ORDER
ROSENBAUM, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ joint application for the award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses. A hearing was held on April 29, 1991.
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to $11,281,950.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,127,070.03 in litigation expenses to date.
Background
A full recitation of the facts is unnecessary in this order. The nature of the case was set forth in some detail in this Court’s orders of July 28, 1987,
and March 20, 1990.
In brief, plaintiffs filed this case in April, 1983, alleging antitrust violations by the defendant insurance companies and the Workers’ Compensation Insurers Rating Association of Minnesota (WCIRAM) which had been organized pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, § 79.21 (1978). The proceedings have included eight years of litigation, a plethora of motions, one attenuated and a second successful trip to the court of appeals, defendants’ unsuccessful petition for certiorari, contested class certification proceedings, extensive discovery, and several hundred docket entries. After concluding these prefatory steps, plaintiffs have settled (not without hotly contested post-settlement hearings) their claims against all named defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel have amassed for the benefit of their clients the considerable sum of $50,142,-000.00, plus interest, as a settlement fund in favor of the class. Plaintiffs’ counsel now approach the Court seeking an award of fees from the common fund and full reimbursement of litigation expenses.
Discussion
It is settled that parties to a lawsuit may negotiate a settlement where defendants make a lump-sum payment including both monetary relief to the plaintiffs and attorneys’ fees.
Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 733, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). In the case of a class action settlement, such an agreement is subject to the approval of the district court. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(e).
Although this lawsuit was initiated under statutes which contain fee-shifting provisions,
the settlement agreements contain an explicit term creating a common fund.
As such, plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees under the “common fund” doctrine.
The “common fund” doctrine “rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.”
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,
444 U.S. 472, 478, 100 S.Ct. 745, 749, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980). One way to spread litigation costs proportionately among those who benefit from the lawsuit is to assess attorneys’ fees against the entire common fund.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y,
421 U.S. 240, 257-58, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621-22, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). In this case, the Court easily finds that plaintiffs’ counsel have bestowed a substantial common benefit upon the plaintiff class by pursuing and funding this litigation. The Court further finds that the amount recovered is directly attributable to their efforts. Finally, the Court finds the fund large enough to support both reasonable attorneys’ fees and a fair settlement distribution to the members of the plaintiff class.
While it is firmly established that attorneys’ fees may be drawn from a common fund, the law has not refined the proper method by which the amount of compensation should be calculated. Plaintiffs seek a percentage of the recovery, a method which has been recognized by the Supreme Court in dicta.
Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 900 n. 16, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1549 n. 16, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).
Since
Blum,
a number of circuits have found the percentage of recovery method to be an acceptable method for calculating fee awards in common fund cases.
Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,
886 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Cir.1989);
Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied,
488 U.S. 822, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988);
Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n,
805 F.2d 396, 407 (D.C.Cir.1986).
See also
Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985). Other courts continue to adhere to the “lodestar” approach, where the hours spent on the case are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation. Under this method, the Court may utilize a multiplier to adjust that figure to reflect the complexity of the case or the quality of the work required.
Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,
860 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied,
493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989);
In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig.,
818 F.2d 226, 232 (2nd Cir.1987).
The award of attorneys’ fees lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
H.J., Inc. v. Flygt Corp.,
925 F.2d 257, 259 (8th Cir.1991). The Court, having presided over this case for almost six full years, is in a unique position to evaluate the claim for attorneys’ fees. The Court finds the percentage of recovery method to be equitable and appropriate in this case. Class members were well served by experienced attorneys who, at great cost and difficulty, obtained a favorable recovery for their clients.
The Court finds that a 22.5% award from the common fund is appropriate and reasonable, considering the actual amount of time devoted to this case by plaintiffs’ counsel, the complexity and duration of this litigation, the experience and ability of the attorneys involved, and awards in similar eases.
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ORDER
ROSENBAUM, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ joint application for the award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses. A hearing was held on April 29, 1991.
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to $11,281,950.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,127,070.03 in litigation expenses to date.
Background
A full recitation of the facts is unnecessary in this order. The nature of the case was set forth in some detail in this Court’s orders of July 28, 1987,
and March 20, 1990.
In brief, plaintiffs filed this case in April, 1983, alleging antitrust violations by the defendant insurance companies and the Workers’ Compensation Insurers Rating Association of Minnesota (WCIRAM) which had been organized pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, § 79.21 (1978). The proceedings have included eight years of litigation, a plethora of motions, one attenuated and a second successful trip to the court of appeals, defendants’ unsuccessful petition for certiorari, contested class certification proceedings, extensive discovery, and several hundred docket entries. After concluding these prefatory steps, plaintiffs have settled (not without hotly contested post-settlement hearings) their claims against all named defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel have amassed for the benefit of their clients the considerable sum of $50,142,-000.00, plus interest, as a settlement fund in favor of the class. Plaintiffs’ counsel now approach the Court seeking an award of fees from the common fund and full reimbursement of litigation expenses.
