In re Wetmore

33 P. 769, 99 Cal. 146, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 626
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 25, 1893
DocketNo. 15412
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 33 P. 769 (In re Wetmore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Wetmore, 33 P. 769, 99 Cal. 146, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 626 (Cal. 1893).

Opinion

Harrison, J.

The legislature of this state at its session in 1889 passed an act, approved March 19, 1889, authorizing the incurring of indebtedness for municipal improvements, and issuing bonds therefor by cities, towns, and municipal incorporations (Stats. 1889, p. 399), the first section of which declares that “ Any city, town, or municipal corporation incorporated under the laws of this state, may, as hereafter provided, incur indebtedness to pay the cost of any municipal improvement, or for any purpose whatever requiring an expenditure greater than the amount allowed for such improvement by the annual tax levy,” By the next section of the act it is provided that whenever the legislative branch of the municipal corporation shall determine that the public interest or necessity demands the acquisition, construction, or completion of any municipal buildings or other municipal improvements, whose cost will be too great to be paid out of the ordinary annual income and revenue of the municipality, it may call an election for the purpose of determining whether bonds of the municipality shall be issued for such improvement, and if the proposition shall receive the vote of two thirds of the voters voting at such election, such bonds may be issued. September 23, 1891, the council of the city of Oakland passed an ordinance by which it declared that 4he public interest and necessities of the city of Oakland demanded the acquisition, construction, and completion of certain [148]*148municipal buildings and improvements in that city for public school purposes, viz., certain designated school-houses, and that the cost thereof would be too great to be paid out of the ordinary annual income and revenue of the city; and afterwards passed an ordinance that the question of issuing bonds therefor to the amount of four hundred thousand dollars, be submitted to the voters of the city at a special election to be held for that purpose. At that election more than two thirds of the voters having voted for the issuance of the bonds, suitable ordinances were passed by the council, and bonds of the city to the amount of four hundred thousand dollars were issued and sold prior to January 1, 1893, and the proceeds placed in the city treasury In June, 1893, the appellant having challenged the validity of these proceedings, an agreed case was submitted to the superior court of Alaméda County, under the provisions of section 1138 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of having a determination by that court of the validity of the bonds. The superior court adjudged that they were valid obligations of the city of Oakland, and from its judgment this appeal has been taken.

The proposition presented by the appellant in support of his appeal is that the municipality of the “city of Oakland” has no power to issue its bonds for the construction of school-houses, for the reason that the management of its schools is vested in a board of education, and that any bonds to be issued for school purposes must be authorized by that body.

The city of Oakland is governed by a freeholders’ charter, which was' approved by the legislature February 14, 1889. (Stats. 1889, p. 513.) Under this charter the legislative power of the city is vested in a. council of eleven members, and the government of the school department is vested in a board of education consisting of eleven members. The board of education is by the charter vested with authority to “build schoolhouses” upon plans approved by it, but the work of building the school-houses is to be carried on through the medium of a ■board of public works. It is, moreover, expressly declared in the charter, section 131, that the board of education “shall not ■have power to contract any debts or liabilities in any form whatsoever against the city, exceeding in any year the income [149]*149and revenue provided for the school fund for such year.” By section 149 of the charter it is provided that whenever the council shall determine that the public interest requires the construction or acquisition or completion of any permanent municipal building .... the cost of which in addition to the other expenditures of the city will exceed the income and revenue provided for in any one year, they may by ordinance submit a proposition to incur a debt for such purpose, and proceed therein as provided in section 18 of article XI. of the constitution of this state and general law.” By this section of the charter the same authority is conferred upon the council to create a bonded indebtedness as is given by the aforesaid act of the legislature, but the act of the legislature prescribes the steps to be taken, and is the “ general law ” under which it is necessary for the council to proceed in incurring such indebtedness.

The provisions of the act of March 19, 1889, are general in their character, and give to every municipal corporation incorporated under the laws of this state the power to create a bonded indebtedness for any of the purposes authorized by the act. The indebtedness is not to be incurred, nor are the bonds to be issued until after the voters of the municipality have so directed, but as it is the vote of the electors which determines that they shall be issued, it is immaterial to them what officers of the city carry out this vote. The act itself designates the legislative branch of the municipality as the body to determine in the first instance whether the public interest or necessity demands the construction or completion of the building or improvement, and also designates that body as the agency of the corporation through whose acts the indebtedness is to be created and evidenced. There is no particular mode provided by which the council shall ascertain this fact, but in a matter which pertains to the public schools, the fact would naturally be ascertained by direct communicatio./ with the board of education, or by a request from that board, and inasmuch as that board has no power to issue the bonds of the city, it is but natural to assume that it would manifest its wishes to the council. The question, however, is not how the council shall ascertain whether the public interest demands the improvement, but whether it- has any power to issue ilia bouds after it has [150]*150so determined, irrespective of the mode of ascertaining it. Although the board of education has been entrusted with the management of, the schools, and it is the body designated in the charter to build the school-houses, there is nothing inconsistent with this provision for the legislature to designate the council as the body to give inception to the indebtedness and .issue the bonds therefor. The power to build or improve the schoolhouses which is vested in that board is distinct from the power to borrow money with which to build or improve them. The board of education, as such, is forbidden by the charter from incurring any indebtedness,beyond the annual income for school purposes, and as the constitution permits such indebtedness by any municipal corporation only after a vote of the electors therefor, it is competent .for the legislature to designate the agent or body of the municipal government which shall act for it in carrying out the will of its electors, and for this purpose the legislative branch of that government would most naturally be selected.

That the education of the youth is properly included within the functions of a municipal government cannot be denied.

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Bluebook (online)
33 P. 769, 99 Cal. 146, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wetmore-cal-1893.