FILED FEB 5 2024 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-23-1072-GCS VINCENT DWYNE HOWARD, Debtor. Bk. No. 8:20-bk-11319-ES
VINCENT DWYNE HOWARD, Adv. No. 8:20-ap-01115-ES Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* RAY HODGE & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Erithe A. Smith, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: GAN, CORBIT, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 7 debtor Vincent Dwyne Howard (“Debtor”) appeals the
nondischargeable judgment, entered pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A),1 in favor of
Ray Hodge & Associates, L.L.C. (“RHA”). After trial, the bankruptcy court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. determined that Debtor made fraudulent statements and omissions to
obtain a loan from RHA. Debtor argues that RHA failed to establish its
standing and failed to prove: (1) Debtor’s intent to deceive; (2) Debtor’s
duty to disclose information; and (3) RHA’s justifiable reliance. The
bankruptcy court correctly applied the law, and its factual findings are not
clearly erroneous. We AFFIRM.
FACTS 2
A. Prepetition Events
Debtor is an attorney who owned and operated a law firm called
Howard Law, PC (“Howard Law”). Howard Law provided legal services
in the areas of personal injury, workers’ compensation, employment, Social
Security disability, and bankruptcy. Debtor primarily managed the firm,
and he employed attorneys who were knowledgeable in the firm’s practice
areas.
In 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) began
investigating Howard Law’s bankruptcy practice. In 2017, the CFPB filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
against Debtor and Howard Law. After CFPB filed the case, Debtor
borrowed $400,000 from Series 5 Virage Master LP (“Virage”) under a
litigation funding agreement. To secure the loan, Debtor pledged as
2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the adversary and main bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 2 collateral the expected attorney’s fees in several of Howard Law’s pending
cases.
According to Debtor, in 2018 Howard Law’s workers’ compensation
business, which comprised a significant portion of its revenue, began to
suffer due to poor performance by the primary workers’ compensation
attorney, Anthony Oropallo. Debtor states that he terminated Mr. Oropallo
in February 2018, and cut off his access to Howard Law’s files. Debtor
claims that, until April 2018, he continued discussions with Mr. Oropallo
about how they could continue to work together, but during that period,
Mr. Oropallo worked in concert with two other members of Howard Law,
Jose Avina and Diana Martinez, to improperly transfer at least 70 workers’
compensation cases to a law firm founded by Mr. Oropallo. In late April
2018, Howard Law terminated Mr. Avina and Mrs. Martinez and sued Mr.
Oropallo’s firm and the three individuals (the “Orapallo Case”).
Because of Howard Law’s financial difficulties in 2018, Debtor spoke
with Ryan Hodge about a loan. Mr. Hodge was an attorney, licensed in
Kansas, who owned and operated RHA. Mr. Hodge was also affiliated
with a litigation funding company called Helping Hands Capital (“Helping
Hands”), and he had previously performed underwriting for HMR
Funding, a company that provided non-recourse medical advances. Based
in part on Mr. Hodge’s personal friendship with Debtor’s then-wife, who
had worked with Mr. Hodge at HMR funding, he agreed to loan Debtor
money.
3 On April 16, 2018, Debtor completed and emailed to Mr. Hodge a
“Request for Funding,” seeking $150,000. Debtor also sent Mr. Hodge a list
of cases showing Howard Law’s revenue for the prior 12 months,
consisting of $528,881.99 for workers compensation cases, $82,366.13 for
personal injury and tort cases, and $165,905.19 for employment law cases.
Debtor provided a list of Howard Law cases he intended to use as security
for the loan, and the amount of attorney’s fees he expected to recover from
those cases.
After further communications, the parties executed an agreement
(“Agreement”) on May 10, 2018, under which RHA agreed to “advance to
[Debtor] $150,000 as case expenses for cases set forth in [E]xhibit A.”
Attached to the Agreement as Exhibit A was the list, previously provided
by Debtor, of 14 cases described as “litigation matters for which Howard or
a member of his law firm is counsel of record . . . and for which Howard
seeks an advance for case expenses . . . .”
