessary to provide guidance as
to how courts should apply the Act in cases where transgender individuals are found to be victims
of harassment. See id. (“The Act addresses issues of great public interest, and its purposes can only
be accomplished if the courts properly apply the statutory requirements.”). Accordingly, we find
that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies and we have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal.
¶ 26 B. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
¶ 27 Nita argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Nita frames this argument
as a challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is more accurate to say that she
challenges the trial court’s personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction “is invoked by the
filing of a petition or complaint alleging the existence of a justiciable matter.” In re Luis R., 239
Ill. 2d 295, 305 (2010). The Act’s subject-matter jurisdiction provision states that “the circuit
-9- No. 1-23-0011
courts shall have the power to issue orders of protection.” 750 ILCS 60/207 (West 2020). Nita
does not dispute that the trial court had the power to issue an order of protection, so she does not
challenge the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
¶ 28 Rather, Nita contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged abuse
occurred primarily outside of Illinois. This argument attacks personal jurisdiction because
“personal jurisdiction is derived from the actions of the person sought to be bound.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) See Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d at 305. To obtain an order of protection, a
petitioner must establish personal jurisdiction under section 208 of the Act. Gasaway v. Gasaway,
246 Ill. App. 3d 531, 534 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/208 (West 2020). Under section 208, a court has
“jurisdiction to bind (i) State residents and (ii) non-residents having minimum contacts with this
State, to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute, Section 2-209 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.” 750 ILCS 60/208 (West 2020). We review whether the trial court had jurisdiction
de novo. Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (2009).
¶ 29 A.A.’s petition alleged that A.A. lived in Chicago and Nita lived in New Jersey. For the
trial court to have personal jurisdiction over Nita, A.A. had to establish that Nita had minimum
contacts with Illinois pursuant to the long-arm statute. The long-arm statute provides, in relevant
part, that a court “may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without [Illinois] against
any person who *** [i]s a natural person present within this State when served.” 735 ILCS 5/2-
209(b)(1) (West 2020). The record indicates that Nita was served in open court in Cook County,
Illinois, on December 1, 2021, the day after her attorney entered an appearance, providing the trial
court with personal jurisdiction over her. See id.; see also In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 413-14, 427-
- 10 - No. 1-23-0011
28 (2009) (court obtained personal jurisdiction over minor’s parents despite no formal service of
process because parents appeared in court and were given a copy of the petition).
¶ 30 Nita argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged abuse occurred
primarily in California and New Jersey and because “[t]he boundaries and application of the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act [are] specifically in regards to the State of Illinois.” Nita cites no
authority to support her contention that an Illinois court cannot issue an order of protection based
on abuse that occurred outside Illinois. The Act’s jurisdiction provisions contain no such
limitation. 750 ILCS 60/207, 208 (West 2020). Nita’s interpretation of the Act as being limited to
abuse that occurred in Illinois would leave a victim of abuse that occurred in another state unable
to obtain an order of protection upon moving to Illinois, even if the abuser followed the victim to
Illinois. Such a limitation would render Illinois ineffective as a haven for victims of domestic
violence, which is contrary to the purpose of the Act. See id. § 102(3)-(4) (purposes of the Act
include not “allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution”). Accordingly, we find that the trial
court had jurisdiction to hear A.A.’s petition for an order of protection against Nita.
¶ 31 C. Statute of Limitations
¶ 32 Nita next argues that the statute of limitations barred A.A. from filing a petition for an
order of protection because the petition was based on events that occurred more than five years
before A.A. filed it. Specifically, Nita argues that “A.A. should have been precluded [from
bringing] any claims or evidence regarding matters prior to October 6, 2017.” 4
4 A.A. filed the petition for an order of protection on October 6, 2021. If Nita is correct that a five- year statute of limitations applies, that would preclude claims that arose prior to October 6, 2016, not 2017.
- 11 - No. 1-23-0011
¶ 33 As an initial matter, the parties conflate Nita’s statute of limitations argument with an
evidentiary argument. Nita’s statute of limitations argument contends that A.A.’s petition for an
order of protection could not be premised on events that occurred more than five years before A.A.
filed the petition. However, the parties primarily construe this argument as addressing whether the
court could consider evidence of abuse that occurred prior to October 6, 2016. These are two
separate issues. We address Nita’s statute of limitations argument here and her evidentiary
argument below.
¶ 34 The Act contains no statute of limitations for a petition for an order of protection. 750 ILCS
60/101 et seq. (West 2020). However, the Act provides that “[a]ny proceeding to obtain *** an
order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with a civil or criminal
proceeding, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State.” Id. § 205(a). The Code
of Civil Procedure provides that a five-year statute of limitations applies to civil actions that do
not have a specific statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2020). Nita reads these
provisions together to argue that the general five-year statute of limitations applies to petitions for
orders of protection. We have found no caselaw that supports this argument or that imposes any
statute of limitations on petitions for orders of protection. Nita cites no such authority.
