[856]*856Brachtenbach, J.
This case involves an application for admission to the State Bar Association.
Jimi T. Wright, the applicant, graduated from law school, twice failed the bar examination, then passed the July 1982 examination. After several hearings, the Board of Governors of the Bar Association recommended admission. By order we denied admission.
Wright petitioned for reconsideration on the merits and alternatively for clarification of his status as to future application for admission.
We deny reconsideration on the merits, set forth our rationale on the merits and clarify Wright's status as to future application.
In 1973 Wright was convicted by a jury of second degree murder while armed with a firearm, a firearm for which he had applied for a permit, but which permit was not yet valid at the time of the killing. He was sentenced to not more than 20 years. He appealed; the conviction was affirmed. State v. Wright, 12 Wn. App. 585, 530 P.2d 704, review denied, 85 Wn.2d 1006 (1975). He was represented at trial and on appeal by an able and experienced criminal defense attorney.
While his appeal was pending, Wright was free on bail. In 1974 he was charged with possession of heroin. In his application for an APR 9 status Wright represented that he was charged with possession of .25 gram of heroin. In fact he pleaded guilty to possession of .65 gram. He was sentenced to 5 years, suspended on condition that he serve 1 year in the county jail; he did so. Again he was represented by an able and experienced criminal defense lawyer.
In July 1975, after his conviction was affirmed, his minimum term was set at 10 years with a 5-year mandatory. He served 3 years 8 months in the institution. He was paroled and was discharged from parole in February 1983.
This court has the inherent power to admit or not admit [857]*857to the bar association applicants quite apart from and independently of the recommendation of the Board of Governors. In an early case, In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152 (1918), we said:
It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the constitution, but upon coming into being under the constitution, this court came into being with inherent powers. Among the inherent powers is the power to admit to practice, and necessarily therefrom the power to disbar from practice, attorneys at law. Formerly attorneys were admitted in various courts. The legislature, with a view of bringing about uniformity in the requirements and standards for admission of attorneys, conferred the whole matter of admission of attorneys upon this court, and this court is the only court entitled to admit and enroll attorneys in the state of Washington.
. . . The power to admit, so far as the statutes of this state are concerned, is vested in the supreme court. The cases are fairly uniform upon the proposition that admitting to practice, suspending, and disbarring are judicial functions.
"The authority of this court to promulgate rules setting forth the qualifications to be met by an applicant for the practice of law in this state is unquestioned." In re Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 66, 72, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813, 5 L. Ed. 2d 692, 81 S. Ct. 694 (1961) (Finley, J., concurring in the result). Accord, In re Ellis, 118 Wash. 484, 203 P. 957 (1922); In re Levy, 23 Wn.2d 607, 617, 161 P.2d 651, 162 A.L.R. 805 (1945); In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d 561, 565, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).
This power is recognized in the Admission to Practice Rules. The former APR 5(d) provides that after receipt of the Board of Governors recommendation, "[t]he Supreme Court may thereupon examine the recommendation and accompanying papers and make such order in each case as it deems advisable." The former APR 5(e) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall enter an order admitting to practice those applicants it deems qualified . . .". (Italics ours.)
[858]*858The former APR 2(b)(3) requires that an applicant be of good moral character. The former APR 5(g) mandates an oath of attorney that he is fully subject to the laws of the State of Washington and will abide by the same.
While the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to admitted lawyers, its provisions provide guidance by analogy to evaluate the fitness of an applicant to be admitted. We can look to CPR for guidance in setting admission standards. CPR DR 1-102(3) mandates that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude." In re Stroh, 97 Wn.2d 289, 644 P.2d 1161 (1982). CPR EC 1-6 states that an applicant for admission to the bar may be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other than moral or educational reasons. CPR EC 1-5 provides that "[o]bedience to law exemplifies respect for law."
A lawyer is an officer of the court. This means that an attorney must have respect for the court, the laws under which the system operates and indeed, the entire legal system. Inherent therein is his respect for the rights of others, including their lives.
The twin questions of good moral character and fitness to practice law escape precise definition. We are impressed by the analysis of the Florida court. In Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners. Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978) it said:
In our view, a finding of a lack of "good moral character" should not be restricted to those acts that reflect moral turpitude. A more appropriate definition of the phrase requires an inclusion of acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.
. . . The inquiry into good moral character which emphasizes honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of this state and nation is a proper and suitable standard for those who desire to be [859]*859an integral part of the administration of justice in the courts of this state.
See also In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 976, 46 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 389 (1975). Nonetheless, we have no doubt that the taking of a life under circumstances amounting to second degree murder does not exhibit good moral character. Wright offers extenuating circumstances, but the jury rejected his contentions in a trial found by the Court of Appeals to be free of reversible error.