The Agreement required Debtor to use the proceeds of the loan only
for business or commercial purposes in connection with his business, and it
required Debtor to immediately notify RHA of the resolution of any case
listed in Exhibit A and pay RHA 20% of all attorney’s fees received in those
cases. Debtor represented in the Agreement that he had “not taken any
action (including executing documents) or failed to take any action,
which . . . would materially and adversely affect any Claim, or . . . would
give any person or entity other than a Client or [Debtor] an interest in the
4 award or the proceeds stemming from a Claim.” The Agreement also
required Debtor to “promptly give written notice to Hodge” of: (1) “any
litigation or proceeding affecting [Debtor] that could have a material
adverse effect on the business, operations, property, or financial or other
condition of [Debtor];” (2) “a material adverse change” in Debtor’s
business, operations, property, or financial condition; or (3) any adverse
outcome in any case listed in Exhibit A.
Prior to executing the Agreement, Debtor did not notify RHA of
Howard Law’s loss of workers’ compensation business, the pending
Orapollo Case, 3 the pending CFPB suit, 4 or the lien in favor of Virage
which encumbered expected fees in some of the cases listed in Exhibit A. In
October 2019, Debtor permanently closed Howard Law. He never made
any payments to RHA under the Agreement.
B. The bankruptcy and adversary proceeding
In May 2020, Debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. He
scheduled a claim in favor of RHA for $221,993.84, but did not list it as
contingent, unliquidated, disputed, or subject to offset. RHA filed a proof
of claim for the same amount, and Debtor did not object.
3 In November 2018, Debtor settled the Orapollo Case, and Mr. Orapollo’s firm was authorized to continue representing the clients that left Howard Law. 4 The CFPB case culminated in March 2019 with the entry of a consent judgment
in the amount of $35,256,275 against Howard Law, Debtor, and another attorney, jointly and severally, and a civil penalty of $40,000,000. Debtor agreed to settle the CFPB judgment by paying $40,000 from his retirement account. 5 In August 2020, RHA filed an adversary complaint seeking to hold its
claim against Debtor nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). RHA alleged
that Debtor made several false representations in the Agreement regarding
the status of the cases in Exhibit A and his intent to use the loan proceeds
solely for business purposes. Debtor filed an Answer, admitting that RHA
loaned him $150,000 pursuant to the Agreement, but denying that he made
false representations.
The parties filed a joint pre-trial stipulation (“JPTS”), and the
bankruptcy court conducted a trial in September 2022. Pursuant to the
JPTS, Debtor and RHA agreed that: “The parties jointly executed an
agreement dated May 10, 2018, signed by Debtor and Plaintiff . . . under
which Plaintiff agreed to ‘advance to Howard $150,000 as case expenses for
cases set forth in exhibit A.’” The JPTS did not identify as a contested issue
whether RHA was a party to the Agreement, but it did indicate as a
contested issue whether RHA actually provided the funds.5
At trial, Debtor acknowledged that he did not tell RHA about the
CFPB litigation or the Orapollo Case. RHA also presented evidence that at
least one of the clients listed in Exhibit A to the Agreement had not
retained Debtor or Howard Law. Mr. Hodge testified that RHA would not
have made the loan had it known of the CFPB litigation or of Mr.
Debtor first argued that Ryan Hodge, and not RHA, was a party to the 5
Agreement in his trial brief. 6 Oropallo’s termination and the collapse of Howard Law’s workers’
compensation practice.
At the conclusion of RHA’s case, Debtor moved for a directed verdict
and argued that RHA failed to prove it loaned the funds or that it was a
party to the Agreement, and thus lacked standing. Debtor claimed that the
funds came from Helping Hands, not RHA. The bankruptcy court denied
the motion without prejudice and requested the issues be fully addressed
in closing briefs. The trial concluded, and the parties filed their closing
briefs.
RHA argued that it had standing, and it made the loan to Debtor. It
pointed to uncontroverted evidence that Ryan Hodge was the sole member
and manager of RHA and manager of Helping Hands, and testimony from
Ryan Hodge that RHA transferred funds to Helping Hands—which
ultimately made the transfer to Debtor—because Helping Hands could
make wire transfers and RHA’s operating account was not set up to do so.