Discussion
It is settled that parties to a lawsuit may negotiate a settlement where defendants make a lump-sum payment including both monetary relief to the plaintiffs and attorneys’ fees.
Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 733, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). In the case of a class action settlement, such an agreement is subject to the approval of the district court. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(e).
Although this lawsuit was initiated under statutes which contain fee-shifting provisions,
the settlement agreements contain an explicit term creating a common fund.
As such, plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees under the “common fund” doctrine.
The “common fund” doctrine “rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.”
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,
444 U.S. 472, 478, 100 S.Ct. 745, 749, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980). One way to spread litigation costs proportionately among those who benefit from the lawsuit is to assess attorneys’ fees against the entire common fund.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y,
421 U.S. 240, 257-58, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621-22, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). In this case, the Court easily finds that plaintiffs’ counsel have bestowed a substantial common benefit upon the plaintiff class by pursuing and funding this litigation. The Court further finds that the amount recovered is directly attributable to their efforts. Finally, the Court finds the fund large enough to support both reasonable attorneys’ fees and a fair settlement distribution to the members of the plaintiff class.
While it is firmly established that attorneys’ fees may be drawn from a common fund, the law has not refined the proper method by which the amount of compensation should be calculated. Plaintiffs seek a percentage of the recovery, a method which has been recognized by the Supreme Court in dicta.
Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 900 n. 16, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1549 n. 16, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).
Since
Blum,
a number of circuits have found the percentage of recovery method to be an acceptable method for calculating fee awards in common fund cases.
Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,
886 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Cir.1989);
Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied,
488 U.S. 822, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988);
Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n,
805 F.2d 396, 407 (D.C.Cir.1986).
See also
Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985). Other courts continue to adhere to the “lodestar” approach, where the hours spent on the case are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation. Under this method, the Court may utilize a multiplier to adjust that figure to reflect the complexity of the case or the quality of the work required.
Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,
860 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied,
493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989);
In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig.,
818 F.2d 226, 232 (2nd Cir.1987).
The award of attorneys’ fees lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
H.J., Inc. v. Flygt Corp.,
925 F.2d 257, 259 (8th Cir.1991). The Court, having presided over this case for almost six full years, is in a unique position to evaluate the claim for attorneys’ fees. The Court finds the percentage of recovery method to be equitable and appropriate in this case. Class members were well served by experienced attorneys who, at great cost and difficulty, obtained a favorable recovery for their clients.
The Court finds that a 22.5% award from the common fund is appropriate and reasonable, considering the actual amount of time devoted to this case by plaintiffs’ counsel, the complexity and duration of this litigation, the experience and ability of the attorneys involved, and awards in similar eases.
This view is supported by the response to the class notice which explicitly stated that attorneys’ fees might be as large as 30% of the fund.
Of the 118,000 notices sent, not a single class member registered an objection to counsel’s notice request for fees or to the proposed reimbursement for litigation expenses. The Court is satisfied that the amount represented by this percentage will adequately compensate counsel for the services performed in this litigation.
The Court is acutely aware of the large number of dollars reflected in this award. A percentage, even a small percentage, of a number as large as $50,000,000.00 generates a great deal of money. The fees have been well earned. At the same time, the Court cannot be insensitive to the fact that a single percentage, in a case such as this, involves a half million dollars of the class members’ potential recovery. The Court has carefully considered the balance.
Were it not for plaintiffs’ counsel, in particular for counsel of this quality and tenacity, there would have been no fund at all. But the Court is confident that the award will well remunerate them for their efforts. The fee represents a respectable multiple of their current hourly fees, collected at 100 cents on the dollar. While this payment may have been slow in coming, it will come in a lump sum, and it is in cash. With all of these factors in mind, the Court finds the fees awarded to be full and fair.
Plaintiffs’ counsel also move for reimbursement of $1,127,070.03 in litigation expenses incurred from the inception of the lawsuit to date. Expenses claimed include costs for discovery and experts’ fees. The Court has closely examined these expenditures and finds the amounts to be adequately documented, proper, and reasonable. Counsel for plaintiffs may separately approach the Court for necessary expenses for distribution and administration of the class recovery.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ counsel are jointly awarded $11,281,950.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,127,070.03 in litigation expenses to be paid from the common fund established pursuant to the settlement approved by this Court. Further, plaintiffs’ counsel are awarded interest on the attorneys’ fees from the date the full common fund was assembled.
The balance of the settlement funds shall be distributed to authorized claimants pursuant to the terms of the approved settlement. The Court reserves jurisdiction over all matters relating to the consummation of the settlement.