We are much disturbed by the fact that in the 123 pages of the report of the proceedings before the Board of Governors, where Wright was the only witness, there is not a single expression of remorse for the murder of the victim. Rather, he characterizes it as "bad judgment." No sorrow, no regret expressed, just "bad judgment."
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[856]*856Brachtenbach, J.
This case involves an application for admission to the State Bar Association.
Jimi T. Wright, the applicant, graduated from law school, twice failed the bar examination, then passed the July 1982 examination. After several hearings, the Board of Governors of the Bar Association recommended admission. By order we denied admission.
Wright petitioned for reconsideration on the merits and alternatively for clarification of his status as to future application for admission.
We deny reconsideration on the merits, set forth our rationale on the merits and clarify Wright's status as to future application.
In 1973 Wright was convicted by a jury of second degree murder while armed with a firearm, a firearm for which he had applied for a permit, but which permit was not yet valid at the time of the killing. He was sentenced to not more than 20 years. He appealed; the conviction was affirmed. State v. Wright, 12 Wn. App. 585, 530 P.2d 704, review denied, 85 Wn.2d 1006 (1975). He was represented at trial and on appeal by an able and experienced criminal defense attorney.
While his appeal was pending, Wright was free on bail. In 1974 he was charged with possession of heroin. In his application for an APR 9 status Wright represented that he was charged with possession of .25 gram of heroin. In fact he pleaded guilty to possession of .65 gram. He was sentenced to 5 years, suspended on condition that he serve 1 year in the county jail; he did so. Again he was represented by an able and experienced criminal defense lawyer.
In July 1975, after his conviction was affirmed, his minimum term was set at 10 years with a 5-year mandatory. He served 3 years 8 months in the institution. He was paroled and was discharged from parole in February 1983.
This court has the inherent power to admit or not admit [857]*857to the bar association applicants quite apart from and independently of the recommendation of the Board of Governors. In an early case, In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152 (1918), we said:
It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the constitution, but upon coming into being under the constitution, this court came into being with inherent powers. Among the inherent powers is the power to admit to practice, and necessarily therefrom the power to disbar from practice, attorneys at law. Formerly attorneys were admitted in various courts. The legislature, with a view of bringing about uniformity in the requirements and standards for admission of attorneys, conferred the whole matter of admission of attorneys upon this court, and this court is the only court entitled to admit and enroll attorneys in the state of Washington.
. . . The power to admit, so far as the statutes of this state are concerned, is vested in the supreme court. The cases are fairly uniform upon the proposition that admitting to practice, suspending, and disbarring are judicial functions.
"The authority of this court to promulgate rules setting forth the qualifications to be met by an applicant for the practice of law in this state is unquestioned." In re Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 66, 72, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813, 5 L. Ed. 2d 692, 81 S. Ct. 694 (1961) (Finley, J., concurring in the result). Accord, In re Ellis, 118 Wash. 484, 203 P. 957 (1922); In re Levy, 23 Wn.2d 607, 617, 161 P.2d 651, 162 A.L.R. 805 (1945); In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d 561, 565, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).
This power is recognized in the Admission to Practice Rules. The former APR 5(d) provides that after receipt of the Board of Governors recommendation, "[t]he Supreme Court may thereupon examine the recommendation and accompanying papers and make such order in each case as it deems advisable." The former APR 5(e) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall enter an order admitting to practice those applicants it deems qualified . . .". (Italics ours.)
[858]*858The former APR 2(b)(3) requires that an applicant be of good moral character. The former APR 5(g) mandates an oath of attorney that he is fully subject to the laws of the State of Washington and will abide by the same.
While the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to admitted lawyers, its provisions provide guidance by analogy to evaluate the fitness of an applicant to be admitted. We can look to CPR for guidance in setting admission standards. CPR DR 1-102(3) mandates that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude." In re Stroh, 97 Wn.2d 289, 644 P.2d 1161 (1982). CPR EC 1-6 states that an applicant for admission to the bar may be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other than moral or educational reasons. CPR EC 1-5 provides that "[o]bedience to law exemplifies respect for law."
A lawyer is an officer of the court. This means that an attorney must have respect for the court, the laws under which the system operates and indeed, the entire legal system. Inherent therein is his respect for the rights of others, including their lives.
The twin questions of good moral character and fitness to practice law escape precise definition. We are impressed by the analysis of the Florida court. In Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners. Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978) it said:
In our view, a finding of a lack of "good moral character" should not be restricted to those acts that reflect moral turpitude. A more appropriate definition of the phrase requires an inclusion of acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.