RHA further noted that Debtor admitted the debt was owed to RHA in his
schedules and answer and should be estopped from arguing otherwise at
such a late date.
In response, Debtor cited language in the Agreement which
described the parties as individuals, and he contended that he scheduled
the debt to RHA because he thought RHA was a party to the Agreement,
and only realized it was not a party after the bankruptcy case was closed.
7 Debtor asserted that RHA failed to substantiate the purported transfer to
Helping Hands and therefore could not prove it sustained damages.
In March 2023, the bankruptcy court rendered an oral ruling, holding
the debt nondischargeable. The court determined that RHA had standing
because the Agreement was signed by Ryan Hodge, “for Ray Hodge and
Associates,” and the unrefuted testimony of Ryan Hodge demonstrated
that RHA funded the loan. Turning to the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A), the
court found that Debtor made false representations in the Agreement that:
(1) either Debtor or a member of his firm were attorney of record in the
cases listed in Exhibit A; and (2) the cases in Exhibit A had been filed and
litigation was ongoing.
The bankruptcy court also determined that Debtor fraudulently
omitted that: (1) he was a defendant in a $75,000,000 action filed by the
CFPB for alleged involvement in a fraudulent debt relief scheme; (2) four of
the cases in Exhibit A were already pledged as collateral to Virage; and
(3) Mr. Orapollo had downloaded client information and was purporting to
represent several individuals whose cases were listed in Exhibit A. The
court rejected Debtor’s claims that his false representations were
unintentional. It also found Debtor to be not credible because his testimony
was at times evasive, and he seemed to lack basic knowledge of his firm
and its operations. Finally, the court held that RHA justifiably relied on the
representations, and it sustained damages under the Agreement. The court
8 entered a nondischargeable judgment in favor of RHA for $221,993.84, and
this timely appeal followed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUES
Did RHA have standing to assert a claim for nondischargeability?
Did the bankruptcy court err by holding the debt nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(2)(A)?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether a party has standing is a question of law we review de novo.
All. United Ins. Co. v. Krasnoff (In re Venegas), 623 B.R. 555, 560 (9th Cir. BAP
2020). The ultimate question of whether a claim is nondischargeable is a
mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo. Carillo v. Su (In
re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Under de novo review, we
“consider a matter anew, as if no decision had been made previously.”
Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
We review for clear error any facts expressly or impliedly found by
the bankruptcy court in determining standing. Harkey v. Grobstein (In re
Point Center Fin., Inc.), 890 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2018). Similarly, when
the appellant challenges the bankruptcy court’s factual findings supporting
its nondischargeability decision, we review those findings for clear error. In
re Su, 290 F.3d at 1142. Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are
9 illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. Retz v. Samson (In re
Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985).
We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, whether the
bankruptcy court relied upon, rejected, or even considered that ground.
Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2014).
DISCUSSION
Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court failed to properly analyze
apparent ambiguities in the Agreement, including whether the individual
lawyers or their law firms were the true parties to the contract. Debtor
submits that Ryan Hodge, and not RHA, is the party to the Agreement and
consequently, RHA lacked standing to file the complaint. Debtor also
argues that the bankruptcy court erred by finding the misrepresentations
were intentional, that Debtor had a duty to disclose the CFPB case or Mr.
Orapollo’s termination, and that RHA justifiably relied on the
misrepresentations and omissions.
A. RHA had standing
“A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a litigant only when
that litigant meets constitutional . . . standing requirements.” Veal v. Am.
Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 906 (9th Cir. BAP 2011).
10 To establish constitutional standing, a party must demonstrate the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” consisting of: “(1) an injury in fact,
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” In re Venagas, 623 B.R. at 561 (quoting In re Sisk, 962 F.3d 1133,
1141 (9th Cir. 2020)). The burden of establishing these elements is on the
party invoking federal jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992).
To challenge the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(2), the
“creditor to whom such debt is owed” must timely file an adversary
complaint. Oregon ex rel Frohnmayer v. Lacy (In re Lacy), 74 B.R. 23, 24
(Bankr. D. Or. 1987); § 523(c); see also Rule 4007(a) (“[A]ny creditor may file
a complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any debt.”).
