In Re Veach

4 F.2d 334, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2975
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 29, 1925
Docket269, Original
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 4 F.2d 334 (In Re Veach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Veach, 4 F.2d 334, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2975 (8th Cir. 1925).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Veach alleges in his petition filed here that Adler instituted his suit-in said District Court in April, 1919; that a receiver was appointed in said cause of all the properties of the Railways Company, with power to take possession of and oper *335 ate its street ear system in the city of St. Louis; that said receiver took possession and has continued in possession of said properties and has eontinuonsly operated them. Adler’s complaint, on whieh the receiver was appointed, and Veaeh’s petition in intervention, which he tendered to the clerk, and whieh the clerk refused to file, are attached as exhibits to the petition here, and it appears therefrom that the sole purpose of intervention in Adler’s suit is to attack the jurisdiction of said District Court, it being alleged in the petition in intervention tendered to the clerk that the court was without jurisdiction, and that the order appointing the receiver, and all other orders in said canse, are null and void. The United Railways Company is, and was at the time the receiver was appointed, the owner of all of the street railway system in St. Louis. That system was made up in part of street railway property that had belonged to other companies, which had been taken over byr' the United Railways Company. Twp of the subsidiary companies whose properties were taken into the system were the St. Louis Transit Company and the Union Depot Railroad Company, each of whieh had issued bonds secured by mortgages prior to the consolidation, and these bonds were outstanding when Adler brought his suit. He held 135 bonds issued "by the St. Louis Transit Company, and petitioner, Yeaeh, owns 3 bonds of the same issue. The United Railways Company executed a $45,000,000 mortgage on all of its properties, under which about $30,000,- 000 in bonds issued were outstanding. When it took over the St. Louis Transit Company’s property it guaranteed the payment of the bonds of the transit company, and as security therefor it g’ave a second mortgage on •all of its properties. The guaranty mortgage named the Mercantile Trust Company, of St. Louis, trustee, and petitioner here claims, and so alleges in his petition in intervention tendered to the clerk, that the court was without jurisdiction in Adler’s suit, because the Mercantile Trust Compamy was not made a party thereto. In support of that claim two sections of article III of the guaranty mortgage are quoted in the petition tendered in intervention as the basis for the allegation and claim therein that the Mercantile Trust Company was a necessary and indispensable party to the jurisdiction of the court in the Adler suit. Those sections are these:

“Seetion 4. In ease default shall have been made in the payment of any interest on any bonds at any time issued under.and secured by this indenture, and any such default shall continue for a period of six months, or in case default shall be made in the due observance or performance of any other covenant or condition herein required to be kept or performed by the Railways Company, which shall continue for a period of three months after written notice thereof to Railways Company from trustee, or from the holders of 5 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby secured, or in ease default shall be made in the due and punctual payment of the principal of any bond" hereby secured, then, and in each casé of such default, trustee, with or without entry, personally or by attorney, in its discretion, may sell to the highest and best bidder all and singular the mortgaged property and premises, rights, franchises, interests; and appurtenances, and all the other real and personal property of every kind, and all right, title, interest, claim, and demand therein and the right of redemption thereof, in one lot and as an entirety, unless a sale in parcels shall be requested and required by the holders of 75 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby secured and then outstanding, in whieh case such sale may be made in parcels.”
“Section 13. No holder of any bond or coupon hereby secured shall have any right to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity or at law for the foreclosure of this indenture, or for the execution of any trust thereof, or for the appointment of a receiver, or for any other remedy hereunder, unless such holder previously shall have given to trustee written notice of such default and of the continuance thereof, as hereinbefore provided; nor unless, also, the holders of 25 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby-secured, then outstanding shall have made written request upon trustee and shall have afforded to it a reasonable opportunity either to proceed to exercise the powers hereinbefore granted or to institute such action, suit,- or proceeding in its own name; nor unless, also, they shall have offered to trustee adequate security and indemnity against the costs, expenses, and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby; and such notification, request, and offer of indemnity are hereby declared, in every such ease, at the option of trustee,- to he conditions precedent to the execution of the powers and trusts of this indenture, and to any action or cause of action for foreclosure, or for the appointment of a receiver, or for any other remedy hereunder; it being understood and intended that no one or more holders of bonds and cou; pons shall have any right • in any matter *336 ^whatever to-affeet, disturb, or prejudice the lien of, this indenture by his or their action, or to 'enforce aim right hereunder, except in .the manner • herein provided, and that all proceedings at law or in equity shall be instituted, had, .and maintained in the manner .herein provided and for the equal benefit of all holders of. such, outstanding bonds and .coupons.” .. •-

It is made clear that the-would-be intervener has no other purpose than that of attacking the jurisdiction of .the district .court in the .Adler suit, and thus accomplishing, if. he can, a, dismissal of that suit and the vacation of all orders made therein, as having been -made by the court without right or .power-to -do so2 and for that reason null and void. .

11 It is our opinion that Veaeh cannot be permitted to evade the explicit command of equity rule 37. He can be admitted as an intervener in’ the Adler suit only in recognition of apd subject to the requirements of that. rule. It says that any one who is permitted tq intervene in a suit shall do so in subqrdinaijon. to and in recognition of the .propriety of the main .proceeding. Counsel frankly admits here tiiat. his only purpose is to lajinch.ai^at;tack, against the propriety of all,of the proceedings in the. Adler suit, and the petition, which he tendered to the clerk shows.upon-its-face that that was his sole purpose. ...If the clerk had .accepted and filed his petition in, intervention, it would have been the duty of the- District Court to immediately dismiss him out 'of-that ease, and It wopld.be an idle proceeding and a vain order .to require the clerk to accept and file-it. Mueller v. Adler (C. C. A.) 292 F. 138; Jennings v. Smith (D. C.) 242 F. 56; 64; King v. Barr (C. C. A.) 262 F. 56; Adler v. Segman (C. C. A.) 266 F. 828; Seaboard Air Line v. Trust Co., 125 Ga. 463, 465, 54 S. E. 138; Charleston By. Co. v. Pope, 122 Ga. 77, 50 S. E. 374.

2. The facts on- which petitioner bases his claim that, the Mercantile Trust Company was a necessary and indispensable party in the Adler suit do not .support that claim.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 F.2d 334, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-veach-ca8-1925.