. . . The inquiry into good moral character which emphasizes honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of this state and nation is a proper and suitable standard for those who desire to be [859]*859an integral part of the administration of justice in the courts of this state.
See also In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 976, 46 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 389 (1975). Nonetheless, we have no doubt that the taking of a life under circumstances amounting to second degree murder does not exhibit good moral character. Wright offers extenuating circumstances, but the jury rejected his contentions in a trial found by the Court of Appeals to be free of reversible error.
We are much disturbed by the fact that in the 123 pages of the report of the proceedings before the Board of Governors, where Wright was the only witness, there is not a single expression of remorse for the murder of the victim. Rather, he characterizes it as "bad judgment." No sorrow, no regret expressed, just "bad judgment."
In his letter of application to take the bar examination he stated:
I believe that you should permit me to take the Bar Examination in spite of my felony convictions, because neither of those convictions represent a breach of any fiduciary duties. They don't involve any acts of dishonesty.
The standards set by this court are not so narrow.
This court has taken a strict posture on moral character; a felony conviction for violation of the selective training and service act precluded admission. In re Brooks, supra.
Other courts have been similarly strict. In re G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433 A.2d 1159 (1981) (felony conviction for custodial interference and giving of perjured testimony in dissolution proceedings). Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865, 7 L. Ed. 2d 63, 82 S. Ct. 114 (1961) (attorney denied admission to federal district court for conviction of mail fraud); In re Dillingham, 188 N.C. 162, 124 S.E. 130 (1924) (admission denied for convictions of larceny, fraud and extortion among others).
Wright has cited no cases and we have found none where a convicted murderer has been admitted.
[860]*860In addition to his murder conviction, while awaiting his unsuccessful appeal, Wright was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. Again he offers extenuating circumstances, yet he did plead guilty, largely to avoid being labeled a "snitch" if his murder conviction required him to serve his sentence in an institution.
Good moral character, abide by the laws of the state, not engage in illegal conduct, obedience to the law — these characteristics appear to be missing in the commission of these two felonies.
Another matter discloses Wright's fitness to practice law. On his application for admission Wright described part of his employment as a "researcher." Upon inquiry by bar counsel the following was elicited:
Q On your application you indicate that you were a researcher apparently for a relatively short period of time.
A Yes.
Q Was that a legal researcher?
A Yes. It was legal and nonlegal. People would own a barber shop — I knew a couple of people that owned private businesses and they hired me to incorporate them or research ideas for the expansion of their business. I got two such jobs and with that I thought that I could maybe make a go at it if I could get enough work, but I couldn't get enough work and so I decided to take the job back at the Human Rights Department.
Q What do you mean when you say people would hire you to incorporate?
A Specifically I knew two people that owned private businesses, a barber and a beautician, and one of them paid me to draw up papers of incorporation and advise them as to whether or not incorporating would be advisable as opposed to a sole proprietor. I got those two assignments real early and I was under the illusion that if I got enough work like that, maybe I could continue working for myself.
Q Did you do those things, draw up the incorporation papers?
A At first I drew them up and then I advised them as to which would be to his advantage, and in both cases it [861]*861would not have been to either party's advantage to incorporate, in my own opinion.
Q Did you do this in connection with an attorney or just on your own?
A No, I did this on my own.
Q Did you make any differentiation in your mind between that and the practice of law, drawing up the incorporation papers and advising people which course to take?
A Yes. I didn't think I was practicing law. I thought I was just giving them an opinion. He knew I wasn't a lawyer and I didn't hold myself out to be a lawyer. It was the same kind of thing that a business graduate could have done.
Q Is it your understanding that a business graduate could draw up incorporation papers and advise people whether or not to do so?
A I don't know. I am not a business graduate, but I would think maybe they could.
Simply put, a person who for a fee advises whether to incorporate and then draws articles of incorporation, and who does not think he is practicing law is not qualified to practice that profession.
Perhaps his attitude and understanding of the profession is best found in his own words:
... I was exploring the liabilities of a business of an individual operating a business as a sole proprietor as opposed to being incorporated. That didn't seem to involve anything that was particularly within the realm of practicing law. ... It didn't cross my mind that I was attempting to practice law and I didn't say I was giving him legal advice.
Despite his perseverance and despite apparently successful efforts at rehabilitation, we do observe that his time from discharge from parole is relatively short; we conclude that the total circumstances of Wright's background do not warrant admission. Again, his words, without remorse, "I am a bit more stable now" are not sufficient to meet our high standards.
As to future application for admission, we cannot now set the standards which may influence a future Board of Gov[862]*862ernors or a future decision by this court. The applicant may submit an application to the Board of Governors when he desires. Its recommendation will be forwarded to this court for determination.
Admission denied.
Dore and Dimmick, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur.