In Re Wahlie

417 B.R. 8, 2009 WL 1758747
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 16, 2009
Docket19-11013
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 417 B.R. 8 (In Re Wahlie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Wahlie, 417 B.R. 8, 2009 WL 1758747 (Ohio 2009).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

RICHARD L. SPEER, Bankruptcy Judge.

On June 15, 2009, a Continued Hearing was held on the Motion of the Creditor, State Resources, To Dismiss the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Case. After allowing Parties’ counsel to make statements regarding their respective positions, the Court granted the Movant’s Motion, dismissing the Debtors’ bankruptcy case effective at 1:04 P.M. For this decision, the following, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014, constitutes this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On November 11, 2008, the Creditor, State Resources, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Debtors’ case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). (Doe. No. 84). Section 1112(b)(1) prescribes that a court is to dismiss or convert a case where “cause” is found to exist, providing:

Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, subsection (c) of this section, and section 1104(a)(3), on request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, absent unusual circumstances specifically identified by *11 the court that establish that the requested conversion or dismissal is not in the best interests of creditors and the estate, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, if the movant establishes cause.

The party seeking dismissal or conversion under § 1112 bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that “cause” exists. In re Woodbrook Associates, 19 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1994). Once this burden is met, dismissal or conversion is mandatory unless it can be shown that, under the conditions set forth in the opening proviso of § 1112(b), grounds exist not to convert or dismiss the case. In re Gateway Access Solutions, Inc., 374 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2007) (with the enactment of BAPCPA, the statutory language of § 1112(b) has been changed from permissive to mandatory). Determinations concerning the dismissal of a case, which affects both the ability of a debtor to receive a discharge and directly affects the creditor-debtor relationship, are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 (b)(2)(J)/(0), thereby conferring upon this Court jurisdiction to enter final orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Section 1112(b) provides, in paragraph (4), a nonexclusive list of grounds which may constitute “cause” for dismissal or conversion. Among the enumerated grounds giving rise to “cause” in § 1112(b)(4) are a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. § 1112(b)(4)(A). The Movant cited to this ground as its primary basis for seeking the dismissal of the Debtors’ bankruptcy case.

The basis for dismissal under § 1112(b)(4)(A) is read in the conjunctive so that the moving party must demonstrate that there is both a(l) continuing loss to or diminution of estate assets and (2) an absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. In re Fall, 405 B.R. 863 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2008). The first part, loss and diminution, considers whether the debtor has suffered or continues to experience a negative cash flow, or, alternatively, declining asset values. Also relevant, whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the debtor, or some other party, will be able to stem the debtor’s losses and place the debtor’s business enterprise back on a solid financial footing within a reasonable amount of time. 7 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 1112.04[5][a]. When evaluated in this matter, the Debtors financial situation does not appear in a good light.

First, the Debtors have, since the commencement of this case, completely utilized all their monthly disposable income to fund their day-to-day living expenses, thus raising the question: How do the Debtors realistically expect to fund a plan of reorganization? A closely related fact, the Debtors have, contrary to an indicium of good faith, consistently sought to allocate, during the two years this case has been pending, only the bare minimum of their financial resources toward the payment of their debts. At the same, it was brought to the Court’s attention that the Debtors found it acceptable to pay the debts of third-party family members.

The Debtors’ failure to place their financial resources on the table during the pen-dency of this case must also be viewed against the fact that the Debtors have allowed their asset base to diminish. Specifically, as pointed out by the Movant, the Debtors have not satisfactorily explained why they failed to pursue the collection of *12 certain accounts receivable, totaling approximately $750,000.00 in value.

The Debtors’ likelihood of rehabilitation also seems remote. This prerequisite for dismissal under § 1112(b)(4)(A) looks to whether the debtor’s deteriorating financial situation can be corrected, taking into account whether some other party in interest is capable of performing the necessary remediation. Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 1112.04[5][a][ii], Although not dis-positive on this element, a useful indicator regarding a debtor’s chance for rehabilitation considers whether the debtor will be in a position to have a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization confirmed. In re 3 Ram Inc., 343 B.R. 113, 117 fn. 14 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2006). This does not seem likely.

This case was commenced on June 11, 2007. Two years later, the Debtors, after being afforded the opportunity to file a plan of reorganization, were unable to solicit the necessary votes to have a plan successfully confirmed. 1 Under this circumstance, the following statement made by the Third Circuit seems particularly appropriate:

The Supreme Court has said that “[h]owever honest in its efforts the debt- or may be, and however sincere its motives, the District Court is not bound to clog its docket with visionary or impracticable schemes for resuscitation.” Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 18, 22, 57 S.Ct. 85, 87, 81 L.Ed. 13 (1936). “[T]here must be ‘a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time.’ ” United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 376, 108 S.Ct. 626, 632, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). “Courts usually require the debtor do more than manifest unsubstantiated hopes for a successful reorganization.” In re Canal Place Ltd. Partnership, 921 F.2d 569, 577 (5th Cir.1991).

In re Brown (First Jersey National Bank v. Brown),

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
417 B.R. 8, 2009 WL 1758747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wahlie-ohnb-2009.