In Re Yankton College

101 B.R. 151, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 870, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 673, 1989 WL 60651
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJune 7, 1989
Docket19-40042
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 101 B.R. 151 (In Re Yankton College) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Yankton College, 101 B.R. 151, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 870, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 673, 1989 WL 60651 (S.D. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PEDER K. ECKER, Bankruptcy Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter 11 case is before the Court pursuant to applications for fees filed by James S. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) and John R. Kabeiseman (“Kabeiseman”), attorneys for the debtor, Yankton College (“College”), and David C. Humphrey (“Humphrey”), attorney for the Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”). This case is presented on the United States Trustee’s (U.S. Trustee’s) objections and the Court’s duty to scrutinize fee applications independent of objections. A hearing on the matter was held May 6, 1988, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. After receiving evidence at the hearing and arguments of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement.

BACKGROUND

The debtor filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 21, 1984. Prior to filing, the College, commencing perhaps as early as 1974 or 1975, had struggled with financial problems which became acute in the latter part of 1984. After lengthy meetings by the College’s Board of Trustees, it was determined that a Chapter 11 filing was the most appropriate means to preserve the value of the debtor’s assets.

The board of trustees engaged in a careful analysis of its options, and this analysis included the problem of selecting counsel. Consideration was given to the likely complexity of the case and the need for counsel to be able to manage that complexity, the potential for numerous conflicts of interest among South Dakota attorneys, the pros and cons of out-of-state counsel, and the need for local counsel. After the board of trustees decided to proceed with the Chapter 11 filing, they retained Mitchell and Kabeiseman as counsel for the debtor. Humphrey was retained as the attorney for the UCC on February 1, 1985.

The debtor faced a number of extraordinary problems from the outset, amid tremendous pressure from within and outside the College, along with accompanying adverse publicity. The circumstance of filing during an academic semester presented a myriad of problems connected with completing the semester, arranging student transfers to other schools, assisting faculty in obtaining other employment, and accommodating the financial needs of employees of the College affected by the closing during a time in which the College could not meet its payroll. The board of trustees had recently recruited a new president and found themselves being sued by this man shortly thereafter. While all this was going on, counsel and College officials, because of the College’s lack of adequate financial books and records, attempted to reconstruct the College’s books and records to deal with the filing of the required bank *154 ruptcy schedules. Not surprisingly, the books and records were in some disarray and this required significant effort on the part of applicants and the College’s remaining staff. The bankruptcy schedules which could not be completed until February 1, 1985, reflect a total of 779 creditors were involved in the case and known to the debt- or at that time. 1

From the outset, this was not anything like a “typical” Chapter 11 reorganization. The College was an educational institution with great public importance to the students, faculty, staff, the City of Yankton, and the State of South Dakota. But its highly visible financial crisis brought anger, bitterness, and divisiveness as well.

From the bankruptcy standpoint, it was very difficult to assess at the outset where the final outcome might lie. This was an institution with a long tradition and there was sentiment in favor of reorganization and reopening of the College. In light of the damaging publicity and chaotic financial situation, the more realistic scenario was an orderly liquidation. This alternative, clearly, would take some time. The assets of the College had certain intrinsic value, but the problem of identifying and persuading a buyer who would pay that value seemed at times insurmountable.

One alternative which the College administration strenuously sought to avoid was the quick liquidation or “gavel” sale of the assets. There was a strong desire to see that all who had dealt with the College would be dealt with equitably and honorably. A quick liquidation would bring the lowest possible return on the assets and leave only enough to pay the secured debt, while leaving the unsecured creditors with little or no dividend. There was significant pressure, however, from one secured creditor for just such a liquidation. Thus, the worst case, but not unlikely case, scenario would have resulted in a “no asset” or “low asset” case from the standpoint of the unsecured creditors. Humphrey, as the attorney for the UCC, made the initial assessment that a quick liquidation was not in the best interests of the unsecured creditors. A plan for utilization of the real estate was the key to the unsecured creditors’ chances of recovery of even a minimal portion of their claims. Humphrey made the decision to cooperate with the College administration in a “workout” of the problems. Efforts were directed toward keeping the reorganization viable until such time as the College could reopen or a suitable buyer could be found. Don Peterson (acting president for the College) and Julie Hisel (business manager for the College) with the College worked with Mitchell and Kabeise-man, attorneys for the College, and Éum-phrey, attorney for the UCC, toward that end. The Court characterizes this group of five individuals as the “reorganization team.”

Before any plan toward that end could be formulated, there were a number of critical short-run problems requiring immediate attention. First, there were problems with maintaining the value of the assets. With the rather sudden closing of the College, there were opportunities for unscrupulous or disgruntled individuals to seek self-help or revenge during the initial chaotic stages of the reorganization when measures to ensure the security of the assets were not yet in place. The reorganization team developed the following measures: (1) ensuring a correct inventory of all assets, including the real estate and personal property located in each building; (2) attempting to determine a value of said property; and (3) ensuring a method of securing said property from deterioration or loss.

It was important from the unsecured creditors’ standpoint that the initial shock of the bankruptcy filing did not precipitate a collapse of the College’s reorganization. The reorganization team therefore became involved in the monitoring of claims, specifically the assessment of the nature, extent, and validity of the outstanding claims and the payment of operating expenses during the initial stages of the reorganization.

*155 Attention to details by this group of the daily operation became a necessity because there was no one else left to administer the College and because the operating funds were so low that even the details became significant. Decisions concerning the minimum maintenance of the buildings and grounds are just one example.

The applicants needed to formulate an overall strategy, so they, along with the other members of the reorganization team, developed a financial and political support system to preserve the assets for either reorganization under a Chapter 11 plan or for an orderly liquidation with the minimum depletion of assets available to the creditors.

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Bluebook (online)
101 B.R. 151, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 870, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 673, 1989 WL 60651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-yankton-college-sdb-1989.