A “creditor” is an entity that has a claim against the debtor, and a “claim”
is a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” § 101(5),
10(A).
Debtor acknowledges that he borrowed $150,000 under the terms of
the Agreement and did not make any payments on the loan. The evidence
at trial demonstrated that the funds came from RHA. Debtor’s standing
argument is premised entirely on his belief that the Agreement identifies
Mr. Hodge, and not RHA, as the party to the contract.
11 Debtor is correct that the Agreement is less than clear about who are
the parties to the contract. 6 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the
bankruptcy court correctly held that RHA had standing to seek a
nondischargeable judgment because Debtor admitted RHA was the
creditor. He scheduled a non-contingent, liquidated, undisputed debt in
favor of “Ryan [sic] Hodge and Associates, LLC.” See Heath v. Am. Express
Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Heath), 331 B.R. 424, 431 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“bankruptcy schedules can constitute admissions under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)”). He did not object to RHA’s proof of claim as unenforceable
under § 502(b)(1); thus, RHA had an allowed unsecured claim.
Additionally, in his Answer and the JPTS, Debtor admitted that RHA
executed the Agreement and made the loan. Debtor’s admissions resolved
any ambiguity in the Agreement, and in light of these admissions, the
bankruptcy court did not err by determining that RHA was a party to the
Agreement. 7
6 The prefatory language in the Agreement states: “This Agreement is between Ryan Hodge (Hodge) and Vincent Howard . . . . This Agreement establishes their relationship between two lawyers in the representation of various clients as set forth in exhibit A.” Yet, the Agreement also requires Debtor to indemnify “Hodge and each of its officers and other employees, representatives, and agents . . .” and it refers to a “general understanding of responsibility between the firms” with “each firm assum[ing] the same ethical responsibility . . . .” And, as the bankruptcy court found particularly relevant, the Agreement was signed by “Vince Howard, Attorney at Law” and “Ryan Hodge for Ray Hodge & Associates, L.L.C.” 7 Moreover, Civil Rule 17, made applicable by Rule 7017, provides further
support for RHA’s standing. Civil Rule 17(a)(1) requires that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” A party without a legal right to 12 B. Legal standards governing nondischargeability
Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge any debt “obtained by
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” To
prevail on a nondischargeability claim under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) misrepresentation,
fraudulent omission, or deceptive conduct by the debtor; (2) knowledge of
the falsity or deceptiveness of his statement or conduct; (3) an intent to
deceive; (4) justifiable reliance on the debtor’s statement or conduct; and
(5) damage proximately caused by its reliance on the statement or conduct.
enforce an obligation is not a real party in interest. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). But under Civil Rule 17(a)(3), “[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” The purpose of Civil Rule 17(a)(3) is “to prevent forfeiture of an action when determination of the right party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made.” United States ex rel. Wulff v. CMA, Inc., 890 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 1989). Given the ambiguities in the Agreement, even if Mr. Hodge was the real party in interest, any mistake in selecting RHA as plaintiff was understandable. And though Mr. Hodge did not formally substitute or join as plaintiff, the record amply supports his ratification, which requires the real party in interest to: “(1) authorize continuation of the action and (2) agree to be bound by its result.” Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. SPI Spirits Ltd., 726 F.3d 62, 83 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting ICON Grp., Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 829 F.2d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also C. Wright & A. Miller, 6A Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 1555 (3d ed. 2020). Mr. Hodge is the sole member of RHA. He signed the Agreement, authorized the filing of RHA’s proof of claim and adversary complaint, provided testimony at trial, and maintained that RHA was the proper party to bring the suit. Consequently, even if we were to agree that RHA was not the real party in interest, Mr. Hodge’s ratification cured any problem with RHA’s standing. 13 Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d
1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996).
A fraudulent omission of a material fact may constitute a false
representation if the debtor is under a duty to disclose. Apte v. Japra, M.D.,
F.A.C.C., Inc. (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1996); Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir.
1996). A party to a business transaction is under a duty to disclose:
facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1324 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(1976)).