¶ 35 However, we need not decide which, if any, statute of limitations applies to a petition for
an order of protection. Nita has forfeited her statute of limitations argument because she did not
timely raise it in the trial court. See Bedin v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2021 IL App (1st)
190723, ¶ 37. Nita raised the statute of limitations for the first time in her posthearing motion to
vacate or reconsider the order of protection, and a party forfeits an argument that it raises for the
- 12 - No. 1-23-0011
first time in a motion to reconsider. See Zander v. Carlson, 2020 IL 125691, ¶ 34. Accordingly,
Nita has forfeited her statute of limitations argument.
¶ 36 D. Admission of Evidence
¶ 37 Nita next contends that the trial court improperly admitted messages that Nita sent to A.A.
through various electronic messaging services. Nita argues that the trial court should not have
admitted these messages because A.A. failed to authenticate and lay proper foundation for them
and because messages from 2014 and 2015 were too remote in time to warrant admission.
¶ 38 The rules of civil procedure and evidence apply to a hearing on a petition for an order of
protection. See Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348-49 (2006); 750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2020). We
review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Trinidad
C. v. Augustin L., 2017 IL App (1st) 171148, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s
ruling is arbitrary or fanciful or when no reasonable person would take the trial court’s view. Id.
¶ 39 1. Authentication and Foundation
¶ 40 Nita argues that the trial court improperly admitted the messages because A.A. failed to
authenticate and lay foundation for them. We treat text messages like any other form of
documentary evidence. People v. Watkins, 2015 IL App (3d) 120882, ¶ 36. A proper foundation
for the admission of documentary evidence exists when the document has been identified and
authenticated. Id. To authenticate documentary evidence, the proponent must demonstrate that the
document is what the proponent claims it to be. Ill. R. Evid. 901(a) (eff. Sept. 17, 2019).
Documentary evidence can be authenticated through direct or circumstantial evidence. Watkins,
2015 IL App (3d) 120882, ¶ 37. Circumstantial evidence includes “appearance, contents,
substance, and distinctive characteristics, which are to be taken into consideration with the
- 13 - No. 1-23-0011
surrounding circumstances.” Id. Documentary evidence may also be authenticated by its contents
if it contains information that would only be known by the alleged author of the document or, at
the very least, to a small group of people including the alleged author. Id. In determining whether
documentary evidence is admissible, the trial court serves a “limited screening function,” assessing
whether the evidence of authentication, viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, would
allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the document is more likely than not authentic. Id.
¶ 36.
¶ 41 A.A. testified that exhibits B through D were “chat screen shots” between A.A. and Nita
from March 2014 to May 2015, that A.A. took the screenshots with A.A.’s phone and laptop in
the spring of 2022, and that the screenshots were true and accurate depictions of the messages.
A.A. further testified that the messages were from Gmail’s chat system and identified Nita’s e-
mail address at the top of the messages. A.A. recognized that e-mail address because they had
received emails from Nita at that address for years and had seen Nita use it. A.A. identified other
exhibits as text messages from a specific phone number that both Nita and A.A.’s father used. A.A.
knew the text messages were between A.A. and their parents because they referenced A.A.’s
performance in school, grades, friends, living situation, and that A.A. had studied at both Caltech
and the University of Chicago. The messages themselves contain circumstantial evidence that they
were communicated between A.A. and Nita as opposed to A.A. and their father. For example,
exhibit BW, dated September 17, 2020, is from “Parents” to “A” and asks “A” to “text me or daddy
every day one word *** as short or as long, to me, or to your daddy.” It is reasonable to conclude
that this is a message from Nita to A.A. Similarly, text messages in exhibits CC and CH begin
- 14 - No. 1-23-0011
“From Mom” or “from mumma.” We find that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
messages were what A.A. claimed they were.
¶ 42 Nita argues that the trial court erroneously admitted the messages because “there was no
way of knowing who they were from, no phone number, dates, or times.” That is not accurate.
Several of the Gmail chat messages and text messages between Nita and A.A. contain dated read
receipts and the e-mail address and phone number of the sender. As explained above, A.A. testified
to who sent the messages, which e-mail addresses and phone numbers they were sent from, which
messaging services they were sent through, and when they were sent. Moreover, Nita never denied
that she authored and sent the messages at issue. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting these messages over Nita’s objections to authenticity and
foundation.
¶ 43 2. Age of Messages
¶ 44 As noted above, Nita also contends that the messages from 2014 and 2015 were too far in
the past for the trial court to properly consider them. The trial court concluded that it could consider
such evidence pursuant to Richardson, 2022 IL App (1st) 211055. We agree. Richardson holds
that evidence of past abuse is relevant to a trial court’s determination as to whether abuse occurred,
regardless of whether the prior abuse “occurred 40 years ago or 5 years ago.” Id. ¶ 59. That is
because the Act itself “expressly directs courts to consider instances of past abuse” without
limitation as to time. Id. ¶ 56 (citing 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(1)(i) (West 2020)). In Richardson, this
court found that the trial court should not have assigned only “limited relevance” to abuse that
occurred in 2015 when determining whether abuse occurred in 2020 and 2021. Id. ¶¶ 55-57.
