Kennedy v. Miller

32 P. 558, 97 Cal. 429, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 559
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 2, 1893
DocketNo. 19032
StatusPublished
Cited by79 cases

This text of 32 P. 558 (Kennedy v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennedy v. Miller, 32 P. 558, 97 Cal. 429, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 559 (Cal. 1893).

Opinion

Harrison, J.

The charter of the city of San Diego was framed by a board of freeholders chosen therefor, and, having been adopted by the electors of the city and approved by both houses of the legislature (Stats. 1889, p. 643), went into effect on the first Monday of May, 1889. Article 7 of the charter is entitled “Educational Department,” and provides for a hoard .of education with certain designated powers and duties. Section 6 of this article provides for a public school fund of the city, to consist of “all moneys received from the city, county, and state school funds, of all moneys arising from taxes which shall be levied by the common council for school purposes,” and certain other moneys; and further provides that “ all moneys of this fund shall be deposited with the city treasurer, and the same shall be drawn only by warrant, signed by the president and clerk of the board and duly audited by the auditor.” [431]*431Section 16 requires that the board of education “ shall report to the common council before the annual tax levy be made the amount necessary to carry on the public schools for the next school year, and thereupon the common council shall levy a rate of tax for school purposes, .... and such tax shall be in addition to all other amounts levied for city purposes.” The plaintiff herein is the city treasurer of the city of San Diego, and alleges that certain moneys in the custody of the county treasurer have been apportioned by the county superintendent of schools to the school district of the city of San Diego, a portion of which were derived from the public school fund and a portion from a tax upon the taxable property of the city of San Diego levied by the board of supervisors in pursuance of an estimate made by the city board of education; and he seeks by this proceeding to compel the defendants, as auditor and treasurer of the county of San Diego, to deposit these moneys with him, as the treasurer of the city of San Diego.

Article IX. of the constitution makes education and the management and control of the public schools a matter of state care and supervision. The election of a state superintendent of public instruction, and of a county superintendent of schools for each county, is therein authorized, and a public fund for the support of schools is provided, which, it is declared in section 4, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of common schools throughout the state and in section 6, that the revenue from this fund, as well as from the state school tax, “ shall be applied exclusively to the support of primary and grammar schools”; and, in section 8, it is further declared that no public money “ shall ever be appropriated for the support of any .... school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools.” The legislature is directed, in section 5, to provide for “ a system of common schools,” and section 6 declares that “ the public school system shall include primary and grammar schools, and such” other (of cer[432]*432tain designated) “schools as may be established by the legislature or by municipal or district authority.”

The term “system” itself imports a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and the direction to the legislature to provide “a” system of common schools means one system which shall be applicable to all the common schools within the state. In pursuance of this direction, the legislature has enacted chapter III. of title III., part III., of the Political Code, wherein the system outlined in the constitution is amplified, and provision made for the organization of school districts, and the election of the officers thereof, as well as of the officers authorized by the constitution, and defining their powers and duties, and also providing for the proper application of the revenue from the state school fund, and for the raising of additional money by taxation for the support of the common schools.

Section 1576 of the Political Code declares that “each county, city, or incorporated town, unless subdivided by the legislative authority thereof, forms a school district.” By virtue of this legislative authority, each school district becomes a public corporation (Estate of Bulmer, 59 Cal. 131; Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414), and its functions and powers as such corporation are those which are given to it by the act under which it is created. The legislative declaration that every incorporated city is a school district does not import into the organization of the school district any of the provisions of the city charter, or limit the powers and functions which, as a school district, it has by virtue of the Political Code. The city is a corporation distinct from that of the school district, even though both are designated by the same name, and embrace the same territory. The one derives its authority directly from the legislature, through the general law providing for the establishment of schools throughout the state, while the authority of the other is found in the charter under which it is organized; and even though the charter may purport to define the powers and duties of its municipal [433]*433officers in reference to the public schools in the same language as has the legislature in the Political Code, yet these powers and duties are referable to the legislative authority, and not to the charter.

The constitution and laws of this state recognize three classes of cities: those which are organized under the provisions of the general law authorizing municipal in-corporations; those whose charters have been framed by a board of freeholders, chosen for that purpose by the city itself; and those which were organized prior to the adoption of the constitution, but have not chosen to change their form of organization. The legislature is, by the constitution, not only prohibited from creating a municipal corporation by special law, but it has also been prohibited from passing any local or special laws with reference to the powers or duties of municipal officers, or of any matter relating to municipal government. In all matters, however, which may affect the state at large, or whenever any legislation is, in its judgment, appropriate for all parts of the state, it possesses all the legislative power of the state that has not been specifically denied to it, and upon whatever subjects its power to pass a general law exists, such general law must be the controlling rule of action in all parts of the state, and over all its citizens. The constitution does not purport of itself to affect the organization of any city which had been previously incorporated, or to give to the legislature any power to affect its organization, except with its consent; but it gives to the legislature the right to pass general laws which shall be applicable to all cities within the state, by declaring (art. XI., sec. 6) that cities or towns heretofore or hereafter organized, and all" charters thereof framed or adopted by authority of this constitution, shall be subject to and controlled by general laws.”

Section 1616 of the Political Code declares that " boards of education are elected in cities under the provisions of the laws governing such cities, and their powers and duties are as prescribed in such laws, except as [434]*434otherwise in this chapter provided”; and in the Municipal Government Act provision has been made for boards of education in cities that may be organized under that act.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 P. 558, 97 Cal. 429, 1893 Cal. LEXIS 559, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennedy-v-miller-cal-1893.