C. The bankruptcy court did not err by holding the claim nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).
Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court erred by finding he made
intentional misrepresentations. But regarding fraudulent
misrepresentations, he focuses entirely on the bankruptcy court’s
discussion of Howard Law’s financial condition and whether the values in
Exhibit A corresponded to expected attorney’s fees or the total value of the
case to the client. Neither of these issues formed the basis for the court’s
fraudulent misrepresentation finding.8
8 The parties disputed whether the values attributed to the cases in Exhibit A 14 The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor fraudulently
represented the cases on Exhibit A were filed and ongoing, and either
Debtor or a member of his firm was as attorney of record. The evidence
showed that at least one of the purported clients, Rogelio Herrera, had not
signed a retainer agreement and Howard Law had not filed his complaint.
Debtor makes no argument relevant to the court’s rationale for finding
fraudulent misrepresentations, and he has thus waived the issue. See Smith
v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, we find no error in the court’s ruling. Debtor provided
Exhibit A as part of his efforts to procure the loan from RHA, and he
attested that Howard Law represented the clients listed in Exhibit A. That
representation was false. The evidence supports the bankruptcy court’s
holding that Debtor had knowledge of the falsity of that representation and
made it with intent to deceive, and that RHA justifiably relied on the
representation and sustained damage as a result. Debtor argues that the
court should have credited his testimony that the misrepresentations were
innocent mistakes and not intentional. But the court did not find Debtor’s
testimony to be credible, and we “give singular deference to a trial court’s
judgments about the credibility of witnesses.” Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1474 (2017).
were expected attorney’s fees or the total expected recovery for each client. The bankruptcy court determined that the values corresponded to expected attorney’s fees, but this issue was unrelated to the court’s ruling. 15 Regarding the fraudulent omissions, Debtor argues he had no duty to
disclose the pending lawsuits or the Virage liens because the relevant
information was publicly available. But, in a business transaction, parties
have a duty to disclose facts basic to the transaction if they know the other
party is about to enter into the transaction under a mistake and would
reasonably expect disclosure. See In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1324.
Although the liens and lawsuits were publicly discoverable, Debtor
had a duty to disclose them based on: (1) the obligation in the Agreement
to disclose “any litigation” that could have a “material adverse effect” on
his “business, operations, property or financial or other condition;” and
(2) the statement that he had “not taken any action (including executing
documents) or failed to take any action, which . . . would materially and
adversely affect any Claim, or . . . would give any person or entity other
than a Client or [Debtor] an interest in the award or the proceeds stemming
from a Claim.” Given the Agreement’s express requirements of Debtor,
RHA could reasonably expect him to disclose pending lawsuits and liens
affecting the cases in Exhibit A.
Debtor further argues that RHA failed to prove he made the
omissions with intent to deceive. But again, Debtor provided the list of
cases—which became Exhibit A to the Agreement—to procure the loan. He
specifically represented that attorney’s fees in cases listed in Exhibit A
would be pledged to repay the loan. Yet, at the time of the Agreement, he
knew certain workers’ compensation clients listed in Exhibit A had left
16 Howard Law, and fees in other cases were already pledged to Virage. The
record supports the bankruptcy court’s finding of intent because Howard
provided the list of cases, and other financial information pertaining to
Howard Law, to induce RHA to make the loan but failed to disclose
material changes prior to executing the Agreement.
Finally, Debtor contends that RHA failed to prove its reliance was
justified because Mr. Hodge is a sophisticated lender with many years of
experience in underwriting litigation funding loans. But in cases of
fraudulent omission, reliance and causation are established and need not
be separately proven. In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323 (“nondisclosure of a
material fact in the face of a duty to disclose . . . establish[es] the requisite
reliance and causation for actual fraud under the Bankruptcy Code”); see
also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (“Under
the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.”); Titan Grp. v.
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) (“In cases involving non-disclosure
of material facts, even when coupled with access to the information,
materiality rather than reliance thus becomes the decisive element of
causation.”).
Debtor does not demonstrate error in the bankruptcy court’s factual
findings or its legal conclusions. The bankruptcy court properly held that
RHA had standing to file the nondischargeability complaint, and it did not
17 err by determining that Debtor’s conduct constituted fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions under § 523(a)(2)(A).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the nondischargeable judgment
in favor of RHA.