Rather, the trial court should have fully considered that evidence and should have issued an order
- 15 - No. 1-23-0011
of protection. Id. ¶ 60. Richardson’s reasoning translates to this case and clearly supports the trial
court’s conclusion that Nita’s abuse of A.A. in 2014 and 2015 via Gmail chat message was relevant
and admissible at the order of protection hearing in 2022.
¶ 45 E. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 46 Finally, Nita argues that the trial court’s decision to grant the order of protection was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Nita contends that she cannot be blamed for being
“worried and concerned about” A.A. and that A.A. voluntarily initiated contact with her and
accepted financial support from her.
¶ 47 We review findings of abuse under the Act under the manifest weight of the evidence
standard. Stapp v. Jansen, 2013 IL App (4th) 120513, ¶ 16 (citing Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 349-50). A
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on any of the
evidence. Id. The trial court was in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
parties, so we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court by reweighing the evidence.
Id. ¶ 17. In addition, we will not overturn the trial court’s findings simply because we might have
reached a different conclusion about what the evidence established. Id.
¶ 48 We find that the trial court’s decision to grant the order of protection was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. There is no dispute that A.A. and Nita are family members who
lived together from fall 2013 to spring 2016 and again in the summer of 2020. See 750 ILCS
50/103(6) (West 2020). From 2014 through 2021, Nita sent A.A. harassing text messages, e-mails,
and voicemails. The Third District has found that sending 27 unwanted text messages and 6
voicemails over the course of approximately two hours constitutes “stalking behavior” (Coutant
- 16 - No. 1-23-0011
v. Durell, 2021 IL App (3d) 210255, ¶¶ 75-78), so it is reasonable to conclude that Nita sending
dozens of unwanted messages over several years, despite A.A. requesting her to stop, constituted
stalking behavior as well. Nita also made unwanted in-person contact with A.A. in multiple cities,
including Pasadena, San Bruno, Berkeley, and Chicago after A.A. had directed her to cease
contact. As recently as late 2021, Nita communicated that she knew where A.A. lived in Evanston,
Illinois, and that she had visited Evanston. Altogether, the evidence showed that Nita verbally
harassed and stalked A.A. despite A.A. repeatedly telling Nita to stop.
¶ 49 Furthermore, the evidence established that transphobia motivated Nita’s abusive behavior.
The messages from 2014 and 2015 explicitly referred to A.A.’s transgender identity and their
association with LGBTQ individuals and groups. At least two of those hostile messages included
suggestions of violence, such as Nita’s threat to “beat the crap” out of A.A. and her suggestion that
A.A. should “lgbtq away to death.” In 2016 and 2018, respectively, Nita criticized A.A.’s decision
to undergo hormone therapy and to change their legal name and gender. In 2019, Nita gave A.A.
bank cards issued under A.A.’s “deadname,” which is the name given at birth to a transgender
individual that the person no longer uses after transitioning. See Christiana Prater-Lee,
#Justice4Layleen: The Legal Implications of Polanco v. City of New York, 47 Am. J.L. & Med.
144, 145 n.18 (2021). The use of a transgender person’s deadname is disrespectful. Id. at 145.
Harassing A.A. to not express their identity as transgender is not a reasonable or necessary purpose,
and A.A.’s uncontested testimony was that Nita’s behavior caused emotional distress. See 750
ILCS 60/103(1), (7) (West 2020). The evidence clearly established abuse as the Act defines it and
supported the trial court’s decision to issue an order of protection.
- 17 - No. 1-23-0011
¶ 50 Nita argues that, because she provided financial support for A.A. between 2013 and 2021,
A.A. should not be allowed to seek protection from her abusive behavior. This argument is
meritless. Merely because one adult gives another adult financial support does not absolve the
adult with more resources from violating the Act. A parent providing financial support for her
child, particularly in young adulthood, does not give that parent license to abuse the child. Nita
cannot and did not “buy” the right to abuse A.A. Furthermore, as the trial court observed, Nita’s
financial support of A.A. did not negate the evidence of abuse and harassment.
¶ 51 Nita also claims that she “now has a criminal history because of the order of protection.”
That is incorrect. As the trial court explained to Nita in denying her motion to reconsider, a criminal
conviction and being subject to an order of protection are not the same things. See People v.
Alvarez, 2012 IL App (1st) 092119, ¶ 58; see also Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 348 (proceedings to obtain
an order of protection under the Act are “civil in nature”). The record contains no indication that
criminal charges were filed against Nita or that she was convicted of any crimes because of this
order of protection. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s finding of abuse was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 54 Affirmed.
- 18 - No. 1-23-0011
A.A. v. Nita A., 2023 IL App (1st) 230011
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-OP- 78104; the Hon. Beatriz Frausto-Sandoval, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Lawrence A. Stein , of Lawrence A. Stein LLC, of Wheaton, for for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Aziza Khatoon, Benjamin J. Bennett, and Miriam Hallbauer, of for Legal Aid Chicago, of Chicago, for appellee. Appellee:
- 19 -